CHAPTER VI
THE WORK OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN THE EXECUTION OF A CITY PLAN
We have thus far considered how the municipal authorities may execute a plan by enforcing those rights which the legislature has delegated to them as the representatives of the people. Through the ownership of land and by the exercise of the police power the city may absolutely control the working out of many details of a plan. But a city is seriously handicapped in the use of both of these methods of control. The acquisition of land by any method is expensive, and by the condemnation method is both expensive and slow. To enforce a police ordinance requires an injunction after a court hearing, and the usual administrative agency is slow to ask for an injunction and the usual court is slow to grant it. Some details, at least, of a city plan will be executed, in the future as in the past, by the mere guidance of developments undertaken on private initiative without resort to legal compulsion.
A plan for a city’s growth generally approved by the business interests, by public service corporations, and by the public, and administered by a tactful agency which advocates the execution of the proper features of the plan at the right time carries with it the persuasion of good business policy. It becomes the thing to do to fall in line with such a plan.
THE CONTROL OF STREET LAY-OUT BY ADMINISTRATIVE PRESSURE
In a growing community, even if the public authorities are utterly supine in the matter, private initiative will constantly increase the number of house lots and bring about the creation of streets necessary to give access to them. These streets may promptly become public ways or they may remain private ways for a long time; but in the aggregate they form the most important single element in the city plan, largely controlling every other feature. The most obvious and perhaps the most important step in the wise guidance of a city’s growth is the endeavor to make the streets thus brought into existence through private initiative serve not merely the immediate selfish purpose of the dealer in real estate but the permanent interests of the whole community. The attempt to control private development is made through the supervision of all plans offered for record, supplemented in a few cities by the establishment of an official street plan to which all private plattings are expected to conform.
The right in a municipality to supervise all plans of subdivisions is well recognized in the United States, but the exercise of the right is by no means general. It varies from a purely formal supervision, to a real attempt to control private development. A street which is to be a public highway is frequently required to conform to standard specifications as to width, sidewalk space, surfacing, and so forth. In some cities a considerable measure of co-operation is secured and owners of property are induced to change even the number and direction of proposed streets at the suggestion of the municipal authorities.
The method of enforcing the right of supervision in most general use is to refuse for record any plan of proposed streets and lots which has not been approved by the proper municipal authorities. Owners who persist in their plan are prevented from describing lots by a short reference to a recorded plan and must in each transfer describe by metes and bounds. The inconvenience is considerable, although the burden of this falls rather on the title examiner who is paid for his labor and on the purchaser than on the vendor. In cities where the custom of dealing in lots by reference to a recorded plat instead of by metes and bounds is nearly universal, a prospective purchaser may balk at buying a lot that fails to conform to the customary standard in this respect.
Another method of control, also in pretty general use, is the refusal to accept a non-conforming street as a public highway. Instead of having the benefit of the co-operation of the municipality in the construction of water mains, sewer pipes, and other municipal services, and instead of being entirely relieved of their upkeep, the cost of both construction and maintenance of the highway and of the various conduits for public service falls on the owners of lots abutting on the private street. Unfortunately, these owners are rarely the offending developers of the property; they usually are innocent purchasers who have bought lots, relying on the supposition that they were on an accepted or acceptable street. Rather than pursue their rights against the land company which made the sale, they are more likely to prevail on the municipal authorities to waive the requirements and accept the street as a public highway.
The experience of at least one town has worked out a variation of these methods of pressure. Massachusetts towns, by the acceptance of Chapter 191 of the acts of 1907, may authorize the board of selectmen to act as a board of survey with power to compel the submission of all plans for the location of streets or highways for their approval.[147] It was found that while development companies were usually quite willing to submit plans and accept suggestions, when the land was cut up into streets and lots the plans which had been accepted by the board of survey frequently had not been followed. Consequently the town adopted the following regulation:
Whenever application is made to the selectmen acting as the board of survey, by the owner or owners of a parcel of land for the approval of a plan showing the layout of streets in said land, such owner or owners shall furnish a bond conditioned for the prompt construction of said street or streets in accordance with the grades and layout approved by the board of survey....
This practice seems effective at least in cases where the developer desires the approval of the board of survey, but the situation is still left without remedy where the developer is willing to subdivide his land without submitting his plans to the municipal authorities and to construct and maintain streets at his own expense.
The possibilities of official supervision have not been fully realized, partly because of the too frequent use of political influence and partly because of an adherence to old methods, and of an utter lack of scientific handling of the problem and the absence of a well considered city plan. The property owner often objects with justice to the arbitrary specifications required both for the width of a street and the allotments of space for sidewalk and parking strips. Even in cities where most has been accomplished in the planning of a street system there has not been a sufficient regard for the difference in the use of streets as affecting their width and cross section. Many cities require all streets to have a certain minimum width, either 40, 50, or 60 feet between property lines, whereas in some cases a width less than this standard minimum would be much more suitable. Often a street is made 70 feet wide because it is the extension of a street 70 feet wide, although this width both for the old street and the new may be too great or too little. Sidewalks in many cities are given a fixed width in proportion to the width of the entire street, although that width may be excessive or inadequate for sidewalk purposes in special cases.
But at best, supervision by these means will fail of great effectiveness because too much depends on persuasion and there is too little opportunity for legal pressure. The property owner can block the best laid plans of the municipality. To obtain positive control of property development land or rights in land must be taken, and for this the city must pay.
With the purpose of forestalling private development several cities have established bureaus to prepare an official plan of streets to which private platting is expected to conform. A device included in the legislation creating some of these street planning bureaus, which aims to place the location and design of streets absolutely in the control of the municipality, is contained in the provision that owners who erect buildings within the limits of a proposed street as laid down on the official plan will receive no compensation for damage to their buildings when the street is constructed.[148]
But in every state which has enacted this provision except Pennsylvania this interference with private property is regarded as a taking of property without compensation, therefore unconstitutional, or has been expressly so held by the supreme court.[149] From early times Pennsylvania statutes have given the properly constituted municipal authorities power to determine in advance the location of all streets without compensation for the interference with the rights of property owners. By act of June, 1836, commissioners were authorized to set off a certain tract of land and plot it with streets and squares. Notice was then given to property owners concerned, and after a hearing of objections the plan with or without amendments was recorded and became official “and the streets, lanes, and alleys so approved shall forever after be deemed, adjudged and taken to be public highways.” In 1841 the court of general sessions refused to grant a petition establishing this plan on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute. The case on a writ of certiorari went to the supreme court which reversed the decision of the lower court and found that
The mere laying out of the streets can not be said of itself to be the taking of the property of individuals upon which they are laid out for public use at some future day, but rather a designation of what may be required for that purpose thereafter, so that the owners of the property may in due time be fully apprised of what is anticipated and regulate the subsequent improvements which they shall make thereon accordingly.... Until the actual opening the owners thereof continue not only to hold the same interest in them but likewise to have the right to enjoy them and in the same manner as they did previously.[150]
Thirty years later, in 1871, the supreme court further extended the principle by holding that if buildings were erected within the line of the street after notice of the plan was given to the owners, the damage to such building on the opening of such street could not be paid for, “otherwise the map or plan would be entirely nugatory.”[151] The same question was considered in 1893 and the principle was held well established.[152] Curiously enough, the first Pennsylvania case was decided on the reasoning in a New York case decided in 1836, Furman St., 17 Wend. 649,[153] but this New York decision was reversed in 1892 by the case of Forster _vs._ Scott, 136 N. Y. App. 577,[154] the court holding that
Whenever a law deprives the owner of the benefit, use and free enjoyment of his property or imposes restraint upon such use or enjoyment that materially affects its value without legal process or compensation, it deprives him of the property within the meaning of the constitution.
This power of determining the lines of a street without immediate construction of the street has allowed a widening of some of Philadelphia’s narrow business streets in a way impossible in a city of any other state. In 1870 it was determined to increase the width of Chestnut Street from 40 to 50 feet by an addition of five feet on either side. Land abutting on this street has great value and was occupied by costly buildings, and if condemnation proceedings had been instituted for acquiring the additional 10 feet the expense of the improvement would have been perhaps prohibitive. But the act of 1870 provided that compensation should not be paid till a building was reconstructed and set back to the new building line, and thus the expense for getting a 50-foot street was distributed over many years and nothing was paid for buildings. The same process has been adopted for at least two other downtown streets of Philadelphia, but this power has not been employed to increase the width of streets in built-up areas in any other city of Pennsylvania.
PLATTING BOARDS IN VARIOUS CITIES
PHILADELPHIA. Official planning in Philadelphia is done by the bureau of surveys. The board is composed of fourteen district surveyors presided over by the chief engineer and surveyor of the city. Each district surveyor has charge of a particular section of the city, with a corps of engineers and assistants under his immediate direction. He is the only person having the authority to make an official survey of public or private property in his district. All fees for work done for private parties are paid into the city treasury by the individual for whom the work is done. Such a system gives each district surveyor a practical knowledge of the land and of the land owners, and the confidence which is had in the district surveyor has done more to prevent violations of the street plan than the penalties contained in the legislation. The city has a plan of streets ready for each district before the land owners are ready to subdivide their land. When any one or more of the land owners begin to consider platting their land the district surveyor must be consulted, and the city is in a strategic position to carry through its own officially adopted plan.
BOSTON. The board of survey in Boston was created in 1891[155] with power to make plans of such territory “as the board may deem advisable, showing thereon the location of such streets or ways, whether already laid out or not as the board shall be of opinion that the present or future interests of the public require or will require.” For five years the activity of the board resulted in planning 6,000 acres of comparatively unoccupied territory. The board of survey was succeeded and its duties were taken over by the long established and conservative board of street commissioners in 1896. Since this time there has been much less activity, if the amount of territory covered by a street plan is an accurate measure. The fifteen years of the work of the street commission resulted in the platting of about the same amount of territory as was covered by the board of survey in five years. The difference may be due to a lack of sufficient appropriation. The act of 1891 carried with it a special appropriation for the work of platting new streets, and the city council during the life of the board of survey was very liberal with appropriations for this purpose. During the subsequent history of the street commissioners the only amount available for purposes of platting was what could be spared out of the total appropriation for street work. It is also a fair conclusion that there was less enthusiasm for platting under the board of street commissioners than under the board of survey, which was created for that specific purpose.
