Chapter 13

(M373) As long as she remained in her husband’s home she enjoyed to the full whatever she had brought there as a marriage-portion, whatever her husband had settled upon her, and also received a share from her husband’s goods at his death. The widow’s share was the same as a child’s. But she had no power to alienate any of these possessions. The Code expressly declares that they were her children’s after her.(343) The children had no power to turn her out. If they desired her to leave, the matter came before the law-courts, and her private wishes were consulted. If she wished to remain, she might do so, and the judge bound over the children to allow her to do so.(344)

(M374) A very clear example of the permanence of the Code regulations on this subject meets us in the fifth year of Cambyses.(345) Ummu-tâbat, daughter of Nabû-bêl-usur, wife of Shamash-uballiṭ, son of Bêl-ebarra, a Shamash priest, who was dead, whose sons were Shamash-eṭir, Nidittum, and Ardi-Ḥar, swore to Bêl-uballiṭ, priest of Sippara, saying, “I will not remarry, I will live with my sons, I will bring up my sons to manhood, until they are numbered with the people.” On the day that Ummu-ṭâbat remarries, according to her bond, the property [of her late husband] which is in the possession of Bêl-uballiṭ, the priest of Sippara, [she shall forfeit]. The tablet is defective here, but on the edge of the tablet we see that the care of her sons was given her. To remarry is expressed here by the words, “going into the _bît zikari_.”

(M375) A widow could remarry at her discretion. She no longer had to be given in marriage. She was free to marry the man of her choice.(346) She might take with her her marriage-portion to her new home, but she had to leave behind any settlement which her former husband had given her, or any share of his goods that had come to her at his death. Her family were not called upon to find any fresh marriage-portion for her. But she was not completely mistress of even her marriage-settlement. If she had children of the former marriage, they and any children of her second marriage shared her marriage-portion equally. Only she had the enjoyment of it for life.(347) If there were no children of the second marriage, those of the first took all she left.(348)

(M376) We have assumed that when her husband died her children were old enough to care for themselves. If they were not, she had no power to enter upon a second marriage and desert her first family. She was not free to marry at all without consent of the law-court.(349) But there is no evidence that this could be withheld, if proper conditions were observed. The first husband’s property was inventoried and consent for the second marriage being granted, she and her new husband were bound by deed to preserve the whole estate of the late husband for his children. With that proviso, the newly married pair entered into full use of the deceased’s property and were bound to educate the children until grown up. They had no inducement to neglect them, as in any case none of the deceased’s property could ever be theirs. If the children died, it would all revert to the family of the deceased. The newly married pair had no further interest in it than the enjoyment of it until the children could manage for themselves. They could not alienate any of it. The sale of even a utensil was not possible.(350)

XIII. Obligations And Rights Of Children

(M377) It is customary to say that the father had absolute power over his children, but it is better to state only what is known with certainty regarding the extent of his power. The father could treat his child, or even his wife, equally with a slave, as a chattel to be pledged for his debts.(351) We may therefore conclude that he could sell his child. An actual example cannot be cited from early times, but they are very common later.

The son was not capable of entering into an independent contract with an outside person.(352) We may assume that this means simply while yet living in his father’s house. The father had rights over what his son earned. A man could also hire out his child and take the wages.(353)

(M378) The father had the right to prefer one son above the rest. He could endow him with house, field, and garden. But this must be done in his lifetime and by written deed. This gift did not in any way affect the son’s claim to inherit equally with his brethren on the father’s death, when he took a full share over and above what he had by gift.(354)

(M379) The father had full power to dispose of his daughters in marriage. But he was expected to furnish them with a marriage-portion. This was not obligatory, being probably a matter of negotiation with the parents of the bridegroom. In later times the obligation evidently became irksome and oppressive, and Law E was passed to relieve the strain. A father was bound to do his best to fulfil his promise to dower his daughter, but no more. A father could not hinder his daughter from becoming a votary.(355) If he approved her choice, he might give her a portion, as if for marriage,(356) but he was not compelled to do so. A father could give his daughter to be a concubine.(357)

The father’s consent was also needed to his son’s marriage.(358) He had to provide the youth with a bride-price, and secure a wife for him.(359)

(M380) It is not easy to determine when children ceased to be under the paternal power. Betrothed daughters remained in their father’s house; so did married sons sometimes. Whether the birth of a child, making the young man himself a father, freed him as head of a family, or whether it was entering a house of his own, we cannot yet say.

