Part 3

Worn down by farm use and the wash of heavy rains, this natural trench joins the Hagerstown Pike 500 yards south of the Dunker Church. From this point the road runs east about 1,000 yards, then turns south toward the Boonsboro Pike. That first 1,000 yards was soon to be known as Bloody Lane.

Posted in the road embankment were the five brigades of D. H. Hill. At dawn these men had faced east, their line crossing the Sunken Road. But under the pressure of the Federal attacks on the Confederate left, they had swung northward. Three of Hill’s brigades had been drawn into the fight around the Dunker Church. Then Greene’s Federals had driven them back toward the Sunken Road. There Hill rallied his troops. About 10:30 a.m., as the men were piling fence rails on the embankment to strengthen the position, a strong enemy force appeared on their front, steadily advancing with parade-like precision. It was French’s division, heading up the ravine toward Sunken Road Ridge.

Crouched at the road embankment, Hill’s men delivered a galling fire into French’s ranks. The Federals fell back, then charged again. One Union officer later wrote: “For three hours and thirty minutes the battle raged incessantly, without either party giving way.”

But French’s division alone could not maintain its hold on the ridge. Hurt by fire from Confederates in the road and on either side, the Union men gave way. Still it was not over. French’s reserve brigade now rushed up, restoring order in the disorganized ranks; once again the division moved forward.

Now, opportunely, Maj. Gen. Israel Richardson’s Federal division—also of Sumner’s corps—arrived on the left of French and was about to strike Hill’s right flank in the road embankment.

It was a critical moment for the Confederates. Aware that loss of the Sunken Road might bring disaster, Lee ordered forward his last reserve—the five brigades of Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson’s division. At the same time Brig. Gen. Robert Rodes of Hill’s division launched a furious attack to hold the Federals back until Anderson’s men could arrive. This thrust kept French’s men from aiding Richardson, who even now prepared to assault the Confederates in the road.

As French’s attack halted, Richardson swept forward in magnificent array. Richardson was a tough old fighter—bluff and courageous, a leader of men. One of his officers recalled his leading the advance, sword in hand: “Where’s General ——?” he cried. Some soldiers answered, “Behind the haystack!” “G— d— the field officers!” the old man roared, pushing on with his men toward the Sunken Road. In three units they passed to the east of the Roulette farmhouse and charged the Confederates at the crest of the ridge.

As the struggle increased in fury, R. H. Anderson’s brigades arrived in the rear of Hill’s troops in the road. But Anderson fell wounded soon after his arrival, and suddenly the charging Confederate counteroffensive lost its punch. By a mistaken order, Rodes’ men in the Sunken Road near the Roulette lane withdrew to the rear. A dangerous gap opened on the Confederate front. The artillerist Lt. Col. E. P. Alexander wrote later, “When Rodes’ brigade left the sunken road ... Lee’s army was ruined, and the end of the Confederacy was in sight.”

Union Col. Francis Barlow saw the gap in the Confederate front opened by Rodes’ withdrawal. Quickly swinging two regiments astride the road, he raked its length with perfectly timed volleys. Routed by this devastating enfilade, the Confederate defenders fled the road and retreated south toward Sharpsburg. Only a heroic rally by D. H. Hill’s men prevented a breakthrough into the town.

The Sunken Road was now Bloody Lane. Dead Confederates lay so thick there, wrote one Federal soldier, that as far down the road as he could see, a man could have walked upon them without once touching ground.

The Federals had suffered heavily, too. Their bodies covered the approaches to the ridge. In the final moments, while leading his men in pursuit, Colonel Barlow had been seriously wounded; and shortly after, his commander, General Richardson, had fallen with a mortal wound.

The fight for the Sunken Road had exhausted both sides. At 1 p.m. they halted, and panting men grabbed their canteens to swish the dust and powder from their rasping throats.

The Confederate retreat from Bloody Lane had uncovered a great gap in the center of Lee’s line. A final plunge through this hole would sever the Confederate army into two parts that could be destroyed in detail. “Only a few scattered handfuls of Harvey Hill’s division were left,” wrote Gen. William Allen, “and R. H. Anderson’s was hopelessly confused and broken.... There was no body of Confederate infantry in this part of the field that could have resisted a serious advance.” So desperate was the situation that General Longstreet himself held horses for his staff while they served two cannon supporting Hill’s thin line.

But McClellan’s caution stopped the breakthrough before it was born. Though Franklin’s VI Corps was massed for attack, McClellan restrained it. “It would not be prudent to make the attack,” he told Franklin after a brief examination of the situation, “our position on the right being ... considerably in advance of what it had been in the morning.”

