Part 23

Unfortunately the facilities for comparing the capitalization, product, etc., in 1905 with that of earlier years only extends, in its relation to all the factory industries, to the Census of 1900. In a few of the important industries, however, it is possible to compare conditions in 1900 with those of earlier censuses. The Census of 1900 shows that the number of boot and shoe factories in the United States fell from 1,959 in 1880 to 1,600 in the year 1900, while the capitalization increased from an average of $21,957 per factory to $63,622 per factory, the number of wage-earners from 57 to 89 per factory, the wages paid from $21,951 to $36,985 per factory, and the value of the year’s product turned out from $84,763 per factory to $163,142 per factory. In cotton goods the number of establishments in 1880 was 1,005, and in 1900, 1,055, the capital per establishment in 1880, $218,412, and in 1900, $442,882, the number of wage-earners in 1880, 185 per establishment, and in 1900, 287, the wages paid in 1880, $45,387 per establishment, and in 1900, $80,180, the value of product in 1880, $209,901 per establishment, and in 1900, $362,349. In iron and steel the number of establishments was in 1880, 699, and in 1900, 668, average capital per establishment in 1880, $294,652, and in 1900, $858,371, wage-earners per establishment in 1880, 197, and in 1900, 333, wages paid per establishment in 1880, $78,020, and in 1900, 222 $180,869, value of product turned out per establishment in 1880, $418,583, and in 1900, $1,203,545. In woolen goods the number of factories fell from 1,990 in 1880 to 1,035 in 1900, the capital per establishment increased from $48,289 in 1880 to $120,180 in 1900, and the value of the product increased from $53,755 per establishment in 1880 to $114,425 in 1900.

It will be seen from the figures above presented that in these four great industries the tendency from 1880 to 1900 was distinctly in the direction of reduction of the number of factories, and a greater increase in capitalization than in that of persons employed, wages paid or in value of product turned out; while the figures covering the operations of the entire factory system for the period 1900 to 1905 also show a continuation of this same tendency toward a greater growth in capital than in persons employed, wages paid or value of product turned out.

V. TRUSTS AND COMBINATIONS.

The great increase in the size of the manufacturing establishment and of the capital invested in the manufacturing industry which necessarily followed the adoption of expensive machinery for manufacturing purposes was followed by a tendency toward co-operation and mutual agreements among the great organizations engaged in similar lines of work, the purpose being to reduce expenses, increase profits and control prices. Originally the persons, firms or companies engaged in manufacturing disposed of their products as best they could and in direct competition with others in their own line of manufacture. If the market for their product was good they demanded higher prices. If there was an oversupply they sold for whatever profit they could get, or if necessary at cost or even lower than cost, in order to prevent accumulations of stocks or the closing of their factories. The competition thus grew intense. In order to dispose of their goods they must put many salesmen into the field, they must advertise freely, 223 and often their orders came from such distances that the cost of delivery formed a large percentage of the cost of the goods by the time they reached the purchaser.

This competition of one manufacturer with another making the same line of goods was not only expensive but resulted in working at cross purposes in many ways, and in loss of energy and money. So certain of the companies or corporations engaged in like industries began to make agreements among themselves by which they could co-operate in distributing their supplies to a given field and reduce the expenses of supplying that field. It was argued that the people of any section would only use a given amount of any standard product, and that the expense which the various manufacturers were incurring in competing among themselves for their respective shares in that trade might be materially reduced by an agreement through which the extraordinary efforts to sell in competition with each other should be abandoned and each manufacturer receive the share of the sales to which his proportion of production would entitle him. Not only would this reduce unnecessary expenses but it would in some degree render possible the maintenance of prices as they might be mutually agreed upon.

The first steps in combinations or agreements of this sort are known as “pools.” “This form of agreement,” says J. Russell Smith, “provides that each of the makers of a certain material for a certain territory should make a stipulated proportion of the product to be sold at an agreed price. If a factory made more than its share the owner made a cash payment to the pool and the money went to some manufacturer who had made less than his share. The weak spot of these pools was their absolute lack of power of coercion and that no member had faith in the others.” Often members took advantage of technicalities to violate the spirit of the agreement, and the agreements were short-lived. The 224 system, while it is still working satisfactorily in Germany under the name of the “cartel,” failed to give satisfactory results in the United States, and also met with disaster in the fact that the courts held it to be a combination in restraint of trade and therefore unlawful.