(M381) The Sumerian laws are very severe upon a child’s repudiation of a father. That degraded him to the status of a slave. He might also be branded. Obviously he was disinherited. The repudiation is expressed in the words, “You are not my father,” but it may be intended to cover all unfilial conduct. The Code is more explicit. If a son struck his father, his hands were cut off.(360)

(M382) The Sumerian laws preserved the father’s rights to disinherit the son by a simple repudiation, saying, “You are not my son.” The son then had to leave house and enclosure. The Code limits this power. It insists on legal process and good reason alleged. Also it was not allowed for a first offence on the son’s part.(361)

(M383) The mother was in much the same position of authority as the father. A son who repudiated his mother was branded and expelled from house and city. He was not, however, sold as a slave. The Sumerian laws also reserved to the mother the right to repudiate her son, and he must quit house and property. The Code gives no such power to mothers. Indeed, we find examples of a son disputing with a mother.(362) Mothers took up the father’s place toward the children on the death of the father as regards marriage-portions, bride-price, and other family affairs. But they usually acted in concert with the elder children.

(M384) The repudiation of adoptive parents was a very grievous sin, especially on the part of those who were children of parents who were forbidden to have children. Something worse than illegitimacy was their lot. The penalties of having the eye torn out, or the tongue cut out,(363) show the abhorrence felt for their ingratitude.

XIV. The Education And Early Life Of Children

(M385) Much has been made of the knowledge of writing shown by the Babylonians and Assyrians. The ability to draw up deeds and write letters seems at first sight to have been widely diffused. In the times of the First Dynasty of Babylon almost every tablet seems to have a fresh _tupšar_, or scribe. Many show the handiwork of women scribes.(364) But most of the persons concerned in these documents were of the priestly rank. There is no evidence that the shepherds or workpeople could write. In the Assyrian times the scribe was a professional man. We find _aba_ or _tupšar_ used as a title. So, too, in later Babylonian times. The witnesses to a document can only be said to sign their names in so far as that they impressed their seals. This was done, at any rate, in early times. In the Assyrian period the only parties who sealed were the owners of the property transferred to a new owner. The whole of a tablet shows the same handwriting throughout. Anyone who reads carefully through the facsimile copies in _Cuneiform Texts_ can readily see this. Different scribes, especially in early times, wrote differently, but this was still the case in Assyrian days. Yet no change of hand can be noted anywhere in one document, save where, as in the forecast tablets, a date or note was added by a different person, often in Assyrian script, to a text written in Babylonian. The only safe statement to make is that from the earliest times a very large number of persons existed, at any rate in the larger towns, who could write and draw up documents.

(M386) The use of Sumerian terms and phrases in the body of a document written in Semitic Babylonian might be ascribed to a mere tradition. But they were no meaningless formulæ. The many variations, including the substitution of completely different though synonymous words, show that these Sumerian phrases were sufficiently understood to be intelligently used. In later times they either disappear altogether, or are used with little variation. They had become stereotyped and were conventional signs, doubtless read as Semitic, though written as Sumerian. Our own retention of Latin words is a close parallel. The First Dynasty of Babylon was bilingual at any rate in its legal documents, though the letters are all pure Semitic. The earlier documents show few signs of Semitic origin, though its influence can be traced as far back as we can go.

(M387) The discovery at Sippara of a school dating from the First Dynasty of Babylon is very fully worked out by Professor Scheil in _Une Saison de fouilles à Sippara_, pp. 30-54. Professor Hilprecht gives further details in _Explorations in Bible Lands_, pp. 522-28 and _passim_.

The methods of learning to write and the lessons in Sumerian are well described by these authors, and illustrated by numerous extant examples of practice-tablets. The subjects were very numerous and included arithmetic, mensuration, history, geography, and literature. As Dr. Pinches has shown by his edition of some of these practice-tablets,(365) these contain very valuable fragments of otherwise lost or imperfectly known texts.

(M388) Slaves were often bound as apprentices to learn a trade or handicraft. A man might adopt a child to teach him his trade, and his duty to him was sufficiently discharged by doing so.

(M389) We do not yet know in any authoritative way, when or with what ceremonies children were named. In the case of slaves we have a boy, still at the breast,(366) or a girl of three months, not named.(367) On the other hand, a girl still at the breast is named. Hence Meissner concludes, that at the end of one year, at latest, the child was given a name.(368) But the usage with respect to slaves is hardly a rule, and, as appears from the above, they were not consistently named.

(M390) A child seems often to have been put out to nurse. From the phrase-book we learn that a father might “give a child to a wet-nurse to be suckled, and give the wet-nurse food and drink, oil for anointing, and clothing for three years.”(369) That this was not only done with adopted children is clear from the Code;(370) where we find a severe penalty laid on a wet-nurse, who substitutes another child for the one intrusted to her, without the parents’ consent.

