Part 2

The resignation of his post by Leicester (April, 1588) may be taken as the date at which the history of the United Netherlands as a self-governing State really begins. The treaty with England still subsisted by the terms of which the Commander of the English auxiliary troops with two colleagues had seats in the Council of State, but the Council of State ceased ere long to have any but executive functions. The conduct of affairs affecting the whole Union was vested in the States-General as representing the States of the seven sovereign provinces from which its authority was derived. A more cumbrous system of government than that under which the United Provinces were now to develop rapidly into a powerful and flourishing State, probably never existed. That it was workable was due to two facts. The voices of the provinces were nominally of equal weight in the States-General, in reality that of Holland was dominant. Holland contributed 60 per cent. of the general expenses and contained about one-half of the entire population of the Union. With Zeeland she furnished almost the whole of the navy and was already becoming one of the most thriving centres of commerce in the world. At this time the influence of an exceptionally able statesman, John van Oldenbarneveldt, who filled the office of Advocate of Holland, was supreme in the States of that province, and as their representative and spokesman he was able to exercise an authority in the States-General which placed for thirty years in his hands the general administration of the country and the control of foreign affairs. By his side stood Maurice of Nassau, respected and honoured as the son of William the Silent, wielding as Captain and Admiral-General authority over all the armed forces of the Republic, and exercising as Stadholder of five provinces large executive powers. A consummate general but no politician, Maurice was content to leave the business of administration and the conduct of diplomacy in the hands of the statesman who had been his father's friend. Thus by the efforts of these two men, each eminent in his separate sphere, the youthful Republic, despite the inherent weaknesses of a confederacy so loosely compacted as that of the United Provinces, was able to carry out a wise and consistent foreign policy, to defend its borders, and meanwhile to thrive and flourish.

The relations between England and the States required the most careful handling during the whole of the period that intervened between the return of Leicester and the death of Elizabeth. The assistance given by the English Queen had not been without a return: it had been fully repaid by the services rendered by the Dutch fleet during the spring and summer of 1588 in blockading the ports in which lay the transports collected by the Duke of Parma for the invasion of England. When the Armada entered the Channel, Parma with his splendid veteran army was thus compelled to remain a helpless spectator of events, unable to take any part in promoting the success of the great enterprise which Philip had been so long preparing. But Elizabeth had been piqued by the opposition that Leicester had encountered, and by the evident determination of the States, under the leadership of Holland, not to permit any interference on the part of the representative of a foreign power with their provincial rights and privileges. She did not withdraw her help, but it was given from motives of pure self-interest rather than from any love for the cause she was supporting, and in a huckstering spirit. With her it was a question of give and take, and the military successes of Maurice, accompanied as they were by the rapid growth of commercial prosperity in Holland and Zeeland, only encouraged her to drive a harder bargain in her negotiations and to press for repayment of the loans she had advanced.

In these circumstances friction in the relations between England and the Republic was at times inevitable, but the community of interests was so strong that friendly co-operation never ceased. An English contingent took part in the campaigns of Maurice; a powerful Dutch squadron sailed with the fleet of Essex to the sack of Cadiz in 1595. The conclusion of peace between France and Spain in May, 1598, brought about a fresh treaty between England and the United Provinces, the terms of which point clearly to the great change which had taken place in the relative position of the two States since the time of Leicester's mission. The Dutch were now in a position to promise the repayment of their debt to Elizabeth by equal annual instalments[2] and to undertake in case of a Spanish attack upon England to come to the assistance of their allies with thirty ships of war and a force of 5,000 infantry and five cornets of cavalry. On the other hand, only one Englishman henceforth was to have a seat upon the Council of State, and the English auxiliary troops in the Netherlands were transferred to the service of the States as their paymasters and were required to take an oath of allegiance to them. This English brigade in the Dutch service, now first formed, was to have a long and honourable career. It was speedily to prove its worth and gain immortal fame by the share that it took in winning the great victory of Nieuwport (July 2, 1600), and in the heroic defence of Ostend (1601-4).

[2] The towns of Flushing and Brill and the fort of Rammekens were delivered into the hands of Elizabeth, as security for repayment.

Such was the state of things when James I ascended the English throne. From him the Netherlands could hope for little active aid. The chief aim of James's policy from the first was to live on friendly terms with Spain, and in 1604 he concluded a treaty of peace with Philip III and with the Archdukes, as sovereigns of the Netherlands. His attitude to the United Provinces was not indeed unfriendly. He still retained the cautionary towns, as a pledge for the debt, and his representative sat in the Council of State, but as one of the conditions of peace he promised to lend no assistance to the Dutch. The privilege of recruiting in England for the regiments in their service was not withdrawn, but in return a like privilege was extended to the Spaniards. Thus there were occasions on which Englishmen were found fighting against one another on opposite sides. The Court of Madrid on their part, exhausted by the long and costly struggle, were already in 1606 making tentative proposals to the rebel provinces for the conclusion of a peace or truce, and meanwhile spared no efforts to prejudice the mind of James against a people for whose cause as a stanch Protestant it was feared he might have secret leanings, and at the same time to secure his benevolent support in the coming negotiations. The arguments that were used and their effect upon the King are well summed up in the words of the keen-eyed Venetian Ambassador, Nicolò Molin, who in 1607 thus reports:--

