Part 16

[Footnote 18: "Bügelfühling," as against "Knie an Knie" (knee to knee).--Trans.]

[Footnote 19: As a rule, the squadron _attacks cavalry_ as a single unit in line. The shock must be affected with the maximum momentum in two well-defined, well-closed ranks. Cohesion is above all things necessary for decisive results. Every man must realize this, must maintain his place in the ranks, and must keep close touch with his neighbour.

"The two squadron flank guides will hold the squadron in towards the centre. Small gaps in the front rank may be filled by closing in, larger gaps by moving up the rear rank files."]

[Footnote 20: "When attacking _cavalry_, the regiments will, as a rule, be employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually in the form of échelons. If the situation demands it, even single squadrons can follow in column formation.

"The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to a flank."]

[Footnote 21: The German cavalry use two paces at the gallop, 500 and 700 paces per minute, the pace being 80 cm. (32 in.), thus 14-1/2 and 20-1/2 miles per hour.--Trans.]

[Footnote 22: "A squadron must seek success against _infantry, artillery, and machine-guns_ by means of surprise and flank attacks. If a frontal attack is necessary, the zone of fire is best passed by increasing the pace. The gallop will be resorted to early in the advance, and the pace increased in the vicinity of the enemy. Breathing spaces can be obtained under cover of the _terrain_. As, in these cases, momentum of impact is not so important, it will be sufficient if collision takes place at a rapid gallop.

"In order to minimize loss, it is advisable to let the advanced portions of the squadron, or even the whole, adopt single rank formation with wide intervals. By this means the hostile fire may be broken up, and, on occasions, the dust raised by the troops in open order may facilitate the attack of the portion of the squadron remaining in close order.

"If it is a question of simultaneous attacks, either on a single enemy from several directions, or on several distinct units of the hostile force, action by single troops may be advisable.

"Hostile skirmishing lines will be ridden through, if there are other detachments behind them to be attacked. Any form of attack may be employed against shaken, yielding infantry. Skirmishing lines are best pursued in open order, which formation permits of the most effective employment of cavalry weapons.

"If, during an attack, a squadron breaks into a battery or machine-gun detachment, a portion of the men will be employed against the personnel, a portion against the limbers. Captured guns or machine-guns should be carried off; but, if this is impossible, they will be made unserviceable, or, at any rate, incapable of movement. Led horses should also be made the objective in attacks on dismounted cavalry. "The principles laid down for action against cavalry can be applied, _mutatis mutandis_, in the matters of pursuit, _mêlée_, and rally."

"Such attacks are carried out in accordance with the principles of para. 113.

"The strength of a regiment renders it impossible to attack the objective in several lines. The officer commanding will give orders as to whether the front line is to be in single rank, and as to whether the rear lines are to be in a similar formation or in closed double rank.

"In attacking infantry, the lines must not be at too great a distance from one another. In attacking artillery, the distance between lines is determined by the effective area of the burst of shrapnel (300 metres = 330 yds)."]

[Footnote 23: _i.e._ with insufficient men to lead them.--Trans.]

[Footnote 24: "Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening of fire. By means of skillful use of ground and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained the desired results."

"As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand."

"Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."]

[Footnote 25: "At the command: '_Dismount for dismounted action!_' the squadron dismounts. If the carbines are not already slung across the back, they will be taken from the buckets.

"When double rank has been formed, the horse holders will take charge of the horses. The horse holder of either rank is the left flank file of each section (excepting the left flank guide). If there is only one man in the rear rank of the left flank section of the troop, he will hand over his horse to his front rank horse holder; or, if the latter is already in charge of four horses, to his neighbour. The horses in charge of a horse holder will be linked. Officers' horses are held by trumpeters.

"Lances are laid on the ground--if in line, in the front of the ranks; if in column, on the flanks--in such a manner that they cannot be damaged by the horses.

"In the absence of a contrary order, the sergeant-major and the left flank guides will remain with the led horses, in addition to the horse holders."]

[Footnote 26: "The led horses will remain in the original troop formation. Their leader must keep himself informed of the course of the encounter, he must remember to keep off hostile patrols by means of single sentries, and he must facilitate the rapid remounting of the dismounted men by placing the horses in orderly formation, with the troops and ranks separated."]

