CHAPTER I

MY APPOINTMENT AS AN OFFICIAL IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND MY FIRST AUDIENCE WITH BISMARCK--WORK AND OBSERVATIONS UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE

On February 1st, 1870, while living in Leipzig and engaged in literary work, I received--quite unexpectedly--from Dr. Metzler, Secretary in the Foreign Office of the North German Confederation, who was at that time occupied principally with press matters and with whom I had been in communication since 1867, a short note requesting me to come to Berlin in order to have a talk with him. On my arrival I ascertained, to my great surprise, that Dr. Metzler had recommended me to Herr von Keudell, Councillor of Embassy, who was then in charge of personal and finance matters in the Foreign Office, for a confidential position under the Chancellor of the Confederation, which he, Metzler himself, had previously held, and in which my chief duty would be to carry out the instructions of the Chancellor in press matters. I was to be in immediate communication with the Chancellor. My position for the time being would be what was called “diätarisch,” that is to say without any claim to a pension and without a title. Further details were to be arranged with Herr von Keudell on his return from his honeymoon. For the moment I was only required to declare my readiness in general to accept the offer, and later on I was to formulate my wishes and lay them in writing before Herr von Keudell.

This I did in a letter dated February 4th, in which I emphasised as the most important condition that I should be entirely independent of the Literary or Press Bureau, and that if my capacity for the position should not prove equal to the expectations formed of it I should not be appointed an official in that department. On February 19th I heard from Metzler that my conditions had been in the main agreed to, and that no objections had been raised with regard to that respecting the Literary Bureau. I was to discuss the further arrangements with Keudell himself, and to be prepared to enter upon my duties at once. On February 21st I had a satisfactory interview with the latter, in the course of which we came to an understanding as to terms. On the 23rd I was informed by Keudell that the Chancellor had agreed to my conditions, and that he had arranged for me to call upon Bismarck on the following evening. Next day I took the official oath, and on the same evening, shortly after 8 o’clock, I found myself in the presence of the Chancellor, whom I had only seen at a distance once before, namely, from the Press Gallery of the Reichstag. Now, two years later, I saw him again as he sat in a military uniform at his writing table with a bundle of documents before him. I was quite close to him this time, and felt as if I stood before the altar.

He gave me his hand, and motioned me to take a seat opposite him. He began by saying that although he desired to have a talk with me, he must for the moment content himself with just making my acquaintance, as he had very little time to spare. “I have been kept in the Reichstag to-day longer than I expected by a number of lengthy and tiresome speeches; then I have here (pointing to the documents before him) despatches to read, also as a rule not very amusing; and at 9 o’clock I must go to the palace, and that is not particularly entertaining either. What have you been doing up to the present?” I replied that I had edited the _Grenzboten_, an organ of practically National Liberal views, which I left, however, on one of the proprietors showing a disposition to adopt a Progressist policy on the Schleswig-Holstein question. The Chancellor: “Yes, I know that paper.” I then went on to say that I had at the instance of the Government taken a position at Hanover, where I assisted the Civil Commissioner, Herr von Hardenberg, in representing Prussian interests in the local press during the year of transition. I had subsequently, on instructions received from the Foreign Office, written a number of articles for different political journals, amongst others for the _Preussische Jahrbuecher_, to which I had also previously contributed. Bismarck: “Then you understand our politics and the German question in particular. I intend to get you to write notes and articles for the papers from such particulars and instructions as I may give you, for of course I cannot myself write leaders. You will also arrange for others doing so. At first these will naturally be by way of trial. I must have some one especially for this purpose, and not merely occasional assistance as at present, especially as I also receive very little useful help from the Literary Bureau. But how long do you remain here?” and as he looked at his watch I thought he desired to bring the conversation to a close. I replied that I had arranged to remain in Berlin. Bismarck: “Ah, very well then, I shall have a long talk with you one of these days. In the meantime see Herr von Keudell, and also Herr Bucher, Councillor of Embassy, who is well acquainted with all these matters.” I understood that I was now at liberty to go, and was about to rise from my seat when the Chancellor said: “Of course you know the question which was before the House to-day?” I replied in the negative, explaining that I had been too busy to read the reports in the newspapers. “Well,” he said, “it was respecting the admission of Baden into the North German Confederation. It is a pity that people cannot manage to wait, and that they treat everything from a party standpoint, and as furnishing opportunities for speech-making. Disagreeable business to have to answer such speeches, not to say such twaddle! These eloquent gentlemen are really like ladies with small feet. They force them into shoes that are too tight for them, and push them under our noses on all occasions in order that we may admire them. It is just the same with a man who has the misfortune to be eloquent. He speaks too often and too long. The question of German unity is making good progress; but it requires time--one year perhaps, or five, or indeed possibly even ten years. I cannot make it go any faster, nor can these gentlemen either. But they have no patience to wait.” With these words he rose, and again shaking hands I took leave of him for the time.

I was thus enlisted in the ranks of Bismarck’s fellow-workers. An opportunity for the general instructions which he proposed to give me never occurred. I had to enter upon my work at once. Next evening I was twice called in to him to receive instructions for articles. Later on I sometimes saw him still more frequently, and occasionally in the forenoon also--now and then as often as five or even eight times in one day. At these interviews I had to take good care to keep my ears well open, and to note everything with the closest attention, so that two pieces of information or two sets of instructions should not get mixed up. However, I soon found myself equal to this unusually trying task, as Bismarck’s opinions and instructions were always given in a striking form, which it was easy to remember. Besides, he was accustomed to repeat his principal points in other words. Then, again, I made myself all ears, so that, through practice, I gradually succeeded in retaining long sentences, and even whole speeches, practically without omissions, until I had an opportunity of committing them to paper. Bismarck used also to send me, by one of the messengers, documents and newspapers marked with the letter V and a cross, signs which indicated “Press Instructions.” When I found such papers on my desk I looked them through, and subsequently obtained the Chancellor’s directions with regard to them. Furthermore, when I had anything of importance to ask or to submit for his approval, I was allowed to call upon him without previous invitation. I thus practically occupied the position of a “Vortragender Rath” (_i.e._, an official having direct access to the Chancellor), excepting only that I had neither the title nor the sense of infallibility common to all such Councillors.

The newspapers to which the articles thus prepared were supplied were the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, then edited by Brass, which was the semi-official organ, properly speaking; the _Spenersche Zeitung_, and the _Neue Preussische Zeitung_. I also frequently sent letters to the _Kölnische Zeitung_, expressing the Chancellor’s views. During the first months of my appointment Metzler, who had previously contributed to that paper, served as the medium for communicating these articles. Subsequently they were sent direct to the editor, and were always accepted without alteration. In addition to this work I saw one of the writers from the Literary Bureau every forenoon, and gave him material which was sent to the _Magdeburger Zeitung_ and some of the smaller newspapers; while other members of his department furnished portions of it to certain Silesian, East Prussian, and South German organs. I had similar weekly interviews with other, and somewhat more independent, writers. Amongst these I may mention Dr. Bock, who supplied articles to the _Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung_, and a number of papers in Hanover; Professor Constantine Roeszler, formerly Lecturer at Jena, who subsequently assisted Richthofen at Hamburg and afterwards edited the _Staatsanzeiger_; and finally Herr Heide, who had previously been a missionary in Australia and was at that time working for the _North German Correspondence_, which had been founded with a view to influencing the English press.

In addition to this my duties also included the reading of masses of German, Austrian and French newspapers, which were laid upon my table three times daily, and the management and purchase of books for the Ministerial Library. It will therefore be easily understood that while the Chancellor remained in Berlin I had more than enough to attend to. I was engaged not only on week-days, but also on Sundays, from 9 in the morning until 3 in the afternoon, and again from 5 till 10 and sometimes 11 o’clock at night. Indeed, it sometimes occurred that a messenger from the Chancellor came at midnight to call me away from a party of friends or out of my bed in order to receive pressing instructions.

I reproduce here in the form in which they appear in my diary the particulars of a number of more or less characteristic statements and instructions which I received from the Chancellor at that period. They show that the statesman whom I had the honour to serve thoroughly understood the business of journalism, and they further throw a welcome light upon many of the political events of that time.

Some days after the debate in the Reichstag respecting the entrance of Baden into the North German Confederation, to which reference has already been made, and while the matter was still occupying both the attention of the press and of the Chancellor, I find the following entry among my notes:--

_February 27th, evening._--Called to see the Minister. I am to direct special attention to the nonsense written by the National Liberal Press on the last sitting of the Reichstag. The Chancellor said:--“The National Liberals are not a united party. They are merely two fractions. Amongst their leaders Bennigsen and Forckenbeck are sensible men, and there are also a couple of others. Miguel is inclined to be theatrical. Loewe, with his deep chest notes, does everything for effect. He has not made a single practical remark. Lasker is effective in destructive criticism, but is no politician. It sounded very odd to hear him declare that they were now too much occupied with Rome in Paris and Vienna to interfere with us in connection with the Baden affair. If it were possible to get those of really Progressist views to act independently, it would make the situation much clearer. Friedenthal’s speech was excellent. I must ask you also to emphasise the following points:--1. The unfairness of the _National Zeitung_ in repeating misunderstandings which I explained and disposed of in my speech. 2. The make-believe support given to my policy by men who were elected for the express purpose of rendering me real assistance. 3. That such politicians either cannot see or intentionally overlook my principal motive, viz., that to admit Baden into the Confederation would bring pressure to bear upon Bavaria, and that it is therefore a hazardous step. Attention should be paid to the situation in France, so that nothing should be done which might endanger the Constitutional evolution of that country, an evolution hitherto promoted in every way from Berlin, as it signifies peace for us. The French Arcadians” (the party that supported Napoleon through thick and thin) “are watching the course of events in Germany, and waiting their opportunity. Napoleon is now well disposed to us, but he is very changeable. We could now fight France and beat her too, but that war would give rise to five or six others; and while we can gain our ends by peaceful means, it would be foolish, if not criminal, to take such a course. Events in France may take a warlike or revolutionary turn, which would render the present brittle metal there more malleable. There was an important point in my speech, which, however, these good people failed to recognise. That was the intimation that in certain circumstances we should pay no regard either to the views of Austria respecting South Germany as a whole, nor to those of France, who objected to the admission of any single South German State into the North German Confederation. That was a feeler. Further measures can only be considered when I know how that hint has been received in Vienna and Paris.”

