Business Administration: Theory, Practice and Application. [Vol. 1] Business Economics

Part 8

Chapter 83,973 wordsPublic domain

It has since been found necessary, however, to modify both the theory and practice of this extreme individualism in order to protect the interests of various classes of society, especially the laborer. The legal theory still is that “today the labor contract is perfectly free: either side may make whatever contract he can get the other side to sign. Not only this, but either side may freely combine to demand any form of contract from the other side, as mere combinations alone are now made perfectly legal.”[11] In practice, however, this complete freedom has been greatly modified by factory acts, acts restricting the hours and conditions of employment of women and children, anti-truck acts, laws providing for weekly payments, guarding of machinery, limiting the hours of labor, and on the other hand prohibiting intimidation and molesting. For the most part these laws have applied to women and children, who are thought less capable of guarding their own interests, and to a much less degree to labor 66 contracts made by men, who have been considered better able to make equal contracts with employers. But concerning certain conditions of employment it has been realized that even adult males are not capable of securing equitable bargains, and along these lines the nominal freedom of the labor contract has been decidedly abridged. The attitude of the courts toward such legislation shows that they have declared many laws unconstitutional on the ground that they infringe upon the right of free contract, but in the long run seem inclined to uphold as much of this restrictive legislation as seems necessary to obviate the undoubtedly evil results that flow from this real inequality of employer and laborer.

It is a very vital and important practical economic problem that presents itself in this connection. How far shall we carry this regulative principle, or how far shall we insist upon the principle of freedom? Many labor leaders are again asking for an effectual control of the labor contract, not by the action of trade unions, but by the direct legislation of the state. What shall be our attitude to this demand? Before we can fairly answer this question we must consider somewhat more fully the character of the bargain that takes place between an employer and an individual workman, and the nature of the commodity that the laborer has to sell.

It has already been stated that the commodity which the laborer brings upon the market is his labor, that is, himself, his time, and his energies. But these wares are peculiar and differ in several important respects from ordinary marketable commodities. In the first place, labor is like a perishable commodity which must be sold at once if the owner is not to incur loss. The laborer has usually little if any capital by which to support himself in case he cannot find work, and may be compelled to make a forced sale of his labor, that is, to accept unduly low wages. In this respect then he is at a disadvantage 67 in bargaining with his employer. A second peculiarity of the sale of labor is that the laborer and his work are inseparable. The seller of an ordinary commodity disposes of it absolutely when he makes a sale. “It matters nothing to the seller of bricks whether they are to be used in building a palace or a sewer; but it matters a great deal to the seller of labor, who undertakes to perform a task of given difficulty, whether or not the place in which it is to be done is a wholesome and a pleasant one, or whether or not his associates will be such as he cares to have.” The person who buys this labor necessarily directs the application of it to the task in hand, and thus controls very largely the place, the sanitary and social conditions, the hours, the character, and safety of the work. In the third place, the superior knowledge and intelligence of the employers gives them an advantage in bargaining with their employes, while the reluctance of employers to “spoil the labor market” often prevents that freedom of competition which is supposed to secure to the laborer his full share of the product he helps to produce.

In view of these facts we may fairly conclude that workmen are inferior to employers as bargainers and that protective legislation is necessary in order to put them on a real equality. “When laborers have to make a forced sale of their labor, their freedom of contract is more nominal than real. When women and children stand individually before the manager of hundreds of thousands of capital, it is possible that there may be little freedom and less equality in the contract by which they sell their services.”[12] It is clear that between two parties of such unequal knowledge, resources and ability as a laborer and his employer the labor contract cannot be entirely free and equal. While trade unions, by combining isolated workmen into formidable and unified groups, have immeasurably increased their bargaining 68 strength, yet legislation has also been found necessary to remedy the disadvantages already enumerated. It is realized that “there is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.” In the opening section of this text attention was called to the fact that economic freedom or liberty was one of the corner stones of our modern industrial society. But freedom can best be secured by securing equality and responsibility. Factory legislation and labor laws are designed to correct the inequalities imposed by nature or involved in the very nature of capitalistic production. Direct interference by the state in the freedom of contract is justified as leading to a more real and certain equality and liberty. But while we may thoroughly approve the principle of labor legislation it is difficult to know at what point we should stop. A leading American authority on the law of labor has stated[13] that “the industrial laborer at least is beginning to be a privileged class in the law.” On the other hand, it was possible for Disraeli to say as late as 1875, after the passage of the Employers and Workmen Act by the British Parliament, “for the first time in the history of this country employer and employed sit under equal laws”--so recently were the legal disabilities removed under which the English workmen had suffered up to this time.[14] The pendulum has swung so rapidly and so far in labor’s direction in the last generation that it is a fair question how far it will--or should--continue to go.

