Part 17

In no way does the State affect the interests of its citizens more vitally than in the sphere of taxation. The State in modern society is the people organized for certain collective purposes, as for the public defense, the preservation of domestic peace, and the furtherance of the social and industrial welfare. To carry out these objects money is needed and the State has therefore to collect from its citizens sufficient revenue to defray its expenditures. John Fiske has tersely defined taxes as “portions of private property taken for public purposes.” Taxation thus implies a certain degree of compulsion; by it the Government interferes with the free choice of the individual and expends a part at least of his income for him in ways that he himself might not have chosen. The social and industrial consequences of a system of taxation may also be far-reaching and important. As Professor R. T. Ely says: “Taxation may create monopolies, or it may prevent them; it may diffuse wealth, or it may control it; it may promote labor or equality of rights, or it may tend to the establishment of tyranny and despotism; it may be used to bring about reform, or it may be used to aggravate existing grievances and foster dissensions between classes.” It is evident therefore that the utmost care should be exercised in framing a system of taxation.

Certain canons or rules of taxation were laid down by Adam Smith over a hundred years ago and have been generally endorsed by economists ever since. One was that taxes ought to be certain and not arbitrary, as to amount, time and manner of payment; another was that taxes ought to be levied in the manner most convenient to the tax-payer; and a third, that taxes ought to take as little as possible out of the pockets of the tax-payer over and above what is paid into the public 155 treasury. These three maxims--certainty, convenience, and economy--have been generally accepted, but less general agreement exists in regard to the fourth, which states that the subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the Government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities. This rule has given rise to two problems: first, is ability the most just basis of taxation; and secondly, if so, how is ability to be measured? The theory of justice generally accepted by legal writers and by the American courts is expressed in the maxim that taxes should be proportioned to benefits received. The benefit theory affords a good rule in the assessment of local property taxes, but fails utterly in the domain of national and state affairs. Who can measure the benefits to each individual of an appropriation for a new war ship or for a state penitentiary or for the public school system? Probably the benefits are in inverse proportion to the income or wealth of the individual, and the heaviest taxes would then have to be apportioned to those least able to pay. Most economists today agree that taxes should be apportioned according to “faculty” or ability to pay. It satisfies better our sense of fairness and is more readily applicable than the benefit theory. In the last analysis, of course, it may be said that taxation in general must confer real benefits upon society or it will not be tolerated. Here, however, we are concerned with a rule of apportionment.

The second practical problem encountered is when we attempt to apply the faculty principle in practice; how is ability to be measured? Three measures have been suggested: expenditure, income, and property. Expenditure is open to the objection that it would place an unduly large proportion of the tax burdens on the poor, whose expenditures are larger in proportion to their means than those of other classes of society. Property is objected to because large classes of society, 156 including professional men with large incomes, would then escape taxation largely or altogether. Income on the surface seems the fairest measure of ability, but is objected to because the incomes of different individuals, both on account of source and size, really indicate unequal and not similar abilities. In practice, however, all three methods are employed in all advanced states, so it is not necessary to decide which is theoretically the fairest.

Still another practical question confronts us after we adopt the ability theory: Shall the rate of taxation be the same no matter what the amount of the property or income, or shall it increase as the amount grows larger? In other words, shall taxation be proportional or progressive? In general the advocates of the ability theory also support progression, though there are many exceptions to this statement. Three main arguments have been urged in support of this method. First, progression is advocated in order to secure equality of sacrifice; it is argued that each dollar of a $10,000 income affords less gratification to the owner than each dollar of a $1,000 income, and that consequently in order to equalize the sacrifices of the two individuals a larger proportion of the first income should be taken than of the second. Objection is made to this, that wants expand even more rapidly than incomes and therefore the initial assumption is untrue. Progression is urged, in the second place, by those who desire to use taxation as a method of introducing social reforms or of bringing about a more equitable distribution of wealth, as by the breaking up of large fortunes. It seems inadvisable, however, to use the machinery of taxation for such purposes. Other writers urge that the ability to earn or produce wealth increases at an accelerating rate, and that taxation should therefore keep pace with it. “It is the first thousand that counts.” The objection is made here that it would penalize ability and energy. In general, while the arguments are not 157 conclusive, progression certainly secures a nearer approach to the ideal of the ability theory than does proportional taxation. The practical application, after we accept it, is still a difficult matter. It should be applied to the revenue system as a whole by the careful selection of special taxes. As a matter of fact we have just the opposite system in the United States, for the poor man undoubtedly pays out a larger proportion of his income in taxes--principally on articles of consumption--than do his wealthy neighbors.