_March 1st._--Count Bismarck wishes me to get the following inserted in the South German newspapers:--“The speech of von Freydorf, the Grand Ducal Minister, in the Baden Diet on the Jurisdiction Treaty with the North German Confederation, has been inspired by an absolutely correct view of the situation. Particular attention should be paid to that portion in which the Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy declared the policy of Baden to be in perfect accord with that of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, and also to the manner in which he defined the position of the South German States towards the Treaty of Prague. Through the dissolution of the old Germanic Confederacy, those States have, as a matter of fact, become sovereign States. That treaty _gives them liberty_ (to me: Underline those words!) to form a new union amongst themselves, a South German Confederation, by means of which they may take measures for bringing about a national union with the united North. That treaty involves no prescription, engagement or compulsion whatever to adopt such a course. Any insinuation of that kind with respect to States whose sovereignty has been emphatically recognised would be something absolutely unheard of. In the Swiss war of the Sonderbund, and also in the late American civil war, States were obliged against their own will to remain within a union which they had previously joined, but no one ever saw a sovereign State or Prince required to enter into confederation against their own judgment. The South German States, including half of Hesse, have unquestionably the right--acting either in concert or singly--to endeavour, in co-operation with the North, to advance the cause of national unity. The question is whether the present is a good time to choose. The Chancellor of the North German Confederation answers this question in the negative. But it is only possible by the most wilful garbling of his expressions to maintain that his final aim is not the union of Germany. Partition of German national territory! Calumny! Not a single word of the Chancellor’s justifies that conclusion. As Herr Lasker has not spoken at the instance of the Government of Baden, although his speech would almost convey the impression that he was a Minister of that State, it is difficult to understand where he got that idea. Perhaps it was merely the conceit of the honourable member that led him to make such a statement.”

_March 3rd._--The Minister wishes the _Kölnische Zeitung_ first, and afterwards the South German newspapers, to advocate the organisation into one great party of all men of national views in the South German States, so as to get rid of the particularism which had hitherto divided them. “The matter lies much more in their hands,” he said, “than in those of the North German National Liberals. The North German Governments will do all that is possible in a reasonable way in support of the efforts of South Germany. But the South Germans who wish to unite with us must act together and not singly. I want you to reiterate this point again and again. The article must then be printed in the _Spenersche Zeitung_ and in other newspapers to which we have access, and it should be accompanied by expressions of deep regret at the particularism which prevents the union of the various Southern parties that gravitate towards North Germany. A union of the four Southern States is an impossibility, but there is nothing to hinder the formation of a Southern League composed of men of national sentiments. The National party in Baden, the German party in Würtemberg, and the Bavarian Progressist party are merely different names for the same thing. These groups have to deal with different Governments, and some persons maintain that they must consequently adopt different tactics. Their aims are nevertheless identical in all important points. With the best will in the world those three parties, while acting singly, produce but a slight impression. If they desire to go ahead and become an important factor in public affairs, they must combine to form a great and homogeneous South German National party which must be reckoned with on both sides of the Main.”

Read over to the Minister, at his request, an article which he ordered yesterday and for which he gave me the leading ideas. It was to be dated from Paris, and published in the _Kölnische Zeitung_. He said:--“Yes, you have correctly expressed my meaning. The composition is good both as regards its reasoning and the facts which it contains. But no Frenchman thinks in such logical and well-ordered fashion, yet the letter is understood to be written by a Frenchman. It must contain more gossip, and you must pass more lightly from point to point. In doing so you must adopt an altogether French standpoint. A Liberal Parisian writes the letter and gives his opinion as to the position of his party towards the German question, expressing himself in the manner usual in statements of that kind.” (Finally Count Bismarck dictated the greater part of the article, which was forwarded by Metzler in its altered form to the Rhenish newspaper.)

In connection with this task the Minister said to me the day before:--“I look at the matter in this way. A correspondent in Paris must give his opinion of my quarrel with Lasker and the others over the Baden question, and bring forward arguments which I did not think it desirable to use at that time. He must say that no one could deem it advisable in the present state of affairs in Bavaria, when the King seems to be so well disposed, to do anything calculated on the one hand to irritate him, and on the other to disturb the Constitutional movement in France--which movement tended to preserve peace while it would itself be promoted by the maintenance of peace. Those who desire to advance the cause of liberty do not wish to go to war with us, yet they could not swim against the stream if we took any action in South Germany which public opinion would regard as detrimental to the interests and prestige of France. Moreover, for the present the course of the Vatican Council should not be interfered with, as the result for Germany might possibly be a diversion. We must wait for these things,” he added. “I cannot explain that to them. If they were politicians they would see it for themselves. There are reasons for forbearance which every one should be able to recognise; but Members of Parliament who cross-question the Government do not usually regard that as their duty.”

The second portion of the article which the Minister dictated runs as follows:--“Whoever has had an opportunity of observing here in Paris how difficult the birth of the present Constitutional movement has been, what obstacles this latest development of French political life has to overcome if it is to strike deep roots, and how powerful are the influences of which the guiding spirit only awaits some pretext for smothering the infant in its cradle, will understand with what anxiety we watch the horizon abroad and what a profoundly depressing effect every little cloud there produces upon our hopes of a secure and peaceful development of the new _régime_. It is the ardent wish of every sincere adherent of the Constitutional cause in France that there should now be no diversion abroad, no change on the horizon of foreign politics, which might serve if not as a real motive at least as a pretext for crying down the youthful Constitutionalism of France, while at the same time directing public attention to foreign relations. We believe that the Emperor is in earnest, but his immediate _entourage_, and the creatures whom he has to employ, are watching anxiously for some event which shall enable them to compel the Sovereign to abandon a course which they resent. These people are very numerous, and have during the eighteen years of the Emperor’s reign grown more powerful than is perhaps believed outside France. Whoever has any regard for the Constitutional development of the country can only hope that no alteration, however slight, shall occur in the foreign relations of France to serve as a motive or pretext for that reaction which every opponent of the Constitution is striving to bring about.”

Between the directions for these articles, which I here bring together as they relate to the same subject, I received others, some of which I may also reproduce.

_March 4th._--The _Boersen Zeitung_ contained an article in which it was alleged that in Germany only nobles were considered competent to become Ministers. This the Count sent down to me to be refuted in a short article, expressing surprise at such a statement. “An absurd electioneering move!” the Chancellor said. “Whoever wishes to persuade the world that in Prussia the position of Minister is only open to the aristocracy, and that capable commoners have absolutely no chance of attaining to it, must have no memory and no eyes. Say that under Count Bismarck no less than three commoners have, on his recommendation, been appointed Ministers within a short period, namely Delbrück, Leonhard and Camphausen. Lasker, it is true, has not yet been appointed.”

I wrote this short article immediately; but the Chancellor was not pleased with it. “I told you expressly,” he said, “to mention the names of Delbrück, Leonhard and Camphausen, and that their appointments were due to my personal influence. Go straight to the point, and don’t wander round about it in that way! That is no use! A pointless article! They are just the cleverest of the present Ministers. The attack on Lasker is also out of place. We must not provoke people unnecessarily. They are right when they complain of bullying.” The reference to Lasker consisted merely of his own words as given above.

_March 5th._--The _Vossische Zeitung_ contained a bitter attack, which culminated in the following remark: “Exceptional circumstances--and such must be acknowledged to exist when working men are treated to breech-loaders, and Ministers are hanged on street lamps--cannot be taken as a rule for the regular conduct of affairs.” The Count received this article from the Literary Bureau of the Ministry of State (where extracts from the newspapers were made for him), although it might well have been withheld, as not much importance attaches to the scoldings of “Tante Voss.” The Count sent for me, read over the passage in question, and observed: “They speak of times when Ministers were hanged on street lamps. Unworthy language! Reply that such a thing never occurred in Prussia, and that there is no prospect of its occurring. In the meantime it shows towards what condition of affairs the efforts of that newspaper are tending, which (under the auspices of Jacoby and Company) supplies the Progressist middle classes of Berlin with their politics.”

Called in again later to the Count. I am to go to Geheimrath Hahn and call his attention to the question of capital punishment, which in view of the approaching elections should be dealt with in the _Provinzial-Correspondenz_ in accordance with the policy of the Government, who desire its retention. The Minister said: “I am firmly convinced that the majority of the population is opposed to its abolition. Were it otherwise it would of course be possible to do away with it. It is a mere theory--the sentimentality of lawyers in the Reichstag--a party doctrine which has no connection with the life of the people, although its advocates are constantly referring to the people. Tell him that, but be cautious in dealing with him. He is somewhat conceited--bureaucratic. Do it in a diplomatic way. You must let him think that those are his own ideas. Otherwise we shall not get anything useful out of him. Let me know afterwards what he says.”

_March 6th._--Have seen Hahn. He is of opinion that it is yet too early to deal with this matter. It will probably end in a compromise, capital punishment being only retained for murder. The attitude of the Liberals in the elections can only be influenced after the decision in the Reichstag. In the meantime he has instructed the Literary Bureau to refute the article in the _National Zeitung_, and to show how sterile the present Parliament would be if it allowed the long wished for Criminal Code to be wrecked upon this question of capital punishment. Report this to the Minister. He is of opinion that Hahn is mistaken. “It is necessary to act in a diplomatic way in this case,” he observed. “One must present an appearance of determination up to the last moment; and if one wants to secure a suitable compromise, show no disposition to give way; besides, Hahn must have no other policy than mine. I shall speak to Eulenburg, and get him to set Hahn straight. This must be put down at once. We must think in good time about the elections.”

_March 7th._--Sent Brass (_Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_) an article written by Bucher under instructions from the Minister, showing that the majority in the Reichstag does not represent public opinion nor the will of the people, but only the opinions and desires of the Parliamentary party.

Called to the Count in the evening, when he said: “I want you to secure the insertion in the press of an article somewhat to the following effect: For some time past vague rumours of war have been current throughout the world for which no sufficient ground exists in fact, or can be even suggested. The explanation is probably to be sought in Stock Exchange speculation for a fall which has been started in Paris. Confidential whispers are going about with regard to the presence of Archduke Albrecht in the French capital which are calculated to cause uneasiness; and then, naturally enough, these rumours are shouted aloud and multiplied by the windbags of the Guelph press.”

_March 11th._--The Count wants an article in the _National Zeitung_ to be answered in this sense: “The Liberals in Parliament always identify themselves with the people. They maintain, like Louis XIV. with his _L’état c’est moi_, that ‘We are the People.’ There could hardly be a more absurd piece of boasting and exaggeration. As if the other representatives, the Conservatives in the country, and the great numbers who belong to no party, were not also part of the nation, and had no opinions and interests to which regard should be paid!”

