Part 22

"Until now," (said the king in his answer to the address,) "circumstances have not permitted my government to attend to anything but the war, which has afforded you an occasion to show your zeal and your fidelity. With commendable generosity, you have voted the contingents and the subsidies which the situation of the empire demanded; and the remembrance of your devotion shall never be extinguished in my heart, or in the hearts of my family. But, now that peace is concluded, I desire to extend my solicitude to the kingdom of Hungary--to the country which has most effectually aided me in the wars I have had to sustain--which, by its extent, its population, its fertility, the noble character and the valour of its inhabitants, is the chief bulwark of the monarchy. My desire is to arrange with the states of Hungary the means of increasing her prosperity, and to merit the thanks of the nation."

But the peace of Amiens proved to be a hollow truce, and this flattering communication became the prelude to renewed demands for men and money. To hasten the votes on the supplies, the diet was informed that it would be dissolved in two months. In the debate which ensued, one of the members uttered the sentiments of the nation, when he said--"It is plain that the king calls us together only when he wants soldiers and supplies. He knows that, after all, we have too much honour to allow the majesty of the King of Hungary to be insulted by his enemies." The impost was increased, and the contingent raised to 64,000 men; but the consideration of the measures recommended by the great national commission, though promised, was deferred by the king. The diet of 1805 resembled that of 1802--the same promises ending in similar disappointment.

The diet of 1807 was more remarkable. To the usual demands was added the royal proposition, that the "insurrection," or _levée en masse_, should be organised, and ready to march at the first signal. The patience of the nation was exhausted. The diet represented to the king, in firm but respectful addresses, the disorder in the finances produced by the amount of paper-money issued in disregard of their remonstrances, and called upon the government to repair the evil. They said that, during many years, the country had done enough to prove its fidelity to the sovereign, whose royal promises had not been fulfilled; and that henceforth the Hungarians could not expend their lives and fortunes in the defence of his hereditary states, unless he seriously took in hand the interests of their native country. They demanded the revision of the commercial system, and liberty freely to export the produce of the country, and freely to import the productions of other countries. They complained of a new depreciation of the currency, demanded a reduction of the duty on salt, (the produce of their own mines,) which had recently been augmented, and denounced "the injustice of paralysing the industry of a people, while requiring of them great sacrifices."

The justice of these representations was admitted, but no satisfactory answer was returned; and the murmurs at Presburg became loud enough to cause alarm at Vienna. The advance of Napoleon to the frontiers of Hungary turned the current of the national feeling. It was now the sacred soil of Hungary that was threatened with desecration, and the diet not only voted all the subsidies and 20,000 recruits, but the whole body of the nobles or freemen spontaneously offered one-sixth of their incomes, and a _levée en masse_ was decreed for three years. Napoleon's attempts to detach the Hungarians from the cause of their king were unavailing, and their devotion to his person was never more conspicuous than when he had lost the power to reward it.

In 1811 the royal propositions, in addition to the usual demands, requested the diet to vote an extraordinary supply of twelve millions of florins, and to guarantee Austrian paper money to the amount of one hundred millions, (about ten millions sterling.) The diet called for the account of the previous expenditure, and were told that the details of the budget were secrets of state. This answer excited the greatest indignation, and they refused to vote any extraordinary supply till the accounts were produced. They complained that the finances of Hungary were administered by Austrians--foreigners, who were excluded by law from a voice in their affairs--and that the cabinet of the emperor had illegally mixed up the finances of Hungary with those of the hereditary states of Austria. Some members of the diet even threatened to impeach the ministers. In their addresses to the throne, the financial administration of the imperial government was roughly handled; and the cabinet, perceiving that the debates at Presburg had inconveniently directed attention, even in the Hereditary States, to financial questions, hastily withdrew their propositions.

