Part 18

The new grand vezír still postponed his journey to Belgrade, and at length pretended it was too late in the season to proceed to that quarter. “Nothing of importance,” he said, “could, by the time he could arrive there, be accomplished.” He maintained, that no warlike operation was immediately called for in the present circumstances of the frontiers, or from the aspect presented by the enemy. Lála Mohammed Páshá, who succeeded in the command after the death of the late commander-in-chief, he further said, should be confirmed in the serdárship, proceed, if necessary, with the force under his command, and open the campaign. Thus did the new grand vezír excuse his own tardiness, and try to dispense with the necessity of his own departure. The Sheikh-ul-Islám, Siná-allah Effendí, thought otherwise. He maintained it to be absolutely requisite that the new grand vezír should proceed without a moment’s delay to Belgrade, and urged this sentiment with great warmth even before the emperor. The new grand vezír had no alternative left him but to proceed: but for this interference of the high priest the grand vezír never ceased to employ every stratagem he could against him, and at length had him deposed. In the military and ecclesiastical departments he made what changes he pleased: particularly in the first, and that too as far as Adrianople; though this department properly belonged to the Sheikh-ul-Islám Effendí. He advanced some, deposed others, as his fancy directed, and some he degraded. The Sheikh-ul-Islám Effendí, the high priest of the religion of Mohammed, felt his displeasure, as well he might have anticipated, after having expressed himself in the manner he did. Khoja Zádeh Mohammed Effendí was created mufti in the room of Siná-allah Effendí. Bostán Zádeh Effendí and Shemish Effendí were succeeded by Abdulhelím Effendí and by Isaád Effendí. The cazí of Constantinople, Ketkhodá Mustafa Effendí, was replaced by Mustafa Effendí of Adrianople, who was succeeded by Yahiah Effendí. The seventh vezír, Khalíl Páshá, was made káímakám, and Háfiz Ahmed Páshá was made third vezír. Tarnákjí, who had been deprived of his ágháship, but afterwards appointed to the government of Baghdád, had to resign his situation to Mohammed Páshá, son of Sinán Páshá, and Hasan Páshá was made vezír at Constantinople. Hamza Effendí was made chancellor in room of Okjí Zádeh. All these changes were effected by the new grand vezír.

On the ninth day of the month Sefer, the grand vezír and commander-in-chief, Yemishjí Hasan Páshá, left Constantinople with great pomp and show, but did not encumber himself with tents or any heavy baggage. Persons were previously appointed to proceed in advance and have booths of branches of trees prepared at every station for his army. By this mode of quick travelling he was enabled to reach Belgrade by the 27th of the month, when he took possession of his predecessor’s tents which had been erected in the plains of Zimún by the late grand vezír himself. This was the first time he had entered a tent from the day he left Constantinople till his arrival at Zimún.

The new grand vezír lost no time in attending to the duties of his station and office. Provisions were distributed amongst the troops, and full fifteen days were spent in arranging matters for commencing another campaign. Before detailing the events of that campaign, we must first advert to the success which the enemy had obtained at Alba Julia, and some other affairs, but which properly belong to the events of the preceding year.

The fall of Kaniza was a heavy loss to the enemy, and afflicted them very much and universally.

Towards the end of winter the Duke Mathias, with his Austrian and Hungarian commanders, came to the plains of Yanuk, where he assembled an army of forty or fifty thousand men, composed of Germans, Hungarians, Bohemians, and Polish troops. Twenty pieces of ordnance and ten sháhí (royal guns) were attached to this mighty host, which marched upon Alba Julia. Information having reached Belgrade, a short time after the spring commenced, that the enemy had laid siege to Alba Julia, the commander sent off, to the aid of the above place, the beglerbegs of Romeili and Anatolia with the Bosnian army; but before these auxiliary troops had time to cross the bridge of Usk, Alba Julia was taken by the enemy, after a siege of nine days. Alba Julia was no sooner taken than the enemy supplied it with a sufficient garrison, and afterwards concentrated its whole force at a place in its neighbourhood.