_Evening._--The Minister, referring to a statement in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, remarked: “There is much ado about the decided attitude taken up by Beust against the Curia. According to the report published by Brass he has expressed himself very emphatically respecting its latest action, in a note which the Ambassador read to the Secretary of State. That must be refuted, weakened. Do it in a letter from Rome to the _Kölnische Zeitung_. Say: ‘We do not know if the analysis of the despatch in question (which has made the round of the papers, and which was first published by _The Times_) is correct,[2] but we have reason to doubt it.’ Trautmansdorf (the Austrian Ambassador to the Holy See) has read no note and has received no instructions to make any positive declaration, but is on the contrary acting in accordance with his own convictions--and it is known that he is very clerical and not at all disposed to radical measures. He has communicated to Cardinal Antonelli such parts of the information that reached him from Vienna as he thought proper, and he certainly made that communication in as considerate a form as possible. It cannot therefore have been very emphatic.”

_Later._--Attention is to be directed, at first in a paper which has no connection with the Government, to the prolonged sojourn of Archduke Albrecht in Paris as a suspicious symptom. In connection with it rumours have been circulated in London of an understanding between France and Austria. Our papers should afterwards reproduce these hints.

_March 12th._--In the afternoon Bucher gave me the chief’s instructions to order the Spanish newspaper, _Imparcial_. (This is of some importance, as it doubtless indicates that even then we had a hand in the question of electing the new King. On several occasions subsequently I secured the insertion in non-official German papers of translations which Bucher brought me of articles in that newspaper against the candidature of Montpensier.)

_March 13th._--The Chancellor wishes to have it said in one of the “remote” journals (that is, not notoriously connected with the Government) that the Pope has paid no regard to the representations of France and Austria respecting the principal points which should be decided by the Council. He would not have done so even if those representations had been expressed in a more emphatic form than they actually were. Neither Banneville nor Trautmansdorf was inclined to heartily defend the cause of the State against the Ultramontanes. This disposes of the news of the _Mémorial Diplomatique_ to the effect that at the suggestion of Count Daru the Curia has already given an affirmative answer. That report is absolutely false, as is nearly all the news published by the paper in question. It is much the same with Count Beust’s note to the Papal Government. (“Quote the word ‘note,’” added the Minister.) It was only a despatch, and, doubtless, a very tame one.

_March 16th, evening._--Called up to the Minister, who lay on the sofa in his study. “Here,” he said (pointing to a newspaper). “They complain of the accumulation of labour imposed upon Parliament. Already eight months’ hard work! That must be answered. It is true that members of Parliament have a great deal to do, but Ministers are still worse off. In addition to their work in the two Diets the latter have an immense amount of business to transact for the King and the country both while Parliament is sitting and during the recess. Moreover, members have the remedy in their own hands. If those who do not belong to the Upper Chamber will abstain from standing for election both to the Prussian and the Federal Diet they will lighten their task sufficiently. They are not obliged to sit in both Houses.”

_March 21st._--I am to call attention in the semi-official organs to the fact that the Reichstag is discussing the Criminal Code far too minutely and slowly. “The speakers,” observed the Count, “show too great a desire for mere talk, and are too fond of details and hair-splitting. If this continues the Bills will not be disposed of in the present Session, especially as the Budget has still to be discussed. The President might well exercise stricter control. Another unsatisfactory feature is that so many members absent themselves from the sittings. Our newspapers ought to publish regularly lists of such absentees. Please see that is done.”

Called up again later and commissioned to explain in the press the attitude of Prussia towards those Prelates who oppose the Curia in Rome. The Chancellor said: “The newspapers express a desire that the Government should support the German Bishops on the Council. You should ask if those writers have formed a clear idea as to how we should set about that task. Should Prussia perhaps send a Note to the Council, or to Antonelli, the Papal Minister, who does not belong to that body? or is she to secure representation in that assembly of Prelates, and protest (of course in vain) against what she objects to? Prussia will not desert those Bishops who do not submit themselves to the yoke, but it is for the Prelates in the first place to maintain a determined attitude. We cannot take preventive measures, as they would be of no value, but it is open to us to adopt a repressive policy in case a decision is come to in opposition to our wishes. If, after that decision has been arrived at, it should prove to be incompatible with the mission and interests of the State, then existing legislation, if found inadequate, can be easily supplemented and altered. The demand that the Prussian Government should support the more moderate Bishops is a mere empty phrase so long as no practical means of giving effect to it can be discovered. Moreover, the course which I now indicate will in any case be ultimately successful, although success may not at once be completely achieved.”

_March 25th._--The Chief wishes Klaczko’s appointment in Vienna to be discussed. He said to me: “Beust intends in that way to revive the Polish question. Point to the journalistic activity of that indefatigable agitator, and to his bitter hatred both of ourselves and Russia. Quote Rechenberg’s confidential despatch of the 2nd of March from Warsaw, where he says that the Polish secret political societies which are engaged at Lemberg in preparing for a revolution, with the object of restoring Polish independence, have sent a deputation to Klaczko congratulating him on his appointment to a position where he is in direct communication with the Chancellor of the Empire. Send the article first to the _Kölnische Zeitung_, and afterwards arrange for similar articles in the provincial newspapers. We must finally see that this reaches Reuss (the Ambassador in St. Petersburg), in order that he may get it reproduced in the Russian press. It can also appear in the _Kreuzzeitung_, and it must be brought up again time after time in another form.”

_Afternoon._--Geheimrath Abeken desires me, on the instructions of the Minister, to take note of the following document, which is apparently based on a despatch: “It is becoming more and more difficult to understand the attitude of the Austrian Government towards the Council. All the organs of public opinion are on the side of the Austrian Bishops, who are making such a dignified and decisive stand in Rome. The reports which the Government thought well to allow the press to publish respecting the steps which they have taken in Rome were in harmony with this attitude. The news from Rome, however, speaks only of the tameness and indecision with which the Government’s policy is being carried into execution. The most contradictory accounts are now coming in. It is said that the Austrian Ambassador has supported the action of the French Ambassador, which is known not to have been very effective. Expressions have been attributed to Count Beust showing that, in his opinion, the only effectual course would be for all the Powers to take common or collective action. On the other hand, it is asserted that he gave a negative answer, reciting different objections, to the proposal of another Catholic State (Bavaria) to join it in a decisive declaration in Rome. In presence of this indecision on the part of the Catholic Powers the Bishops will doubtless be obliged to follow their own consciences and decide for themselves what their course of action is to be. We are convinced however that if the Prelates themselves resolved to make a determined stand on behalf of their consciences the situation would immediately undergo a change in their favour, and that ultimately no Government would desert its own Bishops even if they were in a minority.

“Bismarck has already explained to the Prussian Ambassador in Paris that he is prepared to support every initiative taken on the Catholic side in the matter of the Council. He at the same time discussed the subject with Benedetti, expressing himself in a similar sense, but in the meantime making no positive proposal. On the other hand, he asked incidentally whether it might not be desirable to consider in a general conference the attitude to be adopted by the various Governments towards the Council. Benedetti replied that such a course would only hasten the Council’s decision. Bismarck urged that a conference might be useful, even were it no longer possible to influence the Council, and were the question to be considered merely how far the injurious effects of its decisions on the peace of Church and State could be minimised.

“Benedetti sent a report of this informal conversation to Paris, representing it as a proposal to hold a conference. Daru replied in a despatch which pointed out the difficulty of carrying that idea into execution. Who should take part in the conference? Russia maintained such an unfriendly attitude towards the Catholic Church, and Italy was so hostile to the Curia that they could hardly join in any common action. Spain wished to confine herself to the repression of any eventual breach of the laws of the country, and England ignored the official declarations of the Roman Church. Many Powers had Concordats, while others occupied a more independent position towards the Curia, therefore, in that respect also, an understanding would be difficult. Finally, Daru feared that Rome, on hearing of an intended conference, would reply with a _fait accompli_. For these reasons he declined the proposal. He would, however, like to afford the other Powers an opportunity of supporting the measures taken by France on her own initiative. In case he received a negative answer to his demand that France should be represented on the Council he would officially communicate to the other Governments his declaration to the Secretary of State, Cardinal Antonelli, that the rights and interests of the State would be defended against any encroachment on the part of the Spiritual Power, and urge them to support his action in Rome. Bismarck thanked Daru for this communication, and said that the Government at Berlin (when it had satisfied itself that such a course on the part of France was calculated to promote the interests of Prussian Catholics) would endeavour to strengthen the impression made thereby; and that further communications were awaited with interest.

“The French Government looks forward with anxiety to the consequences of the Council, but hesitates to take any serious and decisive measures, and is not disposed to enter upon any common action with the other Powers. Bray, at Munich, seemed less disinclined to such a course. He thought a declaration might possibly be made that the Government considered the œcumenical and authoritative character of the Council to be affected by the promulgation of the dogma of infallibility notwithstanding the opposition of a minority of the Bishops, as also the legal position assured to the Prelates under the Concordats, and that the dogma in question was to be regarded as null and void. Bray was anxious that Austria should join in this declaration. Beust, however, would not consent, as he believed that such a declaration would merely induce the Council to come to an unanimous decision which would then be binding upon the Governments. An unequivocal attitude of any kind is not to be expected from Vienna.

“If the Catholic Governments will not take the initiative the question remains what course the Bishops themselves will adopt. We hold to the principle of not acting directly and in our own name with the Roman See, while at the same time powerfully and steadfastly supporting every effort made by the Catholics themselves, and particularly by the German Bishops to prevent illegal changes being made in the constitution of the Catholic Church, and to preserve both Church and State from a disturbance of the peace. We do not find ourselves called upon to take up a prominent attitude towards the Council; but our readiness to support energetically every well-meant effort of the Catholic Powers, whose duty it is to intervene in the first place, or of the Bishops within the Council, remains unaltered.”