A provision in the board of survey act, like those in the Pennsylvania acts, withholds compensation to property owners who erect structures in the streets proposed for new areas, but the supreme court held that this no-damage provision was an interference with the use of property and that since no compensation was given the owner it was an unconstitutional interference.[156] Although this opinion was not necessary for a decision of the case there is little question that the dictum would be followed in Massachusetts, and in accordance with this dictum the street commissioners have been advised by the city of Boston law department that building lines can not been forced without payment of compensation.
It is conjectural just how much this decision has weakened the effectiveness of the board of survey acts as instruments for building up an adequate street system, since no record is kept of the violation of the lines which the board of survey has laid down. The official plan has standing among respectable property owners who recognize a real economy in a planned street system. Conservative banks in Boston refuse to loan on property subject to a board of survey line unless the building plans show the observance of these lines. Careful conveyancers in examining a Boston title inquire whether there is a board of survey line on the property. The practice in Boston is to issue from the city hall a certificate showing all municipal claims against any given parcel of property, and the existence of a board of survey line is noted on this certificate. Pressure can still be brought to bear on non-conforming owners by refusal on the part of the city to co-operate with them in the construction and maintenance of the water, sewer, and lighting systems. It is the general impression among those who are most closely acquainted with the work of the laying-out of the streets that violations of the street lines are of infrequent occurrence.
Under Chapter 191 of the acts of 1907, Massachusetts towns may authorize their selectmen to act as a board of survey with the same power to lay out official streets as the Boston street commissioners. Several towns of the state have accepted the act and in a very few cases survey lines have been imposed on particular streets, but there has been no general extension of the street plan into unoccupied areas.
NEW YORK. New York had a topographical bureau for four years, dating from the first Greater New York charter, January 1, 1898, but during these formative years there was little or no progress with official plans. On January 1, 1902, the amended charter placed the topographical work in each of the five boroughs under the control of the borough president, and since then five separate bureaus have had charge of the completion of the map of the city and the drainage plan. The disadvantage of separate planning bureaus, particularly where the territory of two boroughs is contiguous, is obvious. There is, however, one opportunity for securing co-ordination in street planning. All plans must be submitted by the presidents of the boroughs to the board of estimate and apportionment, and they do not become official without the approval of that board. In Manhattan and Brooklyn the plans submitted consist almost entirely in changes in the official map which is practically complete for both boroughs. The following table shows the work of the topographical bureaus in the other boroughs since 1902:
TABLE 7.—PROGRESS MADE IN MAPPING THE BOROUGHS OF THE BRONX, QUEENS, AND RICHMOND, NEW YORK CITY, TO JANUARY 1, 1913[157]
======================================+====================== | BOROUGH +——————+——————+———————— |The |Queens|Richmond |Bronx | | ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Total area in acres |26,523|75,111|36,600 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Acres approved for mapping prior to | | | Jan. 1, 1902 | | | Tentative | — | — | — Final |14,430| 5,402| 60 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Total |14,430| 5,402| 60 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Between Jan. 1, 1902, and Jan. 1, 1912| | | Tentative[158] | 956| 3,416| 7,940 Final |10,004|14,476| 964 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Total |10,960|17,892| 8,904 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— During 1912 | | | Tentative | — |12,984| 2,540 Final | 234| 3,070| — ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Total | 234|16,054| 2,540 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Total area in acres mapped to Jan. 1, | | | 1913 | | | Tentative[158] | 956|16,168|10,480 Final |24,668|22,948| 1,024 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Total |25,624|39,116|11,504 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Per cent of borough area in acres | | | mapped to Jan. 1, 1913 | | | Tentative[158] | 3.6| 21.5| 28.6 Final | 93.0| 30.6| 2.8 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+———————— Total | 96.6| 52.1| 31.4 ——————————————————————————————————————|——————+——————+————————
BALTIMORE. The Baltimore topographical survey commission was created by ordinance in 1893 for the purpose of making a complete survey of the city, including about seventeen square miles of undeveloped territory, rural in character, which had become a part of the city in 1888. With the completion of the survey an official plan was adopted for the annexed territory in 1893 by the mayor and city council, and subsequently by act of the general assembly of Maryland, Baltimore was prohibited from accepting a deed of dedication or the opening in any manner of a street which did not conform to the general plan or the plan duly amended. Amendments of the official plan must be approved by the topographical survey commission and adopted by the city council before they can be incorporated.
In spite of the legislation in Maryland which seems to put the control of city planning in the hands of the city, and in spite of the activity of topographical bureaus of New York City, the limitations on municipal control of street planning in both Baltimore and New York are the same as in Boston. Official streets in both cities have been blocked by the owners of the land or speculative builders, and cases of successive house planting in New York City are notorious. And yet, the advantages of official street plans are considered to offset these limitations and street planning bureaus have passed the experimental stage.
Their success furnishes a precedent for many cities in the United States which still exercise little or no control over a phase of planning where the interest of the private owner is so often opposed to the public good. The possibilities of administrative pressure in the solution of other city planning problems now determined on the initiative of private or corporate interests suggest themselves. The development of the water front, the location of railroad terminals, the transit problem, have all been distinctly recognized as requiring the permanent attention of a special planning board representing the public interest. But in those fields where the public interest is apt to conflict with the advantage of private or corporate owners, the value of expert suggestion and study can never be as fully realized as where the execution of a plan is entirely in the control of the municipality.
PLANNING OF PUBLIC WORK OTHER THAN STREETS
In the location and design of public parks and in the location and design of public buildings, including bridges, the administrative agency of the municipality or other governmental unit has a free hand. The establishment and development of a system of parks and parkways are now entrusted very generally to an administrative board which employs expert advice and considers the park problems of the entire city as a unit. The location and design of public structures are, however, in most cases left to the judgment of the several departments which will use or maintain them; but occasionally the function of a municipal art commission is enlarged so that its approval is necessary to the selection of the site and design for public structures as well as for the location and design of “works of art.”
In New York City the art commission must approve the location and design of all structures for which the contract price exceeds $250,000; but in the case of other public structures the approval of the commission need not be required if the mayor or the board of aldermen request the commission not to act.[159]
The Philadelphia art jury created in 1912 was given this additional power by the legislature of 1913.
No construction or erection in a city of the first class of any building, bridge or its approaches, arch, gate, fence, or other structure or fixture which is to be paid for wholly or in part by appropriation from the city treasury or other public funds, or for which the city or any other public authority is to furnish a site, shall be begun until the approval of the jury shall have been given to the design and proposed location thereof. The approval of the jury shall also be required in respect to all structures or fixtures belonging to any person or corporation which shall be erected upon or extend over any highway, stream, lake, square, park or public place within the city.... In deeds for land made by any city of the first class restrictions may be imposed requiring that the design and location of structures to be altered or erected thereon shall be first approved by the art jury of each city. Nothing requiring the approval of the jury shall be erected or changed in design or location without its approval. If the jury fails to act upon any matter submitted to it within 60 days after such submission, its approval of the matter submitted shall be presumed.[160]
In spite of the complete control which a municipality has over the location and design of public structures and the creation and extension of its park system, the obstacles to the formulation of and adherence to a consistent plan are as persistent and often as effective as those which prevent the control of street development.
Expert suggestions have too frequently been disregarded by a purely political city council whose power of appropriation is a most effective check on the execution of city plans. One of the chief objections to the usual form of city government with a mayor and a large elected council of one or two chambers, aside from incompetence and wastefulness and, at the worst, dishonesty, arises from this power of obstruction. Neither the people’s representatives in council nor the engineers and architects in the employ of the city departments have been educated to the idea of a unified city. The department system emphasizes a city’s subdivisions; the political system emphasizes still different subdivisions; and neither group of subdivisions logically fits into a city plan. There may be interesting historical reasons for the combination of certain areas into this or that group; politicians may have had shrewd reasons for establishing certain political boundaries; but the topographical conditions of the site often prove the strangeness of the compound. Several sections contained in a political subdivision may be separated by considerable waterways or difficult grades so that transit between parts of the same political district is almost prohibitively expensive; and yet that district must be treated as a unit when appropriations for public improvements are considered. The ward or district method of electing city councilmen does not produce a body interested in the best development of the city as a unit, the best transit system for the whole city, the best park system for the whole people, the most complete playground system for all the children. Instead, forty units, more or less, with selfish ideas fostered by local business men and property owners, are represented each by a councilman whose best equipment is his ability to get things for his own ward, and the city plan develops like a crazy quilt.
The last few years have seen considerable development of the unit idea. One interesting step is the correlation of all the departments of a city administration. This is done, first, by the creation of a new administrative board in which are united for purposes of efficiency and economy the various departments. Thus under a board of public works or of public improvement are united the maintenance work of the city, and the construction of streets, water mains, sewers, and so forth, each of which municipal services was formerly in charge of a separate department.
The mayor’s cabinet in Kansas City, Missouri, is an interesting experiment in correlation. A weekly conference of the heads of all city departments is held at which questions from each department which affect the development of the entire city are discussed, and the policy of each department is influenced by its effect on other departments. For nine months the experiment was tried only in connection with the city administration. It succeeded so well that to the members of the city administration were added representatives from several organizations and industrial bodies. These conferences are said to have resulted in an improvement in the city’s management by the securing of a most desirable measure of co-operation between the administration and the tax payers. Kansas City was a most advantageous field for an experiment of this kind. The creation of the park and boulevard system of the city had already produced the finest kind of co-operation between property owners and the park commission, and an eager willingness on the part of the citizenship to contribute to the carrying out of the unit idea as expressed in plans of the commission.
The elimination of ward representation in city government is a recent advance toward the unit idea. It is sometimes expressed in the commission form of government, sometimes in a single city council elected at large. From the viewpoint of city planning the most notable advantage of this simplified form of government is that the administration represents the entire city and is not a collection of representatives from the several parts of the city. Other advantages due to a saving in time and money caused by a smaller body with a businesslike procedure, are no doubt real. It is more satisfactory in urging the need of planning measures to deal with a few men, whether bad or good, efficient or stupid. It is also wholesome to fix the responsibility of a policy on an administration consisting of a few men rather than to trace the responsibility through a maze of committees and motions to an irresponsible clerk. City planning legislation may chance to succeed in two chambers of a city council in spite of numbers, because of the domination of one or two individuals; but when responsibility for success or failure must be fixed, it will not be placed on those individuals but ingeniously distributed over various committees. If the single council of limited number is likely to produce better councilors, just so far city planning measures may be benefited; but there is no guaranty of this result. However constituted, the smaller body does represent the entire city; and though each individual member will have by natural and political inheritance a desire for the advancement of his own locality, he may be controlled by the greater fact that he is chosen by all the citizens of the city.