_Concerning Tarnákjí Hasan Páshá’s going to Kaniza._

Some time after the reduction of Kaniza, Tarnákjí Hasan Páshá having arranged matters at Buda, left the care of that fortress to the defterdár, Munker Kúshí Mohammed Effendí, and set out, towards the end of winter, to Belgrade, to pay a visit to the serdár, Ibrahím Páshá. This visit was not made in vain; for he succeeded with Ibrahím to have himself appointed to the government of Kaniza, and the defterdár, Munker Kúshí, to retain his charge at Buda. After his appointment he left Belgrade and went to take charge of his new government, but was not long at Kaniza before he heard of the death of his benefactor, Ibrahím Páshá. In a state of grief, occasioned by this intelligence, he left Kaniza and pitched his camp at a place called Ghurizghár, not far from Sigetwar. A wonderful event happened on the day on which he made the transition alluded to. It was excessively hot and sultry: suddenly, in a moment, an unusual loud sound was heard in the air, and so terrible as to frighten the horses. Everywhere they perceived immense companies of crows in the air, above the tents, fighting with each other, and which, after having fought their battle, as described, set out directly towards Kaniza. About an hour after this wonderful scene another of equal wonder presented itself. A host of eagles, similar to that of the crows, made their appearance above the tents, performed the same sort of manœuvres as their predecessors had done, and followed the same direction which they had taken. Those who witnessed these strange phenomena were, as may well be imagined, awfully surprised and confounded: but Hasan Páshá was a man of great prudence and caution. “It is a warning and a sign from God,” said he, in a solemn tone of voice; “it is an intimation of two engagements with the enemies of our religion.” After having repeated these words he called his deputy, who, at that time, was Iskender Páshá, and desired him to proceed to Belgrade and send him word who had been, or was to be, appointed commander-in-chief; and also to request him, whoever he might be, to send a reinforcement of troops to Kaniza. After having dispatched this messenger, he himself returned to Kaniza, and paid all due care and attention to put it into a state of defence and security. He sent persons, also, to the sanjáks of Sigetwar, Petcheví, and Púzgha, to collect provisions for the garrison; also others to spy out the condition and strength of the enemy. These latter messengers brought him the intelligence that the enemy had assembled an immense army at Yanuk, and that eighty thousand Franks were expected to join them from Frangistan. The páshá sent out other spies, and waited with anxiety for their return.

_The enemy return to lay siege to Kaniza._

It is to be observed that before this, an augmentation of troops, amounting to sixty thousand, foot and horse, supplied by Austria, Spain, and France, had been shipped at a port belonging to Venice, and disembarked on the shores of Croatia. The brother of the Roman pontiff commanded the Italian troops (the troops supplied by Spain, probably). Zerín Oghlí Majar, the beglerbegs of Aslobin, of the Black Herzog, with King Ferdinand at their head, met the above-mentioned European troops at Warashdin, in the country of Mekomúriah, and brought forty pieces of large ordnance along with them.

In a council of war held on this occasion at Warashdin, they were all nearly unanimous in thinking it most advantageous to lay siege to Kaniza. Zerín Oghlí replied, in opposition to general opinion, that first of all, the fortresses of Perzencha and of Búbofché should be reduced; the ruined fortress of Sekish rebuilt and garrisoned: then to go and take the fortress of Kushwar, which would have the effect of dispersing the inhabitants of Koban and of its vicinity, _viz._ those of Barcan. “That appears to me,” said he, “to be the plan we ought to adopt. After we have accomplished these, let us support the German and Hungarian army stationed near Alba Julia. If the Moslem serdár should venture to attack them, we shall, in such a case, be ready to assist them; if he should attack us, then they will be ready to come to our assistance.” This counsel of Zerín Oghlí was rejected and the first opinion adhered to. They determined on reducing Kaniza.