_Evening._--I am to refer to England and the way in which the press is treated there. “The Liberals always appeal to English example when they want to secure some fresh liberty for the press. Such appeals, it is well known, rest largely upon mistaken notions. It would be desirable to examine more closely the Bill which has just been passed for the preservation of order in Ireland. What would public opinion in Germany, and particularly what would the people of Berlin say, if our Government could proceed against any of our democratic journals, even against the most violent, according to the following provisions, and that too without even a state of minor siege? Then quote the provisions, and add that the Bill was carried by a large majority.”[3]

_March 28th._--The Chancellor desires that the question of the Council should be again dealt with somewhat to the following effect: “The press has repeatedly expressed a desire to know what position will be taken by Prussia towards the policy of the majority of the Council, and several proposals have been made in this connection. In our opinion the answer to that question is to be found in the character of Prussia as a Protestant Power. In that capacity Prussia must leave the initiative in this matter to the Catholic Governments who are more directly threatened. If these do not take action the question remains what course the Bishops who form the minority in the Council will adopt, a question which will be answered by the immediate future. If the Catholic Governments decide to take steps against the majority of the Council, Prussia ought to join in that action if she considers it to be in the interests of her Catholic subjects. But it is less the duty of Prussia than of any other State to rush into the breach.... If the Bishops defend the constitution of their Church, their episcopal rights, and peace between Church and State in a fearless and determined protest against the encroachments of the Ultramontane party in the Council, it may then be confidently hoped that the Prussian Government will extend to them a powerful support.”

Some of the last sentences repeated almost literally the conclusion of the document brought to me by Abeken.

_March 30th._--The Count sent down a report from Rome for use in the press. This report says: “The tourists who visited St. Peter’s on the 22nd instant were several times disturbed by a dull noise which rolled through the aisles like a storm, proceeding from the direction of the Council Chamber. Those who remained a little longer saw individual Bishops, with anxious looks, hurriedly leave the church. There had been a terrible scene amongst the reverend fathers. The theme _de erroribus_, which was laid before the Council about three weeks ago and then returned to the Commission, was again being discussed in an amended form. This discussion had now lasted five or six (eight) days. Strossmayer criticised one of the paragraphs of the Proemium which characterised Protestantism as the source of all the evils which now infect the world in the forms of pantheism, materialism, and atheism. He declared that this Proemium contained historical untruths, as the errors of our time were much older than Protestantism. The Humanist movement, which had been imprudently protected by the highest authority (Pope Leo X.) was in part responsible for them. The Proemium lacked the charity due to Protestants. (First uproar.) It was, on the contrary, amongst Protestants that Christianity had found its most powerful defenders, such as Leibnitz and Guizot, whose meditations he should wish to see in the hands of every Christian. (Renewed and increased uproar, while closed fists are shown at the speaker, and cries are heard of ‘_Hæreticus es! Taceas! Descendas! Omnes te condemnamus!_’ and now and then ‘_Ego eum non condemno!_’) This storm also subsided, and Strossmayer was able to proceed to another point, namely, the question to which the Bishops referred in their protest, that is to say, that a unanimous vote is indispensable for decisions on dogma. Strossmayer’s remarks on this theme caused the indignation of the majority to boil over. Cardinal Capalti interrupted him. The assembly raged like a hurricane. After a wordy war of a quarter of an hour’s duration between the speaker and the Legates, Strossmayer retired, three times repeating the words: ‘_Protestor non est concilium._’ It is worthy of note that a Congregation has been held to-day at which the Bishop of Halifax and others are understood to have expressed views similar to those of Strossmayer and that no attempt was made to interrupt them. It would therefore appear as if the storm raised against the Bishop of Bosnia were a party manœuvre with the object of ruining the most important of the Princes of the Church.”

_March 31st._--Commissioned by the Chief to tell Zitelmann (an official of the Ministry of State in charge of press matters) that the newspaper extracts which his office prepares for submission to the King (through the Minister) should be better sifted and arranged. Those that are suitable for the King are to be gummed on to separate sheets and detached from those that are not suitable for him. Particularistic lies and stupidities, such as those from Kiel of the 25th and Cassel of the 28th, belong to the latter category and must not be laid before him. If he sees that kind of thing printed in black on white he is apt to believe it. He does not know the character of those papers.

I am to secure the insertion in the press of the following particulars, which have reference to a paragraph in a newspaper which the Minister did not name to me. It is a well-known fact that Howard, the English representative at Munich, although he is married to a Prussian lady (Schulenberg), exercises, in opposition to the views of his own Government, a decidedly anti-Prussian influence, not so much in a pro-Austrian as in a Guelph sense. He was Minister at Hanover up to the events of 1866.

_April 1st._--The Minister’s birthday. When I was called to him in the evening his room was perfumed with flowers presented to him. He lay on the sofa, booted and spurred, smoking a cigar, and reading newspaper extracts. After receiving my instructions, I offered my congratulations, for which he thanked me, reaching me his hand. “I hope,” he said, “we shall remain together for a very long time.” I replied that I hoped so too, that I could find no words to say how happy I felt to be near him, and to be able to work for him. “Well,” he answered, smiling, “it is not always so pleasant, but you must not notice every little thing.”

My instructions referred to Lasker and Hoverbeck. They were as follows:--“Just take Lippe and Lasker as your subject for once. Lasker has, it is true, been taken to task for one of his latest utterances by Bennigsen, the chief of his fraction, but it can do no harm to deal with the affair once more in the press--and repeatedly. He, like Lippe, wants the Constitution to be placed above our national requirements. _Les extrêmes se touchent._ Lippe is the representative of the Particularistic Junkers with the tendency to absolutism, Lasker that of the Parliamentary Junkers with Particularistic leanings. Vincke, who was just such another, succeeded, with his eternal dogmatism, in ruining and nearly destroying a great party in a few months, notwithstanding favourable circumstances. Please send the article to the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ for publication, and let it be afterwards reproduced in another form by the Literary Bureau.” (...)

_April 4th._--It was well that I carried out the Minister’s orders at once. On being called to him this morning he received me with the words: “I asked you recently to write an article on the subject of Lippe and Lasker. Have you done so?” I replied “Yes, Excellency, and it has already appeared. I did not submit it to you as I know that you see the _Norddeutsche_ daily.” He then said, “I have had no time as yet, I will look it up immediately.”

In a quarter of an hour I was again sent for, and on appearing before him the Minister said: “I have now read the article--it was amongst the extracts. It is excellent, exactly what I wished. Let it now be circulated and reproduced in the provincial journals. In doing so it may be further remarked that if Count Bismarck were to charge Lasker and his fraction with Particularism--I do not mean all the National Liberals, but principally the Prussians, the Lasker group--the accusation would be well founded. Lippe has also laid down the principle that the Prussian Diet is independent of the Federal Diet.”

The Minister then continued: “Here is the _Kölnische Zeitung_ talking of excitability. It alleges that I have manifested an excitability which recalls the period of ‘conflict.’ That is not true. I have merely repelled passionate attacks in the same tone in which they were delivered, according to the usual practice in Parliament. It was not Bismarck but Lasker and Hoverbeck who took the initiative. They began again with offensive personal attacks, and I begged of them in a friendly way not to return to that style. Ask whether the writer had not read the report of the sitting, as it showed that it was not Count Bismarck who picked this quarrel. Apart from its pleadings on behalf of the claims of Denmark, the _Kölnische Zeitung_ was a sensible newspaper. What had Count Bismarck done to it that it should allow its correspondents to send such a garbled account of the facts? Moreover, Bennigsen had reprimanded Lasker. They now themselves recognised that the tone they adopted was wrong, as Lasker came to me on Saturday to excuse himself.”

_April 6th._--Under instructions from the Minister I dictated the following paragraph to Doerr for circulation through the Literary Bureau: “The position of the Bishops who form the opposition in the Council does not appear to be satisfactory, if one may judge from the attitude of the Catholic Governments and particularly of the Vienna Cabinet. Probably Count Beust has not yet made up his mind in this matter. He seems to have sent somewhat energetic remonstrances to the Ambassador in Rome, but it is obvious that Count Trautmansdorf has delivered them in a very diluted form. According to certain newspapers the Austrian Chancellor has also endeavoured to bring about a common action of the Powers, while others report an incident which renders it doubtful whether any such attempt has been made. The French also maintain an attitude of exceptional prudence and reserve, and the Bishops would thus appear to stand well nigh alone.... The initiative must come from the Bishops themselves.”

Between the 6th and the 10th of April I wrote an article on the question of North Schleswig from the Minister’s instructions. This attracted great attention on its publication in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, principally on the ground that there seemed to be no occasion for its appearance at a time when the political horizon was absolutely clear. (It may possibly have arisen through a Russian reminder and approval of the pretended claims of Denmark.) The article was to the following effect: “It is a wilful falsehood to maintain that according to the peace of Prague the population of North Schleswig has to decide the question of the frontier. Prussia alone, and no one else, is authorised to do that. Moreover, the Treaty of Prague does not mention North Schleswig at all, but only refers, quite vaguely, to the northern districts of Schleswig, which is something quite different. The parties to the treaty were not called upon, and, as the wording selected by them proves, never intended to deal with any such conception as ‘North Schleswig,’ and have not even used that term. But the Danes and their friends have so long and so persistently endeavoured to make the world believe that paragraph 5 of the treaty stipulated for the cession of North Schleswig, that they have come to believe it themselves.

“The Prussians alone have to decide as to the extent of those districts. Prussia has no further political interest in negotiating with Denmark if the latter is not content with the concessions which the former is prepared to make. Finally, only Austria has a right to demand that the matter shall be settled in any form.... If Prussia and Austria,” so concluded the Minister’s directions, “now come to an understanding as to cancelling that paragraph of the treaty--probably on the basis of further concessions on the part of Prussia--absolutely no one has any right to object.” Two articles were to be written on this subject, one for the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, in which the reference to Austria was to be omitted, and one for the _Spenersche Zeitung_, which was to contain it.