To overcome these defects and create a system of division of production, control of prices and distribution of profits in proportion to the value of the plants co-operating, a new form of agreement was devised. It provided that the companies or corporations entering the agreement for mutual operation and proportionate distribution of profits should transfer the shares of their respective properties to a new corporation with full powers to manage the same, receiving in lieu thereof certificates which should entitle the holder to his proportionate share of the net earnings of the new corporation. “Under this form of organization,” says the Universal Encyclopedia, “the stockholders of each of the separate companies assigned their stock to a few trustees, giving thus an irrevocable power of attorney. In lieu of the stock assigned the trustees issued stock certificates to the stockholders of the separate companies and upon these trust certificates profits were divided. All of the earnings of the different members of the company were pooled and each manufacturer received his proportionate share as evidenced by the certificates, regardless of the question whether his establishment was running or closed. The trustees, having in their hands the voting power of all the stockholders, elected whatever persons seemed to them best as officers of the separate companies. In this way the management was absolutely unified and the interests of all parties concerned became as one. The courts finally holding that this trust agreement was illegal, the plan was later adopted of organizing a new company which should buy up all of the separate plants of the different companies entering the combination, so that in this way a unified management was secured within the law. In order that a more convenient form of 225 handling the properties of the different companies might be secured, a third form of organization was later adopted in which a new company is organized as a stockholding company. This company then buys up all, or a large proportion of, the stock of each of the companies coming into the organization and controls these stocks. The officers of the central organization are thus in a position, by voting the stocks of different companies, to elect the directors and officers of those companies and thus control their policy.”

The advantages of this combination over competition are summed up by the Encyclopedia Britannica, in its 1902 edition, as follows: (1) The cost of selling may be greatly lessened; (2) the salaries of commercial travelers and their traveling expenses can be largely reduced; (3) if different manufacturing establishments, scattered throughout the country, are brought under one management it will be possible for orders for goods to be distributed so that goods can be dispatched to customers in each case from the nearest establishment and freight expenses reduced; (4) when several establishments are combined the most skillful of the managers can be selected for the general manager; (5) each business manager is likely to have some special excellence in his methods of management, and by combining the establishments it is possible to so distribute this managerial skill as to give to each branch of the work the man best suited to its conduct; (6) it is also possible to distribute the various branches of the manufacturing to the various mills or factories of the combination best suited for that particular branch of the work; (7) the advantages of unifying in one establishment the machinery of selling the product of all; (8) the ability of an establishment to fill large orders on short notice gains and retains business; (9) the great financial and business strength and skill of the combined organization gives it special facilities for pushing its goods into foreign markets, as is shown by the success abroad of the Standard Oil Company, and the 226 American Tobacco Company; (10) better facilities for dealing with credits and thus aiding the business community.

Whether trusts, through their control of prices of the particular commodities which they manufacture, have actually advanced the selling price to the consumer, has been and is still the subject of much discussion. It has been urged that the mere reduction of the cost of production and distribution which results from the combinations would enable them to realize larger profits than formerly, even if the manufactures are sold at former prices, and that although their profits have doubtless been large it has not been accomplished through an actual advance in prices to the public, but rather through economies of production and sale. Nelson’s Encyclopedia, issued in 1908, discussing this subject, says, “The weight of evidence indicates that, judged from the margin between price and finished product and cost of raw materials, prices are increased somewhat by the existence of trusts. It is a fair conclusion that the actual prices of goods have as a rule been somewhat increased by trusts, although not in the measure that was anticipated at the inception of the trust movement.” The Encyclopedia Britannica of 1902 in discussing this subject says, “Experience seems to show beyond question that whenever the combinations are powerful enough to secure a monopolistic control it has usually been the policy to increase the prices above those obtained during the period of competition which preceded the formation of the combination.”

As to the effect of trusts upon wages it may be said that up to the present time no very strongly marked change is perceptible in the matter of rates of wages paid by the trusts as compared with other employers in the same line. Doubtless the combinations of numerous establishments under one general management have reduced the numbers of employes in certain lines, but in those lines in which the trusts 227 require labor for the carrying on of their work no marked changes in the rates of wages have been developed as a result of the combinations. In steadiness of employment for the men and women engaged in the work of the establishments it seems probable that the trusts or great combinations of this character offer certain advantages, since their business is less liable to fluctuations than that of the smaller, and even in the absence of orders they are more likely to continue work accumulating stocks for future use than is the small manufacturer with limited capital or credits. In the matter of relations with the labor organizations certain of the trusts have made long time agreements with the labor organizations, thus adding to the steadiness of employment, though in some cases the trusts have declined to recognize the demands of labor organizations.