Boston is the largest city with sufficient experience to test this theory. Certain critics of the charter of 1909 tried to strike a locally popular note by alleging that wards without representation in the council did not get their share of the annual appropriations for local improvements. This statement is not borne out by the facts. The figures for the years 1910 and 1911 show a total appropriation of $2,132,881 for local improvements excluding appropriations for highways, sewers, bridges, and other improvements in which the city as a whole is interested. Of this sum, $795,163 was used in four districts which had no representative, as the term was formerly used in the council. The entire membership in the council came from six districts of the city, or seventeen wards. Distributing the amount spent on these districts among the seventeen wards would result in an average of $78,689 each, with which an average of $90,395 for each of the eight wards in unrepresented districts compares very favorably. Five members of the council of nine live in three wards whose appropriations for the last two years for local improvements make a total of $133,000. This is only one-sixteenth of the total appropriated, and the remaining fifteen-sixteenths is for districts which all together had only a minority in the council. Such evidence is an interesting corroboration of the sound conclusion that the elimination of sectional representation is an important step toward the carrying out of the unit idea in comprehensive city planning.
PLANNING COMMISSIONS
1. HISTORY
The appointment of planning commissions is the most recent step in the development of the unit idea in city planning. In theory, the function of this new agency is to correlate the official plans prepared in the various municipal departments, to pass upon unofficial plans or suggestions for improvement, and to make plans of its own in all cases where no existing agency has jurisdiction. Hartford, Connecticut, was the first to establish such a commission under a resolution of the Connecticut Legislature of 1907.[161] The Chicago plan commission dates from 1909; the Baltimore and Detroit commissions from the following year.
In 1911 Pennsylvania and New Jersey passed general acts enabling cities of the second class (Pittsburgh and Scranton) in Pennsylvania and cities of the first class in New Jersey, to create an additional executive department to be known as the department of city planning. In 1913, by general law, New York state authorized the appointment of planning commissions in all cities and incorporated villages; Pennsylvania extended the act of 1911 with important amendments to cities of the third class, and Massachusetts made planning commissions mandatory in all cities and towns of over 10,000. In the same year by special act of the Connecticut Assembly plan commissions were authorized for the cities of New Haven and West Hartford, following the precedent of Hartford; in Ohio, Cleveland[162] and Dayton included city planning commissions in their new city charters.
The following list of active plan commissions does not include temporary commissions appointed merely to make a report or prepare a city plan.
TABLE 8.—YEARS IN WHICH PLANNING COMMISSIONS WERE AUTHORIZED, AND SOURCE OF AUTHORIZATION, FOR THE 54 CITIES OR TOWNS HAVING PLANNING COMMISSIONS IN APRIL, 1914
========================+====+========== City |Year|Authorized | | by ————————————————————————+————+—————————— Hartford, Conn. |1907|Act Chicago, Ill. |1909|Ordinance Baltimore, Md. |1910|Act Detroit, Mich. |1910|Ordinance Jersey City, N. J. |1911|Act Newark, N. J. |1911|Act St. Louis, Mo. |1911|Ordinance Pittsburgh, Pa. |1911|Act Philadelphia, Pa. |1911|Ordinance Salem, Mass. |1911|Ordinance Lincoln, Neb. |1911|Ordinance Trenton, N. J. |1912|Ordinance Cincinnati, Ohio |1913|Ordinance Scranton, Pa. |1913|Act Schenectady, N. Y. |1913|Ordinance Pittsfield, Mass. |1913|Act Fitchburg, Mass. |1913|Act Waltham, Mass. |1913|Act Lawrence, Mass. |1913|Act Lowell, Mass. |1913|Act Springfield, Mass. |1913|Act Northampton, Mass. |1913|Act Holyoke, Mass. |1913|Act Malden, Mass. |1913|Act Louisville, Ky. |1913|Ordinance New Haven, Ct. |1913|Act New London, Ct. |1913|Ordinance Bridgeport, Ct. |1913|Ordinance Erie, Pa. |1913|Act Providence, R. I. |1913|Ordinance Adams, Mass. (town) |1913|Act Chelsea, Mass. |1913|Act Chicopee, Mass. |1913|Act Cambridge, Mass. |1913|Act Chester, Pa. |1913|Act Easton, Pa. |1913|Act Syracuse, N. Y. |1914|Act Meadeville, Pa. |1914|Act Reading, Pa. |1914|Act Scranton, Pa. |1914|Act Harrisburg, Pa. |1914|Act Oil City, Pa. |1914|Act Boston, Mass. |1914|Act Gloucester, Mass. |1914|Act Haverhill, Mass. |1914|Act Melrose, Mass. |1914|Act Medford, Mass. |1914|Act Newton, Mass. |1914|Act Newburyport, Mass. |1914|Act Somerville, Mass. |1914|Act Taunton, Mass. |1914|Act Watertown, Mass. (town) |1914|Act Framingham, Mass. (town)|1914|Act Binghamton, N. Y. |1914|Act ————————————————————————+————+——————————
A suburban metropolitan plan commission was also created in 1913 for Pennsylvania cities of the first class (Philadelphia), to have jurisdiction over a district comprising the cities within 25 miles of Philadelphia. This commission is to be composed of fifteen members appointed by the governor of the state. Its aim is to secure “coordinating comprehensive plans of highways and roads, parks and parkways, and all other means of intercommunication; water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal, collection and disposal of garbage, housing, sanitation and health, playgrounds, civic centers, and other public improvements that will affect the character of the district as a whole or more than one political unit within the district.”[163] The aims of the commission can be realized only by recommendation to the several governmental units contained in the district. This legislation is particularly interesting since it is the first successful attempt to create a metropolitan planning commission.
The commission of inquiry appointed by the governor of Massachusetts in 1911 presented to the legislature of 1912 a draft for just such a planning commission, which contained a novel feature for getting its plans carried out. Massachusetts is well supplied with executive commissions with some planning functions. It has a highway board, a grade crossing commission, a transit commission, a gas and electric light commission, a railroad commission, a metropolitan park commission, and a metropolitan water and sewer board, all with jurisdiction in the metropolitan district. The commission of inquiry wisely recommended the necessity of keeping these existing commissions in office. Their tasks were large enough.
The new commission was to be distinctly a planning and not an executing body. Its province was to be suggestion, advice, supervision, and correlation. The cities and towns of the metropolitan district were to be offered, for the consummation of improvements classed as metropolitan by the planning commission, the credit of the state and a direct contribution toward the cost of improvements by the state and by the metropolitan district at large, if the local unit accepted in its development the plan of the commission. The device thus incorporated in the bill recognized two strongly rooted attributes in municipal character—jealousy of local self-government and openness to persuasion when the persuasion is golden. It distinctly kept hands off of metropolitan commissions, county commissions, and local governments, by the provision that all improvements should be executed by the body that would have executed them before the passage of the bill. It offered merely to provide a plan for the whole district and help on the financial burden. All improvements in the metropolitan district submitted to the proposed planning commission were to be classified as local improvements, as ordinary metropolitan improvements, or as extraordinary improvements. In the case of purely local improvements the locality stood the entire financial burden; in the case of ordinary metropolitan improvements the localities in which the improvement was located paid 65 per cent of the entire cost, the metropolitan district 20 per cent and the state 10 per cent; in the case of an extraordinary metropolitan improvement the distribution of the expense was to be determined by a commission appointed by the supreme court of the state.
A feature of very real financial assistance was offered by the provision that towns or cities of the district might borrow money to meet the expense of metropolitan improvements, and this loan would not be considered in reckoning the debt limit. The weakness of the device is in the provision that 20 per cent of the cost of metropolitan improvements should be paid by the entire district. It is very questionable whether there is unity enough in any metropolitan district to allow a fixed assessment over the whole district for an improvement where the most direct benefit is to only two or three towns. But this interesting experiment did not survive the legislative hearing. It was defeated not so much because of opposition to the principle of the bill as out of real or imaginary fear in the minds of the political leaders in the towns and cities about Boston, who see in any plan for a more unified development of the metropolitan district the domination of Boston.
Another legislative experiment in city planning which did not come to maturity should also be mentioned. In 1910 the city of Seattle adopted an amendment to the city charter by the addition of a new article which created a municipal plans commission. Seattle was just then finishing some costly reconstruction, washing away grades and widening important thoroughfares, and the wisdom of avoiding such an experience again appealed to the city with peculiar emphasis. The amendment put on the commission the duty of procuring plans for the arrangement of the city with a view to such expansion as would meet probable future demands. Of the twenty-one members of the commission seven represented the city or county government, and fourteen were appointed by the mayor from nominations of fourteen groups representing architects, engineers, business, real estate, the water front owners, and the public service corporations. The commission served without compensation but was authorized to employ experts, not exceeding three, to prepare a comprehensive plan.
So far there is nothing new in the legislation, but the next provisions are unique. The report was to be presented to the mayor and council not later than December 30, 1911, and
They shall cause the recommendations of the commissions to be submitted to the people at the next general or special election. If a majority of the voters shall favor the adoption of said plan so reported it shall be adopted and shall be the plan to be followed by the city executive departments in the growth, evolution, and development of the city of Seattle until modified or amended at some subsequent election.
After a most thoroughgoing study by an expert, the commission presented an excellent plan and went out of existence September 30, 1911. There was no provision in the legislation for educating the people sufficiently to enable them to cast an intelligent vote. The Seattle experiment is interesting in being the first attempt to make the whole electorate directly responsible for the direction of the city’s growth. It is in accordance with the democratic ideas of legislation which have come out of the west. The people were not ready for so big a program and defeated the project at the polls in the spring of 1912.
No one of these commissions has had a history long enough to be judged by its accomplishments. The Hartford commission, which is the oldest, has fulfilled one of its duties by the publication of a preliminary report embodying the recommendations of the advisory architects for a plan of the city. Its chief activity outside of this has been along lines similar to these employed by the Baltimore topographical survey commission. Detroit’s commission, after working without adequate appropriation for two years, has started the preparation of a plan. The Newark commission under expert advice has prepared two reports; one preliminary in character reviewing the general problem and making some recommendations in regard to the improvement of street lines and grades and street car operations; the other, a special study of a most congested point in Newark at the junction of Broad and Market streets. Other commissions have outlined plans of activity.
