Chapter 15

The most singular feature of King Otho's government is his cabinet, or, as the Greek newspapers call it, "the Camarilla." This cabinet has no official constitution; yet its members put their titles on the visiting cards which they leave, as advertisements of the existence of this irresponsible body, at the houses of the foreign ministers. It consists, or until the late financial difficulties deranged all the royal plans, it consisted, of four Bavarians and two Greeks. Its duty is to prepare projects of laws to be adopted by the different ministers, and to assist the king in selecting individuals appointed to public offices. This is the feature which excites the greatest indignation at Athens; the minister of war does not dare to promote a corporal; the minister of public instruction would tremble to send a village schoolmaster to a country _demos_, even at the expense of the citizens; and the minister of finance would not risk the responsibility of conferring the office of porter of the customhouse at Parras, before receiving the royal instructions how to act on such emergencies, and ascertaining what creature of the camarilla it was necessary to provide for.

We have already mentioned the council of state; it consists of about twenty individuals chosen by his majesty, a motley congregation--some cannot read--others cannot write--some came to Greece after the revolution was over--some, long after the king himself. This council is, by one of the fictions of law so common in the Hellenic kingdom, supposed to form a legislative council, and it is implied that it ought to be considered as tantamount to a representative assembly. Some of its members are most brave and respectable men, who have rendered Greece good service; but since they were decked out in silver uniforms, and received large salaries to form a portion of the court pageant, they have lost much of their influence in the country, either for good or evil. The king looks upon these patriotic members as an insignificant minority, or an ignorant majority, as the case may be, and he has more than once set aside the opposition of this council, by publishing laws rejected by a majority of its members. To speak a plain truth in rude phrase--the council of state is a farce.

King Otho, with his Greek ministers, his Bavarian cabinet, and his motley council of state, is therefore, to all appearance, a more absolute sovereign than his neighbour, Abdul Meschid. But we must now leave the royal authority, and turn our attention to an important chapter in the Greek question; one which nevertheless has not hitherto met with proper study either from the king, his allies, or the public in Western Europe--we mean the institutions of the Greek people.

The inhabitants of Greece consist of two classes, who, from having been placed for many ages in totally different circumstances, are extremely different in manners and in civilization. These are the population of the towns or the commercial class, and the inhabitants of the country or the agricultural class. The traders have usually been considered by strangers as affording the true type of the Greek character; but a very little reflection ought to have convinced any one, that the insecurity of the Turkish government, and the constant change in the channels of trade in the East, had given this class of the population a most Hebraical indifference to "the dear name of country." To the Fanariote and the Sciote, Wallachia or Trieste were delightful homes, if dollars were plentiful. But the agricultural population of Greece was composed of very different materials. We are inclined to consider them as the most obstinately patriotic race on which the sun shines; their patriotism is a passion and an instinct, and, from being restricted to their village or their district, often looks quite as like a vice as a virtue. This class is altogether so unlike any portion of the population of Western Europe, that we should be more likely to mislead than to enlighten our readers by attempting to describe it. The peasants are themselves inclined to distrust the population of the towns, and look on Bavarians, Fanariotes, and government officers, as a tribe of enemies embodying different degrees of rapacity under various names. They have as yet derived little benefit from the government of King Otho, for their taxes are greater now than they were under the Turks, and they very sagaciously attribute the existence of order in Greece to the alliance of the kings of the Franks, not to the military prowess of the Bavarians.

There is a third class of men in Greece who hold in some degree the position of an aristocracy. This class is composed of all those individuals who from education are entitled to hold government appointments; and at the head of this class figure the Fanariotes or Greek families who were in the habit of serving under the Turkish government. Many of the Fanariotes move about seeking their fortunes, from Greece to Turkey, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and _vice versa_. One brother will be found holding an office in the suite of the Prince of Moldavia, and another in the court of King Otho. This class is more attached to foreign influence than to Greek independence, and is almost as generally unpopular in the country as the Bavarians; and perhaps not without reason, as it supplies the court with abler and more active instruments than could be found among the dull Germans.

