Part 2

Montevideo, led by the newly appointed Viceroy, Javier de Elío, made ready a fleet to attack Buenos Aires; Gutiérrez de la Concha, Governor of Córdoba, appointed Liniers to lead its forces against the Junta; and in Alto Perú, General Goyeneche, appointed president of Cuzco by the Viceroy of Peru, took charge of the resistance to the Revolution. The gravity of the reaction that set in, the increasing number of forces that were being arrayed against the new government, demanded firm and instant action. Happily for the independence of Argentina, there was in the Junta a leader of force and vision. He was Mariano Moreno, the secretary of the Junta; he was the soul of the revolutionary movement in its early stages; he was the pilot that steered it safely through the perilous shoals of the dawn of independence. It is in recognition of these great services that Argentina acclaims him to-day as one of her greatest champions, ranking with San Martín, Belgrano, and Rivadavia.

To meet these dangers, two expeditions were sent out: one against Córdoba and Alto Perú, under the orders of Ortiz de Ocampo; and another against Paraguay, under the orders of General Belgrano.

Liniers and Concha were taken prisoners, and by order of the Junta were put to death. Thus died Santiago de Liniers, defender of Buenos Aires during the English invasions. Many historians and writers have denounced this act of the Junta as ruthless and unnecessarily severe; practically as many others have defended it in view of the inexorable need for sternness demanded by the conditions of the times. We mention it as the first instance of internecine struggle, and as typical of the unrelenting character of the Revolution that came later. The expedition continued its northward march, under the orders of Balcarce, and defeating the Royalists at Suipacha, soon had control of the north as far as the Desaguadero, the boundary between the Viceroyalties of Peru and of the Plata. Here we shall leave it for a while in order to follow the campaign against Paraguay.

Heartened by the successes of Balcarce, the Junta decided to hasten the expedition against Paraguay under the orders of Belgrano. But, whereas the expeditionary force of Alto Perú had met until then with remarkable success, Belgrano, after having his communications impeded by the control of the Paraná, which the Royalists held, and taking part in two unsuccessful engagements, was glad to sign an agreement whereby he was allowed to withdraw unmolested from Paraguay with all his forces. Though this expedition failed of its purpose to bring Paraguay under the control of the Junta, it helped in no small degree to create a separatist movement in Paraguay which led in a few years to the defeat of the Spaniards and the establishment of an independent government.

By this time also the situation in Uruguay called for the attention of the Junta. The people of the country, despite the pro-Spanish sentiment prevalent in Montevideo, were manifesting signs of revolt against the Spaniards, and when Artigas, the Uruguayan leader, came to Buenos Aires to enlist the aid of the provisional government, the forces of Belgrano that had returned from Paraguay were intrusted to Rondeau to coöperate with Artigas in Uruguay. With the aid of these troops from Buenos Aires, Artigas obtained a signal victory against the Spaniards at Las Piedras, which enabled him to lay siege to Montevideo.

With the exception of Belgrano's expedition to Paraguay, which, though unsuccessful in its attempt to bring that province under the control of the Junta, had nevertheless caused no serious military loss, the forces of the Revolution were everywhere successful. Unfortunately, the stinging defeat of Huaquí that the army of Alto Perú met at the hands of Goyeneche in 1811, on the boundary between Bolivia and Peru, threatened for a moment to reëstablish the power of Spain. Had the Argentine forces been successful, Bolivia and Uruguay would never have become separate republics. The complete independence of South America would have been attained ten years before the battle of Ayacucho (1824), and, very likely, with its victorious armies, Buenos Aires would have been able to avoid the terrible civil struggle that, through the lack of a wise and strong central government, lasted till the downfall of Rosas. As it was, the siege of Montevideo had to be abandoned at a time when its garrison was on the point of surrendering; and it was only through the energetic and skillful leadership of Pueyrredón, who was put in command after Huaquí, that of the 23,000 men who composed the original Army of the North, one thousand succeeded in reaching Tucumán. From a purely military point of view, the disaster of Huaquí meant the passing of the initiative from the revolutionary Army to the forces of Spain. In fact, not until 1817, when San Martín crossed the Andes and defeated the Royalists in Chile, were the provinces once more on the offensive. It meant also that the way for a _decisive_ blow at the Spaniards through the north was forever barred; that the attack had to be carried through the west to Chile, first, and then by sea to the heart of Spanish power in Lima; that while troops were being prepared slowly and patiently for this purpose, the constant pressure of the victorious Spanish armies from the north had to be withstood; and last, but by no means least, it emphasized the need for the presence of a strong man to bolster up the provisional government in Buenos Aires itself, which, after the death of Mariano Moreno, was left without a leader of ability and strength commensurate with the magnitude of the task to be accomplished.