2. THE FUNCTIONS OF A CITY PLANNING COMMISSION
The effectiveness of any city planning commission is bound to be dependent on the attitude of other existing administrative agencies which have as a part of their function the planning and execution of public improvements. This attitude does not spring merely from self-interest of the older agencies. If, for instance, the street commission or the bureau of survey is doing its work of planning a street system well and seeing that parts of it get constructed at the proper time, there would seem to be little in this line for a planning commission. The same may be said of the park commission, the school board, and others. The city, in other words, may have administrative agencies which are covering practically the entire field of municipal effort in planning the streets, the parks, the public buildings, and other works.
The legislation under which city plan commissions are established recognizes the difficulty in the creation of a new administrative body whose powers may overlap those of existing agencies. This is evidenced particularly in the provision covering membership and scope of powers. Co-operation with existing administrative agencies and with law making bodies is aimed at in Hartford, in St. Louis, and in Salem, Massachusetts, by having both the administrative and legislative side of the government represented on the commission. In each of these cities the mayor is ex-officio chairman of the city plan commission. In Hartford seven of the nine city plan commissioners are members of the city administration. Besides the mayor, the official members are the city engineer, president of the street commissioners, president of the park commissioners, the superintendent of parks, and a member from both branches of the city council. In St. Louis seven of the fifteen members are from official life, the mayor, the president of the board of public improvement, the street commissioner, the park commissioner, the building commissioner, the president of the city council, and the speaker of the house of delegates. In Salem, Massachusetts, the city government is represented in the commission by the mayor, the president of the board of aldermen, and the president of the common council. Detroit’s commissioner of public works, commissioner of parks and boulevards, and city engineer are ex-officio members of the plan commission, but without power to vote.
Further to avoid conflict with existing agencies, commissions are given very limited powers which make them hardly more than advisory bodies. That of Baltimore, for instance, has merely the duty of investigating all plans proposed for the extension of highways and the establishment of a civic center and other public improvements in connection therewith, and reporting the results of its investigations to the city council. Several commissions are charged with the constructive duty of preparing a systematic plan, and in connection therewith are given more or less control over private platting in order to compel conformity with the plan. The Detroit commission has an additional power similar to that given to a municipal art commission. Section 6 provides:
No work of art shall be removed, relegated or altered in any way, nor shall any property be acquired for park or boulevard purposes, nor playground, nor shall any property be condemned for the widening or extension of any park, boulevard or public playground unless the project has been submitted to and approved by the city plan commission; nor shall any gift to the city of a monumental character be accepted until the sketch, plan and location of the same has been approved by the city commission.
FIRST FUNCTION: TO SECURE CORRELATION OF EFFORTS. But assuming existing agencies which plan adequately for each class of the physical elements of a city and which carry out satisfactorily these several plans, there is still needed a permanent body, non-partisan in character, whose primary function shall be to harmonize the plans of existing agencies and to bring forward for execution those plans which are most demanded. This new agency should be the constant guardian of the city plan to which every question of planning policy should be referred, just as questions of financial policy are now referred to a finance commission in several cities of the United States.
That the lack of correlation is a serious problem is proved in the experience of many cities. There is no guarantee of co-operation between the several administrative departments with planning functions. There is, of course, some co-operation, but the maximum or minimum depends on nothing except the good sense and friendly feeling of bureau heads. It is not an unusual thing for the street department to spend some time and some money on resurfacing, only to have the street opened within a month by the water or sewer department for the installation of new water pipes or drains. And what is true of streets and highways can be illustrated in other departments of planning activity.
An improvement is now too seldom considered in its relation to the whole plan. Alternative schemes for a subway are discussed and determined in the interest of those whose property is affected, and the effect of either scheme on the relief of congestion or the opening of new territory to residence gets scant consideration. Street car companies and representatives of the city and property owners fasten on the city a transit system approaching a maze in intricacy and leaving focal points without connection. The transportation problem alone needs a trained agency constantly studying tendencies of retail trade, of the drift of waterfront activities, and constantly suggesting the need for new connecting links either for highways or transit lines.
However desirable in theory may be this vesting of control over physical development of the city in a new agency, there is little or no provision for it in the procedure of existing plan commissions. They are for the most part frankly advisory boards, and in some cases have no power even of suggestion unless called upon by the mayor and council. If the plan commission is to be an intelligent correlating agency, there must be provision for constant reference to it of new construction work of all municipal departments even at the risk of swamping the clerical force of the city planning commission by a mass of detail with little bearing on the city plan. And if any department proposes a serious violation of the plan for the whole city, the plan commission should have the opportunity to arrest the proposed violation long enough to get the point at issue before the public and their representatives in city council and thus fix the responsibility for whatever action is taken after careful consideration.
There are, of course, objections to this modified veto power. It tends to undo an excellent municipal reform by which has been achieved the concentration of responsibility for a public action, and it tends also to produce delay in the execution of public work. But with such a power a judicious and tactful commission would settle most differences in conference, and without it even an ideally constituted commission might be helpless. Just what form this veto shall take and how it shall affect the relations between existing administrative departments and the new agency will depend largely on local conditions, and this question with many others of organization and procedure must wait for more than a theoretical answer until existing commissions have had a longer history. Interesting in this connection is section 3 of the recent Pennsylvania act authorizing plan commissions in third class cities, which provides that all bills and ordinances must, upon introduction in the city council, be referred to the plan commission. The proposed measures may be disapproved by the plan commission but disapproval shall not operate as a veto.[164]
SECOND FUNCTION: TO FACILITATE FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS. The second function of the city planning commission is to suggest changes in the way of doing things calculated to facilitate the execution of a plan. The city planning field is peculiarly one for investigation and experimentation, and the city planning agency is as necessary in it as an experiment station in the fields of forestry and agriculture.
It took but little experimenting to prove the economic value of a flexible street which may be stretched to meet future demands. The flexibility is produced sometimes by imposing a building line set back from the street line varying distances,—even the minimum distance of 10 feet on either side providing an inexpensive increase in the street’s width of 20 feet. The same result is accomplished by the city’s acquiring a greater width than is at present necessary for the use of the street and allowing a certain portion of this width on either side to be used by the owners for garden purposes, but not for buildings of any kind.
Boston’s experiments with her narrow streets in congested retail districts have brought about the use of one-way streets and the regulations against standing vehicles. Other cities have taken a census of traffic conditions along important traffic ways and, in New York City at least, there have been attempts made to direct the lines of traffic particularly at congested centers.
It is possible to have a degree of flexibility even in an area closely built up with expensive buildings, such as downtown districts of any large city, if the planning board is given the right to modify the provisions of the building code in return for concessions from property owners, and a very necessary widening of streets is made possible which otherwise would be prohibitively expensive. In cities, for instance, which have established a height limitation for buildings, even in the central business district, owners fronting on narrow streets might grant to the city land enough to give the street adequate width if their loss in floor space was compensated, not in money but by allowing them to exceed the height limitation by the addition of other stories to their buildings. A building with a 100-foot frontage and 100-foot depth, 10 stories in height, would lose in actual floor area 10,000 feet by a grant to the city of 10 feet for sidewalk purposes along its entire frontage. By adding another story 10 to 15 feet in height, 9,000 feet of this loss would be returned. To determine the feasibility of such suggestions as this would be particularly the province of the city planning board.
Parks and playgrounds now purchased or appropriated at great expense and even then but meagerly supplied in many cities, should be reserved in advance of actual need. Where the problem has best been solved, as in the small parks and playgrounds of Chicago, the commissioners are able to locate wisely new parks and playgrounds in accordance with the density of population, as shown on maps of the city, which are kept up to date. The suggestion is that this can be done with sufficient accuracy before prices rise, and that a planning board is best qualified to make such a reservation because of its intimate knowledge of the trend of industry and other factors which determine the density of population.
The plan commission should be concerned not only with the original planning of the streets but with the changes of the street system made necessary by the location of new industries, the location of new terminal stations either for steam lines or rapid-transit lines, or the appearance of any new element which will create a focal center and attract a stream of travel. There is not a city of 100,000 in the United States which ought not today to widen streets or open new ones in order to give an adequate approach to travel centers. If this widening or opening were done at the time when it could be done most economically and when a planning board would advise it, if the problem were constantly studied by such a board, cities would be saved great outlays for reconstruction and great losses through failure to reconstruct.
3. BROAD OPPORTUNITIES OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION
The city planning board would be quick to discover desirable changes in legislation. The activity in city planning legislation of the 1913 Pennsylvania Legislature shows what may be accomplished by a commission intimately acquainted with the local difficulties which prevent satisfactory execution of plans. It passed a city planning act for the cities and towns within 25 miles of Philadelphia. It authorized the appointment of city planning commissions for cities of the third class. It increased the power of the Philadelphia art jury so that its approval is made necessary for the selection of the site as well as the design of public structures.[165] It granted to all the cities of the state the power to indicate on the official plan, reservations of parks and playgrounds in the same way as they now are allowed to establish an official plan for streets.
Various phases of the planning problem are from time to time made the subject of investigation by special commissions, as for instance, the Massachusetts commission appointed to consider the methods of land acquisition which have been described on page 106. Such studies might be better conducted by the plan commissions whose experience with other planning problems would be of great value.
Finally, the commission should at all times be a propagandist body educating the citizens to see the economy of planning in general and to decide every specific question of the city’s physical growth from the standpoint of city planning. The thoroughgoing work of the Chicago plan commission in this field is an example of what can be accomplished.
The creation of a city plan commission would be justified if it did nothing but safeguard the unit idea by correlating the work of other municipal departments in accordance with the city plan. If it is also to make clear to the citizens the value of city planning and to be a bureau of city planning research, its task will be so consuming that it need not take over any of the functions of existing agencies.
FOOTNOTES:
[147] For text of act see Appendix, p. 280.
[148] See Appendix for text of legislation, pp. 243 ff., 282.
[149] Forster _vs._ Scott, 136 N. Y. App. 577. See Appendix, p. 244. Edwards _vs._ Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529. See Appendix, p. 245.
[150] In re District of Pittsburgh, 2 W. and S. 320.
[151] Forbes St., 70 Pa. 125.
[152] Bush _vs._ McKeesport, 166 Pa. 57. See Appendix, p. 244.
[153] See Appendix, p. 243.
[154] See Appendix, p. 244.
[155] The act does not differ in principle from that creating a Town Board of Survey. See Appendix, p. 280.
[156] Edwards _vs._ Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529. See Appendix, p. 245.