We must now notice the great peculiarity of the national constitution of the Greeks as a distinct people. There is indeed a singular difference in the organization of the European nations, which does not always meet with due attention from historians. The various governments of Europe are divided into absolute and constitutional; but it is seldom considered necessary to explain whether the people are ruled by officers appointed by the central authority of the state, or by magistrates elected by local assemblies of the people. Yet, as the character of a nation is more important in history than the form of its government, it is as much the duty of the historian to examine the institutions of the people, as it is the business of the politician to be acquainted with the action of the government. To illustrate this, we shall describe in general terms the political constitution of the Greeks, and leave our readers to compare it with the share enjoyed by the French, and some other of the constitutional nations, in their own local government. After all the boasted liberty and equality of the subjects of the Citizen King, we own that we consider that the Greeks possess national institutions resting on a surer and more solid basis.

All Greece is, and always has been, divided into communities enjoying the right of choosing their own magistrates, and these magistrates decide a number of police and administrative questions not affecting crimes and rights of property. The most populous town, and the smallest hamlet, equally exercise this privilege, and it is to its existence that the Greeks owe the power of resistance they were enabled to exert against their Roman and Turkish masters. We shall not enter into the history of this institution, under the Turks, at present; as it is sufficient for our purpose to give our readers a correct idea of the existing state of things. A local elective magistracy is formed, which prevents the central government from goading the people to insurrection by the insolence of office which the inferior agents of an ill-organized administration constantly display. Fortunately for the tranquillity of the country, the local administration works its way onward through the daily difficulties which present themselves, independent of king, ministers, councillors of state, or royal governors.

In order to make our description as exact as possible, without presenting a vague statistical view of the whole kingdom, for the accuracy of which we would not pretend to answer, we confine our observations to the province of Attica, concerning which we have been able to obtain official information from all the communes.

There is, of course, a royal governor in Attica, who resides at Athens; he is named on the responsibility of the minister of the interior, with whom he is in daily correspondence, and is the organ of communication between the royal government and the popular magistracy. Of course, in the present state of things, the officer is appointed by King Otho himself, who has made it a point of statesmanship to keep a person in the place quite as much disposed to serve as a spy on all the ministers, as inclined to execute with zeal the orders of his immediate superior.

The population of Attica is divided into seven communes or demarchies.[B]

[Footnote B: To this population of 33,909, must be added the troops and strangers in Athens, and at the Piraeus, who are not citizens. They generally exceed three thousand.]

1. Athens, containing . 22,309 inhabitants. 2. Piraeus, . . . 2099 ... 3. Kekropia, . . . 2158 ... 4. Marathon, . . . 1214 ... 5. Phyle, . . . 2659 ... 6. Laurion, . . . 1470 ... 7. Kalamos, . . . 2000 ... ------ 33,909

It will be enough for our purpose to describe the local constitution of the city of Athens, and then point out the slight variations which circumstances render necessary in the secluded agricultural communes of the province.

The magistrates of Athens consist of a demarch (provost), six paredhroi (bailies), and a town council composed of eighteen members. The town-council is selected by all the citizens, who vote by signed lists, containing the names of thirty-six individuals. The eighteen who have a majority of votes become members of the town-council, and the remaining eighteen who have the greatest number form a list of supplementary members to supply vacancies, and prevent any election being necessary except at the stated periods provided by law. The election of the demarch and paredhroi is a more complicated affair. The eighteen members chosen to form the town-council, and eighteen citizens who are the highest tax-payers in the community, then meet together under the presidency of the royal governor of the province. This meeting first proceeds to elect two of its number to open the ballot-box, and assist and control the conduct of the royal governor, as vice-presidents of the assembly. The election proceeds, the persons present voting by ballot. The names of candidates for the office of demarch must be returned, from which the king selects one, and six paredhroi chosen, who must all have an absolute majority of votes. The indirect election of the demarch is extremely unpopular, as it has no effect except to enable the king to exclude two popular but uncourtly citizens from every municipal office.

The plan of election in the country districts is precisely similar, but the town-council is less numerous, and each village has its own resident paredhros. The election of the demarch and of the paredhroi is conducted as at Athens, and the royal governor of the province is compelled to visit each commune in turn, in order to preside at the election. The whole system rests on a popular basis. Every citizen possessing property, or enrolled in the list of citizens from paying taxes, enjoys a vote in the election of the magistrates of his demos. The royal authority only concurs in so far as is required to preserve order, and give an official certificate of the legality of the proceedings.