[Footnote 27: "If, with due regard to the tactical situation, it can be done without risk, the squadron leader is at liberty, when employing _either method of dismounting_, to increase the number of his dismounted men by decreasing the number of his horse-holders."]

[Footnote 28: If I lay down that the deployment in the case of infantry columns marching towards each other should begin at 8,500 yards, and in the cavalry only at 6,000 yards, the reason is that the mounted arm effects the necessary deployment much more quickly. The depth of the column, also, is not such a decisive factor as in the case of infantry.]

[Footnote 29: "_Exterior lines._" The author uses an expression familiar to soldiers. In popular language the meaning is to gain a front wide enough to deliver a converging attack, and work round upon one or both of the enemy's flanks, from outside of them.--Editor's Note.]

[Footnote 30: "An attack in which troops are sent gradually into action in small detachments, one after the other, is not in accordance with the spirit of cavalry combat. A force large enough for the attainment of the objective must, therefore, be employed from the very commencement of the engagement. But not a man more! No squadron must be allowed to deal a blow in the air. Conversely, it is wrong to commence an engagement with insufficient force, and thus to leave the enemy with initial success."]

[Footnote 31: "Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battle of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such échelon formations as will preserve freedom of action."]

[Footnote 32: "I get into action and then I see."]

[Footnote 33: "If, on emerging from a defile, the enemy is not so close as to necessitate an immediate attack with any available forces, a _deployment at the halt_ offers certain advantages. It saves space towards the front, and gains time--a matter of some moment in a critical situation. On the other hand, it must be remembered that an immediate employment and advance inspires the troops with enthusiasm. A deployment at the halt may also take place when the intention is to make a surprise attack from a concealed position."]

[Footnote 34: "During _operations_, the army cavalry must seek to gain the earliest possible insight into the situation and dispositions of the enemy. It must endeavour, not only to drive the hostile cavalry from the field, but also to press back advanced detachments of all arms, or to break through and push forward to the vicinity of the main body. Cavalry screen duties, also, may provide fighting for the army cavalry.]

[Footnote 35: "The leader must select a station from which, while keeping his own troops well in hand, he can obtain a good view of the surrounding country, of the enemy, and of the progress of the battle. He will either observe himself, or by means of officers sent out to observing stations. These latter must maintain constant communication with him.

"_Personal observation is always the best, and is essential in the case of offensive action against cavalry._"]

[Footnote 36: "As a general principle, a _mounted reserve_ will be detailed.

"In special cases, the leader may detail a _dismounted reserve_, which he can make use of at points where, during the course of the battle, the enemy's weakness is disclosed, or which are recognized as decisive objectives for the attack. It is often advisable only to detail such a force, when it is required, from the troops which have remained mounted."]

[Footnote 37: "_The mounted reserve_ continues the tactical reconnaissance and undertakes the protection of the led horses. It will also assume the offensive against a flank of the hostile position, whenever it is possible to combine it with the above duties. When fighting dismounted cavalry, it endeavours to drive the hostile mounted reserve from the field, and to capture the led horses."]

[Footnote 38: "Rasch vorwärts."]

[Footnote 39: "Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening of fire. By means of skilful use of ground, and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained the desired results."

"As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand."

"Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."]

[Footnote 40: "Cavalry in Future Wars," Part I, chap. v.]

[Footnote 41: According to the French General Staff history, this cavalry met a battalion of the 25th Regiment of the 6th Corps, as well as the 3rd Chasseur Battalion and a battalion of the 27th Regiment of the 2nd Corps. At all events, the attack met, not retiring, but unshaken troops.]

[Footnote 42: Five German miles = 23 English miles.]

[Footnote 43: "Should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the cavalry must strain every nerve to facilitate the _retreat_ of the other arms. It is just in such cases that they must assume a relentless offensive. Repeated attacks on the flanks of the pursuing troops will produce the best results.

"Even temporary relief for the retreating infantry and a short gain in time may avert utter defeat. The cavalry which effects this will, though it gains no victory, retain the honours of the day."]

[Footnote 44: Échelon formations are those in which lines or bodies of troops are placed not directly in rear of each other, but with the second line to the right or left of the first and the next similarly placed--"like steps of stairs"--hence the name. "Échelon" means literally a "step" or the "rung of a ladder."--Editor's Note.]