[157] Report of Chief Engineer, Board of Estimate and Apportionment, 1912, page 66.
[158] Excludes areas for which final maps have been adopted.
[159] Charter of New York City as amended by Chapter 675 of the laws of 1907, Section 637.
[160] Pa. Acts, 1913, No. 456.
[161] See Appendix, p. 296.
[162] For text, see Appendix, p. 299.
[163] Act No. 226 of 1913.
[164] For text of the act, see Appendix, p. 290.
[165] For text of legislation see Appendix, p. 305.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
I. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF LAND
A. BUILDING LINES
1
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS. Article VI, Sect, 1.
Boulevards, Conditions for the establishment.
The Municipal Assembly may by ordinance, recommended by the Board of Public Improvements, establish and open boulevards or change existing streets into boulevards ... and may regulate the traffic thereon, and may exclude heavy driving thereon, or any kind of vehicle therefrom, and may exclude and prohibit the erection or establishment or maintenance of any business houses, or the carrying on of any business vocation on the property fronting on such boulevard, and may establish a building line to which all buildings, fences or other structures thereon shall conform.... Adequate compensation shall be allowed the owners of property fronting or bordering thereon for damages occasioned by the establishment of a building line on such boulevard, and by limiting the use to which such property may be put by the owners thereof.
2
ACTS OF INDIANA, 1909. Chap. 89, Sect. 7.
Building lines—Cities of 100,000 or over.
The Board of Public Works may establish a line determining the distance at which all structures to be erected upon any premises fronting any park, parkway, park boulevard or boulevard shall be erected, and may, in the name of the city acquire by condemnation the right to prevent the erection of, and to require the removal of, all structures outside of such lines.... The establishing of any building line outside of any park, parkway, or boulevard, as herein provided, in connection with the condemnation of the land for the same, shall be understood to be condemnation and the perpetual annihilation of all rights of the owners of property which shall front on such park, parkway or boulevard, or across which such building line shall run, to erect any building or structure whatever or any part thereof between such building line and such boulevard, park or parkway; or such result may be accomplished by absolute condemnation of the land, with perpetual and irrevocable free license to use and occupy such land between any building line established and the outside line of such park, parkway, park boulevard or boulevard for all purposes except the erection of buildings or other structures. No subdivision into lots of any lands lying within five hundred feet of such boulevards, parks or parkways shall be valid without the approval of such board of park commissioners.
3
REVISED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS. Chap. 48, Sect. 103, as amended by Chap. 572 of Acts of 1913.
Building lines in cities and towns.
If the city council of a city or if a town accepts the provisions of this section or has accepted the corresponding provisions of earlier laws, a building line not more than 40 feet distant from the exterior line of a highway or town way may be established in the manner provided for laying out ways, and thereafter no structures shall be erected or maintained between such building line and such way, except steps, windows, porticos and other usual projections appurtenant to the front wall of a building to the extent prescribed in the vote establishing such building line, and except that buildings or parts of buildings existing at the time of the establishment of the building line may be permitted to remain and to be maintained to such extent and under such conditions as may be prescribed in the vote establishing such building line. Whoever sustains damage thereby shall have the same remedies therefor as for damages sustained by the laying out of a town way.
4
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 24, 1910. 61st Congress, 2d Session. H. R. 19069. (Identical with S. 5715)
A BILL providing for the establishment of building lines and special building restrictions in the District of Columbia.
_Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled_, That the Commissioners of the District of Columbia are hereby authorized and empowered from time to time and at all times hereafter by public notice by advertisement published in some newspaper or newspapers of general circulation in the said District at least once a week for three successive weeks prior to the expiration of said notice, to designate any highway or highways, street or streets, or avenue or avenues in the District of Columbia now existing or which may hereafter be created or dedicated or condemned or purchased, or any part or parts thereof, the land fronting upon which shall thereafter be subject to certain building restrictions (which restrictions said commissioners may impose, alter, amend, or modify at the time such designation is made, or at any time or times thereafter), and the said highways, streets, or avenues, or part or parts thereof so designated shall be classed as Class A streets, and all other highways, streets, and avenues, or part or parts thereof shall be classed as Class B streets, and it shall be the duty of the said commissioners, and especially of the engineer commissioner, to give preference, in their discretion, to Class A streets in all recommendations and estimates for street improvements, and in all matters of sidewalk construction, laying of curbs, and the maintenance of the surface of the streets. And said commissioners are hereby further authorized and empowered in making, altering, amending, or modifying said special restrictions to include in whole or in part the _establishment of building lines, prohibitions as to the erection_ or _alteration of buildings designed or proposed to be used for business purposes, prohibitions as to the establishment of any place of business, and such requirements as to height of buildings, materials of construction, and architectural design as shall secure, in the judgment of said commissioners, the beautiful and harmonious appearance, as viewed from the public streets, of all structures to be erected or altered on the land to which said restrictions shall apply: Provided, That no such designation shall be made unless the owners of ninety per centum, or more, measured by the front foot, of the property fronting upon the street, avenue, or part or parts thereof under consideration shall in due form have dedicated, or granted, or conveyed, or assigned to the District of Columbia, in consideration of benefits received or to be received, easements in, to, and upon their property by virtue of which said special restrictions may be established_: Provided further, That the Commissioners of the District of Columbia may exercise their judgment as to whether such special restrictions shall cover only the ninety per centum or more of frontage, the owners of which have conveyed easements as above provided, or, in addition to such frontage, any portion of the remaining property fronting on the highway, street, or avenue, or part or parts thereof under consideration.
SECT. 2. That if said commissioners in the exercise of their judgment shall designate highways, streets, or avenues, or any part or parts thereof, and shall impose any special restrictions authorized by this Act so as to include property fronting on any such highway, street, or avenue which has not been dedicated or granted or conveyed or assigned to the District of Columbia, then, at any time within one year from the date of any such designation, and not thereafter, the owner or owners thereof, or any person having an interest therein, may recover as damages just compensation from the District of Columbia for the taking, if any, of the easements involved in said designation, subject to deduction for benefits; and said damages and benefits and all benefits herein mentioned shall be appraised by a commission composed of three capable and disinterested persons, to be appointed by the supreme court of the District of Columbia, holding a district court of the United States for said District, upon application, in writing, made within said year and not thereafter by such owner or owners or person having an interest against the District of Columbia; and upon failure of any such owner or owners or person having said interest to thus present such claim within said period, said right shall cease and determine.
SECT. 3. That the Commissioners of the District of Columbia be, and they are hereby, authorized and directed, as soon as practicable after every recovery of damages as just compensation as in this Act provided, to institute proceedings in said court to _assess the amount of said damages, the interest thereon_, and _all costs_ whatsoever of _the proceeding wherein the said damages have been ascertained against and upon all property covered by said designation, pro rata in proportion as said property may be found to be benefited, omitting from consideration all property found by the court in the proceeding to recover said damages as just compensation to have been damaged than more benefited_.
Sections 4-7 inclusive relate to the procedure in assessing benefits.
SECT. 8. That the Commissioners of the District of Columbia are hereby authorized to appoint an advisory commission to consist of the inspector of buildings of the District of Columbia, the municipal architect of said District, two architects to be nominated by the Washington Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, and a landscape gardener, the two first named officials to serve without compensation and the other members of said commission to receive such compensation as may be fixed, from time to time, by said commissioners. The duties of said commission shall be to advise said commissioners in all matters connected with the purposes of this Act, and to perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by said commissioners.
SECT. 9. That the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated, one half out of the revenues of the District of Columbia, and the other half out of any moneys in the United States Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the provisions of this Act.
SECT. 10. That it shall be the duty of all owners of, and persons and corporations interested in, any property fronting upon any highway, street, avenue, or part or parts thereof, designated or made subject to any special restriction, or on which any easement or right is taken or imposed by virtue of this Act, to comply, in every case, with such designation and restriction, and in event any such owner, person, or corporation, after notice from the Commissioners of the District of Columbia so to do, shall fail, neglect, or refuse to comply as aforesaid, the said commissioners are hereby authorized and empowered, in the name of the District of Columbia, by proceedings in equity in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, to obtain, without giving any bond or security whatsoever in such case at any time or in any court, an injunction or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to compel such compliance; and in the enforcement of such process the court shall have those powers ordinarily exercised by it in compelling obedience to its writs of injunction or mandamus; and the issuance of any notice as aforesaid by said commissioners shall be prima facie evidence of the right of the District of Columbia to a preliminary injunction on the filing of any bill, petition, or other proceeding; and the said court shall give precedence to every such case and shall adjudge and decide the same within thirty days after said case shall have been submitted; and the opinion of said court in every such case shall be rendered in writing and shall be filed in such case as a part of the record thereof.
B. BUILDING HEIGHTS
1
ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1898. (Chap. 452)
AN ACT relative to the height of buildings on and near Copley Square in the city of Boston.
Section 1. Any building now being built or hereafter to be built, rebuilt, or altered in the city of Boston upon any land abutting on St. James Avenue between Clarendon Street and Dartmouth Street, or upon land at the corner of Dartmouth Street and Huntington Avenue, now occupied by the Pierce Building, so called, or upon land abutting on Dartmouth Street now occupied by the Boston Public Library building, or upon land at the corner of Dartmouth Street and Boylston Street now occupied by the New Old South Church building, may be completed, built, rebuilt, or altered to the height of ninety feet and no more; and upon any land or lands abutting on Boylston Street between Dartmouth Street and Clarendon Street may be completed, built, rebuilt, or altered to the height of one hundred feet and no more; provided, however, that there may be erected on any such building above the limits hereinbefore prescribed, such steeples, towers, domes, sculptured ornaments, and chimneys as the board of park commissioners of said city may approve. _Section 2_ repeals St. 1896, c. 313, and St. 1897, c. 379, so far as they limit the height of buildings erected along the line of streets, parkways, or boulevards bordering on public parks. _Section 3_ provides for the payment of damages to any person owning or having an interest in an uncompleted building begun before the fourteenth day of January, 1898, which is affected by the act, and _Section 4_ provides for compensation to all persons sustaining damages to their property by reason of the limitation of the height of buildings prescribed by the act.
2
ATTORNEY GENERAL _vs._ HENRY B. WILLIAMS et als. 174 Mass. 476. 1899.
Information in equity by the attorney general to restrain the erection and maintenance of a building on Copley Square in Boston above the height of ninety feet prescribed by statute 1898, c. 452, entitled “An act relative to the height of buildings on and near Copley Square in the city of Boston.”