We come now to another popular institution, which gives a great degree of political strength to the municipal organization of Greece, and protects its liberties in a manner unknown in most other countries. Each province possesses a provincial council, the members of which are elected by the citizens of the different demoi into which the province is divided--a demos containing 2000 inhabitants, sends one representative; a demos with 10,000 but exceeding 2000, sends two representatives; and a demos having more than 10,000 inhabitants, sends three. Here, however, the electors are required to pay fifty drachmas of direct taxes to the general government in order to be entitled to vote.[C]

[Footnote C: Twenty-eight drachmas make a pound sterling.]

It will be seen, on referring to the population of the Attic demoi, that the provincial council of Attica consists of twelve members, and these members are elected for six years. The restriction on the electors is not unpopular in Greece, as it is connected with an extended suffrage in the municipal elections. Upwards of 500 citizens voted in Athens at the last elections of provincial councillors. The provincial councils meet every year in the months of February or March, as that is the season when the landed proprietors in the country can most conveniently absent themselves from their farms. The council chooses its own president and secretary, but the royal governor of the province has the right to attend its meeting. The budget of each demos must be presented to the council and approved by it, and it has the power of rejecting any item of expenditure; but it can only recommend, not enforce, any additional expense. It is likewise the business of the provincial council to examine the grounds on which any demos solicits the power of imposing local taxes: it proposes also general improvements for the whole province, and has the power of assessing the taxes necessary for carrying them into effect. Roads, barracks for _gendarmes_, prisons, hospitals, and schools, are objects of its attention. Its acts must all be presented to the minister of the interior at the conclusion of the session, and they acquire validity only from the time the minister communicates the royal assent to the proceedings.

This system of popular government, in all matters directly connected with the daily business of the citizens, is a wise arrangement, and it has proved a powerful engine for the preservation of order amidst a population accustomed to anarchy, revolution, and despotism; and it has also formed a firm barrier against the tyrannical aspirations of the Bavarians. Indeed, had King Otho's government not been prevented, by this municipal system, from coming into daily contact with the people, we are persuaded that it would long ago have thrown Greece into convulsions, and caused the massacre of every Bavarian in the country.

From the account we have given of the royal central government on the one hand, and of the local magistracy on the other, it will be evident to our readers that there are two powers at work in Greece, which, unless they are united in the pursuit of some common objects, must at last engage in a contest for the mastery.

We shall now notice the newspaper allegation, that the Greek court is composed entirely of Bavarians. This was once the case, but it ceased to be strictly true from the moment Armansperg introduced the system of bribing the Greeks to join the Bavarian party; and at present the government is supported almost entirely by Greek deserters from the national cause. There is now no Bavarian in the ministry, and there are Greeks in the cabinet. Many of the Greeks who affect with foreigners to be loud in their complaints against the Bavarians, are, in the administration, the most strenuous supporters of King Otho's system, and, like Maurocordatos, the declared opponents of a national assembly and of a representative form of government. They declare to the king that it is necessary to retain some Bavarians in Greece, and they really wish it done in order to exclude their Greek rivals from office. A revolution, followed by a foreign government, and a lavish expenditure, has demoralized sterner stuff than Greek politicians are made of, so that it is more to be regretted than wondered at, when it appears that the Greek court has an unusually large supply of venal political adventurers always ready to enter its service.

This band consists of the Fanariotes, who were trained to official aptitude and immorality under the Turks--of the politicians of the revolution who deserted the cause of their country for the service of the protecting powers at the last national assembly--and of a large class of educated men not bred to commerce, who have resorted to Greece to make their fortunes, and are now ready to accept places under any government. The court, in its ignorance of Greece, has often purchased the services of these men at their own valuation; and from this cause originates the crowd of incapable councillors of state, useless ambassadors and consuls, ignorant ministerial councillors and royal governors, and dishonest commissaries, who assemble round King Otho in his palace. But time is rolling on--ten years have elapsed since King Otho first stepped on the Hellenic soil--the heroes of the war are sinking into the grave--Miaulis, the best of the brave--Zaimi, the sagacious timid Moreote noble--Kolocotroni, the sturdy strewd old klephtic chieftain;--these three representatives and leaders of numerous classes of their countrymen, now sleep in an honoured grave, and their followers no longer form a majority in the land. A new race has arisen, a race equal in education to the Maurocordatos, Rizos, Souizos, Karadjas, Tricoupis, and Kolettis, and possessing the immense advantage over these men of occupying a social position of greater independence. The fiery vehemence of youth placed most of these new men in the opposition when they entered on life. A political career being closed, they were, fortunately for their country, obliged to devote all their attention to the cultivation of their estates, and content themselves with improving their vineyards and olive plantations instead of governing their country. Years have now brought an increase of wealth, habits of moderation, steadiness of purpose, and feelings of independence.

