Part 5

But if there is no root and branch remedy, there must be some palliatives. It ought to be possible to restrain and diminish the ravages of the share manufacturer and professional market thief, at the same time that the range of temptation was narrowed for the multitude. It should be possible to do this, and with goodwill something might be done even by the Stock Exchange. Take as example the habit now prevalent of introducing new securities of all kinds on the market without the preliminary of a prospectus. This habit has received a great stimulus from the latest attempts at company law reform, in virtue of which the liability of directors for statements in prospectus has been sensibly increased. To escape that risk, new companies are now launched without preliminary statements of any sort. Certain members of the Stock Exchange, acting in concert with the schemers outside by whom they are employed, begin to buy and sell shares in an undertaking whose very name may be until that moment unknown everywhere, and about which neither market nor public has any information whatever. By arrangements with the financial press, whose charges for such services are most remunerative, quotations representing these unreal sales and purchases are daily and weekly paraded before the public, often accompanied by vague general statements regarding the wonderful wealth this particular share represents. Attracted in this way, the ignorant presently begin to itch to take a hand in the game, and gradually, if times are favourable and what the contemptuous broker calls the “fool public” is “on the feed,” quite a lively market arises, whose end is the stripping of the outsiders by those who laid the snare. The end of the fraud comes afterwards, when the plotters have got safely away with their plunder. All that the public may have left is worthless shares. Dozens, one may say scores, of African and other swindles of this sort have been perpetrated during recent times of excitement, and now and then the Stock Exchange itself has been cheated. Surely it ought to require no great amount of self-denial on the part of this body to stop peremptorily all impostures conceived and carried out after this fashion. It need only refuse to grant a settlement of bargains in any share thus foisted upon the public until the whole of the facts relating to it are laid before its committee, and quotations in the official list ought never to be granted to any company until the whole facts regarding it have been properly laid before the public. In other words, I think nothing but good could arise even to the market were the Stock Exchange to enact a rule forbidding the introduction of any security on its floor by the members until full information had been published by those responsible for its inception, whether by prospectus or by properly authenticated and signed declarations.

Another reform within the power of the Stock Exchange that might do much good would be the prevention of dealings in shares that represent goodwill, and therefore, as a rule, merely the plunder of promoters. Often, as it is, vendors’ shares are not “good delivery” until after a certain time has elapsed. If this irregular and capricious usage, dependent really upon the action of those who found the company, were to be made an invariable rule, and if such shares were kept out of the play altogether until a reserve had been gathered against them to give them substantial value, one fertile cause of loss would be reduced to small proportions. The plunderings of the Cecil Rhodeses, Whitaker Wrights, Hooleys, and the like would in this way be circumscribed, although by no means stopped. Unhappily, as I hold, the mischief cannot be entirely stopped until the spirit of the nation changes.

Once the habit of “bulling” and “bearing”—of buying more than one can pay for or of selling what one does not possess—lays hold of a man, the disease is too often incurable. When the victim suffers loss—gets caught by the market, as he would put it—he doubtless suffers more or less acute mental agony according to his character, the traditions of honourable conduct he may possess, or the extent of his risk. Then his mood becomes that of the old rhyme: “When the devil was sick, the devil a monk would be.” Vows are registered never more to be caught in this snare; the mind is prey to remorse, and virtue is honoured. But let the danger pass, the threatened loss become a profit, and all is forgotten when next temptation comes. The player resumes the game, and, on a “tip” from some interested source, sells a “bear,” in the hope of robbing the unknown counter player through a fall in the price that will enable him to buy back at a profit and pocket the difference drawn out of such counter player’s resources. Or he buys a “bull” to effect the same purpose when a rise on the market shows a profit. Morally, I may say, there is not an atom of difference in the character of these two operations, unless it be found in the fact that the “bear,” the speculative seller, is on the average a man of wider intelligence than the “bull.” To the public and the market he is also by much the more valuable gambling animal of the two, because in proportion as a speculative account is oversold is the capacity of a market strengthened to resist shocks from bad news. The publication of such bad news becomes the signal for those who have sold what they do not possess to rush into the market and repurchase. This operation often causes prices to advance on bad news, and always steadies the market against disturbing influences, to the great benefit of the real holder, who is thus enabled to sell at a smaller loss than would otherwise be possible. Bad news on an over-bought account—on a market, that is, where the great majority of the players are holding securities for the rise on borrowed money—always brings disaster. From this point of view, the “bear” is much more useful to the genuine investor than his opponent; but morally there is nothing to choose, so far as the individual operator is concerned, between the two methods of speculating.

