Part 29

Sháh Abbás, when he heard of the advance of the Osmánlís, removed his troops from Reván and from Akcha Kalla, where they had been posted, and retreated. This information had no sooner reached the Moslem camp, than Sefer Páshá addressed the commander-in-chief for permission to advance with a party of veterans and intercept the sháh in his retreat. “His army was comparatively small,” said Sefer, “and if you advance with the grand army in the ordinary way, to my support, I am not without hopes, if you agree to my proposal, of being able to bring the sháh bound in fetters before you.” Such was the heroic language of Sefer Páshá, but the serdár was deaf to all his entreaties. He pretended to be waiting for the arrival of Karah Kásh; and even when Karah Kásh did arrive, he was as far as ever from complying with Sefer Páshá’s proposal. Thus, by delay and hesitation, the enemy was not only allowed to withdraw to a greater distance, but had time afforded them for preparing to offer a more formidable resistance; whilst the grand army by this procedure, was exposed to greater danger, to more difficulties, and to a less chance of success.

The commander-in-chief was indeed at length roused to some activity; but it was only when he perceived the season for warlike operations fast passing away, without his having gained one single advantage, that he was thus roused. Without paying any regard to the councils of Sefer Páshá, which might have been attended with glorious results, had he allowed himself to be swayed by them, he again commenced his march in pursuit of the retreating enemy, and even sent letters to the sháh offering him battle, but the wary sháh paid no regard to his invitations. By the time the grand army reached Nakhcheván, the sháh and his army had safely got into the jurisdiction of Tabríz. The commander-in-chief now saw his error, but it was too late to correct it; and he was destined, in consequence of his own tardiness and want of skill, to become more pre-eminently the sport of fortune. The country round Nakhcheván had been, a little before, the theatre of rebellion and of devastation; and in consequence of this, the cities and villages were enduring the greatest calamity from famine, at the time the Moslem army arrived in Nakhcheván. The serdár, when he perceived the dismal condition he and his army were in, proposed marching towards Shirván, where his son, Mahmúd Páshá, was beglerbeg. The chiefs of the army appeared before the serdár, and told him he might do what he liked, and take what journey he pleased, but the heretics were not to be overtaken. It was quite impracticable, they said, to follow them with a large army; nor would it prove any advantage, they further observed, to march against Tabríz and lay siege to it. The season for retiring into winter-quarters was just at hand, and they therefore thought it would be more prudent to return to their own country. The serdár was totally averse to this proposal, and endeavoured to dissuade them from urging this measure. He did so by representing to them how desirable it was to terminate the campaign honourably; that there still remained a chance of their succeeding; and that it would be much more wise, under all circumstances, to take up their winter-quarters in Gunjah and in Karabágh, than to return to Turkey before they had accomplished something worthy of their name. This speech had the desired effect: the troops struck their tents, and marched forward towards Tabríz. After having passed the river Ars, and accomplished a few stages, they learned that they were within a stage or two of coming up with the sháh, who was retreating with all his might before them. Sefer Páshá, Ahmed Páshá, beglerbeg of Sivás, and Alasha Atlí Hasan Páshá, earnestly implored the commander-in-chief to be allowed to proceed with a body of light troops and overtake the sháh, but he again refused to grant them their request, and maintained his usual obstinacy. On reaching Wán, he distributed his troops into different cantonments, but he himself remained at Wán for the winter. The more discerning of the troops, it must be observed, however, opposed the serdár, and endeavoured to dissuade him from disbanding his army, but their efforts were all in vain. They represented to him that the steps he was about to take were altogether inconsistent with the general safety; and for a commander-in-chief to winter on the frontiers, without any army, might be very aptly compared, they said, “to a head without hands or feet.” Moreover, they maintained that the thing was altogether unprecedented. The serdár, as we have already observed, continued inflexible; took up his quarters in Wán, and conferred the government of the country on Ahmed Páshá. Ahmed Páshá being indisposed when this appointment took place, the serdár sent his chief physician to perform the duties of the new governor, and finally conferred the situation on Alí Páshá.

In the meantime, however, the serdár found means to conciliate the Kúrdistán chiefs, and called them together to the city of Wán, with the view of consulting them about his affairs and the state of things in general. But the sháh no sooner learned that the serdár had dispersed his army than he collected together his detestable and diabolical heretics, with the intention of attacking Wán. He accordingly despatched a division of these atheists towards Wán, whilst he himself, under cover of the night, followed that division with the whole of his disposable forces, and took up his position before Wán, but at such a distance that no cannon could reach him. At daylight on the following morning the unfortunate and infatuated serdár had his eyes opened to the very critical and hazardous situation into which his obstinacy had brought him. He tried to make the best of it he could. He assembled all the Kurds and others that were in Wán together, and deputed one Rázieh Zádeh Mustafa to take the command of them. Mustafa and his troops made a sortie, but they found the heretics too numerous for them and returned. Khundán Aghá and his two sons were unfortunately taken prisoners by the Kuzil báshes on the above occasion.