The peace of 1815 restored to Europe the repose she had long desired, and to Hungary many of her sons who had long been absent. In the midst of war, her diet had never ceased to attend to the internal administration of the country, to the improvement of her resources, and the advancement of her population in material prosperity and intelligence. All the comprehensive measures prepared with this view had been postponed or neglected by the king, acting by the advice of his Austrian cabinet, and supported by a powerful party of the magnates of Hungary. But though her hopes had been disappointed, Hungary had never failed, in any moment of difficulty or danger, to apply her whole power and resources to the defence of the empire. She never sought, in the embarrassments, the defeat, and misfortunes of Austria, an opportunity to extort from her king the justice he had denied to her prayers. She never for a moment swerved from devoted allegiance to her constitutional monarch. "After all, she had too much honour to allow the majesty of the King of Hungary to be insulted by his enemies." She forgave the frequent delays and refusals, by which the most salutary measures had been frustrated or rejected, because she knew that the thoughts and the energies of her sovereign and his Austrian cabinet had been directed to the defence of the empire, and the preservation of its independence. But now that these were no longer threatened, that the good cause for which she had fought with so much gallantry and devotion had triumphed, she had a right to expect a grateful return for her services--or at least that the promises, on the faith of which she had lavished her blood and her treasure in defence of her king and of his Austrian dominions, would be fulfilled. But the republican outbreak in France had led to long years of war and desolation; the triumph of monarchy and order over anarchy had at length been achieved, and men had not only abjured the doctrines from which so much evil had sprung, but monarchs had learned to look with distrust on every form of government that permitted the expression of public opinion, or acknowledged the right of the people to be heard. Even the mixed government of England, to which order owed its triumph, was regarded as a danger and a snare to other countries. The Holy Alliance was formed, and the Austrian cabinet, which for more than twenty years had flattered the hopes of Hungary when it wanted her assistance, now boldly resolved to govern that kingdom without the aid of its diet. In vain did the county assemblies call for the convocation of the national parliament, which the king was bound, by the laws he had sworn to observe, to summon every three years. Their addresses were not even honoured with an answer. In 1822, an attempt was made to levy imposts and troops by royal edicts. The comitats (county assemblies) refused to enforce them. In 1823, bodies of troops were sent--first to overawe, and then to coerce them. The county officers concealed their archives and official seals, and dispersed. Royal commissioners were appointed to perform their functions, and were almost everywhere resisted. The whole administration of the country, civil and judicial, was in confusion; and, after an unseemly and damaging contest, the cabinet found it necessary, in 1825, to give way, and to summon the diet, after an interval of twelve years. One personal anecdote will convey a more correct impression of the feelings with which the Hungarians, who were most attached to the emperor-king, viewed these proceedings, than any detail we could give. John Nemet, Director Causarum Regalium of Hungary, at a personal interview with the king, denounced the proceedings of the cabinet. "Do you know," said the irritated monarch, "that I am emperor and king; that you may lose your head?" "I know," replied Nemet, "that my life is in your majesty's hands; but the liberty of my country, and the honour of my sovereign, are dearer to me than my life."

When the diet met in 1825, the king, in his reply to the address, admitted that "things had happened which ought not to have occurred, and which should not occur again." The diet did not conceal its resentment. The comitat of Zala, through its representatives, demanded the names of the traitors who had misled the king; and the representatives of all the other counties supported the proposition. One of the royal commissioners came in tears to apologise to the diet; another, who attempted to justify himself on the ground of obedience to the king, was told that a faithful subject honoured his sovereign when he reminded him of his duty. The articles of 1790 were declared to have been openly violated, and the diet complained that the public security had been outraged by arrests and prosecutions, founded on anonymous denunciations. The address to the king, in which they set forth their grievances, concluded with the following petition:--

"Convinced that these acts do not emanate from your Majesty, but that they proceed from a system constantly pursued for several centuries, we entreat your Majesty henceforth not to listen to evil counsels--to despise anonymous denunciations--not to exact any impost or any levy of soldiers without the concurrence of the diet--to reinstate the citizens disgraced for having legally resisted the royal commissioners, and regularly to convoke the states, with whom you share the sovereign power."

In his answer, Francis blamed the diet for their proceedings, but wisely conceded their demands. By article 3d of 1825, he engaged to observe the fundamental laws of the kingdom. By article 4th, never to levy subsidies without the concurrence of the diet; by article 5th, to convoke the diet every three years.

The attempt of Francis II. to subvert the constitution of Hungary terminated, as the similar attempt of Joseph II. had terminated thirty-five years before--in renewed acknowledgments of the independence of Hungary, and the constitutional rights of the Hungarians.

After three centuries of contention, the cabinet of Vienna now appeared to have abandoned the hope it had so long entertained, of imposing upon Hungary the patriarchal system of Austria. Relinquishing the attempt to enforce illegal edicts, it relied upon means more in accordance with the practice of constitutional governments. It could command a majority at the table of Magnates, and it endeavoured, by influencing the elections, to strengthen its party in the Deputies. But in this kind of warfare the cabinet of an absolute monarch were far less skilful than the popular leaders of a representative assembly. The attempts to influence the elections by corrupt means were generally unsuccessful, and, when exposed, exhibited the government in a light odious to a people tenacious of their liberties and distrustful of Austria.