All this various information was carried to Hasan Páshá by his spies, and he was immediately induced, without divulging a syllable of what he had heard to any one, to issue orders to his begs and commanders to prepare for entering the country of Mekomúriah on a depredatory excursion on the shortest notice; and to have their arms and provisions in readiness. These begs and commanders throughout his government obeyed, and assembled with their troops in the fortress of Sigetwar. This order to his begs and commanders was given under the pretext that the enemy was marching towards Buda.

In the meantime the enemy’s troops advanced within one stage of Kaniza, where they halted three days for the arrival of their artillery. They thought, from the movements which they had perceived among Hasan Páshá’s troops, that they had actually gone towards Buda, and that, therefore, Kaniza would be obliged to yield without much resistance. “Never mind; let the Turks go to Buda,” said they among themselves; “we shall see what state Kaniza is in.” Thus saying, they sent out some spies, who when they returned confirmed them in their blindness. “The Turks,” said the spies, “have not the least idea of our approach; but Hasan Páshá, the governor of Kaniza, says, our army has marched on to Buda; and that he is therefore preparing to enter into the country of Mekomúriah on a predatory excursion.” Such was the import of the report of the spies; and it had the effect of filling the infidels with joy. After considering all these appearances, apparently in their favour, they advanced to the siege.

_The grand vezír and commander-in-chief, Yemishjí Hasan Páshá, marches against the enemy._

After the grand vezír had reached Belgrade he learned that Alba Julia was besieged by the enemy’s troops, and therefore sent off a body of men to its assistance. This auxiliary army had scarcely reached the bridge of Usk, when information reached him that Alba Julia was taken by the enemy. Immediately after this the news of Kaniza’s being besieged was also communicated to him.

The experienced páshás at Usk entered into consultations as to the plan they ought to adopt in the present circumstances. Some of them proposed to go to Kaniza; others of them thought this unnecessary. Every one had his own opinion: they were fairly divided. After much and long disputation, it was at length observed, that if they should go to Kaniza, it was more than probable the enemy’s army at Alba Julia would pursue them. They would thus be exposed to two armies at once, each of which was very powerful. In this case (said the speaker), it would not be an easy thing to give an answer. Better that we march to Alba Julia; and after we have defeated our enemies there, continued the speaker, we, on our return, will march to the aid of Kaniza.

This counsel was agreed to; and, accordingly, letters were issued, giving information of the resolution the páshás had come to. They commenced their march towards Alba Julia, and on reaching Jankúterán they were joined by the division which the grand vezír had formerly sent forward to the aid of the Alba Julians, and also Munker Kúshí Mohammed Páshá with the troops of Buda. In another council held at this place they unanimously agreed to attack the enemy at once and with vigour. Having taken eight badalooshkas and four large cannon from Buda, they advanced in the greatest haste, and reached the plains of Alba Julia on the first of Rabia II.

The enemy lay between two mountains, and had an immense ditch in front. The Moslem army advanced, threw a bridge over the river which issued from a lake, crossed this river on the following day, and attacked the enemy in their tabúr or fortifications. The great and small guns were put into immediate requisition. On the following morning, at daybreak, the combatants on both sides were in motion, and the work of destruction was again renewed and carried on till the darkness of the night made it necessary for both parties to retire.

According to Hasan Beg Zádeh’s account of this battle, it would appear that the janissaries, on the last of the days above-mentioned, when led on to the attack by the commander, had fled before the opposing foe, and were on the very point of making the commander their prisoner. God protected him.

Petcheví says, that Mohammed Ketkhodá having secured an advantageous position, slew immense numbers of the enemy. The enemy now advanced in four columns, each column five hundred strong, and drove the Moslem cavalry off the field. The salihdárs were ordered to advance to oppose their progress, but were unable to effect any thing: night, however, came on, when both parties retired from the conflict for a few hours, but it was soon after renewed with double fury. In this day’s work of death, towards evening, Mohammed Ketkhodá and Mohammed Munker Kúshí Páshá, the governor of Buda, whilst advancing with their divisions to an attack, fell in the field of battle.

