Part 15

If we turn from this narrower tactical point of view to the formations on a large scale where échelon is to be found--namely, the divisions--here too the examination leads to no more favourable conclusions. I ask myself, when and under what circumstances will such a formation be advisable?

During the approach to the battle of encounter it is, as I have endeavoured to prove, quite superfluous, and may even operate to our disadvantage. In this case, when total uncertainty reigns as to whether the combat will be carried out mounted or dismounted, or both, there can be no question of any stereotyped tactical formation, either of units as a whole or of smaller bodies within them. Here, as we have seen, the battle will generally develop gradually, and the fighting-line be fed from depth, until the necessary information as to the enemy has been gained and the decisive attack can be embarked upon. Under such circumstances the brigades advance according to the tasks allotted them, and make their dispositions as circumstances dictate. The depth that will be necessary can obviously not be laid down, and can be attained by échelon neither in the division nor in its subdivisions. If the division should advance under such circumstances in close formation écheloned within itself, the unnecessary danger would be run of offering an ideal target to the enemy's artillery (which must always be taken into consideration), and at the same time of hampering movement where circumstances demand the greatest freedom in all directions.

If, on the other hand, the enemy's dispositions are known before a collision occurs, the Regulations themselves (426, see p. 172) allow that échelon formation is superfluous, and that the advance may be made in the deployed formation desired, brigades being on the same frontage, if the country and the character of the adversary offer the probability of a charge.

And will it be different in the battle of all arms? In that case, if the army cavalry advances from the wing of the army with the intention of attacking the enemy's flank, what need will it have of échelon formations? It is known that an attack must be made under any circumstances. Further information as to the comparative strength of the enemy cannot and must not be waited for. All available forces will be engaged in order to wrest a victory, and must from the beginning be so disposed that the enemy will be compelled as far as possible to conform to our movements, and that we may prepare the most favourable deployment for attack in the manner discussed above. Must we, then, advance with the division in close formation, écheloned within itself, in order to afford the greatest possible target for the enemy's artillery? Are we to choose the pusillanimous formation of the defensive échelon, that we may perhaps be obliged to approach and to deploy under the enemy's eyes, incapable in this unwieldy formation of turning the ground to account? I cannot think that this is practical and believe that modern artillery fire of itself suffices to make the écheloned division an impossibility and to banish it for ever from the battlefield.

It must be added that should the unexpected appearance of the enemy on a flank make it necessary, _rearward_ échelon is much easier to assume from a formation of brigades on the same front than is the line or attack formation from rearward échelon. It is only necessary for that part of the line which is to be écheloned to halt or decrease the pace, and the échelon is soon formed. To push forward units from depth while on the move means, on the other hand, a considerable and indeed unnecessary expenditure of force.

VII. FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT

As the brigades in a modern division must, on account of the effect of artillery fire, be disposed according to completely different principles from those of the past, so, too, must the formations adopted by the various groups be chosen to suit modern conditions.

Our new Regulations lay down that, if the cavalry, after its preliminary deployment, has to cross an extensive fire-zone, the subordinate leaders are to choose such formations for their units as will minimise the effect of the hostile fire, and that, for this purpose, the configuration of the ground must be turned to the best advantage, even though it should involve temporary departure from prescribed intervals.

I do not consider these instructions, which, in contradiction to the general principles of the Regulations, give free play to the initiative of all subordinate leaders, are sufficiently definite. They appear to try to avoid giving a distinct designation to this manner of advance. Before the publication of the Regulations it was known as "extended formation." As such I have characterised it in my brochure, "Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations," published in 1908, and it is to be regretted that this title was not maintained in the Regulations, and with it also the real essence of the whole formation. This would, I think, have made the matter clearer. I hold it to be of great importance that the adoption of such formations should be ordered by higher authority, as otherwise there must be a danger of the troops getting out of hand.

In adopting these extensions it is not only a question of ground actually under artillery fire, but also of areas during the crossing of which fire may be expected, to which, of course, the troops should not be exposed. Whether such is the case or not, the cavalry commander, who is observing and receiving intelligence as the troops hurry forward, is alone in a position to judge, and not each subordinate leader. For this reason alone, unity of action is absolutely necessary. So is it also from another point of view. I need scarcely enlarge on the picture of what would occur if each subordinate commander, each squadron leader, according to his individual judgment, were to suddenly regulate the pace and formation of his own volition, while it would be a matter of difficulty to maintain proper control of the troops if it were left to the squadron leaders to regain alignment in their own time.