There had long been two parties in the diet, of which one, from supporting the views of the court, was considered Austrian; the other, from its avowed desire to develop the popular institutions and separate nationality of Hungary, was considered Hungarian, and took the designation of the patriotic party. There was thus a government party and an opposition, which, in 1827, was systematically organised. But as Hungary had not a separate ministry, responsible to the diet, that could be removed from office by its votes, there was little ground for the usual imputation of a struggle for place. The patriotic party could expect no favour from the court; their opposition was, therefore, so far disinterested, and was, in fact, founded upon the instructions of the counties they represented.

It must appear extraordinary that the majority of an assembly composed of nobles, of which nine-tenths of the members were elected by hereditary nobles or freeholders, should advocate opinions so liberal as to alarm even the Austrian government. A great majority of the electors, it is true, though rejoicing in the designation of nobles, were men who tilled the soil with their own hands; but they are truly described by Mr Paget as "generally a proud, unruly set of fellows, with higher notions of privilege and power than of right and justice; but brave, patriotic, and hospitable in the highest degree." After describing the national character of the Majjars, he adds,--

"It is scarcely necessary to say that, with such dispositions, the Majjar is strongly inclined to conservatism; he hates new-fangled notions and foreign fashions, and considers it a sufficient condemnation to say, 'not even my grandfather ever heard of such things.'"

To suppose that these men had republican tendencies would, of course, be absurd; and as the patriotic party in the diet represented their opinions, we may be well assured that they were not such as, to any party in this country, would appear dangerous from excess of liberality.

To the government of Austria, however, nothing caused greater uneasiness than attempts to consolidate and improve the popular institutions of Hungary, or to foster feelings of separate nationality, which it had been the constant aim of its policy to obliterate. Determined to maintain, at all hazards, her own patriarchal system, Austria saw Hungary already separated from the Hereditary States by the form of her institutions and by national feelings, and dreaded the wider separation which the onward march of the one, and the stationary policy of the other, must produce. In superficial extent, Hungary is nearly half the empire--in population, more than one-third. The separation of the crowns would reduce Austria to the rank of a second-rate power; and Hungary separated from Austria, and surrounded by despotic governments jealous of her constitutional freedom, could not be safe. Not only an Austrian, but a patriotic Hungarian, might therefore resist, as perilous to his country, any course of legislation that appeared to lead towards such a result. If Hungary continued to advance in material prosperity and intelligence, and succeeded in giving to her constitution a basis so broad as to insure a just distribution of the public burdens, and to unite all classes of her population in its support, she must ultimately separate from Austria, or Austria must abandon her stationary policy, and advance in the same direction. It was impossible that two contiguous countries, of extent and resources so nearly equal, governed on principles so different, and daily increasing the distance between them, should long continue to have their separate administrations conducted by one cabinet, or could long be held together by their allegiance to the same sovereign. To give permanence to their connexion, it was necessary that Austria should advance, or that Hungary should stand still. But the condition and circumstances of more than one-half of her population made it indispensable to her safety--to her internal tranquillity, her material prosperity, and social order--that Hungary should go forward. The nobles, holding their lands by tenure of military service, bore no part of the public burdens during peace. The peasants, though they were no longer serfs, and had acquired an acknowledged and valuable interest in the lands they held from the proprietors, for which they were indebted to Maria Theresa, were yet subject to all manner of arbitrary oppressions. They had been promised ameliorations of their condition as early as 1790, but these promises had not yet been fulfilled. In the mean time, the peasants had been left to endure their grievances, and did not endure them without murmuring. The more intelligent and enlightened nobles felt the danger, and sought to remedy the evil, and hitherto without success. But it is unjust to attribute to Austrian influence all the opposition encountered by those who sought to ameliorate the condition of the peasants. Men who had hitherto been exempted from all public imposts, and who considered it humiliating to be taxed, resisted the equalisation of the burdens; men who had been taught to consider the peasant as a creature of an inferior race, shrank from giving him civil rights equal to their own. Nevertheless, in 1835, measures were passed which greatly improved the position of the oppressed classes. We cannot stop to trace the course of legislation, or to point out the wisdom and disinterested humanity that distinguished the leaders in this movement. Amongst them stands conspicuous the name of Szechenyi, to whom his country owes an everlasting debt of gratitude. Alas! that a mind like his, whose leading characteristic was practical good sense, that rejected every visionary project, should now be wandering amidst its own morbid creations in an unreal world. Several of the wealthier nobles put beyond all question the sincerity of the opinions they had maintained, by voluntarily inscribing their names in the list of persons subject to be taxed; and thus shared the public burdens with their peasants.