So McClellan turned to defensive measures. Franklin’s reserve corps would not be committed, but would remain in support of the Federal right. And in the center, McClellan held back Fitz-John Porter’s V Corps. After all, reasoned the Federal commander, was not this the only force that stood between the enemy and the Federal supply train on the Boonsboro Pike?

But Porter was not quite alone. The entire Federal artillery reserve stood with him. Further, Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton had placed his cavalry and artillery on a commanding ridge west of the Middle Bridge during the morning. From here he had already supported the attack by Sumner’s corps on the Sunken Road, and he had aided Burnside’s efforts on the left. Now he stood poised for further action. Pleasonton was to wait in vain. His dual purpose of obtaining “... an enfilading fire upon the enemy in front of Burnside, and of enabling Sumner to advance to Sharpsburg” was nullified by McClellan’s decision to halt and take the defensive.

In striking contrast to McClellan’s caution, General Lee was at that very moment considering a complete envelopment of the Federal flank at the North and East Woods. By this means he might relieve the pressure on D. H. Hill; for despite the lull, Lee could not believe that McClellan had halted the attack there. If the attack in the North Woods succeeded, Lee hoped to drive the Federal remnants to the banks of Antietam Creek and administer a crushing defeat.

Jackson and J. E. B. Stuart, early in the afternoon, shifted northward and prepared to charge the Federal lines. When they arrived close to the powerful Federal artillery on Poffenberger Ridge, they saw that a Confederate attack there would be shattered by these massed guns. A wholesome respect for Federal artillerists now forced Lee to withdraw his order. As he did so, heavy firing to the south heralded a new threat developing there.

_Burnside Takes the Lower Bridge_

During the morning of the 17th, Confederate observers on the ridge north of Sharpsburg had spotted masses of Federals moving southward beyond Antietam Creek. These were the four divisions of Burnside’s IX Corps concentrating for the attack on the Lower Bridge.

Topography at the Lower Bridge heavily favored the few hundred Georgia men who defended it under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs. The road approaching the east end of the bridge swings on a course paralleling that of Antietam Creek; in the last few hundred yards before reaching the bridge, the road plunges into a funnel-like depression between the opposing bluffs of the creek. Toombs’ men were in rifle pits on the west bluff overlooking the bridge and the approach road.

Because of faulty reconnaissance, Burnside did not know that fords were nearby where his men could have waded across the stream. Instead, the Federal plan of attack forced the advancing columns to pile into this funnel and storm across the bridge.

Soon after 9 a.m., the Federal divisions began to assault the bridge. One after another, their gallant charges were broken by deadly short-range fire from Toombs’ Georgians. By noon, when the agony at the Sunken Road was reaching its highest pitch, and despite repeated orders from McClellan to get across Antietam Creek at all costs, the bottleneck at the bridge was still unbroken.

Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman’s Union division had moved slowly downstream from the bridge in search of a crossing. Rounding a sharp bend in the creek, nearly a mile south, scouts came upon shallow water at Snavely’s Ford. Late in the morning Rodman crossed the stream and began to drive against the right flank of the Georgians guarding the bridge. About the same time, Col. George Crook’s scouts located a ford a few hundred yards above the bridge; there he sent his brigade across. Capt. Seth J. Simonds’ battery was placed in position to command the bridge.

Charge of Burnsides 9^th Corps, on the right flank of the rebel army, Antietam, 3.30 p.m. Sept 17 1 The Town of Sharpsburg. 2 The Old Lutheran Church. 3 9^th N.Y. Vols. Hawkins Zouaves. 4 Rebels retreating into the town. 5 Rebel line of battle.

At 1 p.m., the defending Confederates saw a sudden stir across Antietam Creek. Two regiments, the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania, marched swiftly out from the cover of the wooded hill and charged for the bridge. Supported now by converging artillery fire, they quickly formed into columns and were over the bridge before Confederate artillery could halt them. Soon a wide gap split the Confederate defense. Masses of Federal troops poured across the bridge while Rodman and Crook hammered the Confederate flanks. Burnside’s men had gained the west bank of the creek.

But again there was fateful delay as Burnside paused to reorganize. By the time he was ready to drive the Southern defenders from the ridge in his front, 2 critical hours had passed.

Close to 3 p.m., the mighty Federal line moved slowly up the hill toward Sharpsburg, then gained momentum. “The movement of the dark column,” related an observer, “with arms and banners glittering in the sun, following the double line of skirmishers, dashing forward at a trot, loading and firing alternately as they moved, was one of the most brilliant and exciting exhibitions of the day.”