“Bulling” and “bearing,” it may be said, constitute the daily business of a large proportion of dealers, wholesale merchants in the Stock Exchange, and for them it is legitimate enough to sell according to their judgment what they have not got and buy what they could not out of their own means pay for. It is in their power to cut their losses always when such begin to accrue, and many amongst them close the day with their books “even.” That is to say, they have neither a “bull nor a bear open,” to use the market phrase. They are mere traders, whose judgment of the market tendencies guides them in taking the one course or the other for the day only. It is altogether different, however, for the outsider, the man amongst the public, whether he resides in the City, or at Land’s End, or in Connemara. Such cannot operate with rapidity, and usually act upon tips and prepossessions, which in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred prove fatal to their peace of mind and injurious to their pocket.

Is it, then, impossible to induce the multitude amongst the people to abandon this method of hunting after wealth without labour, for that is our only hope? A change in the spirit of the people, a higher sense of self-respect, a deeper regard for the community of interests which would lead a man to treat his neighbour as a man to be helped, not injured, would do more to put an end to this modern habit than any number of rules and regulations. It has been suggested that gambling could be almost entirely put an end to were sellers of shares to be compelled to hand in the name of the possessor, or the numbers of bonds where bonds are sold. Undoubtedly this would stop every kind of free-handed gambling, except by way of options; but could any such regulation be established that would apply to the irresponsible dealings of the outside gambler through bucket-shops? I think not. Moreover, any such regulation would in the long run be injurious to genuine holders of securities. Take the example of Bank shares. It is almost forgotten nowadays that, as a consequence of the banking panic of 1866, an Act, known as Leeman’s Act, from the name of the man by whom it was introduced and carried through Parliament, effectually stopped speculative dealing in Bank shares. These are now consequently exclusively an investment security. They cannot be sold without giving the numbers of the shares and the name of the holder out of whose possession the shares are to come. There is consequently never any “bear” account, that is to say, any account open in unspecified shares sold for the fall, in Bank shares, and unquestionably this immunity from attack has been most valuable in checking Bank scares when credit has become strained. But what would happen supposing a crisis arose through the failure of one or two important Banks? Would it be possible for frightened shareholders to escape their liability and sell out before the crisis became acute? No, it would not. The shares would simply be unsaleable on any terms; there would be no market for them at all, and each individual holder would be compelled to face his loss without chance of escape. From a moral point of view this may be all right—I am not objecting—but undoubtedly the acuteness of the disaster would be concentrated to a cruel and most ruinous extent upon the then existing groups of Bank shareholders.

Recently, when a panic threatened in Russian securities upon the Paris Bourse, the official brokers there notified to the outside market that they would not record sales of the bonds unless the numbers thereof were handed in with the order. This at once stopped speculative selling, but I doubt whether the consequence was not to weaken the market and to render the credit of Russia suspect amongst the multitude who, speculatively or otherwise, held this particular national debt. At any rate, the rule was very soon abandoned, and dealings resumed on the old footing. In Germany a number of restrictions and vexatious taxes have been placed upon Bourse transactions, especially those of a speculative kind, without increasing the health of the market or really diminishing the amount of gambling done. The business is transferred to other markets, very largely to London—that is all.

Again, it may be said that the English Government put an end to one form of gambling, still prevalent on the Continent, with complete success. Lotteries were put down by Act of Parliament, and the trade of the lottery-ticket jobber summarily stopped. That is true enough, but there is no analogy between a step of this kind and stopping gambling in actually existing securities. If lottery loans themselves had not been discontinued, it would have been impossible for any Government to stop the pernicious dealing in lottery tickets. If we could stop all issues of securities, wipe off the National Debt, Municipal debts, the intolerable burdens of Colonial debts, and turn all joint-stock undertakings into communistic organisations, there would be an end of Stock Exchange gambling, at least in any form now familiar to the public; but short of that I do not see how the legislature can interfere with effect without creating other, and perhaps worse, evils than those it sought to abolish. An example of legislative powerlessness has been furnished by recent efforts at joint-stock company law amendment. The Act of 1900, which was going to do so much to purify the atmosphere and limit the ravages of the unscrupulous promoter and his “front page” guinea-pigs, has really increased the mischief, as I have already pointed out. Gambling might be diminished were the State to increase the taxes upon speculative transactions, although I am doubtful; but any such increase would rather tend to emphasise the absurdity of the Gaming Acts. Through these Acts it is possible now for any speculator to repudiate his obligations, and cases frequently arise in the Law Courts where losses are in this way repudiated.

