Chapter 8

(M223) The service on which the official might be engaged was evidently military and had risks. It is not certain whether the _dannatu_(77) is really a “fortress,” or a “defeat.” The word has both meanings. It does not really matter. Either way the official is captured by the enemy of the king. He was bound to pay for his own ransom, if he had the means; or if not, his town must ransom him and, failing that, the state. But he could not raise money on his benefice. Moreover, while it could descend to his son, it was inalienable. No diminution by bequest to his female relatives, no sale of part of it, no mortgage on it, nor even its exchange for other like estate, was allowed.

Further, the official and his benefice were protected. He could not be hired out by his superior officers, nor in any way plundered or oppressed. He held tax free, subject only to his feudal duty.

(M224) In some cases the tributary there is associated with these two officials. No duty is set down for him, beyond that implied in his name of paying a tribute. It is not clear that all land was held on one or the other scheme, but it is so in parts of the East still. Some land is held by personal service, some on payment of a tax. This tax later became the tithe. The personal service was later compounded for by furnishing a soldier or two for the army. The liability to serve in the levy continued to be borne by slaves and the lower classes.

(M225) That all land did owe either personal service, or tax, is probably to be deduced from § 40, where we read that though a levy-master, warrant-officer, or tributary could alienate nothing of their holdings, other land-owners could do so. But they did so subject to the buyer taking over the duty, or service, of the land so transferred. One of the classes here named, the votary, appears subject to service elsewhere. The votary of Marduk is expressly exempt from this service.(78) The merchant, who represents another class, appears very often to have been a foreigner, only temporarily resident in the country.

(M226) The votary was already known to us from the contracts, but there was little to fix her functions. As seen in the Code, she was a highly favored person. Vowed to God, usually to Shamash at Sippara, or Marduk at Babylon, there seems little to connect her with the prostitute-votaries of Ishtar at Erech. She ordinarily lived in the convent, or “bride-house” of Shamash. She was given a portion, exactly like a bride, on taking her vow and becoming the “bride” of Shamash. But her property did not go to the convent. At her father’s death, with her consent, her estate might be administered by her brothers, or she could farm it out. At any rate, she was provided for during her lifetime. But at her death, unless her father had specially given her power to bequeath it, her property went back to her family. She was not, however, doomed to spend all her days in the convent. She could leave it and even marry. But she was expected to maintain a high standard of respectability. For her to open a beer-shop or even enter one for drink was punished by burning. She remained a virgin, even if married. She could have no children and must provide her husband with a maid, if he wished to have a family. But she was carefully guarded from any reproach as childless. She ranks as a married woman, even if unmarried, and is protected from slander. Many noble ladies, and even kings’ daughters, were votaries.(79)

(M227) The merchant continually appears. Some passages suggest that he was a state official. But this is really pressing far the interest which the state took in him. He was, doubtless, like the Jew of the Middle Ages, a valuable asset to the king. He seems to have been the usual moneylender, so much so that in many places “merchant” and “creditor” are interchangeable. A man is usually said to borrow of “his merchant,” as we say “of his banker.” Doubtless, the king also borrowed from him. It is certain that the Code was very lenient to him. But the merchant also did business in the way of ordinary trade. As a capitalist he sent out his travellers and agents with goods far and wide, even into domains where the king’s authority did not reach. Much of the Code is occupied with regulating the relations between the merchant and his agent. The agency was that form of _commenda_ which is so characteristic of the East at the present. The agent takes stock or money of his principal, signs for it, agrees to pay so much profit, and goes off to seek a market, making what profit he can. There is much to suggest that the merchant was not usually a Babylonian. In later times, the Arameans were the chief merchants, and travelled all over Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, and into Asia Minor.

V. Judges, Law-Courts, And Legal Processes

(M228) Partly because specific references to judges and legal processes are not necessarily to be expected in historical inscriptions, and partly because we do not really know which are the earliest monuments of the race, it is impossible to decide when law-courts first came into existence. It is generally admitted, however, that the stele of Manistusu is one of the earliest known monuments. There we read of Galzu, a judge. There also we find many of the officials, who later acted as judges upon occasion. Hence it may fairly be said that judges were to be found in ancient Babylonia from time immemorial. They must have decided what was right when there was no written law to which to appeal. With the judges were associated as assessors the elders of the city. This was so marked a feature, that in some cases we read, that after hearing the complaint the judge “assembled the city” to hear the case. In Babylonia the maxim, _littera scripta manet_, was so well understood that hardly anything of importance was done without committing it to writing. Hence we are as well informed about domestic affairs in Babylonia as about those of Europe in the Middle Ages.