In the main there has been a clear division in the United States between the sources of income of the Federal Government on the one hand and those of the state and local governments on the other. The Federal Treasury has derived its revenue almost entirely from indirect taxes--excise and customs--while the other governments have depended chiefly upon direct taxes upon persons, property, business, corporations, and inheritances. The division rests upon the constitutional allotment of powers, but it also corresponds very closely to the industrial and political functions of each in their relations to the individual citizens. The chief duty of the Federal Government is that of national defense and foreign intercourse, relations which are national in extent but which affect the individual only remotely; so, too, its taxing area is national and its exactions are felt only distantly. Few persons, it has been said, taste the tax in their tea or their whisky, yet over one-third of all the taxes collected in the United States are derived from either customs or excise duties. Whisky and tobacco contribute most of the internal revenue, while import duties are levied on practically everything brought into the country which could compete with any home product. These two sources yield over $500,000,000 a year to the Federal Treasury. During the Civil War these sources of revenue were supplemented by a federal income tax, but as such a tax was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, further recourse to 158 this in the near future seems improbable. From a purely economic and financial point of view this is very regrettable, for the Federal Government should unquestionably have at its command the means of quickly raising large additional revenue with as little disturbance to industry as possible. Such a means would be afforded by the income tax, which moreover can be administered only by the Federal Government, as it must be national in its operations to be fair.

The main reliance of the state and local governments in this country is the general property tax, which amounted in 1902 to over $700,000,000 or almost half of all the taxes collected. This really consists of two very distinct parts, which present quite different problems, namely, the tax on real property and that on personal property. Under our peculiar system, by which property is assessed locally, and upon the basis of that assessment its share of the state taxes distributed to each locality, there is every incentive offered to the local assessor to under-value the land in his jurisdiction, thereby escaping part of the state burdens. This evil of inequality between localities could be obviated by the simple expedient of relieving real estate of all state taxes and leaving it solely to the counties and cities for purposes of taxation. In the case of personal property the great evil is evasion. Much of our modern wealth exists in the form of securities, stocks, bonds, mortgages, etc., and this is practically undiscoverable by assessors except by the voluntary declaration of the tax-payer, which is only truthfully made by trustees and a few conscientious persons. Most of our laws have been directed to the discovery of this intangible property, as it is called, but without avail. In a few of the most progressive states the effort has at last been recognized as futile, and the attempt is now being made to reach these sources of income indirectly, by taxes on corporations, on business, franchises and other tangible evidences of wealth.

Not only are corporation, business, license and similar taxes being 159 developed, but increasing resort is had to inheritance taxes, over thirty states now making use of this form of taxation. They are more frequently imposed on collateral than direct inheritances, and in many states are progressive, both as to amount and as to nearness of relationship. Thus in Wisconsin the rates advance from one per cent for bequests under $25,000 to husband, wife, or lineal relation, to 15 per cent for sums over $500,000 to very distant relatives or strangers. These various forms of taxation are necessary to secure the needed revenues for the state governments, especially if these forego further resort to taxation of realty. The tendency is now sufficiently marked to make it possible to indicate with some certainty the future of taxation in this country. To a certain extent, however, this must be regarded as the expression of an ideal rather than the description of an existing system. The Federal Government should have customs and excise duties, supplemented by an income tax. The state governments should have corporation and inheritance taxes. The cities and minor civil divisions should have taxes on realty, and license and franchise taxes. Such a division is logical and avoids duplication of taxation of the same source by two or more grades of government. In view of the pre-emption of the field of corporation taxation by the states, it is therefore doubly regrettable that the Federal Government should now (August, 1909) have adopted a tax on income of corporations for federal purposes.