_Knowlton_, J. ... The first question raised by the report is whether the statute is constitutional. The streets mentioned in the statute are adjacent to Copley Square. On the case as now presented we must assume that Copley Square, in the language of the information, “is an open square and a public park intended for the use, benefit and health of the public, and is surrounded by buildings devoted to religious, charitable, and educational purposes, some of which contain books, manuscripts and works of art of great value, many of which are in their nature irreplaceable.”
... It adds to the public park rights in light and air and in the view over adjacent land above the line to which buildings may be erected. These rights are in the nature of an easement created by the statute and annexed to the park. Ample provision is made for compensation to the owners of the servient estates. In all respects the statute is in accordance with the laws regulating the taking of property by right of eminent domain, if the Legislature properly could determine that the preservation or improvement of the park in this particular was for a public use. The uses which should be deemed public in reference to the right of the Legislature to compel an individual to part with his property for a compensation, and to authorize or direct taxation to pay for it, are being enlarged and extended with the progress of the people in education and refinement. Many things which a century ago were luxuries or were altogether unknown, have now become necessaries. It is only within a few years that lands have been taken in this country for public parks. Now the right to take land for this purpose is generally recognized and frequently exercised.... It hardly would be contended that the same reasons which justify the taking of land for a public park do not also justify the expenditure of money to make the park attractive and educational to those whose tastes are being formed and whose love of beauty is being cultivated.... It is argued by the defendants that the Legislature, in passing this statute, was seeking to preserve the architectural symmetry of Copley Square. If this is a fact, and if the statute is merely for the benefit of individual property owners, the purpose does not justify the taking of a right in land against the will of the owner. But if the Legislature, for the benefit of the public, was seeking to promote the beauty and attractiveness of a public park in the capital of the Commonwealth and to prevent unreasonable encroachments upon the light and air which it had previously received, we cannot say that the law-making power might not determine that this was a matter of such public interest as to call for an expenditure of public money, and to justify the taking of private property. While such a determination should not be made without careful consideration, and while the governing tendency towards an enlargement of the field of public expenditure should be jealously watched and carefully held in check, a determination of this kind once made by the Legislature cannot be lightly set aside.
3
ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1904. Chap. 333.
AN ACT relative to the height of buildings in the city of Boston
Section 1. The city of Boston shall be divided into districts of two classes, to be designated districts A and B. The boundaries of the said districts, established as hereinafter provided, shall continue for a period of fifteen years, and shall be determined in such manner that those parts of the city in which all or the greater part of the buildings situate therein are at the time of such determination used for business or commercial purposes shall be included in the district or districts designated A, and those parts of the city in which all or the greater part of the buildings situate therein are at the said time used for residential purposes or for other purposes not business or commercial shall be in the district or districts designated B.
Section 2. Upon the passage of this act the mayor of the city shall appoint a commission of three members, to be called “Commission on Height of Buildings in the City of Boston.” The commission shall immediately upon its appointment give notice and public hearings, and shall make an order establishing the boundaries of the districts aforesaid, and, within one month after its appointment, shall cause the same to be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county of Suffolk. The boundaries so established shall continue for a period of fifteen years from the date of the said recording. Any person who is aggrieved by the said order may, within thirty days after the recording thereof, appeal to the commission for a revision; and the commission may, within six months after its appointment, revise such order, and the revision shall be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county of Suffolk, and shall date back to the original date of recording. The members of the commission shall serve until the districts have been established as aforesaid; and any vacancy in the commission caused by resignation, death or inability to act shall be filled by the mayor, on written application by the remaining members of the commission or of ten inhabitants of the city. The members of the commission shall receive such compensation as the mayor shall determine.
Section 3. In the city of Boston no building shall be erected to a height of more than one hundred and twenty-five feet above the grade of the street in any district designated A, and no building shall be erected to a height of more than eighty feet above the grade of the street in any district designated B. These restrictions shall not apply to grain or coal elevators or sugar refineries in any district designated A, nor to steeples, domes, towers or cupolas erected for strictly ornamental purposes, of fireproof material, on buildings of the above height or less in any district.
The supreme judicial court and the superior court shall each have jurisdiction in equity to enforce the provisions of this act, and to restrain the violation thereof.
Section 4. This act shall take effect upon its passage.
Approved May 13, 1904.
4
ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1905. Chap. 363.
AN ACT relative to the height of buildings in the city of Boston
Section 1. Within thirty days after the passage of this act the mayor of the city of Boston shall appoint a commission of three members to determine, in accordance with the conditions hereinafter provided, the height of buildings within the district designated by the commission on height of buildings in the city of Boston as district B, in accordance with chapter three hundred and thirty-three of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and four.
Section 2. Said commission shall immediately upon its appointment give notice and public hearings, and shall make an order establishing the boundaries of or otherwise pointing out such parts, if any, of said district B as it may designate in which buildings may be erected to a height exceeding eighty feet but not exceeding one hundred feet, and the height between eighty feet and one hundred feet to which buildings may so be erected, and the conditions under which buildings may be erected to said height, except that such order may provide for the erection of buildings as aforesaid to a height not exceeding one hundred and twenty-five feet in that portion of said district B which lies within fifty feet from the boundary line separating said district B from the district designated by the commission on height of buildings in the city of Boston as district A in accordance with said chapter three hundred and thirty-three, provided said boundary line divides the premises affected by such order from other adjoining premises both owned by the same person or persons, and within sixty days after its appointment shall cause the same to be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county of Suffolk. Any person who is aggrieved by such order may, within sixty days after the recording thereof, appeal to the commission for a revision; and the commission may, previous to the first day of January in the year nineteen hundred and six, revise such order, and the revision shall be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county of Suffolk and shall date back to the original date of recording. The boundaries so established shall continue for a period of fifteen years from the date of the recording of the order made by the commission on height of buildings in the city of Boston under chapter three hundred and thirty-three of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and four. The members of the commission shall receive such compensation as the mayor shall determine.
Section 3. Within such parts of district B as may be designated by the commission as aforesaid (which may, except as hereinafter provided, include any parts of said district B affected by prior acts limiting the height of buildings) buildings may be erected to the height fixed by the commission as aforesaid, exceeding eighty feet but not exceeding one hundred feet, or one hundred and twenty-five feet as hereinbefore provided, and subject to such conditions as may be fixed as aforesaid by the commission; but within the following described territory, to wit:—Beginning at the corner of Beacon street and Hancock avenue, thence continuing westerly on Beacon street to Joy street, thence continuing northerly on Joy street to Myrtle street, thence continuing easterly on Myrtle street to Hancock street, thence continuing southerly on Hancock street and Hancock avenue to the point of beginning, no building shall be erected to a height greater than seventy feet, measured on its principal front, and no building shall be erected on a parkway, boulevard or public way on which a building line has been established by the board of park commissioners or by the board of street commissioners, acting under any general or special statute, to a greater height than that allowed by the order of said boards; and no building upon land any owner of which has received and retained compensation in damages for any limitation of height or who retains any claim for such damages shall be erected to a height greater than that fixed by the limitation for which such damages were received or claimed.
Section 4. No limitations of the height of buildings in the city of Boston shall apply to churches, steeples, towers, domes, cupolas, belfries or statuary not used for purposes of habitation, nor to chimneys, gas holders, coal or grain elevators, open balustrades, skylights, ventilators, flagstaffs, railings, weather vanes, soil pipes, steam exhausts, signs, roof houses not exceeding twelve feet square and twelve feet high, nor to other similar constructions such as are usually erected above the roof line of buildings.
Section 5. This act shall take effect upon its passage.
Approved May 8, 1905.
5
WELCH _vs._ SWASEY. 193 Mass. 364
This was a petition for a writ of mandamus addressed to members of the board of appeal from the building commissioner of the city of Boston, ordering the respondents to direct the building commissioner to grant to the petitioners a permit to erect a building to the height of 120 feet, 6 inches. The permit had been refused by the building commissioner on the ground that the proposed structure would exceed the height limit provided by acts 1904, chapter 333, and acts 1905, chapter 383. The petitioners appealed on the ground that the statutes were unconstitutional and void.
The commission appointed by the mayor under chapter 383 of the acts of 1905, made the following orders: (1) In district B buildings may be erected on streets exceeding 64 feet in width to a height equal to one and a quarter times the width of the street on which the building stands, and if situated on more than one street the widest street should be taken, and the height of the building is to be made from the mean grade of the curbs of all streets upon which the building is situated, and not exceeding one hundred feet in any of them. (2) If the street is of uneven width, its width will be considered as the average width opposite the building to be erected. (3) The width of a street shall be held to include the width of any space on the same side of the street upon which a building stands, upon or within which space no building can be lawfully erected by virtue of any building line established by the board of street commissioners, or the board of park commissioners, acting under general or special laws. (4) All streets or portions of streets upon which buildings may be erected on one side only shall be considered as of a width of 80 feet as to that portion upon which building may be erected on one side only. (5) In the case of irregular or triangular open spaces formed by the intersection of streets, the width of the street shall be taken as the width of the widest street entering said space at the point of entrance. (6) No building shall be erected on a parkway, boulevard or public way on which a building line has been established by either of said boards acting under general or special laws to a height greater than allowed by said general or special law nor otherwise in violation of section 3 of said chapter 383, acts of 1905. (7) No building shall be erected to a height greater than eighty feet unless its width on each and every public street on which it stands will be at least one half its height. (8) Nothing in the order shall be construed as affecting any condition or restriction imposed by deed, agreement or by operation of law on any property in said district B.
The said commission further provides that buildings may be erected to a height not exceeding 120 feet in that portion of district B as established by the commission on the height of buildings in its order dated Dec. 3, 1904, which lies 50 feet westerly from the boundary line running from Columbus Av. to the center of Boylston St. separating district B from district A provided that said portion of district B is owned by same persons who own adjoining premises in district A.
KNOWLTON, C. J.: The principal question presented by this case is whether St. 1904, p. 283, c. 333, and St. 1905, p. 309, c. 383, and the orders of the commissioners appointed under them, relative to the height of buildings in Boston, are constitutional. A jurisdictional question, if the petitioner is entitled to relief, is whether a remedy can be given him by a writ of mandamus.