(M229) It seems best to consider legal usages first, because they are essential to the understanding of all others. When we have a simple contract between two parties we do not at once see where the reference to the law comes in. But the contract was not valid unless sealed and witnessed. The sealing was accompanied by an oath. The oath probably had to be made in court. The witnesses seem often to have been a body of men who could only be found at the court. Even when there is least trace of the law and the judge, the case is similar to others where the judge appears explicitly. It is also worthy of remark that, partly owing to our possession of the Code and partly owing to the fuller nature of the legal decisions, we know far more of this subject, as of many others, in the early periods than in the later. Hence the discussion of early legal usage is unusually full. When the evidence from later times merely supports this, it will not be noticed. Only divergences are worthy of record. As a rule, the procedure changes very little for many centuries.

(M230) 1. *Judges.* The references to judges are less numerous than one would expect in the Code. But it seems probable that the sentences there laid down had to be pronounced by the judge, if not carried out by him. We are, however, still in complete ignorance as to the machinery of police administration. We may argue from analogy in other countries and ages, but this is not a theoretical treatise on comparative sociology. We must content ourselves with direct evidence.

(M231) Some sections deal explicitly with the duties of a judge. Thus,(80) if a judge had given a judgment, decided the case, and embodied it in a legal decision, he was subjected to severe penalties for afterwards revoking his decision. If he had inflicted a penalty, he had now to repay it twelvefold to him from whom it was exacted. Further he was to be publicly deposed from his office, expelled from his seat of judgment, _kussû daianûtišu_, and no longer be permitted to sit with the judges. It is, of course, assumed that when he was called to account he could not justify his former judgment, or else could not justify the change. But, as the law reads, it seems simply calculated to render a judgment, once pronounced, irrevocable,—at any rate, for that judge. Probably its revocation, in the case of injustice, was provided for by the right of appeal.

He had to consider the words of the witnesses, _amâtišunu amâru_, literally, “to see their words,” perhaps implying that the depositions were written, but there are instances where _amâru_ simply means “to consider.”(81)

In a criminal case, where a man had to produce witnesses to save his life from a death-sentence, the judge might grant him six months’ grace in which to produce his witnesses.(82) In later times we have many examples of such a stay of process that evidence might be produced.(83)

(M232) Special directions are also given to a judge as to his procedure, when a father was minded to disinherit his son; or, when a widow with a young family wished to marry again.(84) A slanderer was summoned before the judge,(85) a son could not be cut off without referring the case to a judge,(86) the children who wished to turn their widowed mother out of her house had to appear before a judge.(87)

(M233) For the most part judges constituted a distinct profession, but it must not be understood that they had no other means of livelihood. Indeed, there is no hint anywhere that they received any remuneration for their services. But it was a high honor and by no means subsidiary to another office. Among those who officiated as judges we find most of the higher officials. Doubtless the king himself acted as judge on occasions, and probably no great official of the realm was wholly free from the call to act in a judicial capacity. But, as a rule, the judge is simply noted as “judge.” That the priests were judges is quite unproved. The judges were men of great importance and high rank, but there is nothing to show that they were priests. An age qualification is more likely.

(M234) The judge was a professional man. We often find a man, bearing the title “judge,” acting as party to a suit, or witness to a deed, when he is certainly not acting in his judicial capacity. To a certain extent he was a territorial officer, had his own district for jurisdiction, and was jealous of cases being taken elsewhere. How the ranks of the judges were filled we do not know, but there is a hint of royal appointment in the phrase, “the king’s judges.” On the other hand, there is clear evidence of the office being hereditary. Thus, Ibik-Anunîtum had no less than three sons, Idin-Ishtar, Marduk-mushallim, and Nannar-idinnam, all judges. Whether a right to the office descended in the female line is not quite clear, but we find a lady, Ishtar-ummu, among the judges, on occasion. She was also the scribe.(88)

(M235) Though many high officials acted as judges, and so doing are named before the simple “judge,” there is no evidence of the existence of any “chief judge.” The order of names appears to be that of seniority alone. This may be due to the nature of our documents. The phrase-books name a “chief judge” for Sumerian times. In the later Assyrian period the chief-justice was called _sartênu_, evidently because he fixed the _sartu_, or fine, on the condemned party. Then also many high officials acted as judges.(89)

(M236) 2. *Scribes.*—The scribe exercised his craft as a profession. One often meets with a scribe, _tupšarru_, acting in a private capacity, as party to a suit, or as witness. He retains the title even when the deed is drawn up by another writer. The class was very numerous. Almost every document is drawn up by a fresh scribe, so far as the scribe’s name is recorded, for he often omits his title. Generally he is the last of the witnesses, but not always so.

(M237) He wrote the whole of the document, including the names of the witnesses. There is no evidence that anyone else ever wrote a word on the document. As a rule, even when the names of the fathers of the witnesses are given, the scribe is content to write only his title after his name. Hence we have no evidence whether the office was hereditary or not.