According to Hasan Beg Zádeh and Abdulkádír’s accounts of this battle, it appears that the Romeilian troops had been ordered to support the attack in which the two chiefs now mentioned met their death, but that, in consequence of some rancour which their commander, Mohammed Páshá, entertained against Khetkhodá, they had failed: neither did any of the other troops, they say, offer to do it. Petcheví says, however, that he himself was present and an eye-witness: his words are, “I was standing beside the páshá and looking at the contest. The páshá (_i.e._ the beglerbeg of Romeili) was not aware when this attack was made, and therefore could not have rendered them any aid. After the return of the divisions which they had led on to the attack, the martyrdom of these heroes was announced to him, and he was excessively grieved that they had advanced to that attack without having given him notice of it. Any account of the matter differing from this is false.”

On the night of the last battle the enemy altered their position; for when the Moslems, next day, moved slowly to meet their antagonists, they found them closely concentrated in a narrow pass in the road which led to the fortress of Polatah. Finding them thus situated, and seeing they had succeeded, during the night, in casting a deep trench, the Moslem army did not again offer to attack them. Under pretence of winter having set in they retired altogether from the scene of contest and battle.

The government of Buda was conferred on the beglerbeg of Romeili, Mohammed Páshá. Four thousand janissaries, under the command of a túrnají báshí, were ordered to accompany Mohammed Páshá to Buda. On their return to that fortress they passed through the country of Segdin. Winter having come on, preparations for assisting Kaniza were immediately commenced.

_Kaniza is besieged._

We have already mentioned the manœuvre practised by Hasan Páshá, governor of Kaniza, and the arrival of the infidel army within a stage or one day’s journey of the above city and fortress.

On the 8th of Rabia II., five thousand of the above army appeared in the vicinity of Kaniza, on the road which led to Vienna. The governor gave the strictest orders to the head of the artillery not to fire on them, and forbade any of the cavalry to venture out: for the object of this hostile party, he observed, was to seize prisoners where and how they could. Let the foot soldiers, continued he, meet them with their fire-arms and contend with them; and he immediately placed a number of effective men at each of the gates. The order of the governor was obeyed. The heroes who went to dispute the progress of the enemy, manfully maintained the bloody contest till mid-day, when the enemy retired to their tábúr, leaving many of their men, as well as of their horses, on the field of battle. Ferdinand was informed of the result; but, it would seem, knew nothing of the attempt they had made, and strongly reproved them for it.

Next day (the 9th), Ferdinand himself called one of his princes, ordered him to advance with a party, and by all means endeavour to seize some prisoners. This was the very object the party, the day before, had in view. This second party advanced till they were under the very guns of the fortress, and contended with the heroes formerly mentioned till the hour of afternoon prayers, when they, instead of retiring as on the previous day, stopped and cried out: “by the religion of Mohammed, if you have only one gun fire it.” The heroes, in compliance with the instructions of their governor, replied, that though they might have such, yet that they had till then refrained from using them, and had spared their lives. The enemy believed this, and rejoicingly went and told it to Ferdinand the king. The king immediately called a council of his great men, and communicated this intelligence to them. On the following day (the 10th), he sent forth a party a third time, who fought more desperately than on either of the preceding days. On this occasion they again requested the Moslems to fire a gun, that their king might hear its report in his camp or tábúr. The former answer was returned to them, with this addition: “We are here but for a few days, like strangers. Would a man live in a desolate island-like place as this? Our emperor has many thousand palankas like this Kaniza.”