The principal question may be subdivided as follows: First, can the Legislature, in the exercise of the police power, limit the height of buildings in cities so that none can be erected above a prescribed number of feet; second, can it classify parts of a city so that in some parts one height is prescribed and in others a different height; third, if so, can it delegate to a commission the determination of the boundaries of these different parts, so as to conform to the general provisions of the statute; fourth, can it delegate to a commission the making of rules and regulations such as to permit different heights in different places, according to the different conditions in different parts of one of the general classes of territory, made in the original statute; fifth, if it can, are the rules and regulations made by the commissioners within the statute, and within the constitutional authority of the Legislature and its agents?
In the exercise of the police power the Legislature may regulate and limit personal rights and rights of property in the interest of the public health, public morals and public safety. Com. _vs._ Pear, 153 Mass. 242, 63 N. E. 719; Com. _vs._ Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 78 N. E. 136; California Reduction Co. _vs._ Sanitary Works, 199 U. S. 306-318, 26 Sup. Ct. 100, 50 L. Ed. 204. With considerable strictness of definition, the general welfare may be made a ground, with others, for interference with rights of property, in the exercise of the police power. Com. _vs._ Strauss, _ubi supra_.
The erection of very high buildings in cities, especially upon narrow streets, may be carried so far as materially to exclude sunshine, light and air, and thus to affect the public health. It may also increase the danger to persons and property from fire, and be a subject for legislation on that ground. These are proper subjects for consideration in determining whether in a given case, rights of property in the use of land should be interfered with for the public good.... In People _vs._ D’Oench, 111 N. Y. 359, 18 N. E. 562, a statute limiting the height of dwelling houses to be erected in the city of New York, was treated as unquestionably constitutional. See 1 Abbott, Mun. Corp. 237, 2 Tiedeman on State and Federal Control, 754....
... It is for the Legislature to determine whether the public health or public safety requires such a limitation of the rights of land owners in a given case. Upon a determination in the affirmative, they may legislate accordingly.
The next question is whether the General Court may establish different heights for different neighborhoods, according to their conditions and the uses to which the property in them is put. The statute should be adapted to the accomplishment of the purposes in which it finds its constitutional justification. It should be reasonable, not only in reference to the interests of the public, but also in reference to the rights of land owners. If these rights and interests are in conflict in any degree, the opposing considerations should be balanced against each other, and each should be made to yield reasonably to those upon the other side. The value of land and the demand for space, in those parts of Boston where the greater part of the buildings are used for purposes of business or commerce, is such as to call for buildings of greater height than are needed in those parts of the city where the greater part of the buildings are used for residential purposes. It was, therefore, reasonable to provide in the statute that buildings might be erected to a greater height in the former parts of the city than in the latter, even if some of the streets in the former are narrower than those in the latter.
The general subject is one that calls for a careful consideration of conditions existing in different places. In many cities there would be no danger of the erection of high buildings in such locations and of such a number as to affect materially the public health or safety, and no statutory restrictions are necessary. Such restrictions in this country are of very recent origin, and they are still uncommon. Unless they place the limited height at an extreme point, beyond which hardly any one would ever wish to go, they should be imposed only in reference to the uses for which the real estate probably will be needed, and the manner in which the land is laid out, and the nature of the approaches to it.
It was decided in Com. _vs._ Boston Advertising Company, 188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 601, 69 L. R. A. 817, 103 Am. St. Rep. 494, that a statute of this kind cannot constitutionally be passed for a mere esthetic object. It was said in Attorney General _vs._ Williams, 174 Mass. 476-480, 55 N. E. 77, that the statute then before the court, enacted under the right of eminent domain, with compensation for landowners, would have been unconstitutional if it had been passed “to preserve the architectural symmetry of Copley Square,” or “merely for the benefit of individual landowners.” The inhabitants of a city or town cannot be compelled to give up rights in property, or to pay taxes, for purely æsthetic objects; but if the primary and substantive purpose of the legislation is such as justifies the act, considerations of taste and beauty may enter in, as auxiliary. We are of opinion that the provision of St. 1904, p. 283, c. 333, for dividing parts of the city into two classes, in each of which there is a prescribed limit for the height of buildings, was within the power of the Legislature, and in accordance with the constitutional principle applicable to the enactment.
The delegation to a commission of the determination of the boundaries of these parts of the two classes was within the constitutional power of the General Court. The work of the commissioners under the first act was not legislation, but the ascertainment of facts, and the application of the statute to them for purposes of administration. Such subsidiary work by a commission is justified in many cases.
* * * * *
The delegation to a commission of the power to fix different heights in different places in the parts included in class B, under St. 1905, p. 309, c. 363, goes further, and allows the commissioners to make rules and regulations which are in the nature of subsidiary legislation. This is within the principle referred to in Brodbine _vs._ Revere, _ubi supra_, and in some of the other cases above cited. It is that under our system in Massachusetts, matters of local self-government might always be intrusted to the inhabitants of towns. On the establishment of cities this power is exercised by the city council, or by some board or commission representing the inhabitants. Even in towns such powers have long been exercised by local boards, for example,—by the board of health. Originally such representatives of the local authority were elected by the people; but for many years local boards, appointed by the governor or other executive authority, have sometimes been entrusted with the exercise of this legislative authority. It is true that they are further from the people than the members of a city council, for whom the people vote, but in a true sense they represent the inhabitants in matters of this kind. Our decisions cover this point also. Com. _vs._ Plaisted and Brodbine _vs._ Revere, _ubi supra_. It does not follow that all rules and regulations made under such a delegation of authority would be constitutional, merely because the original statute is unobjectionable. Such rules may be tested by the courts to see whether they are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purpose on which the constitutional authority rests, and whether they have a real, substantial relation to the public objects which the government can accomplish. A statute, ordinance or regulation will not be held void merely because the judges differ from the legislators as to the expediency of its provisions. But if it is arbitrary and unreasonable, so as unnecessarily to be subversive of rights of property, it will be set aside by the courts....
We do not see that the action of the commissioners, under St. 1905, was beyond their power under the Constitution. It was seemingly in accordance with the general purpose of the Legislature, and was directed to considerations which they deemed proper in adjusting the rights and interests of property owners and the public. The question is not whether the court deems all the provisions wise; but whether they appear to be outside of the constitutional power of the commission. In prescribing heights in the district, the commissioners might make the width of the streets on which a building was to be erected one factor to be considered. Their action in this particular relates wholly to buildings in class B, which includes only the residential parts of the city.
We cannot say that the prohibition of the erection of a building of a greater height than 80 feet in class B, unless its width “on each and every public street on which it stands will be at least one-half its height,” was entirely for æsthetic reasons. We conceive that the safety of adjoining buildings, in view of the risk of the falling of walls after a fire, may have entered into the purpose of the commissioners. We are of opinion that the statutes and the orders of the commissioners are constitutional.
We think that the court has jurisdiction to dispose of the case in the merits, under this petition for a writ of mandamus. The wrong alleged is that the building commissioner, and afterwards the board of appeal, refused to give the petitioner a permit to erect a building. It is conceded that he was not entitled to a permit if the statutes and orders referred to are constitutional. The petitioner alleges that the board of appeal refused to do their duty, and that his only effectual remedy is by a writ of mandamus, ordering them to grant a permit. The case comes within the general rule giving jurisdiction to issue such writs. Farmington River Water Power _vs_. County Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206-212; Carpenter _vs._ County Commissioners, 21 Pick. 258-259; Attorney General _vs._ Boston, 123 Mass. 460. See Locke _vs._ Selectmen of Lexington, 122 Mass. 290; Attorney General _vs._ Northampton, 143 Mass. 589, 10 N. E. 450.
The building commissioner and the board of appeals are not judicial officers. St. 1892, p. 471, c. 419; St. 1894, p. 494, c. 443. The fact that a refusal to act is founded on a mistake of law does not preclude a remedy by a writ of mandamus. In cases where the duty to perform an act depends solely on the question whether a statute or ordinance is constitutional and valid, the question may sometimes be determined on a petition for a writ of mandamus. Attorney General _vs._ Boston, 123 Mass. 450; Warren _vs._ Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; Larcom _vs._ Olin, 160 Mass. 102-110, 35 N. E. 113.
Petition dismissed.
6
WELCH, TRUSTEE, _vs._ SWASEY, et al. 29 U. S. Supreme Court Reporter. 567, Oct., 1908
In error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts to review a judgment denying a mandamus to compel the board of appeal from the building commissioner of the city of Boston to issue a building permit. Affirmed.
Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham:
The plaintiff in error duly applied to the justices of the supreme judicial court of the state of Massachusetts for a mandamus against the defendants, who constitute a board of appeal from the building commissioner of the city of Boston, to compel the defendants to issue a permit to him to build on his lot on the corner of Arlington and Marlborough streets, in that city. The application was referred by the justice presiding to the full court, and was by it denied (193 Mass. 364, 118 Am. St. Rep. 523, 79 N. E. 745), and the plaintiff has brought the case here by writ of error.
The action of defendants in refusing the permit was based on the statutes of Massachusetts, chap. 333 of the Acts of 1904, and chap. 383 of the Acts of 1905. The reason for the refusal to grant the building permit was because the building site for the proposed building was situated in one of the districts B, as created under the provisions of the acts mentioned, in which districts the height of the buildings is limited to 80, or, in some cases, to 100 feet, while the height of buildings in districts A is limited to 125 feet. The height of the building which plaintiff in error proposed to build and for which he asked the building permit was stated by him in his application therefor to be 124 feet, 6 inches.
The designation of what parts in districts B and upon what conditions a building could be therein erected more than 80 while not more than 100 feet high was to be made by a commission, as provided for in the act of 1905, and the commission duly carried out the provisions of the act in that respect. The sole reason for refusing the permit was on account of the proposed height of the building being greater than the law allowed.
The plaintiff in error contended that the defendants were not justified in their refusal to grant the permit, because the statutes upon which their refusal was based were unconstitutional and void; but he contended that, if they were valid, the defendants were justified in their refusal.
The court, while deciding that mandamus was a proper remedy, held that the statutes and the reports of the commissions thereunder were constitutional.
* * * * *
Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opinion of the court:
The ground of objection of plaintiff in error to this legislation is that the statutes unduly and unreasonably infringe upon his constitutional rights (a) as to taking of property without compensation; (b) as to denial of equal protection of the laws.
