Chapter 6
Weakness in the Trump and strength in some other suit is far from being a sufficient justification, as the chances are that the Dealer is weak in the suit of the Third Hand, and called "two" mainly for the purpose of keeping it from being named. To overbid two Royals or Hearts with three Diamonds or Clubs is obviously absurd, unless holding _five honors_ and such other strength that game is assured.
To overbid two Hearts with two Royals, or two Royals with three Hearts, is almost tantamount to saying, "Partner, I know you are trying to shut out this declaration, but I am strong enough to insist upon it." Such action is only justified by 64 or 72 honors, and a sure game.
To overbid two Hearts or two Royals with two No-trumps, as a rule, means 100 Aces. High-card strength assures the game in the partner's call with probably a big honor score; only the premium of 100 makes the change advisable.
With strength, in the case under consideration, the Third Hand should advance his partner's call with much greater confidence than if it were an ordinary bid of one. He should not worry even if absolutely void of Trumps; in that suit his partner has announced great length as well as commanding cards; Aces and Kings of the other suits are what the Declarer wishes to find in his hand, and with them he should bid fearlessly.
The same line of comment applies with even greater force to the action of the Third Hand when the Dealer has bid three Royals or three Hearts.
WHEN TO OVERBID A PARTNER'S NO-TRUMP
When the Dealer bids one No-trump and the Third Hand holds five or more of any suit, one of the most disputed questions of Auction presents itself.
The conservative player believes that with five Hearts or Spades, inasmuch as but one more trick is required to secure game, it is safer to bid two Hearts or Royals, except, of course, when the Third Hand, in addition to a five-card suit, has the three remaining suits stopped. The theory is that if the combined hands are very strong, the winning of the game is absolutely assured with the suit in question the Trump, but may possibly be lost in the No-trump by the adversaries running a long suit. The chance of a hostile suit being established is unquestionably worthy of the consideration of the Third Hand whenever, with great strength in Hearts or Spades, he allows his partner's No-trump to stand. Five adverse tricks prevent a game. In the majority of cases, the leader opens a five-card suit. When it is not stopped, the game is saved by the adversaries before the powerful No-trump hand can get in; if it be stopped but once, the game is still in grave danger unless the Declarer take nine tricks before losing the lead.
With a Heart or Royal declaration the adversaries are not apt to take more than two tricks in their long suit, which, at No-trumps, may produce four or five (in rare cases six), and yet the Trump bid requires only one more trick for game.
It is unquestionably true that, with great strength, the game will be won nine times out of ten with the No-trump declaration, but in every such case it is absolutely "cinched" by the Heart or Royal call.
It is further argued that, when the combined hands are not quite so strong, a game is more frequently won with the Trump declaration, as the small Trumps are sure to take tricks, but the long suit may not be established in the No-trumper.
The believers in taking a chance, however, view the situation from the opposite standpoint. Their argument is that the game requires one more trick, when a Trump is declared, but does not count as much, that the original declarer may be weak in the suit named, yet strong in all the others, and therefore, with a good hand, it is wiser to leave the No-trump alone.
It is possible that the question is one rather of the temperament of the player than of card judgment. It is susceptible of almost mathematical deduction that five or more cards of a long suit are of greater trick-taking value when that suit is the Trump than when No-trump is being played, and it does not require any argument to substantiate the proposition that the slight difference in the score, between the total in the trick and honor columns netted from a game made without a Trump and a game made with Royals or Hearts, is so infinitesimal as not to be worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, players possessed of a certain temperament will, for example, refuse to overbid a partner's No-trump with Ace, King, Ten, and two small Spades, King of Hearts, and Ace of Diamonds, on the ground that the hand is too strong, although the No-trump bid may have been thoroughly justified by such a holding as Ace, Queen, Knave, of Hearts; King, Queen, Knave, of Diamonds; and Queen, Knave, of Spades. In that event it is practically sure the adversaries will open the Club suit and save the game before the Declarer has a chance to win a trick. This and similar situations occur with sufficient frequency to make them well worthy of consideration, and when such a hand fails to make game, it certainly seems to be a perfect example of what might be termed "useless sacrifice."
In spite of all this, however, probably as long as the game lasts, in the large proportion of hands in which the taking-out does not make any difference, the Declarer will say, "With such strength you should have let my No-trump alone"; or the Dummy will learnedly explain, "I was too strong to take you out."
It would be in the interest of scientific play, if, except when all suits are stopped, the theory, "Too strong to take the partner out of the No-trump," had never been conceived, and would never again be advanced.
The same comment applies with equal force to the remark so often heard, "Partner, I was too weak to take you out."