Possibly the law might be able to put down outside speculative agencies, which do an incalculable amount of mischief, and yet even there difficulties stand in the way. Are newspapers to be forbidden to insert the advertisements of these “bucket-shops”? Will the Post Office refuse to transmit their circulars? How far is it legitimate or safe, let alone wise, for the State to interfere in order to protect the fool from the consequences of his own folly? I cannot solve the problem; it perplexes me much and often, but the longer I think things over the less am I inclined to invoke the aid of the State in order to put an end to this social canker.

The remedy must come, I repeat, from the people themselves: from better instruction, from healthier views of what constitutes true success and respectability. There is an emulation in extravagance which has spread widely through all classes of society during the past two generations, and has now culminated in a vicious recklessness that does more to whet the appetite for gambling of all kinds than anything else. This spirit is not perhaps so visible in the country village, at the rural parsonage, or among the petty tradesmen in a small country town as elsewhere; not so patent to the eyes of the onlooker. We do not need to go so far: society in the West End of London is quite sufficient for illustration. The habits there have grown in extravagance within my time to a degree almost impossible to realise; and most people embraced in this word “society,” as well as thousands who are pressing to get within the magic circle, live beyond their means, struggle to eke out their inadequate incomes—inadequate through the standard set up by gambling on the Stock Exchange, often by ruining themselves.

Why cannot people exercise some moral restraint, or at least a trifle of common-sense? No system of gambling in existence treats the public with absolute fair play. The sharper is everywhere, but far less frequently in evidence on the Stock Exchange than anywhere else. It is none the less true that the mere charges of the market constitute a considerable handicap against the outside player. Supposing a man is induced to buy a security, the price of which at the date of his purchase is £1000. According to the character of that security, he will pay from 25s. to £5 to the broker he employs to carry through the transaction. This charge is really a very small payment for the work done—would be quite inadequate payment at its highest, did the market transact investment business alone. That money, however, is so much out of pocket at the start to be set against expected profit. Then there is what is called the jobber’s “turn.” The wholesale dealer in the market has always two prices. He buys at one price and sells at another, the difference being his immediate limit of profit. Assume such difference to be merely half-a-crown per cent, and the stock bought will cost the outside buyer 50s. more than he could have sold it at when the transaction was entered into. Say £5 altogether is thus against the outside buyer on the deal at the start. The security purchased will therefore have to rise 5s. per cent before he can get home, as the phrase is, without loss. If the profit, however, does not come along within a fortnight or thereby, arrangements have to be made to carry the transaction forward to a new account, as it is called. This involves interest on the money, which cannot, on an average, be less than 5 per cent per annum, or roughly another 50s. per fortnightly account. In addition, there is probably a small charge, representing £1 or 25s., made by the broker for arranging the fictitious purchase and sale by means of which this continuation of the bargain is effected. Let a speculative purchase be carried on in this way for a few months, and it will become evident to everybody that a very considerable rise must occur before the purchaser is able to sell at a profit after meeting all charges. In three months he may be £20 to £25 to the bad, assuming the price to remain where it was when he bought. If people would reflect in this way, and make calculations before they plunged into a gambling transaction of the sort, they would surely often hold their hands.

With sales for the fall—sales of what a man does not possess—it is often very much worse, especially if a man has sold a share or stock on which dividends accrue from time to time. He may be saved the cost of interest on money lent to him, but has to pay the dividend upon the stock he sold each time that one is declared; and should selling for the fall have been large enough to exceed the supply of shares available for lending purposes, he may be called upon to pay a fine for failing to deliver what he sold, and each fortnight the carry-over charges have to be deducted from the price at which he sold, together with dividends when they come, and fines for non-delivery when the “bear” is more or less “cornered.” In this way it often arises that a man will not come out with a profit, even should he round off his speculative sale by repurchasing 10 per cent below the price he originally sold at. I give these brief illustrations to help the outside mind, to warn people off from this method of trying to make money, but my hopes are not profound that they will have much effect. We shall require a world-enveloping credit cataclysm to lift mankind out of its present vicious ruts on to a higher, a more altruistic moral platform.

GAMBLING AMONG WOMEN

By J. M. HOGGE, M.A.

Betting has so long been associated with men that it is probable there are still many people who have never considered the evil in its relation to women. The attention of those, however, who have given some thought to the problem of betting and gambling has been increasingly turned to this phase of the question, and it is now certain that among women the practice is spreading with alarming rapidity. As in the case of men, the habit is not confined to any one class of society but has affected all, so that at the one end of the social scale costly jewellery is sold to cover bridge debts and at the other blankets are pawned to put money on a horse.