[Footnote 45: "As a rule, a single regiment attacks in line. It may, or may not, be in échelon. Only on exceptional occasions should one of the squadrons follow as a second line.

"The officer commanding will bring the directing squadron into the direction of the attack. The squadrons, each in close formation, must be led so as to ensure combined action.

"The échelons will envelop the hostile flank or ward off the enemy's flank attacks; they can also be used to prolong the front of the regiment, or they can turn against portions of the enemy which have broken through."

"When attacking _cavalry_, the regiments will, as a rule, be employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually in the form of échelons. _If the situation demands, even single squadrons can follow in column formation._

"The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to a flank."]

[Footnote 46: "When advancing to attack _cavalry_, the divisional commander will, as a rule, order the brigades into _échelon formation_. _Brigades will make independent arrangements as regards formation in depth and for flank protection._

"As soon as the divisional commander has decided to attack, he will arrange for the employment of the artillery and machine-guns; he will give the brigades their attack orders; if necessary, he will give the directing brigade the line of attack; and he will detach his reserve.

"The further execution of the attack will rest with the brigade commanders."

"Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battles of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such échelon formations as will preserve freedom of action."

"_The formation of the échelon_ will vary according to the objective and to local conditions.

"Should no certain information as to the advance and formation of the enemy be forthcoming, a double échelon is possibly the best. But, should a flank rest on impassable, or on very open, country, which is, however, covered by the fire of friendly artillery, only single échelon is necessary. Échelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the advanced guard situation. The above cases are given merely as examples.

"As the situation is gradually cleared up, the flexibility of échelon formations renders it easy to attain the formation in which the attack will be delivered."]

[Footnote 47: "Should it be possible to ascertain the hostile dispositions with approximate certainty, the cavalry leader can have his front rank units in line from the start, and deployed on the frontage upon which he intends to attack. The advantage thus gained, if combined with rapidity of movement, will often render it possible to deliver an enveloping attack during the hostile deployment."]

[Footnote 48: " ... for greater changes of front, _e.g._ to the complete flank, it will generally be necessary to re-form the division."]

[Footnote 49: "Échelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the advanced guard situation."]

[Footnote 50: "Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations."]

[Footnote 51: Two squadrons abreast in squadron-column at six paces' interval, followed by two more at troop-frontage distance. When there is a fifth squadron, it follows in the same formation in rear of the left.--Trans.]

[Footnote 52: "Regiments-und Brigadekolonnen."]

[Footnote 53: "Tetenschutz."]

APPENDIX

CAVALRY AT PEACE MANOEUVRES

If manoeuvres are to be of real value to the cavalry, care must be taken to demand nothing of the troops but what would be required of them in war. This is most apparent in outpost duty, where demands are made on the outpost cavalry, especially in regard to reconnaissance, that in nowise correspond to the teachings of the "Field Service Manual"; and this is the more unfortunate, as the economy of strength demanded in the "Manual" is absolutely necessary if the divisional cavalry, in particular, is to be prevented from failing soon after the commencement of a war.

The duties of outpost cavalry are limited to watching a strip of country to the front, and possibly on the flank, of the line of infantry outposts, and to carry messages between the different sections of the latter.

Standing patrols are the most useful for observation work. In the case of an enemy close at hand, they should be in touch with him, and should, if there be no close reconnaissance patrols, watch his flanks as well; however, with proper dispositions this should be unnecessary. The standing patrols would, in any case, have to be in a position to detect and report any advance on the part of the enemy's outposts and any movement of the enemy denoting an advance or retirement. If the enemy, however, is so far away as to be out of touch with the cavalry cordon, reconnaissance work beyond this line should be carried out by those portions of the divisional cavalry that are _not_ assigned to outpost duty. If, on the other hand, the outposts on either side are in close touch, reconnaissance to the front should be carried out by infantry patrols. It may, however, be advisable under certain conditions to let weak mounted patrols follow such infantry patrols to covered positions for carrying messages, or to employ them dismounted in the place of the infantry.

If these arrangements are not strictly adhered to, it very easily happens, during manoeuvres, that reconnaissance work is carried out by the reconnaissance patrols in the daytime, but at night by the outpost cavalry. In the morning the latter is then scattered in all directions and cannot be collected again. Such dispositions are also entirely opposed to the teachings of the "Field Service Manual," and are unsuited to conditions of real warfare.