VIII. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

As modern capitalistic production caused the growth of a distinct wage-earning class and brought about a sharp separation between employers and laborers, and as the latter were thrown upon their own 69 resources under the prevailing theories of free competition and free contract, it was inevitable that they should organize to secure their interests as a class. The growth of labor organizations has been greatest in those countries where the laborer has been forced to depend mostly upon his own efforts for protection and improvement, namely, in England and the United States. On the continent of Europe, on the other hand, where the individual has been accustomed to look to the government for the redress of industrial grievances, there has been a much less vigorous and spontaneous development of such organizations. They are a product of the nineteenth century and had their origin in modern machine production.

The growth of labor organizations in the United States has proceeded hand in hand with the industrial development of this country, and has been especially rapid since the Civil War. Two distinct types of trade unions may be noted--the local and the national (or international) unions. The former, which comprises members who live and work in the same locality, is the primary unit, and dates back to the beginning of the century. Each local union, even when subordinate to a national organization, is a self-governing unit, and is absolutely democratic. Its relation to the national body has been well compared to that of one of our states to the United States. The first national union was not formed until 1850, but now these far surpass the locals in importance. Their government is representative, as they are made up of local unions. The great majority of the national trade unions are bound together in the powerful federal organization, the American Federation of Labor. The membership of this body numbers considerably over 1,000,000, while the railroad unions, which are not connected with it, claim about 125,000 more. Probably not far from 1,500,000 persons in the United States belong to labor organizations, which is about 10 per cent of the total working population or about 15 per 70 cent of those engaged in trade and transportation, manufacturing and mechanical pursuits. While this does not seem a very large proportion and is not as large as the membership of British trade unions, yet it must be remembered that they constitute on the whole the elite of the labor world and exercise an authority and power out of proportion to their numbers. Many other workmen, who do not themselves belong to the unions, follow their lead and are directly affected by their actions.

Historically the two most important national organizations in this country have been the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor, and they represent such different principles that it will be worth while to describe them. The Knights of Labor was organized in 1869 as a local union of seven garment cutters and had a meteoric career, counting a membership of 730,000 in 1886, the year of its greatest strength. It was a national amalgamation of mixed local assemblies composed of workers of all trades who lived in the same locality. It held the theory that the interests of all members of the laboring class are identical and must be cared for at the same time, if possible, by political action, by co-operation, and by education. In 1886, however, it entered upon a series of disastrous strikes; later it came into conflict with trade unions which had not joined its ranks and were opposed to its policies; and finally it became entangled in politics. As it lost in influence and strength its place was taken by the American Federation of Labor, which was its very opposite in organization and government. This latter body is a “confederation of trade and labor unions,” each trade being organized separately into local unions which are given great autonomy, these unions alone being represented in the national body. Only matters of general interest come before it, all local trade matters being left to the local unions. In 1903 it claimed a membership of 1,745,000.