The serdár was now heartily sorry, and well he might, for the steps he had taken. He repented most sincerely that he had remained at Wán, but his repentance was too late to avail him. After deeply considering what method he should take to save his own life, he resolved on trying to make his escape to Erzerúm. He accordingly took ship at Wán, and landed at a place called Adaljuwaz. Losing no time at this place, he hastened with all the speed he could make towards Erzerúm, having been furnished with horses for his journey by Emír Sháh, the governor and other officers at Adaljuwaz. On arriving within a short distance of Erzerúm, the beglerbeg of Erzerúm, Gusah Sefer Páshá, went out to meet him, taking along with him an equipage more suitable to the dignity of the commander-in-chief than that with which he had travelled from Adaljuwaz.

The sháh, even after he had heard of the sudden departure of the serdár, ceased not in his endeavours to reduce the city and fortress of Wán for the space of forty days, but was at last obliged to raise the siege, and then marched towards Tabríz and Nakhcheván. On this march, however, he surrounded an Osmánlí place of strength called Makú; but all he gained by laying siege to this fortress was only disgrace.

Before concluding this long section it is necessary to observe, in connection with what we have related with regard to Jeghala Zádeh Sinán Páshá, the commander-in-chief, that at the time the command of the forces in the east devolved upon him, or at least not long after it, Ja’fer Páshá was appointed lord high admiral in room of Jeghala; and that he sailed for the Mediterranean with sixty galleys. In some histories it is said, that it was the admiral Kehyah Páshá Zádeh Mustafa Páshá who was appointed to the deputyship of Constantinople at the time Alí Páshá and Jeghala Zádeh were made commanders-in-chief.

_Lálá Mohammed Páshá succeeds Alí Páshá in all his offices._

After the death of the grand vezír, Alí Páshá, which event had taken place at Belgrade almost immediately after his arrival there, as we have already noticed, a kapújí báshí of the name of Kúrd Mustafa Páshá, brought accounts, in a sealed packet, to the government of Constantinople that Alí Páshá was no more. The officer presented them to the káímakám, Háfiz Páshá, who, however, declined receiving them. Hereupon the emperor’s chaplain called the officer to the royal palace, in order that it might be ascertained to whom it belonged to receive the packet. He complained that Háfiz Páshá refused to have any thing to do with the packet, though he knew it was an official despatch, whilst at the same time it was evident that the forces employed against the Hungarians were in the utmost need of having a commanding general appointed over them. It would appear, however, that before the accounts referred to had arrived, Lálá Mohammed Páshá had been raised by royal appointment to the chief command of the army, but that the commission had not reached him in sufficient time. He was now raised to the dignity of grand vezír.

Lálá Mohammed Páshá no sooner found himself raised to the highest offices which could be conferred on him, than he began with all imaginable speed to make arrangements for renewing hostilities, succeeded in taking several Hungarian towns, and afterwards returned with the body of his army to Buda.

Having formed the design of recovering Osterghún, in order to secure success as much as possible, he conferred on Bektásh Páshá, of Usk, the jurisdiction of Buda, appointed him to the advanced guard, which was composed of three thousand chosen men, and ordered him to march towards the last-mentioned place.

_The infidels abandon Pest._

A report having been circulated that Lálá Mohammed Páshá, the celebrated commander of the Moslem army, was advancing on his march from Belgrade, the infidels who garrisoned Pest, which they had wrested from the Moslems in consequence of the weakness and pusillanimity of Yemishjí Hasan Páshá, the former commander-in-chief, fled in the utmost precipitation, leaving, in fact, the whole of their arms of all kinds behind them. Such was the panic into which they were thrown by the fame of Lálá Mohammed Páshá, of whose heroism they had some knowledge. Their flight was a sufficient proof of the estimation in which they held his military talents.

When the new serdár, Lálá Mohammed Páshá, heard that the enemy had abandoned Pest, he crossed the Danube and took possession of it. The hateful infidels, with the view of totally destroying it, it is necessary to observe, had left the place exposed to the destructive effect of several mines which they had prepared for that purpose, and which, had they not been discovered in sufficient time, would certainly have buried the whole place, and all that was in it, in ruins. Fortunately for the inhabitants, as well as for the Moslem troops who had entered it, a sick soldier, who had been left behind in Pest, had given a hint to the conquerors of the mines referred to, which were almost on the point of ignition at the moment they were discovered. This very remarkable deliverance from so very terrible and inevitable a ruin was properly and religiously improved by the orthodox faithful from the highest to the lowest.