_April 12th._--The Count desires to have an article written for the _Kölnische Zeitung_, part of which he dictated to me. It ran as follows: “The _Constitutionnel_ speaks of the way in which French manners are being corrupted by foreign elements, and in this connection it mentions Princess Metternich and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow. It would require more space than we can afford to this subject to show in its true light all the ignorance and prejudice exhibited by the writer of this article, who has probably never left Paris. Princess Metternich would not act in Vienna as she is represented by the _Constitutionnel_ to have acted in Paris; and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow is not a leader of society in St. Petersburg. The contrary must be the case. Paris must be responsible if the two ladies so conduct themselves, and exercise such an influence as the French journal asserts they do. As a matter of fact the idea that Paris is the home and school of good manners is now only to be met with in other countries, in old novels, and amongst elderly people in the most remote parts of the provinces. It has long since been observed, and not in European Courts alone, that the present generation of Frenchmen do not know how to behave themselves. In other circles it has also been remarked that the young Frenchman does not compare favourably with the youth of other nations, or with those few countrymen of his own who have, far from Paris, preserved the traditions of good French society. Travellers who have visited the country at long intervals are agreed in declaring that the forms of polite intercourse, and even the conventional expressions for which the French language so long served as a model, are steadily falling into disuse. It is therefore quite conceivable that the Empress Eugénie, as a sensitive Spaniard, has been painfully affected by the tone and character of Parisian society, but it would show a lack of judgment on her part if, as stated by the _Constitutionnel_, she sought for the origin of that evil abroad. But we believe we are justified in directly contradicting that statement, as we know that the Empress has repeatedly recommended young Germans as models for the youth of France. The French show themselves to be a decadent nation, and not least in their manners. It will require generations to recover the ground they have lost. Unfortunately, so far as manners are concerned, all Europe has retrograded.”

From the 13th of April to the 28th of May I did not see the Minister. He was unwell, and left for Varzin on Easter Eve. It was said at the Ministry that his illness was of a bilious character, and was due to the mortification he felt at the conduct of the Lasker fraction, together with the fact that he had spoilt his digestion at a dinner at Camphausen’s.

On the 21st of May the Minister returned to Berlin, but it was not until seven days later that I was called to him. He then gave me the following instructions: “Brass (the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_) must not plead so strongly for the Austrians nor speak so warmly of the Government of Napoleon. In the case of Austria we have to adopt a benevolently expectant attitude, yet the appointment of Klaczko and his connection with the Ministry is for us a suspicious symptom. The appointment of Grammont to the French Foreign Office is not exactly agreeable to us. The Czechs must be treated with all possible consideration; but, on the other hand, we must deal with the Poles as with enemies.”

I afterwards asked as to his health. He said he still felt weak, and would not have left Varzin if things had not looked so critical in Parliament. As soon as matters were once more in order there, he would be off again, if possible on an early day, in order to undertake a cure with Karlsbad water, going to some seaside resort.

On being called to the Count on Whit Sunday I found him highly indignant at the statement of a correspondent of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, who reported that there was a scarcity of labour in the Spandau cartridge factory. “Therefore unusual activity in the preparation of war material!” he said. “If I were to have paid two visits to the King at Ems it would not cause so much anxiety abroad as thoughtless reports of this kind. Please go to Wehrmann and let him ascertain at the Ministry of War if they are responsible for that article, and if possible get them to insert a correction in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ or in the _Norddeutsche_, as it must appear in an influential paper.”

A diary entry on an undated slip of paper, but written in May: “Bohlen yesterday bantered Bucher about his ‘Easter mission,’ which appears to have been to Spain.”

On the 8th of June the Minister again left Berlin for Varzin.

Immediately on the commencement of the difficulties with France respecting the election to the Spanish throne of the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, letters and telegrams began to arrive which were forwarded by Bucher under instructions from the Chief. These consisted in part of short paragraphs and drafts of articles, as well as some complete articles which only required to be retouched in the matter of style, or to have references inserted with regard to matters of fact. These directions accumulated, but owing to the spirit and energy inspired by the consciousness that we were on the eve of great events, and that it was an honour to co-operate in the work, they were promptly dealt with, almost all being disposed of on the day of their arrival. I here reproduce some of these instructions, the order of the words and expressions in the deciphered telegrams being slightly altered, while the remainder are given exactly as they reached me.

_July 7th, evening._--A telegram to me from Varzin: “The semi-official organs should indicate that this does not seem to be the proper time for a discussion of the succession to the Spanish throne, as the Cortes, who are alone entitled to decide the question, have not yet spoken. German Governments have always respected Spanish independence in such matters, and will do so in future, as they have no claim or authority to interfere and lay down regulations for the Spaniards. Then, in the non-official press, great surprise should be expressed at the presumption of the French, who have discussed the question very fully in the Chamber, speaking as if that assembly had a right to dispose of the Spanish throne, and apparently forgetting that such a course was as offensive to Spanish national pride as it was conducive to the encouragement of Republican tendencies. This may be safely construed into a further proof of the false direction which the personal _régime_ is taking. It would appear as if the Emperor, who has instigated this action, wanted to see the outbreak of a new war of succession.”

A letter from Bucher, which was handed to me on the evening of the 8th of July, further developed the idea contained in the last sentence of the foregoing telegram. This letter ran: “Previous to 1868 Eugénie was pleased to play the part of an obedient subject to Isabella, and since the September revolution that of a gracious protectress. She unquestionably arranged the farce of the abdication, and now, in her rage, she incites her consort and the Ministers. As a member of a Spanish party she would sacrifice the peace and welfare of Europe to the intrigues and aspirations of a corrupt dynasty.

“Please see that this theme, a new war of succession in the nineteenth century, is thoroughly threshed out in the press. The subject is inviting, especially in the hands of a correspondent disposed to draw historical parallels, and more particularly parallels _ex averso_. Have the French not had experience enough of Spain with Louis XIV. and Napoleon, and with the Duc d’Angoulême’s campaign for the execution of the decrees of the Verona Congress? Have they not excited sufficient hatred by all those wars and by the Spanish marriage of 1846?

“Bring personal influence to bear as far as possible on the editors who have been intimidated by the Stock Exchange, representing to them that if the German press takes up a timid and hesitating attitude in presence of the rhodomontades of the French, the latter will become more insolent and put forward intolerable demands in other questions affecting Germany still more closely. A cool and determined attitude, with a touch of contempt for those excited gentlemen who would like to slaughter somebody, but do not exactly know whom, would be the most fitting means for putting an end to this uproar and preventing serious complications.”

Bucher added: “Protestants were still sent to the galleys under the Spanish Government which was overthrown in 1868.”

Another communication of Bucher’s from Varzin of the same date runs: “The precedents furnished by Louis Philippe’s refusal of the Belgian throne on behalf of the Duc de Nemours in 1831, on the ground that it would create uneasiness, and by the protest which England would have entered against the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier to the sister of Queen Isabella, are neither of them very applicable, as the Prince of Hohenzollern is not a son of King William, but only a remote connection, and Spain does not border on Prussia.”

The following was a third subject received from Varzin on the same day: “Is Spain to inquire submissively at the Tuileries whether the King whom she desires to take is considered satisfactory? Is the Spanish throne a French dependency? It has already been stated in the Prussian speech from the throne that our sole desire in connection with the events in Spain was that the Spanish people should arrive at an independent decision for the maintenance of their own prosperity and power. In France, where on other occasions so much is said of national independence, the attempt of the Spanish people to decide for themselves has immediately revived the old diplomatic traditions which led to the Spanish war of succession 160 years ago.”

On the same day, the 8th of July, a telegram was also received from the Chancellor by the Secretary of State, and it was handed to me for my information. It was to the following effect: “I have now before me in the despatch of Count Solms the official text of the Duc de Grammont’s speech, and I find his language more brusque and presumptuous than I had anticipated. I am in doubt whether that is due to stupidity or the result of a decision taken beforehand. The probability of the latter alternative seems to be confirmed by the noisy demonstrations which will most likely render it impossible for them to draw back. I am reluctant to protest officially against Grammont’s speech on international grounds, but our press should attack it very severely, and this should be done in as many newspapers as possible.”

_July 9th._--A telegram from Bucher to the Secretary of State, saying that the direction to the press to deal with Grammont’s speech in very strong language is not to apply to the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_.

Another telegram of the same date to Thile, which he brought to me: “Any one intending to summon a Congress to deal with a debatable question ought not first to threaten a warlike solution in case the opposite party should not agree to his wishes.”

Further, the Secretary of State handed me a telegram from Berlin to the Chancellor, which was returned by the latter with comments. I was to get these circulated in the non-official journals. The telegram was to the effect that Grammont had stated, in reply to an interpellation by Cochery, that Prim had offered the Spanish throne to the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, (Remark: “He can do nothing of the kind. Only the Cortes,”) and that the Prince had accepted it. (Remark: “He will only declare himself after he has been elected.”) The Spanish people has not yet, however, expressed its wishes. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) The French Government do not recognise the negotiations in question. (Remark: “There are no negotiations excepting those between Spain and the eventual candidates for the throne.”) Grammont therefore begged that the discussion might be postponed, as it was purposeless for the moment. (Remark: “Very.”) The French Government would maintain the neutral attitude which they had observed up to the present, but would not permit a foreign Power to place a Prince upon the Spanish throne, (“Hardly any power entertains such an intention, except perhaps France,”) and endanger the honour and dignity of France. They trusted to the wisdom of the Germans, (Remark: “Has nothing to do with it,”) and to the friendship of the Spanish people. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) Should they be deceived in their hopes they would do their duty without hesitation or weakness. (Remark: “We also.”)

Bucher sent me a whole packet of sketches for articles:--

1. “If Spain records her decision to establish a government which shall be peaceful, and tolerant in religious matters, and which may be expected to be friendly to Germany, who is also devoted to peace, can it be in our interest to prevent the execution of that resolve, and for that purpose to take measures of doubtful legality? Shall we, because of a threat of war made in pursuit of an arbitrary and dynastic object, take steps to frustrate a reorganisation of Spanish affairs advantageous to Germany? Is it not rather an act of insolent presumption on the part of France to address such a demand to Germany? Obviously France lacks either the courage or the means to enforce her views at Madrid; and it appears from Grammont’s speech of the 4th of July that in her anger at what has happened in Spain she is prepared to throw herself upon Germany in a blind fit of rage. That speech is to a certain extent a declaration of war against the person of the Prince of Hohenzollern, in case he should decide to accept the offer of the Spanish people. France demands that Prussia shall undertake the office of policeman in case a German Prince who has attained _his majority_ shows a disposition to meet the wishes of the Spaniards. For a North German Government to interfere with a citizen who should wish to exercise his right to emigrate and adopt the Spanish nationality would raise a very questionable point of law from a constitutional standpoint. Even if such a power existed, the dignity of Germany would demand that it should only be applied in her own interests. The calm consideration of those interests is not in the least affected by the warlike threats of a neighbouring State, which, instead of arguments, appeals to its 400,000 soldiers. If France lays claim in this manner to the guardianship of adjoining nations, the maintenance of peace can for the latter be only a question of time, which may be decided at any moment. On Grammont’s appointment to the French Foreign Office it was feared in many quarters that the choice by the Emperor Napoleon of a statesman who was only remarkable for his personal impetuosity and his hostility to Germany indicated a desire to secure for himself greater liberty in breaking the peace. Unfortunately the haughty and aggressive tone of the Duke’s speech is not calculated to remove the apprehensions entertained at that time. He is not a minister of peace, but rather the instrument of a personal policy which shrinks from no responsibility. In itself the question as to who is to be the ruler of Spain is not one for which Germany would go to war. But the French demand that the German Government, in opposition to its own interests, should put artificial difficulties in the way of the Spaniards manifests a depth of self-conceit which scarcely any government amongst the independent States of Europe could submit to at the present day. We seek no quarrel, but if any one tries to force one upon us he will find us ready to go through with it to the bitter end.”