More important than the history of labor organizations is a knowledge 71 of their objects and methods. The primary purpose is of course to control the conditions of labor and to substitute the principle of collective bargaining for individual contract. As one of the most effective ways to secure this result they aim at a more or less complete monopoly of the labor market. This they may do by bringing all workers in a trade within the union or by preventing non-union men from working. The first of these is called the inclusive method,[15] and if successful makes the union the sole seller of the kind of labor controlled by its members. It is a monopoly of the laborers against the employers and is sought to be enforced by inducing men to join the union either by persuasion or coercion, the latter finding expression in the strikes against the employment of non-union men and the insistence upon the “closed shop.” The other form of monopoly consists in the exclusion of new members from the trade and in a control of employment; this is a monopoly of a small group against their fellow-workmen. It is enforced by regulating the entrance to the trade, making it difficult or expensive, or by limiting the number of apprentices. Sometimes, as in the Chicago Building Trades in 1900, they have united with their employers by means of “exclusive agreements” to raise wages and prices of the finished products at the same time, and thus jointly to mulct the public. Such efforts to monopolize the labor market have their counterparts in the organization of capital, as we have seen. In practice such a labor monopoly has sometimes been used to improve and elevate conditions, just as sometimes a capitalistic monopoly has reduced prices below the competitive point. In general, however, we must condemn monopoly on principle in the competitive field and insist that freedom and opportunity be given to all on as equal terms as possible. Of the two 72 forms of trade union monopoly, the former alone, which endeavors to make it all comprehensive and to enforce generally union conditions, can be economically justified.

“The establishment of a standard rate of wages may perhaps be said to be the primary object of trade union policy. Without the standard rate the trade union, such as it is, could have no existence.”[16] The purpose of the union is to substitute collective bargaining for individual agreements and thereby to improve the condition of its members. But if a single bargain is to determine the pay of a large number of men, there must be a common standard. In every employment on a large scale the men are necessarily grouped together and their pay is determined by a common rule. This is true even in non-union shops. It is generally assumed that the standard rate of labor organizations means a uniform wage for each member, but this is not the case; it means rather a uniform rate of pay to all for the same performance. In the case of piece work, it could manifestly not mean anything else; but a large number of labor leaders object to piece work. They insist that a standard wage means a minimum wage, and that by the establishment of such a minimum the whole standard of efficiency and the plane of competition are raised, as the employers cannot then afford to hire any but competent workmen. The question immediately presents itself as to what is to become of the older or partially disabled men, who are no longer able to earn the standard or minimum wage? In England they are practically guaranteed a subsistence by the union; in this country the union not infrequently exempts them from the provisions as to the standard wage. When the rule is enforced there is certainly a real hardship for these men. But from the employers there comes the more serious complaint that the effect of 73 the standard wage is to reduce to a dead level the efficient and the inefficient; that it is a maximum wage and that the efficient and industrious are prevented from earning more than a fixed amount. There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this charge; the man who hastens the pace is said to be taking “blood money,” and sometimes a maximum wage is set which the members are forbidden to exceed. On the other hand, it may fairly be said that while the union regulation of wages does tend to produce greater uniformity, the union rate is usually higher than the competitive rate would be, that is, wages are leveled up, not down; and finally, that territorial variations make the local rate conform to local conditions.

A reduction in the hours of labor has been even more strenuously urged by progressive labor leaders in the United States than an increase in wages. “Organize and control your trade and shorten your hours,” is their contention, “and wages will take care of themselves.” Their arguments in favor of a general shortening of the working day are twofold. In the first place, owing to the intensity and strain of work under modern machine methods, the worker cannot work efficiently more than eight or nine hours a day. The work is too exacting and the strain on the attention too great; it is a noticeable fact that most of the accidents in industrial establishments occur in the last hour or two of the working day. Not only that, but the laborer is entitled to his share of industrial progress in the form of more leisure, giving him time for a better family and social life, affording opportunity for intellectual improvement, and permitting the development of more rational and higher wants. With the improvement in the condition of the laboring classes, will go the elevation of society as a whole.

The second argument in favor of shorter hours put forward by the trade unionist, is economic rather than social. He argues that a “reduction 74 of hours will diminish the supply of labor in the market, and so will raise its price. It will make room for the unemployed, and so will remove the depressing influence of their competition.” There is involved in this contention the familiar lump-of-labor argument of the trade unionist: there is just so much work to be done, and if some men do each a little less there will be more for others. By shortening the hours of labor of everybody employment will be made more general, and the work will be better distributed. Now the economists in general have supported the trade unions in their demands for a shorter working day, but they have done so because they believed that the product of industry would not thereby be diminished. They have seen that when the hours of labor were reduced the laborer was less rapidly worn out physically, that he could work more rapidly for a short time, and that his increased leisure and pay, if rationally used, made him a more intelligent and efficient worker. In other words, a reduction in the hours of labor from 15 a day to 12, to 10, and even in some cases to 8, was not attended by a parallel reduction in the output, but the latter remained about the same. This is the great economic justification of the shorter working day, and as long as this can go on without materially affecting the product of industry it must be approved. If, however, the latter is decreased there will be less to divide and then the relative disadvantages of a smaller dividend must be weighed against the advantages of increased leisure. Of course the point to which the number of hours can be reduced without lessening the product can only be determined by experiment, and will differ in different trades, but it is inevitable that until this point is reached the pressure of the trade unions for shorter working days--or for more holidays or half-holidays--will not be successfully resisted.