(M391) It will hardly do to interpret the phrase-book(371) as meaning that all children were made to learn writing. But that this was commonly done is evident from the number, both of men and women, who could act as scribes.(372)

XV. Adoption

(M392) Adoption primarily means a process by which parents could admit to the privileges of sonship children born of other parents. There were many reasons which might impel them to such a course. If they were childless, a natural desire for an heir might operate. But under the Babylonian law a man might take a second wife, or a maid, if his wife were childless, to bear him children. A more operative cause was that children were a source of profit to their parents while they remained with them. But it seems that men married early. Hence this alone does not seem sufficient to account for the great frequency of adoption. Besides, in that case, what induced a parent to part with his child for adoption? It seems that the real cause most often was that the adopting parents had lost by marriage all their own children and were left with no child to look after them. They then adopted a child whose parents would be glad to see him provided for, to look after them until they died, leaving him the property they had left after portioning their own children.

(M393) The Code admits all kinds of adoption, but regulates the custom. A man might adopt an illegitimate son, or the child of a votary or palace-warder, who had no right to children, or the child of living parents. In the latter case alone was the parents’ consent necessary. We have examples of cases of adoption of relatives, of entirely unrelated persons, of a slave even.(373) We learn from the series _ana ittišu_(374) that a man might take a young child, put it out to nurse, provide the nurse with food, oil for anointing, and clothing, for a space of three years; and then have it taught a trade or profession, such as that of scribe.(375)

(M394) Adoption was effected by a deed, drawn up and sealed by the adoptive parents, duly sworn to and witnessed. Such contracts definitely state the relationship, which was in all respects the same as that of a son born in matrimony. But it laid down the obligations of the son, while it stipulated what was the inheritance to which he might expect to succeed. It brought responsibilities to both parties and fixed them. The son was bound to do that which a son would naturally have done, explicitly, to maintain his parents while they lived. The parents were bound, not only to leave him property, but to treat him as a son. But, as a rule, all was matter of contract and carefully set down. If such a contract was not drawn up, although the adoptive parents had brought him up, the child must return to his father’s house.(376) Only, for an artisan, it was sufficient to have taught the child his trade.(377)

So far as our examples go, some color might be given to the suggestion that adoption was always merely for the convenience of old people who wanted to be taken care of. But we know that children were adopted on other grounds. That they were children and not always grown-up men and women is clear from the above. This we may regard as adoption pure and simple. Other cases are a legal method of making provision for old age, or for other purposes for which an heir as legal representative was desirable. In the case of no legal heir, the property went back to the next of kin.

(M395) That such a process did take place in Babylonia is made clear by the Code.(378) But few examples are known where a father takes into his family an additional child. The case, in which the son is not only adopted by parents who have a family living, but is ranked as their eldest son, deserves reproducing in full.(379)

Ubar-Shamash, son of Sin-idinnam, from Sin-idinnam, his father, and Bititum, his mother, have Beltum-abi and Taram-ulmash taken to sonship, and let him be the son of Beltum-abi and Taram-ulmash. Ubar-Shamash shall be their eldest son. The day that Beltum-abi, his father, and Taram-ulmash, his mother, say to Ubar-Shamash, their son, “You are not our son,” he shall leave house and furniture. The day that Ubar-Shamash shall say to Beltum-abi, his father, or Taram-ulmash, his mother, “You are not my father or my mother,” one shall brand him, put fetters upon him, and sell him.

Both parents of the adopted son were living. That the son is to be reckoned eldest implies that the adopting parents had other children. This is made clear in one case where the adoptive parents are expressly said to have five children.(380) In another case where a child is adopted a certain person is expressly said to be his brother.(381)

(M396) The existing members of the family had a real interest in the proceeding. For, as inheriting with them, the addition of another son could not but affect their prospects. We may wonder what influenced them to consent. That they did consent is clear from the often-occurring covenant by which they bound themselves not to object. One explanation may be that they had grown up and left home and were anxious for the welfare of their parents, but could not arrange to look after them themselves. Hence for their parents’ sake they were willing to forego their share, or submit to a stranger taking precedence of them, or in some cases to give up all claim to the property in their parents’ possession in return for being relieved of the responsibility of looking after them. Of course, when the adopted son was only taken in as one, even the eldest, among several, he would only have a share at the parents’ death. But it even seems that the children might of their own motion adopt a brother to be son to their parents.(382)

(M397) The clause which implies disinheritance in case the parents repudiate the son, or he repudiates them, could only be enforced by a law-court.(383) But it was nevertheless most regularly inserted in the contract. In one case the document merely consists of it,(384) leaving us to infer that an adopted son was concerned. But this is not absolutely certain. The son might have been rebellious to his mother, who was therefore minded to cut him off, and this may be the result of her bringing her son before the judge. The judge was bound to try and conciliate the parties.(385) Hence, not infrequently the son was bound over not to repeat the offence on pain of disinheritance, while the mother retained her right to disinherit. There was no mention of his being sold for a slave, or branded, as was usual when a son was adopted and then repudiated his parents.