The commander-in-chief made arrangements for repairing and fortifying Pest; also for rebuilding the tower of Ján Kúrturán, and supplied both places with a sufficient number of troops and a proper quantity of provisions. The victorious troops of Lálá Mohammed Páshá entered Buda a little after the commencement of Rabia II., and immediately afterwards the bridge which had extended between Pest and Buda, but which had been cut down by the hatchets of the infidels, was again ordered to be rebuilt according to its former model.

The Moslem veterans were also agreeably surprised to learn that a similar terror with that which had seized the infidels at Pest, had also overtaken the infidels at Khutván, and had produced a similar result. The injuries which the houses of the faithful had sustained in both places, either by burning or otherwise, were ordered to be repaired.

_The fortress of Wáj conquered._

The celebrated serdár, Lálá Mohammed Páshá, now proceeded to reduce Wáj, which for the space of two years had been under the complete sway of the infidels, and encamped at Eskí Buda (Old Buda), immediately opposite to Wáj. By means of boats he conveyed across the Danube his troops, and on the 21st of Jemadi II. Wáj was besieged on all sides. The infidels in this fortress thinking, however, that they were about to be visited by retributive justice, put on an appearance of fortitude, though, as will appear, they were totally overcome by terror. On the very first night of the siege they contrived secretly to set fire to a tower and a palanka in the island opposite to Wáj, took to their boats, and set off, about the middle of the night, for Osterghún. The Moslems, of course, took possession of Wáj.

_Osterghún is laid siege to._

The victorious Moslems, the terror of whose arms spread dismay among the infidels, marched upon Osterghún, and on the 23d of Jemadi II. formed the siege of that place. Every gun and musket throughout the whole army were put in requisition, and every arrangement was made for commencing hostilities; but, alas, the constant fall of snow and rain, the winter season having commenced, rendered it impracticable for the troops to make any use of trenches, or at least they found it difficult to stand in them. The truth seems to be, that too much time had been taken up in repairing and attending to the lately retaken fortresses, Pest, Khutwán, and Wáj, and also with the rebuilding of the bridge formerly mentioned, to be able, at so late a period of the year, to carry on the siege of Osterghún with any great prospect of success.

In consequence of the length of time the Moslems spent unnecessarily with the fortresses they had retaken, as just observed, the infidels found ample opportunity to erect tabúrs or fortifications on the opposite bank of the river, and to extend a bridge from Osterghún to these fortifications. The whole line of these tabúrs were also protected by a range of field-pieces, and every thing, in fact, presented a most formidable appearance. For several successive nights the enemy rushed forth upon the Moslems, attacked them with the utmost celerity, and succeeded in killing many of their bravest heroes.

When it was resolved to augment the number of Moslems who were actually engaged in endeavouring to reduce Osterghún (_i.e._ those who were immediately engaged in active operations against it), the janissaries refused to comply, and urgently demanded that the siege should be raised. The commander-in-chief perceiving himself involved in difficulties of no ordinary kind, ordered Toktamish Gheráí, the son of his royal highness Ghází Gheráí, who had that year joined the royal camp instead of his royal father, to go, with a few thousands of his Tátárs, along with Hasan Páshá, beglerbeg of Romeili, and some of his troops, and scour the country round about, commit all the damage to the enemy they could, and take what spoil they could find.

The commander-in-chief, after a period of thirty-one days uselessly spent in endeavouring to reconquer Osterghún, was obliged to raise the siege and return to Buda. Having made the necessary arrangements with regard to the garrisons on the frontiers, for protecting the Ottoman dominions in that quarter, the commander-in-chief set out for Belgrade, and arrived there on the 3d of Rajab.

The stipulated period of the old pretorian band in Buda for serving having expired, one thousand of them were again hired, and divided into four companies.

We have still to add, by way of appendix, what Petcheví says in reference to the siege of Osterghún, which we have been describing. “Nukásh Hasan Páshá acted at the above siege,” he says, “as ághá of the janissaries, but he was so cowardly that he never once showed his face where he anticipated danger. For this dereliction of duty and disgraceful pusillanimity, the commander-in-chief deprived him of his office, and degraded him. He afterwards, however, sent a petition to the court of Constantinople, requesting to have the judgment of the serdár reversed, but his petition was regarded with contempt.”