In time of war the reconnaissance patrols naturally continue their work of observation during the night, and consequently they need not be relieved by patrols of the outpost cavalry. In peace time, on the other hand, it is still considered remarkable if the patrols remain in touch with the enemy at night, and those that do so have been dubbed "sticky patrols." Those, also, which should really be in touch with the enemy throughout the night usually get under cover, and have been known to spend a comfortable night in excellent quarters.

In making arrangements with regard to outpost cavalry, attention should be paid to reducing the distance which messages have to be carried. In this respect, horses are not always sufficiently considered. When outpost companies are pushed out far to the flank, it would usually be well to observe the instructions of the "Field Service Manual," and to detail small detachments of cavalry to the companies for their independent use, as this will prevent considerable waste of strength. It will often be necessary, on the other hand, to protect unsupported flanks of a line of infantry outposts by special detachments of the divisional cavalry that do not form part of the outpost cavalry. Such detachments would, if possible, find housing for themselves and be self-protecting, though they might, under certain circumstances, be given a small force of infantry for local security.

It is most important that the outpost cavalry should be concentrated in good time in the morning before the commencement of the march or of the engagement, and that they should retire in _formed_ order on the divisional cavalry. This requires careful preparation and instructions; some practical method must be found which will overcome the difficulties that now present themselves. The various squadron commanders must act in conjunction with the officers commanding the outposts. All the higher officers, and those directing the manoeuvres, must, however, always keep this matter in mind, so that the present system, which offers such serious disadvantages, may not become so customary as to be carried on in time of war.

Having examined the flaws still to be found in our outpost system, and which are likely to adversely affect the arm in war, we find, on turning to the sphere of reconnaissance, that such defects are even more prevalent.

The arrangements that are usually made in this matter often draw on the strength of the cavalry in a manner quite out of proportion to the demands of actual war, and weaken the squadrons to such an extent as almost to destroy their fighting value. The weak point is, in the main, as follows:

It is usual for every order given by a commanding officer to direct that a reconnaissance should be carried out, even though the previous order may have given instructions for one in the same direction. The cavalry obeys these orders, and sends out fresh patrols each time the order is repeated. As the patrols are always told to keep in touch with the enemy, and as, on account of peace conditions that obtain, nobody thinks of relieving them, they collect in one direction, whilst the squadron becomes weaker and weaker.

I consider that every effort should be made to combat this bad habit. Care should be taken not to send out unnecessary patrols, and to call in, from time to time, those that have been sent out, or where necessary, to relieve them. I believe that this would be possible if the following rules were observed.

If an order has been given which entails a reconnaissance in a certain direction, it is unnecessary that this should be repeated in a subsequent order. Other directions rather, which are indicated by reason of the altered conditions, should be brought to notice, and reference made to the reconnaissance already despatched. Under no circumstances, however, should a cavalry commander be induced, on receiving instructions to reconnoitre in a certain direction, to send a patrol to a point where he knows his patrols to be already in touch with the enemy. The necessary economy of strength can only be effected by leaving the command of the patrol service _entirely in the hands of the cavalry commander_, who must be responsible to his superior officer for the carrying out of the reconnaissance work entrusted to him. The superior officer should only interfere if he discovers obvious mistakes, or if other circumstances render such a step absolutely necessary. He must, for his part, see that orderlies and reporting patrols that come in remain with his staff, and that they are sent back to the squadron when opportunity offers, so as to be available for fighting purposes. This should be made a standing order at manoeuvres.

All patrols that are sent out must receive definite orders as to how far they are to advance in any given direction, how long they are to reconnoitre in that direction, and when they are to return. If, at the expiration of such a period, renewed reconnaissance is found necessary in the same direction, relieving patrols should be despatched in good time, _i.e._ before the first patrols have returned; and these fresh patrols should, if possible, meet the returning ones, in order to exchange notes regarding the enemy. For this purpose the outward and homeward routes of the patrols should be prearranged as far as circumstances permit.

In manoeuvres, when one officer takes over command from another, he must inquire as to the arrangements made for reconnaissance work, and must take measures accordingly.