Turning now from theory to fact, we find that there has been a great 75 improvement in the condition of labor in this respect. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the almost universal working day was, as McMaster tells us, from sun to sun. As factories grew up the habits of agricultural labor were carried over into industrial occupations, and working days of 16 and 18 hours were not uncommon. In 1903 the average length of the working day in the United States was 9.6 hours. This great reform may fairly be credited to the efforts of organized labor itself, for without their insistence and struggles it is unlikely that it would have been voluntarily granted by employers.

The limitation of output results almost necessarily from the above-mentioned practices of the unions: reduction of hours, prohibition of piece work, and the standardization of wages all tend to restrict the output of the individual worker. But some of the unions have gone further and have directly limited the amount that could be produced during a given period by the laborer. This has been particularly true of British unions and is the subject of common complaint by English employers and writers, but illustrations may easily be found in the United States. Thus in Chicago in 1900 “the lathers limited a day’s work to twenty-five bundles of lath, for which they received $3; they had formerly done thirty-five bundles for a daily wage of $1.75. Plasterers were limited to thirty square yards a day; the steam fitters were permitted to lay only ninety feet of steam pipe per day; but the plumbers had the most objectionable rules and restricted materially the amount of work that could be done in a day.”[17] These rules were defended by the unions on the ground that they were necessary in order to secure careful work and to prevent the “rusher” for setting the pace for a fair day’s work. The practice 76 has not been uncommon, especially in the sweated trades, for an unscrupulous employer to pay a few particularly able workmen to put extra speed into their work and so set a pace that the other workmen would be compelled to maintain. This was especially objected to by the unions in the case of team work. They claimed that when all the workmen had come up to the new standard, particularly in piece work, the wages were reduced so that even by working at the higher rate of speed, they could only make a fair wage. One of the rules of the Chicago carpenters’ union provided that “any member guilty of excessive work or rushing on any job shall be reported and shall be subject to a fine of $5.” Whatever the excuse it is clear that such limitations cannot be economically justified. Not only does such dawdling undermine the industrial efficiency of the worker, but it is unfair to the employer. If the latter bargains for the union rate of wages and the normal working day, he is entitled to a full return of the laborer’s best efforts. Otherwise there is no fairness in collective bargaining. “So far as labor leaders are concerned,” said Mr. John Burns, the English trade unionist, “we are all strongly opposed to the restriction of production; we are all in favor of better and more conscientious work.”

Laboring men have never been quite able to divest themselves of their old antipathy to labor-saving machinery. They generally regard the introduction of a new machine as a displacer of men, a creator of unemployment, a depresser of wages. Some unions have successfully resisted the introduction of machinery into their trades, as the stone cutters in Chicago,[18] but in general they have recognized the impossibility of this attitude. In general they now demand that when machinery is introduced it shall be operated by union men and their wages shall be fixed so as to give the workers a share of the 77 increased production.

The policies and methods of the trade unions thus far discussed are those of a militant nature, but the fraternal objects of these associations, though less conspicuous, are none the less important. Labor organizations generally; have insurance and benefit features, by which sick, injured, or unemployed members are assisted. This is particularly true of the English organizations, which developed these features before the rise of the militant new unionism. They often possess large funds and have been rendered thereby more conservative and responsible. The educative effect of trade unionism among the members is marked; some of them possess libraries and all of them promote discussion and thought upon economic problems, while the administration of their affairs often gives valuable training. The older unions did much to encourage co-operation among their members, but today the tendency is to limit their activities to the essential one for which they are organized, namely, collective bargaining.