2. In another article (there was too much material to be disposed of in one) the following considerations were to be developed. This was not to be communicated to the official organs, but either to the _Kölnische Zeitung_ or the _Spenersche Zeitung_, while it was to be given in a curtailed form to Hahn’s _Literary Bureau_. “If the candidature of Alphonso had up to the present any prospect of success in Spain, it would have been most prejudicially affected by the foolish uproar raised in France, which stamped it with a French official character. No worse service could be done to that Prince than to represent him as a French candidate. Montpensier had already suffered under the reproach that he was a Frenchman. The Bourbons had formerly been imposed upon the Spaniards, and had proved themselves no blessing. The manner in which the succession to the throne is now discussed in France would offend a nation even less proud than the Spaniards.”

3. “Between the years 1866 and 1868, and particularly before the fall of Isabella, France schemed a great deal against Germany with Austria, Italy, and also with Spain. Those intrigues were set at nought by the Revolution of September, to which Count Bismarck referred when he said at that time in Parliament that the danger of war, which had been very imminent, had been dispelled by an unforeseen event. So long as France maintains her warlike intentions towards Germany, she will desire to see on the Spanish throne a dynasty favourable to those schemes, possibly an Ultramontane one, as in case of an attack on Germany it would make a difference of about 50,000 men to France whether she had a benevolent, or at least a neutral neighbour on the other side of the Pyrenees or one whose attitude might be suspected. It is true that France has nothing to fear directly from Spain if the French, who for the past eighty years have been unable to make up their own minds, and who cannot govern themselves, would give up the attempt to play the part of tutor to other nations. Let the period 1848-1850 in France be compared with that of 1868-1870 in Spain, and the comparison will not be to the advantage of the nation _qui marche à la tête de la civilisation_.”

4. “England is accustomed to look upon the Peninsula as a dependency of her own, and doubtless believes that her influence can be more easily made to prevail in a state of insecurity than under the rule of a powerful dynasty. It is not wise of the English to recall certain incidents of Spanish history, a course in which they are followed by the French newspapers. The Spanish version of the history of the wars against the First Napoleon is very different to the English one. In Buen Retiro every traveller is shown the site of a once prosperous porcelain manufactory, which was needlessly burned to the ground by the British allies of Spain.”

5. Still another subject. “Very pleased with the article in the _Spenersche Zeitung_ (this was addressed to me). Please again call attention in a somewhat similar manner to the impetuosity of Grammont therein referred to. What is the real ground for all this alarm? A paragraph in the _Agence Havas_ to the effect that the affair had been settled without the concurrence of the Cortes. It is probable that the French Government itself had this paragraph inserted, and it was, moreover, concocted in complete ignorance of the Spanish Constitution and of the laws governing the election of a King. This, which was the only new feature, was a barefaced invention. It had already been mentioned in all the papers that Prim’s speech of the 11th of June referred to the Prince of Hohenzollern, and that had caused no excitement in France. Is the present agitation then a _coup monté_? Does the French Government insist upon a ‘row’? Has Louis Napoleon chosen Grammont in order to pick a quarrel with us? At any rate he has been unskilful in his treatment of this question. The general moral to be drawn as often as possible is: the French Government is, after all, not quite so shrewd as people believe. The French have succeeded in many things with the assistance of 300,000 soldiers, and owing to that success they are regarded as immensely clever. Is that really so? Circumstances show that it is not.”

_July 10th, evening._--Received further series of sketches and drafts for articles from Bucher, who acts as the mouthpiece of the Chancellor’s views and intentions.

1. For the _Spenersche_ or _Kölnische_:--“Those foreign Powers that are not concerned in the differences respecting the Spanish throne are as desirous to maintain peace as Germany herself. Their influence will, however, be neutralised by Grammont’s ill-considered threats. Should the German Governments consider the security of our frontier to be seriously threatened, they would scarcely come to a decision without convoking Parliament.”

2. “The French are running amuck like a Malay who has got into a rage and rushes through the streets dagger in hand, foaming at the mouth, stabbing every one who happens to cross his path. If France is mad enough to regard Germany as a fit object for a vicarious whipping, nothing will restrain her, and the result will be that she will herself receive a personal castigation.”

3. “The semi-official journals in Paris pretend that attention has been attracted there by the numerous cipher despatches exchanged between Berlin and Madrid, and that they have been clever enough to decipher them. We do not know whether many despatches have passed between the two capitals mentioned, but we remember a communication which was made to Parliament some time ago by Count Bismarck, according to which the cipher system of our Foreign Office is based on a vocabulary of about 20,000 words, each one of which is represented by a group of figures arbitrarily chosen. It is impossible to ‘decipher’ such a system in the same way as those based on an altered alphabet and other old methods. In order to read such a despatch, it is essential to have the vocabulary. Does the cleverness on which the Parisians pride themselves consist in having stolen the key to our ciphers? This would be in contradiction with the original statement that the Prince of Hohenzollern’s candidature first became known through a communication from Prim. It would, therefore, appear that the official press wants to clear the Government of the reproach of incapacity by a subsequent invention, acting, on the maxim that it is better to be taken for a rogue than a fool.”

4. “According to a private telegram from Paris to the _Berliner Boersen Zeitung_, our Ambassador there, together with the second Secretary of Embassy, left for Ems on receipt of a Note delivered to him immediately after the Cabinet Council at Saint Cloud. We have made inquiries in the proper quarter as to the accuracy of this report, and have received the following answer: Note delivered. ‘Not a shadow of truth. Werther’s journey was decided upon and announced in Paris long before the agitation began.’”

5. “As was already known, Prim intended this year, as on previous occasions, to visit Vichy. This would have led to a meeting between himself and the Emperor Napoleon and a discussion of the succession to the Spanish throne. It is also reported that the Prince of Hohenzollern was not indisposed to try confidentially to bring about an understanding with the Emperor. All this has been rendered impossible by the abrupt tone of the Duc de Grammont. As Prim’s visit to Vichy has long since been announced in the newspapers, and the near relationship as well as the personal friendship which hitherto existed between the Prince of Hohenzollern and the Emperor rendered both meetings probable, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the French Government, dreading insurmountable domestic difficulties, desires to inflame French vanity in favour of a war, which would at the same time promote the dynastic views of the Empress Eugénie.”

_July 12th._--Received from Secretary Wollmann a note from Bucher in Varzin which is intended for me. It has been sent to the Secretary of State, in order that he should say whether there is any objection to its being used in the press. He has no objection, and so it goes to the newspapers. It runs as follows: “The _Imparcial_ publishes a letter from Paris to the effect that the furious article in the _Constitutionnel_ reproaching Prince Hohenzollern with his relationship to Murat, has been revised by the Emperor himself.”

In the evening the Minister returned. He is dressed in plain clothes and looks very well.

_July 13th._--Called early to the Chief. I am to wait until a statement appears in the press to the effect that the renunciation of Prince Hohenzollern was in consequence of pressure from Ems, and then to contradict it. “In the meantime (said the Minister) the _Norddeutsche_ should only say that the Prince’s present decision has not been altogether unexpected. When he accepted the throne which had been offered to him he had obviously not foreseen that his decision would occasion so much excitement in Paris. For more than thirty years past the best relations existed between Napoleon and the Hohenzollern family. Prince Leopold could not, therefore, have apprehended any antipathy to his candidature on the part of the Emperor. As his candidature suddenly became known after the Cortes had been adjourned till November, it may well have been assumed that there would be time enough in the interval to sound the Emperor as to his views. Now that this assumption (here the Chancellor began to speak more slowly as if he were dictating), which, up to the acceptance of the Crown by the Prince, was still quite legitimate, had proved to be partly erroneous, it was scarcely probable that the Prince would, on his own responsibility, be disposed to cope single handed with the storm which his decision had raised, and might yet raise, in view of the apprehensions of war of the whole European world, and the influence brought to bear upon him from London and Brussels. Even a portion of the responsibility of involving the great European nations, not only in one war, but possibly in a series of wars, would weigh very heavily upon a man who could not claim to have assumed it as part of the duty of the Royal office which he had already accepted. That was more than could well be expected of a Prince who only occupied a private position. It was the offensive tone of Grammont that alone prevented Prussia from exercising her influence with the Prince.”

The following is to be published in other papers: “It cannot be denied that a Spanish Government disposed to promote the cause of peace and to abstain from conspiring with France would be of considerable value to us. But if, some fourteen days ago, the Emperor Napoleon had addressed himself confidentially to Berlin, or indicated that the affair was attracting attention, Prussia, instead of adopting an indifferent attitude, would have co-operated in pacifying public opinion in Paris. The situation has been entirely altered through the aggressive tone of Grammont’s speech, and the direct demands addressed to the King, who is staying in privacy at Ems for the benefit of his health, unaccompanied by a single Minister. His Majesty rightly declined to accede to these demands. That incident has created so much indignation in Germany, that many people feel disappointed at Prince Leopold’s renunciation. At any rate, the confidence in the peaceful intentions of France has been so thoroughly shaken that it will take a considerable time to restore it. If commerce and trade have been injured by the evidence which has shown us what a den of brigands we have to deal with in France, the people of that country must fasten the responsibility on the personal _régime_ under which they at present live.”

The Minister also desires it to be incidentally remarked in the non-official press that of the South German Courts those of Munich and Carlsruhe had given the most satisfactory declarations in this affair, while on the other hand that of Stuttgart had expressed itself evasively.

Finally, I am to communicate to one of the local papers that Count Bismarck has been sent for to Ems to consult with the King as to summoning Parliament. Breaking off a cure which he was undergoing, the Chancellor has remained in Berlin in order to await there the further instructions of his Majesty, or ultimately to return to Varzin. The Count then added: “Later on I will call for you several times, as there is something more to be prepared for the _Norddeutsche_. We shall now be shortly interrupted.” The Crown Prince arrived five minutes afterwards and had a long interview with the Minister.