This generally emanates from a Third Hand who has a five- or six-card suit in a trickless hand. He does not stop to realize that his hand will not aid his partner's No-trump to the extent of a single trick, but that in a Trump declaration, it will almost certainly take two tricks. The Trump bid only increases the commitment by one, so it is obviously a saving and advantageous play. Furthermore, it prevents the adversaries from running a long suit. It, also, in Clubs and Diamonds, is a real danger signal, and, in the probable event of a bid by the Fourth Hand, warns the partner away from two No-trumps.
The advocates of the weakness take-out realize that in exceptional instances the play may result most unfortunately. When the Dealer has called a border-line No-trump, without any strength in the suit named by the Third Hand, and one of the adversaries has great length and strength in that suit, a heavy loss is bound to ensue, which may be increased 100 by the advance of the bid from one to two. This case is, indeed, rare, and when it does turn up the chances are that the Declarer will escape a double, as the holder of the big Trumps will fear the Dealer may be able to come to the rescue if he point out the danger by doubling the suit call.
The fact, however, that a play at times works badly is not a sufficient argument against its use, if in the majority of cases it prove advantageous, and that is unquestionably true of the weakness take-out.
The strength take-out, above advocated, applies only to Spades and Hearts. With Diamonds and Clubs, at a love score, the distance to go for game is in most cases too great to make it advisable, but the weakness take-out should be used equally with any one of the four suits, as it is a defensive, not an offensive, declaration. With a score, Clubs and Diamonds possess the same value that Hearts and Spades have at love, and should be treated similarly.
WHEN TO OVERBID WITH STRONG CLUBS
The question of whether the Third Hand, with strong Clubs, should overbid his partner's No-trump has aroused considerable discussion. The argument in favor of such a declaration in Clubs, which does not apply to any other suit, is that the difference between a strength and a weakness overbid can be made apparent by calling three and two respectively, and yet the show of strength will not force the Dealer higher than two No-trumps, when his hand is such that the announcement that the Third Hand holds strong Clubs, but nothing else, makes the return to No-trump advisable.
On this basis of reasoning some believe in calling three Clubs whenever an otherwise trickless Third Hand contains five or more Clubs headed by Ace, King, Queen. This, it is conceded, only results advantageously when the No-trump has been called with one suit unguarded, and Clubs is one of the protected suits. When the No-trump has been declared with such a hand as
Spades Ace, King, X Hearts X Diamonds Ace, King, Knave, X, X Clubs Knave, Ten, X, X
the employment of such a system of declaration is exceptionally advantageous; as the game is assured in Clubs, while if the No-trump be left in, the adversaries will probably save it by making all their Hearts before the Declarer secures the lead.
It is admitted that this case is somewhat unusual, but the advocates of the system, conceding this, argue it is advantageous to have this bid in the repertory, and, in the exceptional instance, to obtain the benefit, which is bound to ensue from its use. The contention is that it can do no harm, with such a Club holding, to force the partner to two No-trumps, if he have all the other suits stopped, and the fact that three Clubs is called with strength more clearly accentuates the principle that the two Club takeout means nothing but weakness.
Admitting the force of this argument, and conceding that the system advocated should be universally adopted were there not a wiser use for the three Club take-out, first brings forth the question of whether the case does not more frequently arise in which the long Club holding of the Third Hand is headed by King and Queen, and is it not much more probable, when the Third Hand has _long_ Clubs, that the No-trump maker has the suit stopped with the Ace than with _four_ headed by Knave, Ten?
It must be remembered that the three Club take-out with Ace, King, Queen, at the head of five or more, is only advantageous when the No-trump has been called with a hand in which only three suits are stopped, of which the Club is one. If the Club be the suit unstopped, the call merely forces an advance in the No-trump.
If, however, the convention be to use three Clubs to overbid the partner's No-trump only when holding an otherwise trickless hand which contains either at least five Clubs headed by King, Queen, Knave, or at least six headed by King, Queen, would not the number of instances in which the call proves of benefit appreciably increase, and would not every reason applicable in the former case be even more forceful in the latter?
It cannot be questioned that the partner having called No-trump, the Third Hand is more likely to hold either five Clubs headed by King, Queen, Knave, or six headed by King, Queen, than five or more headed by Ace, King, Queen. The greater probability that the Dealer will have the Ace than four headed by Knave, Ten, is just as obvious.
Take such a No-trump declaration as
Spades Ace, King, Knave Hearts X, X Diamonds Ace, King, Knave, X, X Clubs Ace, X, X
and the advantage of the proposed system becomes apparent. The game, which is almost sure to be lost by the Heart lead in No-trump, becomes almost a certainty with Clubs Trump. When this plan is used and the Dealer has the other suits stopped but has not the Ace of Clubs, he can easily decide whether to go to two No-trumps, as he can estimate from the length of his Club holding whether he can establish the long Clubs or the adverse Ace will block the suit. When the latter is the case, he should not bid two No-trumps unless his own hand justify it, as the Third Hand has announced the absence of a reëntry.