Fortunately for the independence of the provinces of the Plata, there arose, at this critical juncture, men like Belgrano, who by his victories of Tucumán and Salta, stemmed the flood of Spanish invasion after Huaquí; San Martín, who by his conquest of Chile and Lima, was to force the Spaniards into the fastnesses of the mountains of Peru, where his veteran troops, delivered by one of the greatest acts of self-denial in the record of history into the hands of Bolívar, sounded the knell of Spanish dominion on the battlefields of Junín and Ayacucho; Güemes, who after the battle of Sipe-Sipe, a disaster comparable only to Huaquí, was able, with the aid of his intrepid _gauchos_, to protect the communications of the army that was being prepared by San Martín in Mendoza; Rivadavia and Pueyrredón, without the stimulus of whose leadership the provisional government would have succumbed under the weight of the responsibilities it had assumed.

Immediately after the victory of Tucumán, obtained by Belgrano against the Spanish forces that invaded northern Argentina after the defeat of Huaquí, the siege of Montevideo was begun once more, both as a result of that victory and of negotiations with Brazil, whereby the troops of that empire, which had come to the aid of the Spaniards, were to withdraw from Uruguay. The patriots were soon able, in spite of the friction that arose between Artigas and the Argentine troops, to pin the Spanish forces within the inner circle of the defenses of Montevideo. It was in connection with this campaign against Montevideo that San Martín in 1813 won his first victory against the Spaniards, at San Lorenzo, on the shores of the Paraná. By this victory an end was put to the foraging expeditions that the beleaguered garrison of Montevideo sent to the province of Entre Ríos. Thus the only immediate avenue for the supplying of provisions was closed. The desertion, however, of Artigas, and the harassing by his Uruguayan bands of the besieging forces, threatened once more to bring about the abandonment of the siege. The defeat of the naval forces of Spain in the Plata River by Admiral Brown, an Irish sailor in the service of the government of Buenos Aires, came at this time most opportunely to close _all_ avenues of replenishing, and the garrison was forced to capitulate. The taking of Montevideo was an event of the utmost importance for the Revolution, since it made possible the concentrating of all forces for an attack upon Peru, the heart of Spanish power in South America.

Undeterred by the disastrous results of the first Army of the North at Huaquí, the provisional government decided upon a second expedition to Alto Perú. In addition to the strategic difficulties of this plan, new obstacles arose from the jealousies and ill-feeling caused by the ambition of General Alvear. He has truly been called the Alcibiades of Argentina. Handsome, young, accomplished, and erratically brilliant in the conception of his military plans, he was consumed by a disproportionate ambition to be the leading military hero of the Revolution. It was in order to satisfy this inordinate craving for glory that he had himself appointed general-in-chief of the besieging forces of Montevideo, at a moment when that city was doomed to fall, thus depriving Rondeau of a victory which in reality was his. As in the case of the campaign of Montevideo, Rondeau was first selected to command the second Army of the North, but Alvear intended to keep him in command only until the time should come for decisive action, when he himself, aided by the ascendancy he had gained with the provisional government, would assume command and reap the fruits of victory. In accordance with this plan, he attempted to supplant Rondeau towards the end of the year 1814. This time, however, Rondeau refused to deliver his command to Alvear, and, as his troops supported him, Alvear was forced to return to Buenos Aires. The great popularity that he enjoyed in the capital raised him to the supreme honor of Director of the United Provinces, but his harshness in dealing with opposing political parties, and his weakness in meeting the rebellion of Artigas, combined with the opposition of both the Army of the North and the army that San Martín was quietly getting together in Mendoza for the invasion of Chile, made his tenure of office very short-lived, and he was forced to surrender the reins of government and flee to Río Janeiro. This was the first serious defection among the makers of the Revolution, if we except the work of the Uruguayan leader, Artigas, who by his constant opposition to the provisional government of Buenos Aires delayed and prevented the unification of forces necessary to bring about the fall of Spanish power, but who at least worked for the independence of Uruguay, whereas Alvear sought primarily to aggrandize himself. It was not surprising therefore that the Army of the North, its discipline shaken by the recent rebellion caused by Alvear's ambition, and confronted, as it was, by the naturally difficult task of attacking Peru by a road which had been marked by the previous defeat of Huaquí, met a second disastrous defeat at Sipe-Sipe. So complete was this defeat that the Army of the North ceased to exist entirely, never to be reorganized again as it had been after Huaquí. What Belgrano did for the defense of the provinces after the defeat of the first Army of the North, the _caudillo_ Güemes accomplished after Sipe-Sipe. With his swift band of _gauchos_ he conducted such an effective guerrilla warfare against the victorious Spanish army, that they were unable to derive the full benefit of their great victory.