An example of the causes and methods of the combination of kindred manufacturing interests under one general central organization is found in the United States Steel Corporation as described by J. Russell Smith, in his “The Story of Iron and Steel.” No industry, he says, is naturally so uncertain and consequently so competitive as the steel industry. The demand for the product is fitful and uncertain because most of it goes into new constructions and new enterprises, and these are notorious for the spurts and depressions of demand which affect them…. The uncontrolled iron and steel market can make wild rises unknown to many commodities, because it is difficult to suddenly increase the amount of manufactures in response to sudden demand. A wave of prosperity sends a thousand industries which must have iron and steel clamoring, begging for steel. When the industrial sky darkens purchases of iron and steel cease as suddenly as they began and the price must tumble if the output is sold. These were the normal conditions through which all steel makers lived down to the depression of 1893-98. The numerous independent manufacturers thought that if 228 they could get together and agree upon prices they could improve their condition. Attempts to achieve this in the form of pools provided that each of the makers of a certain material should make a stipulated proportion of the product to be sold at an agreed price, and if a factory made more than its share, the owner made a cash payment to the pool. The weak part of these pools was their absolute lack of power of coercion, and the further fact that no member had faith in the other.

The failures in the attempt at price control resulted in the consolidation of many companies, formerly rivals, under one control. The chief companies which later became members of the United States Steel Corporation formed two distinct groups, each group classified according to the product. One group included the manufacturers of unfinished steel, such as ingots, billets, plates and slabs, and included the Carnegie Steel Company, the Federal Steel Company, and the National Steel Company. Other companies which purchased the product of these manufacturers of unfinished steel and turned it into the finished state included the American Tin Plate Company, the National Tube Company, the American Steel and Wire Company and others. The first thought which came to the minds of this finishing group when hard times compelled them to cut down costs was to cheapen their raw material (such as pig iron, steel ingots, billets, etc.) by becoming manufacturers of their own pig iron. The Carnegie Steel Company had already done this and had obtained facilities for transporting the ore to the coal fields of Ohio and Pennsylvania and facilities for transforming the ore into the classes of material which it supplied. The Carnegie Steel Company thus became independent of other companies in the supply of its fuel, its ore, and the transportation of the same, and all of the requirements of operation. When the finishing companies announced their purpose to also supply themselves with the 229 same facilities for producing their own raw material through the ownership of ore lands, transportation, facilities for smelting, manufacture of pig iron and the steel which they themselves required, the raw materials group could not view this operation with unconcern. It meant the loss of their market and necessity of seeking new markets in the United States or in foreign countries. As a consequence, the companies designated as the raw materials group, making pig iron, steel billets, etc., announced that they would establish their own finishing plants and thus compete directly with the group of companies which had formerly occupied the field without interference by the great organizations transforming the ore into the earlier processes of pig iron and steel billets. Mr. Carnegie announced that he would build a finishing mill in northern Ohio at the end of his ore railway which would eclipse anything that the world had ever seen and would be in equipment without a rival in the world. The Federal Steel Company increased its holdings of ore and coal, of upper-lake railways, and of lake steamers, and prepared to establish its plants for turning out finished products. Thus was threatened a doubling of the capacity of production of iron and steel in all of its stages, a capacity already far beyond that of the markets of the United States. Pools had failed, and the earlier trusts, aiming at monopolizing each line of the iron trade, had in the first temporary depression come face to face with the immediate prospect of ruinous competition among themselves. Then came the supreme effort at controlling prices through the creation of the most stupendous corporation that man has yet dared to launch--the United States Steel Corporation. This combination included most of the companies of both groups referred to--the producers of unfinished steel and those transforming the same into the finished product. The combination formed under the leadership of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan 230 controlled two-thirds of the steel output of the country.