Take such a No-trump declaration as
Spades Ace Hearts Ace, King, X Diamonds Ace, King, X, X, X, X Clubs X, X, X
and suppose the Third Hand hold one or two small Diamonds; six Clubs, headed by King, Queen, Knave, and no other face card.
In such a case Clubs is the call most likely to produce game.
Another and possibly the wisest theory of the three Club take-out, is that it should be reserved, not for any one particular holding which may not occur once in a year, but for any hand in which the Declarer wishes to say, "Partner, my cards are such that I believe we can go game in Clubs; with this information, use your judgment as to whether or not to return to your more valuable declaration."
A NEW PLAN FOR OVERBIDDING
In this connection, a new scheme of take-out is respectfully called to the attention of the thoughtful and studious Auction players of the country. It is not in general use, is not recognized as conventional, has never been given a satisfactory trial, and is, therefore, suggested merely as an experiment worthy of consideration.
The idea is that when a partner has called one No-trump, Second Hand having passed, the Third Hand with five or more Spades or Hearts, unless he have four suits stopped, should bid his long suit in the following manner: if the hand be weak, the bid should be two; if strong, three. This warns the Dealer, when two is called, to let the declaration alone, as it is defensive.
On the other hand, when three is bid, the Dealer knows that his partner is strong, and he may then use his judgment as to the advisability of allowing the bid to stand or going back to the No-trump, which he can do without increasing the number of tricks of the commitment.
It must be remembered that, with great strength, it is as easy to make three No-trumps as one, three are needed for game, and, therefore, nothing is lost by the expedient.
Playing under this system, should the Third Hand hold four or five honors in his suit, and earnestly desire to play it for the honor score, it would be a perfectly legitimate strategy to deceive the partner temporarily by bidding two, instead of three.
WHEN TO OVERBID ONE NO-TRUMP WITH TWO NO-TRUMPS
When the Dealer has bid one No-trump and the Second Hand passed, the Third Hand, much more frequently than most players imagine, should call two No-trumps. It must be remembered that should the Third Hand pass, the Fourth Hand can, by bidding two of a suit, indicate to his partner the lead he desires. This places the adversaries in a much more advantageous position than if the leader open his own suit without information from his partner. The bid of two No-trumps by the Third Hand generally prevents the Fourth Hand from declaring, as it necessitates a call of three, which, sitting between two No-trump bidders, is, in most cases, too formidable a contract to undertake.
It is, therefore, advisable for the Third Hand, on the first round, to advance, from one to two, his partner's No-trump declaration, in every instance in which, in the event of an adverse bid, he is strong enough to call two No-trumps. This convention, while as yet comparatively new, and, therefore, but little used, works most advantageously, as it frequently shuts out the only lead which can keep the No-trump from going game. It is important for every player to understand the scheme, and never to overlook an opportunity to make the declaration.
WHAT THIRD HAND SHOULD BID WHEN SECOND HAND HAS DECLARED
This situation involves so many possibilities that it is hard to cover it with fixed rules.
The Third Hand in this position should reason in very much the same manner as the Second Hand, after the Dealer has made a declaration showing strength.[11] There is this distinct difference, however: in the case of the Second Hand, he only knows that the Dealer has sufficient strength to declare, and is without any means, other than the doctrine of chances, of estimating the strength of his partner's hand. The Third Hand, however, in the situation under consideration, is not only advised that one adversary has sufficient strength to declare, but also knows whether his partner's cards justify an initial bid. When the Dealer has shown strength, he can be counted upon for at least the minimum that his bid has evidenced; when he has called "one Spade," it would not be wise to expect him to win more than one trick.
[11] See page 72.
The Third Hand should consider these features of the situation, and satisfy himself, when his partner has not shown strength, that he is taking a wise risk in bidding over an adverse declaration. To justify a call of No-trump over a Trump, he should either have the declared suit stopped twice or, if it be stopped but once, he should also have solid Clubs or Diamonds. When the Dealer has declared Hearts or Royals, and the Second Hand made a higher suit call, it is, as a rule, wiser for the Third Hand to advance his partner's declaration than to venture a No-trump unless he have the adverse suit stopped twice.
When the Dealer has bid No-trump and the Second Hand two of any suit, the Third Hand should not bid two No-trump unless he have the declared suit stopped and at least one other trick. Without the declared suit stopped, he should not bid two No-trump unless his hand be so strong that he can figure with almost positive certainty that the No-trump bid of his partner could not have been made without the adverse suit being stopped. When in doubt, under such conditions, as to the advisability of either bidding two No-trumps or some suit, the latter policy is generally the safer.