In a country such as we have described Greece, and we flatter ourselves our description will bear examination on the part of travellers and diplomatic gentlemen, we ask if there can be any doubt of the ultimate success of popular institutions? For our own part, we feel persuaded that Greece can only escape from a fierce civil war by the convocation of a national representative assembly.--We adopted this opinion from the moment that the Bavarian government was unable to destroy the liberty of the press, after plunging into the contest and awakening the political passions of the people. When a sovereign attacks a popular institution without provocation, and fails in his attack, and when the people show that concentrated energy which inspires the prudence necessary to use victory with a moderation which produces no reaction against their cause, their victory is sure. Under such circumstances a nation can patiently wait the current of events. If Greece exist as a monarchy, we believe it will soon have a national assembly; and if King Otho remain its sovereign, we have a fancy that he will not long delay convoking one. Nothing, indeed, can long prevent some representative body from meeting together, unless it be the interference, direct or indirect, of the three protecting powers. They, indeed, have strength sufficient to become the Three Protecting Tyrants.

We hope that we have now given a tolerably intelligible account of King Otho's government, and how it stands. We shall, therefore, proceed to the second division of our enquiry, and strive to explain the actual state of public feeling in Greece; what the king's government was expected to do, and what it has left undone. We may be compelled here to glance at a few delicate and contested questions in Greek politics, on which, however, we shall not pretend to offer any opinion of our own, but merely collect the facts; and we advise all men who wish to form a decided opinion on such a question, to wait patiently until they have been discussed in a national assembly of Greeks.

The first great question on which the government of King Otho was expected to decide, was the means necessary to be adopted for discharging the internal debt contracted for carrying on the war against the Turks. This debt resolved itself into two heads: payment for services, and repayment of money advanced. The national assemblies which had met during the revolution, had decreed that every man who served in the army should, at the conclusion of the war, receive a grant of land. It was proposed that King Otho should carry these decrees into execution, by framing lists of all those who had served either in the army, the navy, or in civil employments. The same registers which contain the lists of the citizens of the various communes, could have been rendered available for the purpose of verifying the services of each individual. A fixed number of acres might then have been destined to each man, according to his rank and time of service. This measure would have enabled the Greek government to say, that it had kept faith with the people. It would have induced many of the military to settle as landed proprietors when the first current of enthusiasm in favour of peaceful occupations set in, and it would have been the means of silencing many pretensions of powerful military chiefs, whose silence has since been dearly purchased.

The royal government always resisted these demands of the Greeks, and the consequence was, that when it was necessary to yield from fear, Count Armansperg adopted a law of dotation, which, under the appearance of being a general measure, was only carried into application in cases where partisanship was established; and yet national lands have been alienated to a far greater extent than would have satisfied every claim arising out of the revolutionary war. The king, it is true, has in late years made donations of national land to favoured individuals, to maids of honour, Turkish neophytes, and Bavarian brides; and he has rewarded several political renegades with currant lands, and held out hopes of conferring villages on councillors of state who have been eager defenders of the court; but all this has been openly done as a matter of royal favour.

With regard to the second class of claimants. Common honesty, if royal gratitude go for nothing in Greece, required that those who advanced money to their country in her day of need, should be repaid their capital. All interest might have been refused--the glory of their disinterested conduct was all the reward they wanted; for few of them would have demanded repayment of the sums due had they been rich enough to offer them as a gift. The refusal of King Otho to repay these sums when he lavished money on his Bavarian favourites and Greek partizans, has probably lowered his character more, both in the East and in Europe, than any of those errors in diplomacy which induced the _Morning Chronicle_ to publish, that several Bavarians of rank had written a certificate of his being an idiot, and forwarded it to his royal father. The sum required to pay up all the claims of this class, would not have exceeded the agency paid by King Otho to his Bavarian banker for remitting the loan contracted at Paris to Greece, by the rather circuitous route of Munich.