Other problems connected with finance are suggested in connection with the universal tendency to increase in governmental expenditures and in public debts. The former is an expression of the growth and expansion of state functions, which will be discussed in the next section. The latter is due in part to this same fact, in part also to the development of credit and the creation of a market for the sale of 160 public and other securities, and finally to the growth of constitutional government, which has made the people willing to entrust their capital to a government which they themselves as citizens really control.

The question of the tariff involves such important economic as well as financial consideration that it seems best to discuss this form of taxation somewhat more fully. For it has been used not merely as a means of raising revenue but also as an instrument to develop particular industries and prevent foreign competition. Any detailed discussion of this subject therefore involves a statement of the pros and cons of protection and free trade. It should be said, however, in advance that the real issue is not free trade, for that is demanded by only a few doctrinaires, but freer trade through an intelligent revision of the tariff downward. The system of protection has prevailed in the United States for virtually one hundred years, and could not be suddenly changed and abolished if one would. From the financial standpoint, too, import duties are absolutely essential to the support of our Federal Government; the question here is not absolutely free trade, but the choice of articles for revenue purposes. Shall they be those which are not produced in this country or those which enter into competition with domestic products? If financial considerations alone prevailed, the former would undoubtedly be selected as the more convenient, certain, and economical. But in the determination of the tariff policies of the United States economic considerations have been paramount and to an examination of these we must now turn.

Historically the following arguments have played the main role in support of protection at different times in the United States. The infant industries argument was advanced by Hamilton in his celebrated Report on Manufactures in 1791 and has always been important until recently when the infants had grown to be so lusty that it was evident that other reasons for protecting them must be discovered. This was 161 found in the plea for diversified production, which was necessary for a well-rounded economic development; the need of creating a strong national government and national spirit also played their part. In order to win over the farmers the home market argument was early urged; this has taken various forms. In the first place it was urged that the building up of manufacturing centers and the consequent increase in population would give the farmers a better market than the fluctuating foreign one. As set forth by Carey, it would keep within the country the elements taken from the soil. It would also save the freights on the transportation of goods back and forth across the ocean. Each of these arguments has lost force with the development of the country and the decrease in the cost of transportation. More important today is the wages argument; at first protection was urged because wages were high in the United States and the manufacturer needed to be protected against his foreign competitor who employed cheap labor. Today it is argued that protection has raised wages and must be continued in order to protect the laborer against the pauper labor of Europe. Curiously enough, in France protection is urged for French workmen against the highly paid and efficient American. The effect of the tariff on wages has been greatly exaggerated; wages are high in the United States because the productivity of labor is high. Indeed so far as the tariff raises prices it may be argued that the real wages of labor are lowered. More generally accepted as defensible grounds for protection are the political arguments that a nation should be able to produce its own military armaments and supplies, and that it should be able to use the tariff as a retaliatory measure. Recently this latter has received considerable force from the practice of “dumping,” by which is meant the occasional sale of products abroad at prices lower than those charged at home. Domestic manufacturers in the country thus treated are of course seriously injured and have 162 insisted upon protection against this procedure which has been authorized in Canada.

In answer to these various arguments the free traders, or those desiring a modification of present high rates, make their main appeal to the doctrine of comparative costs. Briefly stated this asserts that nations, like individuals, can do some things better than others. Like the individual lawyer therefore who pays to have his boots blacked while he devotes himself to the law, the nation should produce the things it is best fitted for and pay others to produce other things which it can do less well. In this way each will obtain the largest possible return. Protection, which interferes with this natural international division of labor, simply diverts labor and capital from more into less profitable industries. Practically, this purely abstract economic argument has had little influence on the commercial policy of nations, which have been moved more by political and industrial considerations. Today, however, there is no question but that the freer movement of capital and industry throughout the world would be advantageous. In answer to the home market argument it is pointed out that with the growth of large-scale production the profitable area of manufacture has greatly widened and now in many cases transcends national boundaries. As home producers seek foreign markets, as they are beginning to do, they themselves will demand a reduction of the tariff, especially in the matter of raw materials. Free traders also deny the need of artificially diversifying industry in a country as large and varied as the United States, or of building up infant industries. Indeed, on the latter point, they urge that many of our trusts are the result of the tariff, and that the attempt to grant legislative favors has resulted only in wholesale demoralization and a debauching of our national politics.