When the Dealer has called No-trump and the Second Hand two of a suit, the Third Hand must realize that his partner has already been taken out, and therefore, under no circumstances, should he bid in this situation, except for the purpose of showing strength; or with the conviction that, aided by his partner's No-trump, he can fulfil the contract he is proposing. For example, Dealer bids one No-trump; Second Hand, two Royals; Third Hand holds six Hearts, headed by the Knave, without another trick. Under these conditions, a Heart bid would be most misleading, and probably most damaging. The Dealer may not be able to help the Heart declaration, and he may very properly be encouraged by it to believe that the Third Hand has considerable strength, especially in Hearts, but is very weak in Spades. If, in consequence of this supposed information, he return to his No-trump declaration, or double an adverse three Royals, the result is apt to be extremely disastrous.
The Third Hand must distinguish this case carefully from the situation in which the Dealer has bid one No-trump and the Second Hand passed. With the combination mentioned, he should then, of course, most unhesitatingly take out his partner by bidding two Hearts; that bid, under such circumstances, not showing strength.
Another situation that arises more frequently than would be supposed, and the advantage of which it is most important for the Third Hand to grasp, is when the Dealer has bid No-trump; the Second Hand, two of a suit; and the Third Hand, without the adverse suit stopped, holds great strength in Clubs, with such a hand that he desires his partner to go to two No-trumps; provided he have the adversaries' suit stopped. The bid of three Clubs does not increase the No-trump commitment which the partner is obliged to make, and is much safer than for the Third Hand to bid two No-trumps without the adverse suit stopped. It is a suggestion to the partner to bid two No-trumps, provided he can take care of the suit which the Second Hand has declared.
V
FOURTH HAND DECLARATIONS
Some of the principles that have been considered in connection with certain Second and Third Hand bids are also applicable to similar Fourth Hand declarations. These are easily pointed out, but the bidding by the Fourth Hand presents other problems much more difficult.
Each player who has an opportunity to declare materially complicates the situation, and makes it harder to accurately describe. As three players declare or pass before the Fourth Hand has his turn, it is almost impossible to anticipate every contingency that may arise. The best that can be done is to subdivide Fourth Hand declarations as follows:--
1. When the Dealer's defensive declaration has been the only bid.
2. When the only offensive declaration has been made by the Dealer.
3. When the only offensive declaration has been made by the Second Hand.
4. When the only offensive declaration has been made by the Third Hand.
5. When the Dealer has made a defensive, and both the Second and Third Hand, offensive declarations.
6. When the Dealer and Second Hand have made offensive declarations and the Third Hand passed.
7. When the Dealer and Third Hand have made offensive declarations, and the Second Hand passed.
8. When all three players have made offensive declarations.
1. WHEN THE DEALER'S DEFENSIVE DECLARATION HAS BEEN THE ONLY BID
As a general rule, when this situation arises, the Fourth Hand holds a combination of cards which makes his bid unmistakable. The other three players having shown weakness, or, at least, the absence of offensive strength, the Fourth Hand almost invariably has a No-trumper of such strength that his pathway is plain. Of course, his hand may, by reason of Spade or Heart length, call for a Royal or Heart declaration in preference to a No-trumper, but nevertheless, under these circumstances, it is generally easy for the Fourth Hand to declare.
When, however, the exceptional case occurs, in which the Fourth Hand finds himself, no previous offensive declaration having been made, without a plainly indicated bid, it is difficult to lay down a rule for his guidance. Three players have shown weakness, and yet his cards assure him that one or more of them is either unduly cautious, has passed by mistake, or is trying to deceive. If the strength be with his partner, it may be that, by passing, he will lose an opportunity to secure the game. On the other hand, if the adversaries have the winning cards, he may, by declaring, allow them to make a game declaration, whereas they are now limited to an infinitesimal score.
He must also consider that, should he pass, the maximum he and his partner can secure is 100 points in the honor column. This is a position to which conventional rules cannot apply. The individual characteristics of the players must be considered. The Fourth Hand must guess which of the three players is the most apt to have been cautious, careless, or "foxy," and he should either pass or declare, as he decides whether it is more likely that his partner or one of the two adversaries is responsible for his predicament.
It sometimes, although rarely, happens that the strength not in the Fourth Hand is so evenly divided that no one of the three has been justified in making an offensive declaration, and yet the Fourth Hand is not very strong. When this occurs, a clever player can as a rule readily and accurately diagnose it from the character of his hand, and he should then pass, as he cannot hope to make game on an evenly divided hand, while as it stands he has the adversaries limited to a score of 2 points for each odd trick, yet booked for a loss of 50 if they fail to make seven tricks; 100, if they do not make six. In other words, they are betting 25 to 1 on an even proposition. Such a position is much too advantageous to voluntarily surrender.
It is hardly conceivable that any one would advocate that a Fourth Hand player with a sure game in his grasp, instead of scoring it, should allow the adverse "one Spade" to stay in for the purpose of securing the 100 bonus.
Inasmuch, however, as this proposition has been advanced by a prominent writer, it is only fair that its soundness should be analyzed.