The same historian observes, “that formerly, when Ibrahím Páshá was commander-in-chief, the Tátárs, emírs, and other great men under his command, had proposed to exchange Osterghún for Agria; because the latter was much more distant from Buda than the former, and therefore not of such importance to the Ottomans.” When Mohammed Ketkhodá, vezír Murád Páshá, Ahmed Aghá, the khán’s vezír, and Hábel Effendí, the cazí of Buda, went to the enemy’s camp, as the reader may remember, with the view of endeavouring to negotiate a peace between the two belligerent powers, the proposals above-mentioned were the principal subjects submitted to the consideration of the negotiators; but no settlement of any kind at that time was agreed to, and things remained as they had been until this period, when the infidels began to show a disposition favourable to a cessation of hostilities. Accordingly, ten counts, ornamented with golden chains, and the great ministers of state, arrived (probably at Belgrade), and gave their consent to the propositions above alluded to, and Petcheví Ibrahím Effendí, whose sentiments we are here quoting, was sent to the Sublime Porte as the bearer of the propositions for a general pacification. Petcheví, on arriving at Constantinople, presented his dispatches to the káímakám, and to the reverend mufti, the venerable Siná-allah Effendí. Siná-allah Effendí appeared greatly surprised at the nature and import of the propositions which had been thus submitted; and exclaimed, “that they were such as could never be agreed to; that they were altogether unfit to be expressed in words; that they were unworthy of ever having been thought of,” he therefore rejected them with scorn, and ordered the officer who had brought them to retrace his steps, and deliver this answer. The messenger obeyed, and met the commander-in-chief in the plains of Serim; who having anticipated the result of his mission, and without allowing him time to tell the message wherewith he was charged, replied abruptly, “we must bear the disgrace;” and, immediately, without any further reference to the subject, began to call the messenger’s attention to the recent appearance of Botchkai, one of the Transylvanian princes, to whose exploits our attention must now be turned.

_Concerning Botchkai._

The Germans are of the race of infidels or unbelievers, and a distinct and peculiar sect of Christians, who are divided among themselves. The principal chief or head of these different tribes of Christians, as they may be denominated, has the titles of emperor and Cæsar. The dukes of Austria and of Hungary are of the race of the emperor. The Nemcheh, or German nation, having acquired a superiority over the rest, subverted the whole or most of the fortresses belonging to Ardil (Transylvania) and Mejár (Hungary), and have all along, ever since, exercised towards these two tribes every species of oppression and tyranny. The Hungarian and Transylvanian natives, as well as their nobles, in consequence of the humiliating and degrading subjection to which the German tribe had reduced them, were obliged, of course, to feign submission to their oppressors; but cherished in their minds, nevertheless, the most unquenchable hatred and enmity. The Germans, ever since the time they had acquired dominion over these two nations, manifested the utmost contempt towards them, but especially towards the former. To the princes and nobles of Mejár (Hungary) they showed less courtesy and respect than they did to even the vilest and lowest among themselves, and made them the objects of many indignities and of low reproach: yet the ancient Hungarians, unlike their degenerate sons, often repelled the aggressions of their German neighbours with evident advantages, and maintained many a bloody battle with them.

Things continued much in the same way as we have endeavoured to describe, till Botchkai, one of the Hungarian princes, a brave and heroic infidel, called together the branches of his family, to whom he addressed himself thus: “How long are we patiently to submit to the reproach, as well as oppression and tyranny, resulting from a disgraceful subjection to these Germans? Thank God, the Ottoman emperors have always proved our generous friends. King John took refuge under the wings of the emperor Soleimán, and the royal dignity was maintained so long as one of his children and grandchildren remained to fill the throne of Hungary. Let us follow the heroic example of our ancestor; and when we are once supported by the strong arm of the Turks, we shall then be able to take ample vengeance on our oppressors.” This sentiment Botchkai urged with all the warmth and zeal he was able to put forth, and his speech had the desired effect. They unanimously agreed to put themselves under the sheltering power of the Ottomans; elected Botchkai to the dignity and prerogatives of a king, and appointed him their commander-in-chief. Immediately, or at least as soon as they found it convenient, and that was about the middle of this present year, they wrote letters to the Moslem general, wherein they made a formal offer to put themselves under the protection of the Moslem government; that they would be friends to those who were friendly to it, and enemies to those who were its enemies; that they agreed to serve the emperor of the Ottomans; and that they were ready to draw their swords against their German oppressors at his bidding; and requested, moreover, the serdár, as soon as he knew their sentiments, to make them known to the Moslem government at Constantinople.

The court of Constantinople, on being put in possession of the documents relative to the earnest wishes of the Hungarians, not only acquiesced in their solicitations, but also sent the most positive instructions to the commanding general to enter into an immediate engagement with the petitioners, and to assure them of the aid and protection of his government. The commanding general lost no time in communicating to Botchkai and his associates the views of the Sublime Porte, which had the effect not only of confirming them in their hatred and enmity towards the Germans, but also of increasing, day after day, the number of their followers.

_A battle fought between the Germans and the Hungarians._