(M238) Women certainly were scribes. Out of a total of ninety names of scribes known, at least ten were women. Here a difficulty arises from the way in which women’s names occur. At this period proper names are usually written without the determinative which marks sex. Nor do the names decide, for both men and women bore the same name. Thus Taribatum is the name of two men and also of two women. Only when the title _tupšarru_ is given, is the feminine determinative prefixed to that. We have, however, ten clear examples.

In the later times the scribe usually was a man, but female scribes are known.(90) The Aramaic scribe is often named, also the Egyptian. The scribe usually “held” the agreement, which probably means that the parties were willing to leave it in his safe-keeping.

(M239) The scribe was not a judge. It may be true that he sometimes acted as judge or became one, but then the higher office overshadowed the lower. He was no longer scribe but judge. A judge may sometimes have written down his legal decision and so acted as scribe, but we have no evidence of such a case. The judge seems never to have dispensed with the services of the scribe.

(M240) The scribe was not a priest. There is no evidence whatever that either priests were all scribes, or could all write, or that scribes were necessarily priests. As a matter of fact, the same man may have acted both as scribe and priest. But the offices are distinct and no one man ever bears both titles. That in later times the _amêlu_ RID, whose title can be read _šangû_, usually acts as scribe is due to the peculiar nature of the documents. These concern transactions in which the property of the temple, or of its officials, was in question, and one of the college of priests attached to that temple was charged with the duty of notary where temple interests were concerned. One might as well say that every clerk in the Middle Ages was a priest, because all the deeds of the monastery with which we were dealing were drawn up by Brother A, whose name was entered in some monastery list of the brethren as a priest. Whether the scribes were clerics, and always attached to some temple, in minor orders, is not clear. On the whole, the evidence is against this conclusion.

(M241) 3. *Witnesses.*—The word used to designate a witness is _šîbu_, which denotes those who are “gray-headed,” but it is not certain that it can have no other meaning. It may mean those who were “present.” In actual use we can distinguish three classes of persons to whom the term “witness” can be applied.

(M242) First we have the elders, the _šîbu_, of a city.(91) Possibly the Kar-sippar, by which some men swore, or in presence of which a contract was drawn up, were these elders of Sippar. They formed the _puḫru_, or “assembly,” in whose presence a man was scourged,(92) from which a prevaricating judge was expelled.(93) They may have been nominated, or at least approved, by the king; for we read of _šîbê šarri_. They were not exclusively men, for we have _šîbê û šîbatu_.(94) The recurrence of the same names, at the same dates, indicates that a body of official witnesses were held in readiness to act on such occasions. Many of them were temple officials, or members of the guild of Shamash votaries.

(M243) Sometimes they are associated with the judges in such a way as to show that they were assessors.(95) They included judges sometimes, at any rate “this witness” is attached to a list of names which included a _nâgiru_ of Babylon, a judge, and other high officials.(96) In the time of Nûr-Adadi they sent a case before the king.(97) They actually gave judgment.(98) We may regard them as a jury, especially a grand jury, qualified by their own knowledge to understand the rights of the case and to judge of evidence. The judge gave the sentence.

(M244) Secondly, we may distinguish the witnesses examined on oath. It is not clear that these were called by the same name. In the Code we read of _šîbi mûdi_, “the witnesses that know,” who seem to resemble very closely the Greek _Histores_. These, of course, were usually not on the jury. They testified, and were chosen by the parties to the suit. But the judge might examine persons who, in his opinion, would know. He selected and sent for them, directing the parties whom to produce. He might even adjourn the case for the production of witnesses.(99)

(M245) Thirdly, we may distinguish the witnesses to a document. Very often we can discern that these had an interest in the case. They might be relatives of the parties, neighbors of the estate in question, officials whose rights were concerned. In later times they received the special name of _mukinnu_, “the establishers.” They may be presumed to have known at least the general purport of the deed which they witnessed. When the deed was called in question, they would be cited to state what they knew. In the case of legal decisions, both judges and jury occur as witnesses in this sense. Hence, in a great many cases the distinctions drawn above do not hold. Whether the term _šîbu_ was ever applied to the third class is doubtful. Their names are usually preceded by the sign which means “before,” however it was read.