It is therefore imperative, to my mind, that such extensions should not be left to the discretion of the squadron leader, but ordered by superior authority. Instructions as to pace should be given at the same time, and the area indicated where troops are to regain the formation ordered and decrease the pace. These are points that have escaped the notice of the Regulations. Orders must also be given as to whether several lines will eventually be formed. These will then generally have to follow each other at shrapnel distance. Only the choice of formation and line of advance must be left to the subordinate leaders, as they alone are in a position to judge of the local effect of the hostile fire.

If such dispositions are to be made, all commanders, down to squadron leaders, must be instructed in time, so that they may have already adopted the necessary formation on reaching the dangerous zone. They must at the same time be informed, in so far as can be ascertained, from which direction artillery fire--for this alone can be in question--is to be expected.

Should the artillery fire come from the front, column of route will often be a suitable formation. It affords but a small frontage of target, and facilitates use of the ground. If the artillery fire is expected from a flank, the adoption of a single-rank line will often commend itself. In any case, in the larger formations, distances and intervals must be adjusted so that one and the same burst of shrapnel will not strike two squadrons at once.

As the Regulations do not touch on these points, I do not see how a proper understanding of them can be awakened and cultivated in the troops, imperative though this may be.

As a rule it will be by no means sufficient to adopt formations for minimising the effect of artillery fire only in special cases where such fire is to be expected. The great range of modern guns, and their capabilities of indirect fire induced by improved means of observation, and the possibility of bringing fire to bear on large unseen targets with the aid of the map, make it absolutely necessary, when entering within possible effective range of artillery, to adopt formations which will offer no favourable mark. If this tends on the one hand, as already remarked, to a premature deployment, it forces us, on the other, to adopt formations which can cross country easily and afford no easy target for the artillery.

I have already shown in a former work[50] how well the double column[51] answers this purpose, and in what a comprehensive manner the principle of independent squadron columns allows of elaboration, to procure for the cavalry the greatest imaginable freedom of movement.

The Regulations do not agree with these views. They hold fast to the principle that deployment must always be in line, and not in a succession of lines, and that before this deployment the squadron columns hitherto employed will generally be replaced by some other formation.

The above remain the chief formations for movement and deployment of the cavalry. The employment of the "regimental mass and brigade mass"[52] has been limited, but the Regulations give us nothing in their place. Nor, on the other hand, is the flexibility of the double column particularly emphasised; its use, indeed, is in a certain sense limited. I see such limitation in the fact that the trumpet-call "_Double column!_" has been abolished. As, on the other hand, the call "_Form regimental mass!_" has been retained, it does not appear as if the use of double column is to be further developed, or allowed to replace the regimental and brigade mass on the field of battle.

It is further laid down that the regimental mass is to be used when beyond the range of the enemy's fire, the brigade mass when concealed by the ground, even on the battlefield. A deployment is even allowed for from the brigade in mass towards the flank, and that by a wheel of the head of the columns. This presupposes that such a column can be used in a flank movement, which I regard as an impossibility. A deployment from regimental mass to squadron columns is also provided for. In view of the great effective range of the modern gun, I cannot think that movements in such close formation right up to the moment of deployment can go unpunished upon a modern battlefield.

All these instructions contained in the Regulations, and many others that take effect in the same sense, cannot be regarded as practical. They lead us to fear that the regimental and brigade masses, in spite of all modern conditions, will retain more or less their old importance. They will serve as a pretext for many a hidebound drill enthusiast, of which, alas! there are still many among us. Upon the battlefields of the future, however, we will no longer dare to appear in such formations, but only widely deployed and in thin columns, in such dispositions indeed as will allow of a rapid adoption of the attack formation, such as we have discussed in detail above. I can only hope that these views will, in the not too far distant future, come to be more generally recognised and will find their way into the Regulations.

Finally, I would once again draw attention to the idea of the "vanguard."[53] It receives but a passing mention in the Regulations, and no explanation of what is thereby meant. My opinion is that it is indispensable to all flank movements, and must _continually_ be used, especially in the offensive. It should therefore be provided for by regulation in all deployments, and the troops should be fully conversant with its use.