It is to be observed, however, that when Hasan Páshá desired it to be said that there were no cannon in Kaniza, his ághás opposed it by saying, it was improper to mention it to the enemy; “for,” said they, “if the enemy should happen to be either unwilling or afraid to attack us, this saying will most assuredly have the effect of inducing them to do so.” The Páshá replied: “attend you to my orders; there is something that you do not yet know: I know when to employ the cannon: I reserve them till then.” But to return. The infidels returned, as on the former occasions, and informed Ferdinand what they had heard from the Moslems about there being no cannon in the fortress of Kaniza. Ferdinand, elated by this intelligence, called a council of his great men. “Let us,” said he, “send out spies, and if the intelligence which they bring us correspond to what we have just learned, then we will certainly root them out. We will, afterwards, order our movements according to any method which Prince Mathias, now below Yanuk, may see fit to adopt.” So much for Ferdinand. Some of his counsellors, however, ventured to think differently. “Let us first,” said they, “lay siege to Sigetwar and take it: let us, in fact, take every one of the fortresses as far as Usk, and root out the Turks from everyone of them.” Zerín Oghlí, who was present in this sage assembly of warriors, was asked to give his opinion. He did so. It was as follows: “In the reign of Sultán Soleimán Khán I was shut up in this fortress (Sigetwar). The out-works of the fortress can be easily taken, but the citadel is peculiarly strong. It will require forty pieces of cannon for each one of its batteries before any impression can be made upon it. It was after having thrown a hundred thousand loads of earth into the lake, by which it is surrounded, and as much again above its surface, that Sultán Soleimán was enabled to surround the fortress and take it by force. If your strength is sufficient for an exploit of that kind, and if the Turkish troops do not turn upon you, then you may perhaps succeed. One thing I know, that if you are able this year to deliver Kaniza out of the hands of the Turks, you will accomplish a feat which will be without a parallel: for, you must know, there is shut up in it an enchanter whose artifices elude all detection. For twenty years past we have been obliged to drink his poisonous draughts. Every time they announce that he is either sick or dead, he is sure to appear in one or other of our provinces and perpetrates immense evil. Hitherto no one has been able to withstand him. He has completely vanquished, by his artifices, every one who has opposed him.” Zerín Oghlí having finished his long speech, one of the Frank princes, who had hearkened to it, said: “This man (Zerín Oghlí) is not acquainted with our method of war, or he is an ally of the Turks, and tries to intimidate us.” Zerín’s speech was henceforth disregarded by the council, and Ferdinand said “that next day, at all events, they would advance upon Kaniza: if the Turks abandoned it, good and well; if not, we will lay siege to it. Let these treacherous Hungarians (the inhabitants of Kaniza) see what will be the fate of the fortress of Kaniza. After Kaniza is once disposed of, then we shall take vengeance on them. They have every where instigated the sword of the Ottoman to deeds of blood.”

On the 11th of Rabia II., about mid-day, this vile army of infidels, with the beating of drums, sounding of cymbals, blowing of trumpets, and ringing of bells, approached with great pomp, and with inverted arms, the devoted city and fortress, and took up its position on the banks of the river Berk, on the road which led to Vienna. A short time after they had thus taken up their position, they perceived a number of waggons which happened to be conveying provisions from Perzentcha to Kaniza, but which the infatuated infidels thought were waggons come to carry off the population of that city, and therefore gave orders not to meddle with them in going in; determining to pursue them when they again came out, and murder the whole of the people they might find in them. They were, however, completely deceived. It is a curious fact, but true, that the men who had escorted these waggons went to the governor, after having safely entered Kaniza, and asked him what was the meaning of the mighty army they had observed on the banks of the Berk—for surely, said they, they are not enemies. The governor pleasantly replied, that they had come on a visit: “but now that you have all safely got into the fortress,” said he, “they shall be served with a feast of red-hot melons without delay.”

The wisdom of the páshá in giving orders not to fire on the enemy, as before observed, appeared most conspicuously to every one: for had he ordered his guns to be fired at the enemy when they urged him to do so, it is clear the waggons with provisions would certainly not have been allowed to enter into Kaniza, but would in all probability have fallen into the hands of the enemy, as well as the troops which escorted them. But to return. The páshá called the heads of the artillery, and asked them how many cannon there were in the place. Nearly one hundred, small and great, was the answer. “Well then,” said the governor, “let them all be charged, and as soon as you hear _Allah! Allah!_ discharge the largest, and immediately afterwards, and at once, let the others be discharged in the midst of the enemy.” The guns were accordingly loaded, and the well-known signal waited for.