(M246) 4. *Cases of dispute settled out of court.*—When parties disagreed, they might discuss their difference between themselves and arrive at an agreement. Then they procured a scribe, who embodied the agreement in a binding compact, _duppu lâ ragâmi_. This took the form of a contract, the parties mutually undertaking not to withdraw from the agreement, re-open the dispute, or bring legal action, one against the other. To give sanction to this agreement, they swore by the gods and the king. Witnesses were called upon to be cognizant of and attest the contract; and their names were added to the contract. To authenticate their names both parties and witnesses often impressed their seals or, in default of seals, made a nail-mark. The date was then added. Each party seems to have taken a copy of the agreement and the scribe held a third, or deposited it in the archives. Such cases may be said to have been settled “out of court.” At any rate they contain no reference to a judge, or court. But it is possible that the administration of the oath was a judicial, or perhaps a sacerdotal function. Further, the witnesses may have been drawn from a body of men held in readiness at court to perform that function. It is certain in some cases, that agreements arrived at independently were taken to a judge for confirmation,(100) and the Code expressly directs some cases to be taken to a judge. But it is probable that many cases were settled by mutual agreement.

(M247) When the intervention of a judge was deemed essential, one of the parties “complained.” The word really means to “cry out,” “protest”; but it is used in the freest way as equivalent to bringing the action. There is no evidence that anyone then submitted to wrong “under protest.” Whether the people were naturally litigious, or simply because access to the courts was so easy, a protest usually involved a suit.

(M248) The plea was made by the principals to the suit. There is no mention of an advocate, or solicitor. But the verb generally used of the plea _ragâmu_, gives rise to _targumânu_, the original of the modern dragoman. He usually appears in later texts as the “interpreter,” but may originally have been the “advocate.” At any rate, in the bilingual days he might well have combined the offices. Another verb common at this period, _pakâru_, gave rise to _pâkirânu_, later the usual word for “plaintiff,” or “claimant.”

(M249) Here may be noted a peculiarity of the scribe’s conception of the case. It will be found that, as he puts the case, the plaintiff generally loses. This is because the scribe will not prejudge the case by saying who was right. He writes “A claimed the property of B.” In actual fact it may have been that B laid claim to what he proved was his. But that excludes the scribe from saying that B claimed the property of A, because it never was A’s. Hence, writing after the event, he ascribes the property to the rightful owner from the start of his document, and regards the wrongful holder as laying claim to it. Hence, we must not assume that the parties were not both claimants. In fact, both parties agreed, as a rule, so far as to submit their case to a judge. This is clear from the statements which follow the statement of the cause of dispute. Both parties “went to the judges,” or rather quaintly, “they captured a judge.” The preliminary discussion between the parties resulted in agreement to submit the case to a judge. Both were willing to abide by the decision. Once, it is true, the plaintiff is said to have caught the defendant;(101) but there is no evidence of unwillingness to submit. So too, when the parties are said to “receive a judge,” they evidently both sought him.

(M250) Sometimes affairs did not go so smoothly. One party had to act and bring the other before the judges(102) or “caused them to come before the judge.”

There are indications that the judges sometimes had to summon a party before them, or as the scribe puts it, “bring him before the other party.” This is also expressed by the judges “sending up” a party.(103)

(M251) There is considerable evidence that cases might be sent before the judges by a higher party, the king himself. These cases were probably on the suit of a plaintiff. In the letters of the First Dynasty we have examples of the king sending to the local judges his own decision on the case, which they had to carry out; or in other cases he simply sent the case for trial.(104)

(M252) The parties, having found a judge and obtained a day for hearing, “entered,” or “went down to,” the great temple of Shamash, at Sippara, called Ebabbarim.(105) There, as we know, Ḥammurabi set up one of the copies of the Code. The case was heard sometimes at the “old gate.”(106) At Babylon, the parties were taken to the temple of Merodach, Esagila.(107) At Larsa, the “gate” of _NIN-MAR-KI_, or the temple of Sin, might be chosen.(108) The temple of Ishhara is also named.(109)

(M253) 5. *Procedure.*—We have only scattered hints regarding legal procedure. The Code says that the judges “saw the pleas.”(110) The scribe uses the same expression.(111) As a rule, he records the plaintiff’s statement of claim first. Then he records a counter-statement. There is a strong suggestion that he quotes from written documents. The judges read these, or heard the verbal statements.

(M254) As part of the legal process, the object in dispute, or, at any rate, the deeds relating to it, were brought into court, and resigned into the hands of the god.(112) He was to discern the rightful owner and restore the object to him. Hence the decision was “the judgment of Shamash in the house of Shamash,(113) the judgment of the house of Shamash.”(114) So the defendant was said “to make his account before Shamash.”(115) In bringing a suit the parties “sought the altar of Shamash.”(116) In case of loss or damage, the claimant recounted it “before god.”

(M255) In confirmation of the statements alleged witnesses might be called for, who were put on oath before god and the king. They were supposed to know the object claimed and whose it was,(117) or to know that a transaction had taken place.(118)

(M256) Tampering with witnesses, or with a jury, was penalized by the Code.(119) The judges might refuse to accept the witness,(120) and then might decide the case on the sworn deposition of the plaintiff.