_July 14th._--Our newspapers to call attention to the loyal attitude of Würtemberg, “which in consequence of a misunderstanding has been represented in some journals as evasive.”

_July 15th._--I am to send the following _démenti_ to Wolf’s Telegraphic Agency for circulation: “The news published by the _Spenersche Zeitung_ respecting the opening of Parliament is not quite accurate. It was proposed a week ago by the Chancellor while in Varzin that it should be convoked as soon as the Government Bills were ready for submission to it. His Majesty shares this view, and the Federal Council has accordingly been summoned for to-morrow, Saturday, morning to consider those measures.”

In the evening the Chancellor dictated an article for the _Kreuzzeitung_ on the confusion by the public between personal and private proceedings of the King and his official acts. It ran as follows: “It appears from the Mazaredo pamphlet that the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern informed the King at Ems of his acceptance of the offer of the Spanish throne, probably towards the end of June. His Majesty was then at Ems for the purpose of taking the waters, and certainly not with the intention of carrying on business of State, as none of his Ministers had been summoned thither. As a matter of fact, only so much has become public respecting the King’s reply to the communication of the Hereditary Prince (it was in the form of a letter written in his Majesty’s own hand) that the Sovereign was not pleased at the news, although he did not feel called upon to offer any opposition. In the whole affair no State action of any kind has been taken. This constitutional aspect of the situation does not appear to have been properly appreciated up to the present in public discussions of the question. The position of the King in his private correspondence was confounded with his position as head of the State, and it was forgotten that in the latter capacity, according to the Constitution, the co-operation of the Ministry is necessary to constitute a State action. It is only the French Cabinet that appears to have thoroughly realised this distinction, inasmuch as it brought the whole force of its diplomacy to bear upon the person of the Sovereign, who was staying at a watering-place for the sake of his health, and whose private life was not protected by the usual etiquette, in order to force him under official pressure into private negotiations which might afterwards be represented as arrangements with the Government.”

_July 19th._--About an hour after the opening of Parliament in the Royal Palace (1.45 P.M.) Le Sourd, the French Chargé d’Affaires, delivered Napoleon’s declaration of war at the Foreign Office.

Towards 5 o’clock in the evening I was called to the Minister, who was in his garden. After searching for him for some time I saw him coming through one of the long shady alleys to the left which led to the entrance in the Königgrätzer Strasse. He was brandishing a big stick. His figure stood out against the yellow evening sunshine like a picture painted on a gold ground. He stopped in his walk as I came up to him, and said: “I wish you to write something in the _Kreuzzeitung_ against the Hanoverian nobles. It must come from the provinces, from a nobleman living in the country, an Old Prussian--very blunt, somewhat in this style: It is reported that certain Hanoverian nobles have endeavoured to find pilots and spies in the North Sea for French men-of-war. The arrests made within the last few days with the assistance of the military authorities are understood to be connected with this affair. The conduct of those Hanoverians is infamous, and I certainly express the sentiments of all my neighbours when I put the following questions to the Hanoverian nobles who sympathise with those traitors. Have they any doubt, I would ask them, that a man of honour could not now regard such men as entitled to demand honourable satisfaction by arms whether their unpatriotic action was or was not undertaken at the bidding of King George? Do they not, as a matter of course, consider that an affair of honour with them is altogether out of the question, and should one of them be impudent enough to propose such a thing, would they not have him turned out of the house by the servants or eject him _propriæ manu_ after having, of course, put on a pair of gloves to handle him with? Are they not convinced that such miscreants can only be properly described by the good old Prussian word _Hundsvott_ (scurvy, infamous rogues), and that their treason has branded their posterity to the third and fourth generations with indelible disgrace? I beg them to answer these questions.”

_Evening._--In an article in the _Liberté_ of the 18th instant, that paper reminds Italy that she owes her liberation to France, and that in 1866 it was France who brought about the Italian alliance with the Berlin Cabinet. It then maintains that, in view of the seriousness of approaching events, Victor Emmanuel, with truly chivalrous sentiment, has not for a moment hesitated to assure the French of his unconditional support. With reference to this article our papers should observe: “Up to the present the French have played the part of masters to the whole world, and Belgium, Spain, and the King of Prussia have in turn experienced their arrogance. Their behaviour was somewhat like that of the Sultan towards his Khedive, it was a kind of megalomania based upon the bayonet. Their presumption is now beginning to waver, so they court the assistance of those good friends whom they pretend to have placed under obligations to them.”

The Minister subsequently dictated the following, to be worked up for the German newspapers outside Berlin, such as the _Kölnische Zeitung_, and for the English and Belgium journals: “According to confidential communications from loyal Hanoverian circles, amongst other decisive factors which led the French to the declaration of war, were the reports sent to Paris by Colonel Stoffel, the Military Plenipotentiary in Berlin. Stoffel’s information was, it appears, less accurate than abundant, as none of those who supplied him with it being prepared to forego the payments they received from him merely because they had nothing to say, they occasionally invented the news of which they warranted the correctness. The Plenipotentiary had, it is said, been informed that the arming of the Prussian infantry, both as regards rifles and ammunition, was at present undergoing a thorough transformation, and that consequently a moment so favourable as the present for attacking Prussia would hardly occur again, inasmuch as on the completion of this change the Prussian armaments would have been unassailable.”[4]

2. “It now appears to be beyond all doubt that the French Government was aware of the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for months past, that they carefully promoted it and foolishly imagined it would serve as a means of isolating Prussia and creating a division in Germany. No trustworthy information has been received as yet as to whether and how far Marshal Prim had prepared the way for this intrigue, in agreement with the Emperor Napoleon. But doubtless that point will ultimately be cleared up by history. The sudden disappearance of Spain from the political field as soon as the differences between France and Prussia broke out gives matter for reflection and suspicion. It cannot but be regarded as strange that after the zeal shown by the Spanish Government in the matter of the Hohenzollern candidature had been raised to boiling point it should have suddenly fallen below zero, and that the relations of Marshal Prim to the French Cabinet should now appear to be of the most friendly character, while the Spaniards seem no longer to feel any irritation at the interference of France in their internal affairs.”

3. “Rumours were circulated this afternoon to the effect that the former French Military Plenipotentiary, Baron Stoffel, had been insulted in the street. On closer inquiry it was ascertained that some individuals who knew Stoffel followed him in the street, and on his reaching his house struck the door with their sticks. The police intervened energetically on the first report of this matter and have taken measures to prevent a repetition of such conduct and to provide that Baron Stoffel shall not be interfered with on his departure this evening. Excesses of this description are, however, highly reprehensible, even when they are confined to words. The former representatives of France are under the protection of international law and of the honour of Germany until they have crossed the frontier.”

_July 21st._--Keudell asked me this morning if I knew Rasch, the journalist, and if I could say where he was now to be found, in Berlin or elsewhere. I replied that I had seen him in Schleswig in 1864, afterwards at a table d’hôte at the Hotel Weissberg, in the Dessauer Strasse, where he lodged at the end of February. I knew nothing more about him, but had heard that he was extremely conceited, almost to the point of madness--a political visionary who desired to convert the whole world to republicanism. I was not aware of his whereabouts in Berlin, but would make inquiries at Weissberg’s. Keudell told me to hunt him up and ask him whether he would go to Garibaldi and urge him to undertake an expedition against Rome, at the same time carrying him money from us. I pointed out that Rasch was perhaps too vain to keep his own counsel. Keudell consoled himself with the idea that he would doubtless prove a good patriot. I declined to treat with Rasch in the matter, as I could not speak to him in my own name but in that of the Foreign Office, and that could be better done by some official of higher rank, who would make a greater impression upon Rasch. Keudell seemed to recognise the justice of this view. I made inquiries and was able to report on the same evening that Rasch was staying at Weissberg’s.

Called to the Minister in the evening. He showed me an extract from the _National Zeitung_, and observed: “They say here that the English would not allow the French to attack Belgium. Well and good, but how does that help the Belgians if the protection comes too late? If Germany were once defeated (which God forbid!) the English would not be able to assist the Belgians in the least, but might, on the contrary, be thankful if they themselves remained safe in London.”

I am further to call attention to the “manner in which France is begging for help on all sides--that great warlike nation which makes so much parade of its victories, representing them as having always been won solely by the force of its own arms. They go begging (use that expression) to Italy, to Denmark, to Sweden, and above all to the German States, to whom they promise the same brilliant destiny which they have already prepared for Italy--political independence and financial ruin.”

Called up to the Minister again later. I am to secure the insertion of the following in the non-official German papers and in the Belgian and English press: “The English Government observe their neutrality in connection with the war that has now broken out in a liberal and conscientious spirit. They impartially permit both sides to purchase horses and munitions of war in England. It is unfortunate, however, that France alone can avail herself of this liberality, as will appear from a glance at the geographical position of the two countries and from the superiority of the French at sea. Then quote what Heffter (the book must be in the library) has to say on this kind of neutrality, and observe that the English jurists describe it more tersely as ‘fraudulent neutrality.’”

_July 23rd._--Called to the Minister five times to-day. The press should urge the prosecution and seizure of Rothan, an Alsacian who speaks German, hitherto French Chargé d’Affaires at Hamburg, who has been a zealous spy and instrument of French intrigue in North Germany, and who is now understood to be wandering along the coast between the Elbe and Ems, as also that of the ex-Hanoverian officer, Adolf von Kielmansegg, respecting whom further particulars are to be obtained from the Ministry of the Interior. The Count further wants the press to give a list of the names of the Bavarian members of Parliament who voted for the neutrality of that State in the national war, mentioning their professions but without any further remarks. “Give it first in Brass,” (_i.e._, _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_,) he added. “You will find such a list amongst the documents. The complaints as to the manner in which England understands neutrality must be continually renewed. The English Government does not forbid the export of horses, though only France can avail herself of that facility. Colliers are allowed to load at Newcastle and to supply fuel for the French men-of-war cruising in the North Sea. English cartridge factories are working for the French army under the eyes of the Government. In Germany the painful feeling has become more and more widespread that, under Lord Granville, England, while nominally maintaining neutrality, favours France in the manner in which it is really observed.”

About 11 P.M. I was again called to the Minister. The reports respecting the English coal ships to be at once sent by a Chancery attendant to Wolf’s Telegraphic Agency for circulation to the newspapers.