The new company began business in April, 1901, and a comparison of prices since that date with those of earlier years shows regularity and steadiness of prices rather than any marked decline or advance. “This price-steadying,” says J. Russell Smith, “is of incalculable benefit to the independent manufacturer (as well as to the combinations) even when it limits the heights to which a price spurt will go. Rapidly rising prices start a feverish, intoxicated condition of the market very pleasant while it lasts, but followed by a more unpleasant reaction; therefore the Trust tries to keep sober and keep its little brothers sober also, and all are profiting by the new temperance…. Despite its efforts at control, the Trust is not as near monopoly as it was the day it began. The four full years of its operation, 1902-1905, inclusive, did not indicate any increased share of production. The bulletin of the American Iron and Steel Association shows that during these four years there was an almost universal decline in the percentages of iron and steel products made by the Trust.”

VI. THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY.

The history of the iron and steel industry of the world forms an excellent example of the recent advance in manufacturing. The manufacture of iron and steel has made perhaps a more rapid advance than have many others, and its development is due in such a marked degree to the use of machinery and the investment of large sums of capital in the industry that a detailed study of the history and causes of its development seems justified.

Pig iron is the basis of all iron and steel manufacturing, in whatever form, and the record of production of this single article gives at least a suggestion of the growth in the other lines of the industry, the growth in production of the finished articles ready for 231 consumption. The pig iron production of the world in 1800 is estimated at 460,000 tons; in 1850, 4,422,000 tons; in 1895, 29,300,000 tons, and in 1903, 46,381,000 tons. The product of 1850 was thus nearly ten times as much as in 1800, that of 1895, 63 times as much, and that of 1903, 100 times as much as in 1800, while the figures for the year 1907, give a total of 50 million tons or 109 times as much as in 1800.

Great Britain was the world’s greatest pig iron producer in 1800 and in 1850. In 1800 she produced 41 per cent of the world’s pig iron, and in 1850, 50 per cent. By 1895, however, she had begun to take second place, the United States standing at the head of the list of pig iron-producing countries at that time, the product of Great Britain forming 27 per cent of the world’s total and that of the United States 32 per cent. In 1903 the United States showed a still greater lead in this industry, producing in that year 39 per cent of the world’s total product; while Germany, which held a low rank as a producer in 1800 and 1850, actually exceeded Great Britain in 1903, producing 22 per cent of the world’s total, while Great Britain produced but 19 per cent of the total. Great Britain’s production grew from 190,000 tons in 1800 to 8,935,000 tons in 1903; Germany, from 40,000 tons to 10,085,000 tons; the United States, from 40,000 tons to 18,009,000 tons; and all other countries, from 190,000 tons to 9,352,000 tons. In 1800 the United States produced but 9 per cent of the world’s pig iron; in 1903, 38 per cent; and in 1907, 41 per cent.

It will be seen from these figures that the greatest growth in the world’s pig iron production has occurred in the United States.

Turning from the comparison of growth in pig iron production in the leading iron-producing countries of the world and comparing the growth of the iron industry in the United States with that of other manufacturing industries, we find that the development in this line 232 has been greater than that of other leading industries. The census figures show that the value of the product of the blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills of the United States, combined, grew from 297 million dollars in 1880 to 906 million in 1905, having thus more than trebled in value in that period, while the value of the cotton manufactures grew from 211 million to 250 million, having little more than doubled; that of the woolen and worsted manufactures, from 194 million to 308 million; lumber and timber products, from 234 million to 580 million; boots and shoes, from 166 million to 320 million; leather, from 200 million to 253 million; and flour and gristmill products, from 505 million to 713 million in the same time. In the various branches of iron and steel manufacturing there was also a remarkable growth. Foundry and modern ship products grew in value from 215 million dollars in 1880 to 800 million in 1905; structural iron work, from 3½ million to 91 million; and wire and wire work, from 19 million to 71 million.

This increase in value of the various classes of iron and steel products does not by any means show the actual increase in quantity produced, because of the fall in prices meantime. Practically all of the important classes of iron and steel products have fallen greatly in price as the quantity produced has increased. Pig iron, for example, averaged $33 per ton in 1870, and $18 per ton in 1908; steel rails, $107 per ton in 1870 and $28 per ton in 1908; bar iron, rolled, $79 per ton in 1870 and $38 per ton in 1908; and cut nails, 4.4 cents per pound in 1870 and 2.2 cents in 1908. The iron ore production in the United States grew from 3 million tons in 1870 to 52 million in 1907; pig iron, from 1.6 million tons to 26 million; and from 69 thousand tons in 1870 to 23 million tons in 1907.