Plaintiff in error refers to the existence of a general law in Massachusetts, applicable to every city therein, limiting the height of all buildings to 125 feet above the grade of the street (Acts of 1891, Chap. 355), and states that he does not attack the validity of that act in any respect, but concedes that it is constitutional and valid. See also on same subject. Acts of 1892, Chap. 419, Par. 25, making such limitation as to the city of Boston. His objection is directed to the particular statutes because they provide for a much lower limit in certain parts of the city of Boston, to be designated by a commission, and because a general restriction of height as low as 80 or 100 feet over any substantial portion of the city is, as he contends, an unreasonable infringement upon his rights of property; also that the application of those limits to districts B, which comprise the greater part of the city of Boston, leaving the general 125-feet limit in force in those portions of the city which the commission should designate (being the commercial districts), is an unreasonable and arbitrary denial of equal rights to the plaintiff in error and others in like situation.
Stating his objections more in detail, the plaintiff in error contends that the purposes of the acts are not such as justify the exercise of what is termed the police power, because, in fact, their real purpose was of an esthetic nature, designed purely to preserve architectural symmetry and regular sky lines, and that such power cannot be exercised for such a purpose. It is further objected that the infringement upon property rights by these acts is unreasonable and disproportioned to any public necessity, and also that the distinction between 125 feet for the height of buildings in the commercial districts described in the acts, and 80 to 100 feet in certain other or so-called residential districts, is wholly unjustifiable and arbitrary, having no well-founded reason for such distinction, and is without the least reference to the public safety, as from fire, and inefficient as means to any appropriate end to be attained by such laws.
In relation to these objections the counsel for the plaintiff in error, in presenting his case at bar, made a very clear and able argument.
Under the concession of counsel, that the law limiting the height of building to 125 feet is valid, we have to deal only with the question of the validity of the provisions stated in these statutes and in the conditions provided for by the commissions, limiting the height in districts B between 80 and 100 feet.
We do not understand that the plaintiff in error makes the objection of illegality arising from an alleged delegation of legislative power to the commissions provided for by the statutes. At all events, it does not raise a Federal question. The state court holds that kind of legislation to be valid under the state Constitution, and this court will follow its determination upon that question.
We come, then, to an examination of the question whether these statutes with reference to limitations on height between 80 and 100 feet, and in no case greater than 100 feet, are valid. There is here a discrimination of classification between sections of the city, one of which, the business or commercial part, has a limitation of 125 feet, and the other, used for residential purposes, has a permitted height of buildings from 80 to 100 feet.
The statutes have been passed under the exercise of so-called police power, and they must have some fair tendency to accomplish, or aid in the accomplishment of, some purpose for which the legislature may use the power. If the statutes are not of that kind, then their passage cannot be justified under that power. These principles have been so frequently decided as not to require the citation of many authorities. If the means employed, pursuant to the statute, have no real, substantial relation to a public object which government can accomplish, if the statutes are arbitrary and unreasonable, and beyond the necessities of the case, the courts will declare their invalidity.
In passing upon questions of this character as to the validity and reasonableness of a discrimination or classification in relation to limitations as to height of buildings in a large city, the matter of locality assumes an important aspect. The particular circumstances prevailing at the place or in the state where the law is to become operative,—whether the statute is really adapted, regard being had to all the different and material facts, to bring about the results desired from its passage; whether it is well calculated to promote the general and public welfare,—are all matters which the state court is familiar with; but a like familiarity cannot be ascribed to this court, assuming judicial notice may be taken of what is or ought to be generally known. For such reason this court, in cases of this kind, feels the greatest reluctance in interfering with the well-considered judgments of the courts of a state whose people are to be affected by the operation of the law. The highest court of the state in which statutes of the kind under consideration are passed is more familiar with the particular causes which led to their passage (although they may be of a public nature) and with the general situation surrounding the subject-matter of the legislation than this court can possibly be. We do not, of course, intend to say that, under such circumstances, the judgment of the state court upon the question will be regarded as conclusive, but simply that it is entitled to the very greatest respect, and will only be interfered with, in cases of this kind, where the decision is, in our judgment, plainly wrong. In this case the supreme judicial court of the state holds the legislation valid, and that there is a fair reason for the discrimination between the height of buildings in the residential as compared with the commercial districts. That court has also held that regulations in regard to the height of buildings, and in regard to their mode of construction in cities, made by legislative enactments for the safety, comfort, or convenience of the people, and for the benefit of property owners generally, are valid. Atty. Gen. _vs._ Williams (Knowlton _vs._ Williams) 174 Mass. 476, 47 L. R. A. 314, 55, N. E. 77. We concur in that view, assuming, of course, that the height and conditions provided for can be plainly seen to be not unreasonable or inappropriate.
In relation to the discrimination or classification made between the commercial and the residential portion of the city, the state court holds in this case that there is reasonable ground therefor, in the very great value of the land and the demand for space in those parts of Boston where a greater number of buildings are used for the purposes of business or commercially than where the buildings are situated in the residential portion of the city, and where no such reasons exist for high buildings. While so deciding, the court cited, with approval. Com. _vs_. Boston Advertising Co. 188 Mass. 348, 69 L. R. A. 517, 108 Am. St. Rep. 494, 74 N. E. 601; which holds that the police power cannot be exercised for a merely esthetic purpose. The court distinguishes between the two cases, and sustains the present statutes. As to the condition adopted by the commission for permitting the erection, in either of the districts B, that is, the residential portion, of buildings of over 80 feet, but never more than 100, that the width on each and every public street on which the building stands shall be at least one half its height, the court refuses to hold that such condition was entirely for esthetic reasons. The chief justice said: “We conceive that the safety of adjoining buildings, in view of the risk of the falling of walls after a fire, may have entered into the purpose of the commissioners. We are of opinion that the statutes and the orders of the commissioners are constitutional.”
We are not prepared to hold that this limitation of 80 to 100 feet, while in fact a discrimination or classification, is so unreasonable that it deprives the owner of the property of its profitable use without justification, and that he is therefore entitled under the Constitution to compensation for such invasion of his rights. The discrimination thus made is, as we think, reasonable, and is justified by the police power.
It might well be supposed that taller buildings in the commercial section of the city might be less dangerous in case of fire than in the residential portion. This court is not familiar with the actual facts, but it may be that, in this limited commercial area, the high buildings are generally of fireproof construction; that the fire engines are more numerous and much closer together than in the residential portion, and that an unlimited supply of salt water can be more readily introduced from the harbor into the pipes, and that few women or children are found there in the daytime, and very few people sleep there at night. And there may, in the residential part, be more wooden buildings, the fire apparatus may be more widely scattered, and so situated that it would be more difficult to obtain the necessary amount of water, as the residence quarters are more remote from the water front, and that many women and children spend the day in that section, and the opinion is not strained that an undiscovered fire at night might cause great loss of life in a very high apartment house in that district. These are matters which, it must be presumed, were known by the legislature, and whether or not such were the facts was a question, among others, for the legislature to determine. They are asserted as facts in the brief of the counsel for the city of Boston. If they are, it would seem that ample justification is therein found for the passage of the statutes, and that the plaintiff in error is not entitled to compensation for the reasonable interference with his property rights by the statutes. That, in addition to these sufficient facts, considerations of an esthetic nature also entered into the reasons for their passage, would not invalidate them. Under these circumstances there is no unreasonable interference with the rights of property of the plaintiff in error, nor do the statutes deprive him of the equal protection of the laws. The reasons contained in the opinion of the state court are, in our view, sufficient to justify their enactment. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
7
ABSOLUTE HEIGHT LIMITATIONS
Baltimore, Md. 175 feet. Boston 125 ft. or 2½ times width of widest street on which building fronts in section. 80 ft. in residence section. Charleston, S. C. 125 ft. or 2½ times width of widest street, as in Boston. Chicago 200 ft. Cleveland 200 ft. or 2½ times width of widest street, as in Boston. Erie, Pa. 200 ft. or 2½ times width of widest street, as in Boston. Los Angeles 150 ft. Manchester, N. H. 125 ft. Newark, N. J. 200 ft. Portland, Oregon 160 ft. Scranton, Pa. 125 ft. Worcester, Mass. 125 ft. Denver, Colo. 12 stories. Providence, R. I. 120 ft.
C. “SURVEY LINES”
FURMAN ST. 17 Wendell (N. Y.) 649. 1836
By a law of April 12, 1816, section 18, a survey of the village of Brooklyn was to be made and the resulting map was to constitute a permanent plan for laying out the streets of Brooklyn. The act provided that owners who violated the plan were not to receive damages.
The court, in upholding this provision, found that unless damages were withheld from owners building in designated lines of streets, section 18 of the act would be nugatory. The legislation clearly intended that improvements within the street lines should not be paid for. “By expensive erections an owner otherwise might bring an enormous burden upon others for opening the street.”
* * * * *
This decision was cited with approval and followed in the case of Re Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, decided in 1841, 2 W. & S. 320. This language is found in the opinion: “The mere laying out of streets cannot be said of itself to be a taking of the property of individuals, upon which they are laid out, for public use at some future day, but rather a designation of what may be required for that purpose thereafter, so that the owners of the property may in due time be fully apprised of what is anticipated and regulate the subsequent improvements, which they shall make thereon accordingly.
... Until the actual opening “the owners thereof continue not only to hold the same interest in them, but likewise to have the right to enjoy and in the same manner as they did previously.”
In the case of Bush _vs._ McKeesport, City, 166 Pa. 57, the court upheld the validity of the following clause: “No person shall hereafter be entitled to recover any damages for any buildings or the improvements of any kind which shall or may be placed or constructed upon or within the lines of any located street or alley, after the same shall have been located or ordered by counsel.”
But the New York court has since come to a different conclusion in the case of Forster _vs._ Scott, 136 App. Div. 577, and the Massachusetts court has also found against the constitutionality of such a provision. In Forster _vs._ Scott, the plaintiff had given a deed to the defendant warranting against incumbrances. A proposed street was located on the plaintiff’s land. The court held that this was not an incumbrance since the act of 1882, chapter 419 was unconstitutional in providing that “No compensation shall be allowed for any building, erection or construction which at any time, subsequent to the filing of the maps, plans, etc., may be built in part or in whole upon or through any street, avenue, road, public square, or place.”
“Whenever a law deprives the owner of the beneficial use and free enjoyment of his property, or imposes restraints upon such use and enjoyment that materially affect its value without legal process or compensation it deprives him of his property within the meaning of the constitution.”
EDWARDS _vs._ BRUORTON, 184 Mass. 529
KNOWLTON, C. J.
“This is an action for breach of a covenant in a deed. A public street called Jersey Street was laid out by the street commissioners of Boston over a part of the premises under authority of statute 1891,