According to the contracts entered into by the parties, parents could repudiate adopted sons. This was contrary to the law by which the consent of the judge was needed for disinheritance. It seems to be an attempt to contract without the support of the law. The son was then to take a son’s share and go away.(386)

(M398) The word _aplûtu_, abstract of _aplu_, “son,” and therefore literally “sonship,” being also used to denote the relation of a daughter to a parent, came to denote the “share” which a son or daughter received. If a man adopted a son, he granted him an _aplûtu_, or “sonship,” and this carried with it a material property. But the father, while still living, might grant the son his _aplûtu_ and stipulate for maintenance during the rest of his life. Such a grant begins with _aplûtu ša_ B, where B is the son. But it by no means follows that B is an adopted son. The question is only decided for us when the parentage of B is given. If he is said to be the “son of C,” then we know that A giving him “sonship” must mean that A adopted him. But if B is merely indicated as the son of A, we cannot tell whether he was born to A, or only adopted by A.

(M399) So when the property given to B is in his power to dispose of later as he may choose, this privilege is expressed by the words, “he may give his sonship to whom he chooses.” The choice is sometimes expressed as “that which is good to his heart,” or “in his eyes,” or “whom he loves.” A modified choice is often mentioned, as when it is said that a votary may leave her “sonship” after her to whom she likes “among her brothers.”

(M400) We have a large number of documents which make reference to the _aplûtu_ of a certain person, which we can render here by “heritage.” These are especially common on the part of votaries. As we have seen, they were not supposed to have children of their own, but possessed the right to nominate their heir within limits. In return for exercising this right in favor of a certain person, they usually stipulated that such person shall maintain them as long as they live and otherwise care for them. Even outside actual deeds of heritage, we find references to property derived from votaries subject to certain duties. Such dispositions of property are closely related to a will or testament, but anticipate the death of the testator. They are really settlements for the future, which exactly answers to the title given them by the Babylonian scribes, _ridit warkati_.

The following example makes these details clear:(387)

The heritage of Eli-eriṣa, votary of Shamash, daughter of Shamash-ilu. Belisunu, votary of Shamash, daughter of Nakarum, is the caretaker of her future life. One-third _GAN_ of unreclaimed land in Karnamkarum, next the field of Issurîa, one _SAR_ house in Ḥalḫalla, next the house of Nakarum, one-third _SAR_ four _GIN_ in Gagim, one maid Shala-beltum, price ten shekels of silver, all this for the future in its entirety, what Eli-eriṣa, votary of Shamash, daughter of Shamash-ilu, has or shall acquire, she gives to Belisunu, votary of Shamash, daughter of Nakarum. Every year Belisunu shall give to Eli-eriṣa three _GUR_ of corn, ten minas of bronze, and twelve _ḲA_ of oil.

(M401) The _aplûtu_ thus given was in many cases an alienation of property on which some relative had claims. Even where their consent was not necessary it was desirable that they should not involve the heir in legal processes. Hence, such relatives are called up to covenant that they will raise no objection to the heir’s peaceable succession.(388)

(M402) The obligation to support the adoptive parent is emphasized. The amount of sustenance varies much. Another list of yearly allowances reads one shekel of silver, woollen yarn, six _ḲA_ of oil, four _išinni Shamašh_, ten _ḲA_ of fat, one side, two _GUR_ of corn. Many others could be instanced, but they make no great addition to our knowledge.

(M403) The obligation might be service; as when a lady adopts a maid to serve her for life and inherit a certain house.(389) In another case a lady adopts a son to bring up her daughter and give her to a husband. “If he vexes his adoptive mother, she will cut him off. He shall not have claim on any of the goods of his adoptive mother, but shall inherit her field and garden.”(390) Evidently the mother intended her personal effects to be her daughter’s and to form her marriage-portion. The obligation did not always last long. Thus we find that Lautum, who was adopted by a votary and was herself a votary, two years later was in a position to adopt as her daughter another votary.(391) She handed on the same property, indicating that her adoptive mother was dead.

The adoption of a child by a lady of fortune was evidently a good settlement for the child, and usually the real parents raised no objection. We even find the father of a girl adopted by a lady, making an addition to her heritage in the form of a gift to the adopting mother on her effecting the deed of adoption. He gave them two male and two female slaves. Here also the girl covenanted to support the adoptive mother.(392)

(M404) Occasionally the adopted child did not carry out his duties. This was good ground for disinheriting him. But disinheritance was not to be inflicted without the sanction of the judges.(393) Hence we find that when a lady had adopted a daughter who failed to give her food and drink, the judges summoned them to the great temple of Shamash in Sippara, there cut off the daughter from her heritage, took away the tablet of adoption granted her, and destroyed it.(394)