For the rest, the present Regulations, in spite of all actual progress made, can only be designated as provisional, and give rise to the hope that it will be found possible to re-edit them soon, above all as regards the stereotyped parts, so that, fully prepared and up to date, we may go forth with confidence to meet the events of any future war.

VIII. THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT

Having in the last chapter endeavoured to elaborate tactical principles, and to give practical hints, I will now shortly deal with the duties of the various units, and endeavour to form an impression of the performances that may be expected of them in the fight.

When a _squadron_, acting independently in reconnaissance, as advanced guard, flank guard, or divisional cavalry, finds itself obliged to attack, it will, as a rule, employ its whole force simultaneously, whether it charges in line, knee to knee, or uses a troop in single rank as first line. If a troop has been thrown forward as advanced guard, it must quickly clear the front, and endeavour to join the squadron, so as to strengthen it before the collision, and not to become prematurely involved in a disadvantageous fight.

The squadron is generally too weak to carry out an offensive fight on foot. There is also no means of guarding the led horses but by patrols. If they should become isolated during the attack, there will be a danger of losing them, especially in hostile country. A squadron must therefore only determine on a dismounted attack when such action is absolutely unavoidable. For dispersing hostile patrols or armed inhabitants, about a troop dismounted will generally suffice, where there is no opportunity of surprising them in the charge, or of enveloping them. A defensive fight on foot must not be undertaken by a single squadron unless absolutely necessary, or which the led horses can be disposed in a safe place in the immediate neighbourhood, where the flanks cannot be turned, or where the arrival of reinforcements can be relied upon.

A squadron attacking knee to knee is stronger than a numerically superior enemy who charges in looser formation and is not armed with the lance.

The _regiment_ of four or five squadrons is numerically too weak a body to be able of itself to carry out the larger strategical missions. It will therefore operate in more or less close co-operation with other troops, and will seldom be called upon to fight independently. It may, however, find itself for a time obliged to rely upon its own fighting strength, whether acting as divisional cavalry, as advanced guard, or as a detachment from a larger force of cavalry.

If a fight is in immediate prospect, column of troops must first be formed from column of route, and a broader front, which will allow of a rapid assumption of the attack formation, must then be adopted according to the ground.

In the charge against cavalry the regiment should only on rare occasions deploy all its squadrons into line, but must, whenever practicable, detail one squadron to follow in second line, and another in forward échelon, to protect the more exposed flank and to turn that of the enemy.

It will also be possible for the regiment to operate dismounted against weaker hostile detachments. If relative strength allows, at least a squadron should be detached to guard the led horses and to carry out reconnaissance duties. In the defence on foot, with ample ammunition and every available rifle in the firing-line, the regiment represents a formidable fighting force, even when obliged to detach one, or even two squadrons, for reconnaissance and for the protection of the flanks and the led horses.

In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a regiment will frequently be able to intervene in a most effective manner by a timely charge, from which considerable results may often be expected, especially during pursuit of a retreating and shaken enemy. In such cases the formation of lines for attack will frequently be superfluous, and a broad enveloping formation may be adopted.

The _brigade_ of two regiments is numerically too weak of itself to carry out strategical missions, and to be able to engage in the independent actions they demand. The heavy drains on its strength which such missions generally entail will usually weaken the fighting power so much that the brigade will no longer be in a condition to engage an opponent of any strength who may have to be dealt with by mounted or dismounted action, or the two in combination.

At the same time, circumstances may lead to a brigade being _forced_ to carry out an independent rôle. It will then have to reconnoitre with great care, so that it may only embark on a decisive encounter with a full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise, in view of its small offensive power, it will run a great risk of suffering defeat, especially when dismounted.

In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a brigade may be regarded as an important factor of strength, capable of successfully resisting an enemy of considerable superiority, as long as its flanks are protected and the led horses do not require too large an escort.

On approaching the enemy, the brigade must form column of troops from column of route in good time and the regiments must be deployed on the frontage and in the formations demanded by the situation. In such cases a reserve must always be detailed. The allotment of different rôles in the fight to the various regiments or groups will form the framework for the tactical deployment. In all attacks the brigade or its component parts must always adopt the formation in lines. Where there is blind ground to a flank, a forward échelon must be formed which will co-operate concentrically in the charge. In the attack on foot, too, it will often be advantageous to échelon detachments forward under due protection, in order to envelop the enemy's position.