The fortunes of the Revolution had never sunk so low as after the battle of Sipe-Sipe. Yet, it was immediately after this disaster that the Congress of Tucumán, on the 9th of July, 1816, proclaimed officially the independence of the United Provinces of the Plata. This was an artificial way of reviving the hopes of the Revolution, for what was wanted then was action, not words. Withal it did serve to rouse the failing enthusiasm of the people. Moreover, to substantiate the rhetorical enthusiasm of the Declaration of Independence, there soon came from an unexpected quarter deeds of such magnitude as to destroy for all time the power of Spain in America.

A few months after the meeting of the Congress of Tucumán, San Martín started on his great liberating campaign of Chile, after more than two years of patient preparation. Left to his own resources in the province of Cuyo (to-day, Mendoza, San Luis, and San Juan), unaided for a long time by the central government, who saw in him only a mediocre soldier (mistaking his modesty, his stoic disregard for the glamour of popularity, and above all his stanch insistence on systematic and careful preparation, for lack of military genius and dash), San Martín never lost heart, but bided his time till the rise to power in Buenos Aires of Pueyrredón assured him of support. On the 17th of January, 1817, the Army of the Andes set out by the now historic passes of Los Patos and Uspallata on the expedition which was to win for democracy half a continent.

The crossing of the snow-capped Andes was rapidly and successfully accomplished, and on the 12th of February, 1817, the Spanish Army, commanded by General Maroto, was completely defeated on the slopes of Chacabuco, not far from Santiago. Maroto himself was captured, and San Martín entered Santiago de Chile with his army on the 14th of February. Meantime, the remaining Spanish forces fled to Talcahuano, where, having been reënforced by 3000 fresh troops from Peru, they attacked the detachment under Las Heras that San Martín had sent in their pursuit. The siege of Talcahuano had to be raised, and Las Heras withdrew in 1818 to join the corps of the main army. On the 19th of March, San Martín was again closely pressing the enemy, and after a cavalry skirmish the Spaniards sought the protection of the city of Talca. The Argentine forces encamped outside of the city, and the Spaniards, surprising the patriots at night, charged their bivouac, dispersing and killing many of the patriot troops. This night attack is known as the battle of Cancha Rayada. It came very close to wrecking the long-prepared and carefully thought-out plans of San Martín. His coolness and the indomitable courage of his generals, particularly Las Heras, saved the day, and hardly two weeks later, on the 5th of April, he was able to meet the Spaniards on the shores of the River Maipú or Maipo, defeating them decisively, and sealing forever the independence of Chile.

Now, San Martín was able to carry out his long-cherished plan of attacking Peru from the Chilean side, transporting his army by water to Pisco. With the aid of Lord Thomas Cochrane, an English sailor in the service of Chile, he was able to clear the seas of Spanish ships, and on the 7th of September, 1820, he landed his forces in the Bay of Paracas. San Martín drove the Spaniards before him, and Lima and Callao were captured in quick succession. The former was evacuated by La Serna, Spanish viceroy of Peru, the 19th of July, 1821, and Callao was surrendered on the 21st of September of the same year. Once in Lima, the first thing that San Martín did was to call together an assembly to find out the wishes of the people of Peru. The Junta met and notified the Protector, the title given to San Martín by the Peruvians, that the unanimous wish of all was the independence of Peru. At a great demonstration, held in the Plaza Mayor of Lima, San Martín rose before the assembled multitude and unfolding for the first time the national flag of Peru, created by San Martín himself, he exclaimed amid the thunderous applause of the people: "Peru is from this moment free and independent, by the will of its people and the justness of its cause, which God defends."

San Martín had insured the independence of Argentina, which then included Bolivia, had driven the Spaniards from Chile, and now declared the independence of Peru. But the last remnants of the Spanish forces that had fled to the mountains of northern Peru had still to be vanquished before his task could be said to be fully accomplished. As the Argentine historian Mitre says, San Martín might have attempted this task with the forces at his command, unaided by either Chile or Argentina, which were then in the throes of civil discord, but he had too much at heart the independence of those lands in whose cause he had been fighting for over ten years. He preferred to take no chances. He invoked the coöperation of Simón Bolívar, who had done for Colombia and Venezuela what he himself had done for Argentina, Chile, and Peru. On the 26th of July, 1822, therefore, there took place at Guayaquil, Ecuador, a famous interview between the two greatest generals of South America. What took place at that meeting has been wrapped in mystery, though the results are known full well. San Martín delivered his armies into Bolívar's hands, so that he might strike the last blow in behalf of the independence of South America. The combined forces of Colombia and Argentina under the command of General Sucre, Bolívar's lieutenant, won a brilliant victory at Ayacucho in 1824, which crowned once for all the efforts of the peoples of South America to obtain their independence.