In conclusion it may be said that under certain conditions the 163 policy of protection is relatively defensible; that it has undoubtedly hastened the industrial development of the United States, though it has not caused it; and that, on the other hand, it is responsible for not a few evils in our political and industrial life. The struggle of particular interests during the framing of the Payne bill shows the impossibility of deciding this issue upon academic grounds. It may be prophesied, however, that as our manufacturers reach out more seriously after the foreign markets the tariff will be modified so as to make this possible; but he would be a rash prophet who should predict a sudden or great change in our tariff policy within the present generation.

XVIII. THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.

In the course of the preceding pages we have repeatedly referred to the necessity or desirability of governmental action, and have emphasized the important part which it plays in our economic life today. Every practical economic problem that confronts us calls in some degree for the exercise of state activity. It is necessary for us then, if we are to render sound judgment on these questions, to have a clear opinion as to the proper sphere of government action, as to how far the State should interfere in the economic activities of private individuals. We cannot do better than to state first the main functions of a modern state. The modern industrial system, as we saw in the first section, is based upon certain fundamental institutions--personal liberty, competition, and private property. The first function of government is to guarantee to every individual the rights of freedom, property, and contract; this involves the maintenance of peace and order. These are often spoken of as “natural rights”; rather they are rational rights, based upon expediency and human welfare, and are created and maintained by society. Without the constant support and intervention of government they would possess 164 little reality or significance. But in addition to guaranteeing these fundamental institutions, modern governments grant individuals certain privileges, as patents, copyrights, trade-marks, franchises, etc., designed to stimulate the economic activity of individuals.

A second group of functions undertaken by the modern state is regulative. As we have seen, laws are made regulating the freedom of contract, the conditions of labor, the conduct of business, methods of banking and transportation, etc. The terms under which competitive business may be conducted are laid down, and while freedom of industry prevails for every individual it is only on condition that he conforms to the rules of the game thus prescribed. But the conditions are not merely restrictive; sometimes they are designed to promote enterprise, as in the case of gifts, subsidies, protective duties, etc. In all these ways the State interferes with the action of perfectly free competition for the purpose of securing better or more equitable conditions. A third group of functions embraces the direct participation in industry by the Government itself, as the post-office, gas, electric, and water works, canals, roads, sewers, parks, etc. In other countries, when the functions of government are more extended than in the United States, it conducts railroads, telegraph and telephone systems, tenements, pawn shops, theaters, industrial insurance, or various other activities. The line which divides public from private enterprise varies greatly in different countries.

This raises the general question, how far is it desirable that the economic functions of government should extend? As to the necessity of state activity in some form there can be no doubt. Production, exchange, distribution, and to a smaller extent consumption, are all social processes; they concern the whole of society, and must be brought under social control. Montesquieu laid down the proposition in the middle of the eighteenth century that taxes invariably 165 increase with the growth of liberty. Historically this has been verified: the development of freedom in government and industry has meant the realization of self-restraint by the imposition of regulative law. But the modern State has gone further than this: it has realized the necessity of taking an active part in modern industrial life, for the equalization of the terms of competition, the redress of grievances, and the furnishing of utilities, either because it could do it better or because it was the only agency capable of acting. The standpoint of this treatise has been one of moderate individualism, believing in free competition and individual initiative, but not frightened off by the bogey of socialism, if at any point the interference of government seemed desirable or necessary. To present the matter clearly it will be well to state briefly the main theories that have been held as to the proper function of government, arranging them in their logical, though not in their historical, order.