In the combat of detachments of all arms, and especially in pursuit, considerable performances must be expected of a brigade. A timely charge or the employment of its fire power in an effective direction may bring about a decision.

The _division_ of six regiments, under circumstances where its full strength can be employed in the charge, represents, even against troops using the rifle, a very considerable fighting power, which can, if judiciously handled and launched at the right moment, have a decisive effect, even in a battle of armies.

In independent missions it must be remembered that a complete regiment of four squadrons with 15 files per troop will represent 400 rifles at most. In war, however, this figure will never be reached. Wastage on the march and the provision of the necessary detachments and patrols, weaken squadrons very considerably. We must further remember that in every great battle a mounted reserve will always have to be detailed, while, in addition to this, detachments such as reconnoitring squadrons, escorts to transport, reporting centres, and signal stations, will generally fail to rejoin in time for the battle. Thus the division will seldom actually be able to reckon on more than 1,000 to 1,500 rifles in the firing-line.

Even counting on the co-operation of artillery and machine-guns, which the enemy will also have at his disposal, this represents no great offensive strength. It is therefore necessary to be quite clear in our minds that only weak detachments can be attacked with prospect of success.

A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by these circumstances in carrying out the rôle which may be assigned to it in the course of operations. The resistance of a body of equal strength where circumstances demand a dismounted attack can thus never be overcome.

Mounted, however, it is quite another matter. A well-trained German cavalry division, handled according to sound tactical principles and schooled to charge in close formation, may attack even a stronger enemy regardless of consequences.

Should the task at issue demand a larger force, several divisions must be united in a _cavalry corps_. In the battle of all arms such a corps, either by the charge or by employment of its fire power, may aim at decisive results. For the conduct of independent strategic missions fire power is an important factor. As in this case the number of men detached, etc., will be divided between the divisions, a strength of 3,500 rifles can at times be reached in a corps of two divisions.

For the division, as for the corps, the framework of the tactical deployment depends upon the commander's tactical plan, as too does the allotment of duties in the fight to the various units, divisions, brigades, and regiments, or to the tactical groups, advanced guard, main body, reserve, etc., and any attempt at retaining the command in one hand is obviously out of the question. Stress has already been laid on the necessity for early deployment, and once this is effected, the various subdivisions of the force must take their own independent measures for carrying out the rôles that devolve upon them.

On the other hand, neither in the fight of the independent cavalry nor in the great battle should a unit be allowed to become isolated in the combat. The necessary combination must always be preserved. United action, however, is only possible if subordinate leaders never lose sight of the general purpose of the fight, and continually bear in mind the necessary interchangeable relations of the various tactical methods.

In war it will seldom be possible either to undertake or to carry out the very best course of action, but will generally be unnecessary, for we may certainly count on numerous errors and vacillations on the part of the enemy, especially in the case of cavalry warfare.

It is of far greater importance that any plan once undertaken should be energetically carried through to a conclusion.

Success in war is first and foremost a matter of character and will. The indomitable will to conquer carries with it a considerable guarantee of success.

The determination to win, cost what it may, is therefore the first and greatest quality required of a cavalry leader--and the offensive is the weapon with which he can best enforce his will.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 12: "By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also of _dismounted action_. It is thus in a position--and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns--to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it refrain from attack, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."]

[Footnote 13: "In combination with the cavalry combat, the _fire effect of the carbine_ may be employed on occasions. Thus the occupation of _points-d'appui_ by portions of the advanced guard may often provide favourable and, at times, indispensable preliminaries to the deployment of a division. The support of carbine fire may be possible and useful even during contact."]

[Footnote 14: "The Crisis of the Confederacy," by Cecil Battine.]

[Footnote 15: "By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also of _dismounted action_. It is thus in a position--and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns--to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it shrink from attacking, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."]

[Footnote 16: "Cavalry will often be obliged to clear the way for further activity by means of dismounted _attack_. Attempts also on the hostile lines of communication (such as the capture of railway stations or magazines, the destruction of important engineering works, or the capture of isolated posts, etc.) will certainly involve such attacks. On the battle field, however, dismounted cavalry will rarely be pushed forward."]

[Footnote 17: "Cavalry must endeavour to bring dismounted attacks to a conclusion with the _utmost rapidity_, so that they may regain their mobility at the earliest possible moment. It may also be of importance to bring the encounter to a decision before the arrival of hostile reinforcements."]