In this connection may be mentioned an Embassy report from London, dated the 30th of July, to the following effect: Lord Granville had asked the Ambassador if he had not stirred up the authorities in Berlin against the English Government. The reply was in the negative. The Ambassador had only carried out his instructions. Public opinion in Germany influenced the Government, just as the German press influenced public opinion. The manner in which neutrality was observed on the part of England had excited the greatest indignation in Germany. The action of the English Government, which indeed recognised that France was in the wrong, but failed to give expression to that conviction, was also bitterly resented there. Granville replied that once it had been decided to remain neutral that neutrality must be maintained in every respect. If the export of contraband of war were forbidden, the French would regard it as an act of one-sided hostility, while at the same time it would ruin English trade in the branches affected by such prohibition, and favour American manufacturers. For the present, every one in England approved of the maintenance of neutrality, and therefore in a general way no change was possible in these matters. At the same time, the English Government was ready, in case of complaints reaching them in an official way respecting any acts of illegality, to institute an inquiry into the facts and secure the punishment of the guilty parties. It did not seem impossible to prevent the supply of English coal to French men-of-war. Next Monday a Bill was to be submitted to Parliament for the amendment of the laws regulating neutrality. The report concluded as follows: “England is in many respects well disposed towards us, but will for the present remain neutral. If we make further attacks upon English public opinion through our official press in connection with these grievances, it will serve no purpose but to conjure up future difficulties. Granville is not what we might desire, but he is not prejudiced against us. He may become so, however, if he is further provoked by us. We can hardly succeed in overthrowing him, and if we did his probable successor would in all likelihood be much worse than himself.”

_July 24th._--I am instructed by the Count to send an article to the _Kölnische Zeitung_ respecting the Dutch coal question. He gave me the following information on this subject: “Holland asked us to again permit the passage of Prussian coal down the Rhine, and requested that a large transport of Rhenish coal intended for Holland should be allowed to pass the frontier. It was only to be used in factories, and the Government of the Netherlands would prohibit its re-exportation. Prussia willingly agreed to this, but shortly afterwards it was ascertained that foreign vessels were being loaded with coal in Dutch ports, and the Government of the Netherlands subsequently informed us that in promising to prevent the re-exportation they had overlooked the circumstance that their treaty with France did not permit this. Thereupon as a matter of course the export of Prussian coal to Holland was prohibited. In the interval, however, they seem to have secured a sufficient supply in Holland to provide the French fleet for a considerable time. That is a very suspicious method of observing the neutrality promised by the gentlemen at the Hague.”

Bucher brings me the following paragraph from the Chief, which is to be inserted in the _Spenersche Zeitung_, or some other non-official organ, and afterwards in the _North German Correspondence_: “In 1851 a literary _gamin_ in Paris was commissioned to conjure up the Red Terror in a pamphlet, which proved very useful to the President Louis Napoleon, enabling him to escape from a debtors’ prison and ascend the Imperial throne. The Duc de Grammont now tries to raise the Spanish Terror in order to save the Emperor from the necessity of accounting for the hundred millions which he diverted from the State Treasury into his private purse. The literary gentleman in question was made a Prefect. What reward can Grammont have had in view?”

_Evening._--The Minister wishes an article to be prepared for circulation in the German press describing the French and French policy under the Emperor Napoleon. This is to be first sent to the _Spenersche Zeitung_, while the Literary Bureau is to secure the insertion of the principal points in a condensed form in the Magdeburg papers and a number of the smaller journals to-morrow. The Count said (literally): “The French are not so astute as people generally think. As a nation they resemble certain individuals amongst our lower classes. They are narrow-minded and brutal,--great physical force, boastful and insolent, winning the admiration of men of their own stamp through their audacity and violence. Here in Germany the French are also considered clever by persons who do not think deeply, and their Ministers are regarded as great statesmen because of their insolent interference in the affairs of the whole world, and their desire to rule everywhere. Audacity is always impressive. People think their success is due to shrewd political calculation, but it is actually due to nothing else than the fact that they always keep 300,000 soldiers ready to back up their policy. That alone, and not their political intelligence, has enabled them to carry things with such a high hand. We must get rid of this fiction.... In political affairs the French are in the fullest sense of the word a narrow-minded nation. They have no idea how things look outside of France, and learn nothing about it in their schools. The French educational establishments, for the greater glory of France, leave their pupils in the crassest ignorance as to everything beyond her frontiers, and so they have not the slightest knowledge of their neighbours; that is the case with the Emperor, or at least he is not much better, to say nothing of Grammont, who is an ass (_Rindvieh_). Napoleon is ignorant at bottom, although he has been educated in German schools. His ‘Cæsar’ was intended to conceal that fact. He has forgotten everything. His policy was always stupid. The Crimean War was against the interests of France, which demanded an alliance or at least a good understanding with Russia. It was the same with the war in Italy. There he created a rival in the Mediterranean, North Africa, Tunis, &c., who may one day prove dangerous. The Italian people are much more gifted than the French, only less numerous. The war in Mexico and the attitude adopted in 1866 were blunders, and doubtless in storming about as they do at present the French feel conscious that they have committed another blunder.”

_July 25th._--At 11 o’clock this morning Count Bismarck and his family took the Holy Communion at their residence. He asked whether any one in our bureau desired to join them, but no one offered to do so. I was for a moment tempted, but reconsidered the matter. It might look as if I wished to recommend myself.

Copies of the Benedetti draft treaty are sent to Auber (the French Press Agency) and Heide.

_July 27th._--It is to be stated either in the _Norddeutsche_ or the _Spenersche Zeitung_ that secrecy respecting confidential communications between great States is, as a rule, more carefully observed and maintained than the public imagines. Nevertheless, the French misrepresentation of Prussia’s attitude in the affair of the candidature for the Spanish throne (in Grammont’s despatch of the 21st of July) obliged the authorities here to disregard these considerations of discretion. Benedetti’s proposal has therefore been published and it may be followed by other documents of the same description. The Count concluded his directions as follows: “We are at least entitled to tell the truth with discretion in presence of such indiscreet lies.”

Bucher brings me from the Minister the following sketch of a paragraph for the press: “The despatch of the Duc de Grammont, the full text of which now lies before us, is a desperate attempt to prove that the origin of the situation which they have themselves created was the Hohenzollern candidature, and to conceal the motive which they confessed on many other occasions--namely, the conquest by France of the left bank of the Rhine and of Belgium. The inconsistency of the whole assertion is made clear by the circumstance that the offer of the Spanish throne to the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern was first made in a letter dated the 14th of February of the present year. Therefore, there can be no connection between this offer and the conversations in March, 1869, between Benedetti and Von Thile, which were the outcome of aspirations or proposals frequently ventilated in the press (also with reference to Prince Frederick Charles). In 1851 the President Louis Napoleon succeeded in obtaining credence both at home and abroad for certain fictions, so long as that was necessary for the attainment of his object. The fiction which is now circulated, at a somewhat late hour, to the effect that the Prince of Hohenzollern was the candidate of Prussia is refuted in advance by the fact, which has been well known for a long time, that the Prussian Government as well as the officials of the Confederation, had absolutely no knowledge of, or connection with, the Spanish proposal. It was resolutely opposed by his Majesty the King, as the head of the Hohenzollern family, until last June, when at Ems he reluctantly withdrew his opposition when it was represented to him that otherwise Spain would fall into the hands of the Republicans. We find it difficult to understand what interest the French Government can have in circulating such lies now that war has actually broken out. The attempt of the Duc de Grammont to conjure up the spectre of a restoration of Charles V.’s monarchy can only be explained by the complete isolation of the French mind. That apparition had no sooner manifested itself than it vanished before the angry contempt of public opinion, which resented being supposed capable of such credulity.”

The Chancellor desires to see the following considerations reproduced in the evening papers: “The Benedetti document is by no means the only one dealing with the matter in question. Negotiations were also carried on by others, as, for instance, by Prince Napoleon during his stay in Berlin. Since French diplomacy was ignorant enough to believe that a German Minister who followed a national policy could for a moment think of entertaining such proposals, it had only itself to thank if it was befooled with its own schemes so long as such fooling appeared calculated to promote the maintenance of peace. Even those who pursue the most ignorant and narrow-minded policy must ultimately come to recognise that they have hoped for and demanded impossibilities. The bellicose temper which now prevails in Paris dates from such recognition. The hopes of German statesmen that they would be able to befool the French until a peaceful _régime_ was established in France by some transformation of her despotic constitution have unfortunately not been realised. Providence willed it otherwise. Since we can no longer maintain peace it is not necessary now to preserve silence. For we preserved silence solely in order to promote the continuance, and, if possible, the permanency, of peaceful relations.”... The Minister concluded: “You can add, too, that the question of French Switzerland was also mentioned in the negotiations, and that it was hinted that in Piedmont they knew quite well where the French districts begin and the Italian districts leave off.”

_July 28th._--I see the original of Benedetti’s draft treaty, and I am to receive a photographic copy of it similar to that which has been prepared for distribution amongst foreign Governments.

Bucher handed me the following sketch of an article, received by him from the Minister, which is to be inserted in some organ not apparently connected with the Government: “Those who now hold power in Spain declare that they do not wish to interfere in the conflict between Germany and France, because the latter might create internal difficulties for them. They allow Bonaparte to prohibit their election of the King of their own choice. They look on calmly with folded arms while other nations go to war over a difference that has arisen out of a question of Spanish domestic interest. We had formed quite another opinion of the Castilian _gentilhomme_. The Spanish temper seems to resemble that of Gil Blas, who wanted to fight a duel with the army surgeon but observed that the latter had an unusually long rapier.”

_July 30th, 10 p.m._--The Minister desires that attention should be again called to the manner in which the French are looking about for foreign assistance, and he once more gives a few points: “France is begging in all directions, and wants in particular to take Italy into her pay. Here, as everywhere, she speculates upon the worst elements, while the better elements will have nothing to do with her. How does that harmonise with the greatness of the nation which ‘stands at the head of civilisation,’ and whose historians always point out that it was only defeated at Leipzig because its opponents were four to one? At that time they had half Germany, Italy, Holland, and the present Belgium on their side. To-day, when they stand alone, they go round hat in hand to every door, and seek mercenaries to reinforce their own army, in which they can therefore have but very little confidence.”

_July 31st._--This morning received from Roland one of the photographic copies of the Benedetti draft.