Writing after the acts of 1835 had been passed, Mr Paget thus describes the feelings of the peasants,--

"I know that the Hungarian peasant feels that he is oppressed; and if justice be not speedily rendered him, I fear much he will wrest it--perhaps somewhat rudely too--from the trembling grasp of the factitious power which has so long withheld it from him."--(Vol i., p. 313.)

The elective franchise was still withheld from a man born a peasant, whatever might be his stake in the country. He was not equal with the noble before the law; and, what was perhaps still more grievous to him, he continued to bear the whole burden of taxation, local and national. The noble contributed nothing. Besides the labour and produce he gave to his proprietor as rent for his land, the peasant paid tithes to the church, and a head-tax and property-tax to the government. He paid the whole charges for the administration of justice, which he could rarely obtain; for the municipal government, in the election of which he had no vote; for the maintenance of public buildings, from many of which he was excluded; and by much the greater part of the expenses of the army, in which he was forced to serve, without a hope of promotion. He alone made and repaired the roads and bridges, and he alone paid tolls on passing them. On him alone were soldiers quartered, and he had to furnish them, not only with lodgings in the midst of his family, but with fuel, cooking, stable-room, and fodder, at about one halfpenny a-day, often not paid, and to sell his hay to the government, for the use of the troops, at a fixed price, not equal to one-fourth of its value in the market. At the same time, a noble who tilled the ground like the peasant--who was perhaps not more intelligent, not more industrious--had a hereditary privilege of exemption from all these burdens, and enjoyed a share in the government of the country.

The revolt of the Ruthene peasants of Gallicia in 1846, who had massacred whole families of the Polish nobles, and the belief that the Austrian government had encouraged the revolt, had been slow to put it down, and had rewarded its leaders, produced agitation amongst the peasants in Hungary, and the greatest anxiety in the minds of the nobles. They felt that the fate of Gallicia might be their own, if the peasants should at any time lose hope and patience, or if the Austrian government should be brought to adopt, in Hungary, the policy attributed to it in Gallicia. In short, it was plain that, so long as the grievances of the peasants remained unredressed, there could be no security for Hungary. But these grievances could not be redressed without imposing new burdens on the nobles, and, at the same time, restricting their privileges. If they were to tax themselves, they required an efficient control over the public expenditure, and a relaxation of the Austrian commercial system, which prevented the development of the country's resources.

The diet had been summoned for November 1847; and in June of that year, the patriotic party put forth an exposition of its views preparatory to the elections, which, in Hungary, are renewed for every triennial meeting of the diet. In that document, a translation of which is now before us, they declare, that "our grievances, so often set forth, after a long course of years, during which we have demanded, urged, and endured, have to this day remained unredressed." After enumerating some of these grievances, they proceed to state their demands--

"1st, The equal distribution of the public burdens amongst all the citizens; that the diet should decide on the employment of the public revenue, and that it should be accounted for by responsible administrators.

"2d, Participation, by the citizens not noble, in the legislation, and in municipal rights.

"3d, Civil equality.

"4th, The abolition, by a compulsory law, of the labour and dues exacted from the peasants, with indemnity to the proprietors.

"5th, Security to property and to credit by the abolition of _aviticite_, (the right of heirs to recover lands alienated by sale.)"

They go on to declare that they will endeavour to promote all that tends to the material and intellectual development of the country, and especially public instruction: That, in carrying out these views, they will never forget the relations which, in terms of the Pragmatic Sanction, exist between Hungary and the Hereditary States of Austria: That they hold firmly to article 10, of 1790, by which the royal word, sanctified by an oath, guarantees the independence of Hungary: That they do not desire to place the interests of the country in contradiction with the unity or security of the monarchy, but they regard as contrary to the laws, and to justice, that the interests of Hungary should be made subordinate to those of any other country: That they are ready, in justice and sincerity, to accommodate all questions on which the interests of Hungary and Austria may be opposed, but they will never consent to let the interests and constitution of Hungary be sacrificed to unity of the system of government, "which certain persons are fond of citing as the leading maxim, instead of the unity of the monarchy."

"That unity in the system of government," they assert, "was the point from which the cabinet set out when, during the last quarter of the past century, it attacked our nationality and our civil liberty, promising us material benefits in place of constitutional advantages. It was to this unity in the system of government that the constitution of the Hereditary States of Austria was sacrificed, and it was on the basis of absolute power that the unity of the government was developed."