Thus, first by the military prowess of her greatest son, San Martín, and later by his greatness of soul and self-denial, worthy of the best traditions of Rome, Argentina insured the independence of South America. Though the words exchanged between Bolívar and San Martín at Guayaquil are not known, acquainted as we are with the natures of both, we can easily surmise what took place. Bolívar was a brilliant military genius, but like Alvear, was consumed by an unquenchable thirst for power, save that he surpassed Alvear in ambition in the same ratio that his military ability was superior to that of the Argentine Alcibiades. San Martín was a thorough military leader, leaving nothing to chance, a great disciplinarian, and once his plans were completed, as powerful in their execution as he had been patient in their preparation; but above all, San Martín was preëminently a man of lofty ideals and high moral worth. He may not have been endowed with the keen intuitive military genius of Bolívar; he was averse to all dramatic appeal and display, and hence never became popular in the sense that Bolívar and Alvear were popular; but in the unselfish qualities of devotion to a cause, even to the point of self-effacement, he stands the equal of the greatest men in history, a worthy peer of Cincinnatus and Regulus.

After the conference with Bolívar in Guayaquil, San Martín returned to Peru to find that the people whose independence he had declared were hostile to him. He immediately called a meeting of the constitutional congress, and, on the 20th of September, 1822, resigned his title of Protector.

Coming to Chile, he met with equal, if not greater, hostility. He retired to the province of Mendoza in Argentina, where for a while he devoted himself to farming, and then made a voyage to Buenos Aires, then torn by contending factions, to meet there, in his own country, with indifference and disregard. San Martín clearly saw that despite his devotion to the cause of independence, despite his mighty accomplishments in behalf of his country, his presence, if anything, would only lead to greater strife. Stoically, therefore, and without a murmur, he betook himself to voluntary exile in France, where he died in poverty, in 1850, forgotten by his countrymen, attended only by his daughter, who faithfully remained by his side throughout the long years of his exile. Once only, in 1829, he returned to Buenos Aires; but the newspapers of the times published this insulting paragraph: "Ambiguities--General San Martín has returned to his country after an absence of five years, but only after knowing that peace has been signed with the Emperor of Brazil." Even after this crowning insult San Martín uttered no plaint, but quietly returned to France to devote his time to the cultivation of flowers of his native land. His was not the Marian temperament; no messenger was ever sent by him to his fellow-countrymen to tell them that their liberator had been seen in France eating the bitter bread of exile.

"A truly great man...", Shakespeare has said of Cæsar. Much more aptly could that apply to San Martín in point of pure manhood. Argentina, to-day, has made reparation for the oblivion with which she requited her greatest man during his lifetime, by erecting imposing monuments to his memory; but, above all, by enshrining his name in the heart of every one of her sons.

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But to return to Argentina herself: thanks to San Martín, the Revolution was successful, both at home and abroad. Even as early as 1820, however, the discordant elements that were to delay her progress almost half a century were clearly patent, not only in thought, but also in action. Each province had its _caudillo_, who was fiercely jealous of any limitations upon his power. Thus, Ramírez in Entre Ríos, Güemes in Salta, Facundo Quiroga (known for his cruelty as "El Tigre de los Llanos") in La Rioja, López in Santa Fé, Ibarra in Santiago, were practically overlords of independent provinces, ready to make common cause against Spain, but just as ready to quarrel with each other. The situation was similar to that of the colonies in North America, which, though willing to unite against England, resented any attempt at interference in their internal affairs by a central government. Buenos Aires, the city, as the center of Argentine wealth, culture, and civilization, was the exponent of a unitarian form of government, that is, a strong, centralized government with Buenos Aires at the head. Naturally, the _caudillos_ resented any interference on the part of Buenos Aires. In 1820, the first important battle between these two antagonistic elements took place at Cepeda, on the borders of Santa Fé and Buenos Aires. Here Rondeau, representing Buenos Aires and the unitarian principle, suffered defeat at the hands of Ramírez, known as "El Supremo Entrerriano."

Varying fortunes attended the civil strife which went on between these two factions. In 1822, a pact was entered upon by Buenos Aires and the _caudillos_ of Entre Ríos, Santa Fé, and Corrientes, by the terms of which common cause was to be made against an expected Spanish invasion, which never materialized, and the other provinces were to be urged to join the Confederation.

Rivadavia now appears on the scene in Buenos Aires as Minister of Education, and later, as President of the Confederation in 1826. He introduced many noteworthy reforms, founded libraries and universities, and attempted to establish the government on a firm unitarian basis with Buenos Aires as the capital. He resigned in 1827, following the treaty which his envoy signed with Brazil in the same year, after the battle of Ituzaingó. Despite the victory of Argentine arms, Uruguay had been ceded to Brazil.