If we turn to the evidence given before the Lords Commission we find numerous side references to the practice. Here, for instance, is some evidence given by Chief Constable Peacock of Manchester:—

_Q._ One of these slips (_i.e._ bookmakers’ slips) you have given me is from a lady?

_A._ Yes.

_Q._ And it appears that she had 8s. on in one day?

_A._ Yes.

_Q._ In what position in life would she be?

_A._ She is only a working man’s wife.

_Q._ She puts in this slip with 8s., meaning that she has invested that money on horses in one day?

_A._ Yes.

Again, Mr. Horace Smith, a well-known London magistrate, in his evidence refers to the practice of bookmakers taking bets from women and children, and also to the effect betting has on the honesty of women, giving instances to prove his assertions. Asked if he thought that women as well as men bet more than they used to, he replied that he had no doubt they did, and that he had even had women bookmakers before him. Mr. Spruce, a Leeds commission agent, also admitted the fact of the woman bookmaker.

This last statement may come as a surprise to many readers, but we are able to give circumstantial proof of its truth in the following circular:—

Gentlemen in quest of reliable racing intelligence are invited to communicate with Miss ——. Only those who are prepared to pay well need apply, as Miss —— is not one of those who give away Tips.

During the latter part of 1903 Flat Racing Season Miss —— decided to commence business as a racing adviser, and she at once met with conspicuous success, her selections including—Grey Tick, Cesarewitch; Burses, 2nd Cambridgeshire; Switch Cap, Manchester November Handicap.

Miss —— invites all sportsmen in quest of genuine racing intelligence to join her list of regular wire subscribers. Satisfaction guaranteed to all regular subscribers.

Those sportsmen who send for her wires can rely on winning money. Her terms are, she believes, higher than those of the ordinary Turf correspondent, but clients will be fully satisfied that her wires are worth every penny charged. Those sportsmen who require wires every day are requested to apply elsewhere, as Miss —— cannot promise to send out more than two or three selections every week. The source of her intelligence cannot be divulged, but it may be mentioned that no other racing adviser is in the same position as Miss —— to obtain such genuine information.

This lady charges 10s. for a single wire and £5 for twenty.

Mr. Luke Sharp, the Official Receiver for Birmingham, Worcester, and West Bromwich, replying to the Bishop of Hereford, drew attention to perhaps the most deplorable phase of betting among women. This consists in the collection of bets by agents calling on women for other weekly payments. Here is what Mr. Sharp said:—

I had a conversation with one of my friends who is very much interested in these matters with regard to some cases in Worcestershire, and I wanted to get the particulars, as I did not like to make a statement unless I could prove it, and I will now read you his letter if your Lordship desire it. He says: “I do not mention this in any way to incriminate the man who I understand is carrying on a system of gambling, much as I condemn such and consider it should be stopped. I simply brought the matter before you to show how among the many ways gambling is brought to the houses of the working classes. It is done by agents who, while collecting the weekly payments on some article purchased, also collect for the master who makes a book, and so induce the women to place money on any race taking place in any part of the kingdom. I consider something should be done to put a stop to such.” That is about the worst kind of gambling that I ever heard of.

Along with this evidence we must also take that of Mr. Robert Knight, General Secretary of the Boilermakers’ Society, and a magistrate of Newcastle, who says:—

Betting generally is largely on the increase; especially is this noticeable amongst young men and women. Between the hours of 11.55 and 3.15 a bookmaker was recently seen to take 236 bets from men, women, and children in South Shields.... Unrestrained by Act of Parliament, the bookmakers go from door to door in the streets occupied by the working classes for the purpose of inducing women to bet.... When the workmen are at their work these bookmakers go round and visit the parts where they live, get hold of the wives of the workmen when the husband is at work, and get them to bet. Very often it does not end in betting with spare money: a woman very often takes the things of the house and pawns them to get the money to bet with.

There is still another reference to this practice in Mr. Knight’s evidence, which we give in full:—

_Q._ With regard to the house-to-house betting, would you include that in the prohibition (_i.e._ of street betting)?

_A._ I would. I think it has become a terrible evil—one of the worst I know of.

_Q._ Do these bookmakers solicit the women or whoever opens the door to them?

_A._ Yes; they go from house to house, and they get the women, in the absence of their husbands, to bet, and I have known in some cases where the money has been so short that the mother has gone and taken some things out of the house and pawned them in order to get money to bet with.

_Q._ Have you known of bad cases of women betting with their husbands’ money, for example?

_A._ Yes.

_Q._ Do you know many cases of that kind?