First brushing aside the depleted ranks in the rifle pits above the bridge, the Federals struck D. R. Jones’ four lonely brigades on the hills southeast of Sharpsburg—whence every other Confederate infantry unit had been withdrawn to reinforce the line to the north. Unable to stem the massive Federal attack, Jones’ men were driven back toward the town.

To halt the Federal tide, Lee shifted all available artillery southward. By 4 p.m., however, the Federals were approaching the village itself; only a half mile lay between them and Lee’s line of retreat to the Potomac. Disaster seemed at hand for Lee’s decimated force.

_A. P. Hill Turns the Tide_

But now came a great moment in Confederate military annals. A. P. Hill’s notable Light Division, having hurriedly crossed the Potomac, 3 miles away, was driving hard toward the jubilant Federals charging on Sharpsburg. Some of Hill’s artillery had already arrived from Harpers Ferry with the cheering news that Hill’s brigades of infantry were close by.

At Lee’s urgent order, Hill had left Harpers Ferry early. Sensing the critical role they would play, urged on at sword point by their grim commander, Hill’s veterans had covered the 17 miles from Harpers Ferry to the Potomac in 7 hours. Hundreds of men had fallen out, unable to keep the pace. Now, across the river, the stalwart survivors pounded on toward the sound of the guns.

Suddenly the head of Hill’s column appeared on the road to the south. Hill rode up to Lee’s headquarters at the Oak Grove, then quickly to D. R. Jones, whose exhausted troops formed the last defense line in front of Sharpsburg. Hill’s five brigades now rushed toward the Federal flank. Confusion gripped Burnside’s men as this unexpected onslaught plowed into their lines. Men broke and started to run. In moments the tide had turned. The Federal lines, sagging from the overwhelming charge of the Southerners, and with gaping holes cut by artillery, fell back across the hills to the sheltering banks of Antietam Creek.

Powerful Federal artillery continued to thunder across the hills; heavy blue columns could still be seen in overmastering strength across Antietam Creek and far to the north. But the Federal commander had called a halt.

An hour and a half after the timely arrival of A. P. Hill’s division from Harpers Ferry, the battle ended. With sunset, the firing died away. That night, the tired men lay on their arms in line of battle. Neither side would admit defeat; neither could claim the victory.

_Retreat from Sharpsburg_

Seldom had Lee’s army fought a battle so strenuous and so long. “The sun,” a soldier wrote, “seemed almost to go backwards, and it appeared as if night would never come.” From dawn to sunset, the Confederate commander had thrown into battle every organized unit north of the Potomac. Straggling in the days preceding Antietam had reduced Lee’s army from 55,000 to 41,000 men. This small force had sustained five major attacks by McClellan’s 87,000-man army—three in the West Woods and the Miller cornfield, and those at the Sunken Road and the Lower Bridge—each time the outcome hanging in the balance.

In the stillness of the night, Lee called his commanders to his headquarters west of Sharpsburg. Of each in turn he asked the condition of the men, and each, even Jackson, spoke against renewal of battle on the morrow. “Still too weak to assume the offensive,” Lee wrote later, “we waited without apprehension the renewal of the attack.”

Early on the following morning, it became apparent that McClellan was not going to attack, though during the night he had received strong reinforcements, and more were on the way. Still undaunted, Lee returned to his plan of striking the Federal right at Poffenberger Ridge. But after surveying the ground, his officers informed him that Federal batteries completely dominated the narrow strip of land over which the attack must be launched. An attempt against the Federal guns would be suicidal.

Balked in his last hope of a counteroffensive, Lee realized that he could not recall the decision won by McClellan at South Mountain: The campaign was lost. During the afternoon, he announced to his lieutenants his intention of withdrawing that night across the Potomac. At midnight Longstreet led the way across Blackford’s Ford and formed a protective line on the south bank. Steadily through the night and early morning, the Confederate columns crossed over into Virginia.

McClellan did not actively pursue. As the days passed and Lee’s army withdrew into the Shenandoah Valley, President Lincoln became impatient. The time was at hand, he thought, for the decisive blow. Calling upon McClellan on the field of Antietam, October 1, Lincoln urged a vigorous pursuit of the Confederate army. McClellan insisted that his army required reorganization and new equipment. The President, having lost all confidence in McClellan, removed him from command on November 7.

_The Battle and the Campaign_

Tactically, Antietam was a draw. Strategically, however, it was a Northern victory because it halted Lee’s invasion.

Though McClellan failed to destroy Lee’s army, his contribution was in many ways notable. In the 3 weeks after he was chosen for command on September 3, he provided for Washington’s defense, created a new field army, fought two major actions, compelled Lee’s evacuation of Maryland, and established Federal control of the Potomac River from Washington to Williamsport. That he was not a daring commander of Lee’s stripe cannot detract from these solid achievements.

Lee, on the other hand, may have been too daring. Because of this he made two major miscalculations. First, his invasion of Maryland imposed a strain that his poorly equipped and exhausted army could not support; heavy straggling was the surest evidence of this. Second, he misjudged the capacity of the enemy to recuperate from the effects of Second Manassas and quickly put a reliable field army on his trail. He did achieve one of his objectives: The delay of the Federal armies in resuming major offensive operations in Virginia until the next winter. But the price was high and the South could not afford the kind of attrition suffered in the campaign.

Casualties were so heavy in the Battle of Antietam that September 17, 1862, is termed the bloodiest day of the Civil War. Of McClellan’s 26,023 killed, wounded, and captured during the Maryland Campaign (including Harpers Ferry), he counted 12,410 at Antietam. Of Lee’s 13,385 casualties during the campaign, 10,700 fell at Antietam.

_The War for the Union Takes on a New Purpose_

After Antietam there was no serious threat of foreign recognition or intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. And the repulse inflicted on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia gave Abraham Lincoln the opportunity he had sought: On September 22—just 5 days after the battle—the President issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. It declared that upon the first day of January next all slaves within any State or district then in rebellion against the United States “... shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free.”

With the formal Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, the war took on new purpose. In the North, and in many foreign lands, the cause of American Union had become one with that of human liberty.

_Clara Barton at Antietam_

At Antietam, also, was Clara Barton, founder of the American Red Cross. On this field of desolation, long after the guns had ceased, Miss Barton was still busily rendering care to the wounded and dying. Having arrived early in the day in the northern area of battle, she witnessed the wounded men of Sedgwick’s depleted ranks streaming to the cover of North and East Woods. By midmorning her wagonload of supplies, donated by the citizens of Washington, had arrived. She worked tirelessly with army surgeons at the field hospital on the Joseph Poffenberger farm. Her supply of bandages, linens, anesthetics, and oil lanterns replenished the surgeons’ urgent need of dressings and provided light to carry on through the night. So outstanding were her services on the field of battle that she later received official recognition by the United States Army Medical Corps. Her work here and later would become basic to the establishment of the American Red Cross.

_Antietam National Battlefield and Cemetery_

The Antietam National Battlefield was established August 30, 1890, to commemorate the significant events of September 17, 1862, and to preserve the important features of the battlefield. Administered by the War Department until 1933, the site was transferred that year to the U.S. Department of the Interior to be administered by the National Park Service.

The Battle of Antietam was fought over an area of 12 square miles. The site today consists of 810 acres containing approximately 8½ miles of tour roads. Located along the battlefield avenues to mark battle positions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry are many monuments, markers, and narrative tablets. Similar markers describe the actions at Turner’s Gap, Harpers Ferry, and Blackford’s Ford.

Key artillery positions on the field of Antietam are marked by cannon. And 10 large-scale field exhibits at important points on the field indicate troop positions and battle action.

The War Correspondents’ Memorial Arch and the 1st New Jersey Regimental Monument are located at Crampton’s Gap, and at Fox’s Gap is the memorial to Maj. Gen. Jesse Reno, who was killed while leading the Federal attack there.

Outstanding in the observance of battle anniversaries at Antietam was the occasion of the 75th anniversary on September 17, 1937. Thirty-five thousand persons, including 50 veterans who fought at Antietam, joined in the observance held on the battleground near the Sunken Road.

The Robert E. Lee Memorial tablet, located in a plot at the western limits of Sharpsburg, marks the headquarters of General Lee. General McClellan’s headquarters were in the Philip Pry house, 2 miles east of Sharpsburg near the Boonsboro Pike.

The National Cemetery, located at the eastern limits of Sharpsburg, is the burial place of Federal dead from the Battles of Antietam, South Mountain, and minor engagements. The cemetery was established by an act of the Maryland legislature in March 1865; the dedication took place September 17, 1867, the fifth anniversary of the battle. The cemetery plot of 11 acres was deeded by the State of Maryland to the United States Government on March 13, 1878. Of 4,776 Civil War burials, 1,836 are listed as unidentified. The total number of burials, including nearly 300 from recent wars, is more than 5,000.

_Administration_