'The Spaniards are ceaselessly urging upon the King that for his own interests he ought to use his utmost endeavours in this negotiation in order to bring it to some conclusion, since by continuance of the war the Dutch might come to make themselves masters of those seas. Having their fleets ordinarily of a hundred or more ships, and these widely scattered in different places, they can thus say, and with truth, that they are masters of those seas for the possession of which the ancient kings of England have made very long and very costly wars against the princes of Europe. The King knows all this to be true, but is likewise of opinion that at a single nod of his the Dutch would yield to him all that dominion that they have gained; which without doubt would follow so long as the war with the Spaniards lasted, since they are not able at one and the same time to contend with two of the greatest princes of Christendom. But if with time that ripens affairs peace should be effected between them and the Crown of Spain, I do not know if they would be so ready to yield as the King of England promises himself; since just as this profession of the sea is manifestly more and more on the wane in England, so more and more is it increasing and acquiring force and vigour among the Dutch.'

The perspicacity of this review of the situation was completely justified by the events. On April 9, 1609, after prolonged and acrimonious negotiations, a treaty for a truce of twelve years between the belligerents was signed, but on conditions imposed by the Dutch. To the Spaniards the terrible drain on their resources made a respite from war a matter not of choice, but of necessity. To obtain it they had to treat with the United Provinces 'as if they were an independent State', and, worst of all, they had by a secret clause to concede liberty of trading in the Indies. From this moment the relations of the States with England were sensibly changed. The attitude of King James had hitherto been a mixture of condescension and aloofness, and he had not troubled himself to consider seriously the question of Dutch rivalry upon the seas and in commerce, which had so profoundly impressed the Venetian envoy. Nicolò Molin was in 1607 undoubtedly correct in his supposition that at that date James still looked upon the Dutch as dependents on his favour, who would not venture to run counter to any expression of his will. The course of the negotiations for the truce must have gradually undeceived him, and their issue left him face to face with a power compelled to maintain to the utmost the interests of the extensive commerce on the proceeds of which its very existence as a State depended.

No sooner were the signatures appended to the treaty than James took a step which exposed to a very severe strain his relations with the people whose emancipation from Spanish rule he had, ostensibly at least, worked hard to accomplish. Many indeed in Holland had been suspicious of the real friendliness of his attitude during the negotiations, but very few probably imagined that he was preparing, as soon as they were ended, to put to the test their sense of the value of his services and of his alliance by striking a deadly blow at the most important of their industries. On May 16, 1609, the King issued a proclamation, in which, after stating that though he had hitherto tolerated the promiscuous liberty that had been granted to foreigners to fish in the British seas, he has now determined, seeing that this liberty

'hath not only given occasion of over great Encroachments upon our Regalities, or rather questioning of our Right, but hath been a means of daily Wrongs to our own People that exercise the Trade of Fishing ... to give notice to all the World that our express Pleasure is, that from the beginning of the Month of August next coming, no Person of what Nation or Quality soever, be permitted to fish upon any of our Coasts and Seas of Great Britain, Ireland and the rest of the Isles adjacent, until they have orderly demanded and obtain'd Licences from us....'

The news of the publication of this edict caused in Holland no small surprise, not unmingled with indignation. On June 12 the matter was discussed in the States of that Province, and it was resolved[3] that the States-General be requested to adopt measures for the vigorous defence of the land's rights as based upon the treaties. The States-General on their part resolved[4] that a full inquiry should be made into the question of treaty rights and a special embassy be sent to London, and as early as July 6, King James agreed[5] to receive such a deputation, and to appoint commissioners to enter into conference with it on the subject of the privileges and immunities for freedom of commerce claimed in virtue of ancient treaties. Meanwhile the States-General promised the fishermen their protection, at the same time bidding them to be very careful not to give any cause for new complaints on the part of the King. So far indeed were the Dutch from yielding immediate submission to the demand of James, or from admitting its justice, that Sir Ralph Winwood (the resident English ambassador at the Hague), reporting to the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, the results of an interview he had had with Oldenbarneveldt September 16, 1609, informs him:--

'the States do write expressly to their ambassador [Noel Caron] urging him to advertise his Majesty their purpose to send to beseech him upon the necessity of this affair [i.e. liberty of fishing] in the meantime to have patience with their people trading upon his coast that without impeachment they may use _their accustomed Liberty and antient Privelidges_; which he [Oldenbarneveldt] said they were so far from fear that his Majesty upon due consideration will abridge, as that they hope he will be pleased to inlarge and increase into new ones.'[6]

[3] Res. Holl. June 12, 1609.

[4] Res. St.-Gen. June 12, 1609.

[5] Art. 6 of the Treaty between James and the States, July 6 (June 25, 1609, o.s.).

[6] Winwood, _Memorials_, vol. iii.

For a right understanding of the importance of the fisheries question and of the reasons which led King James at this particular time to issue his proclamation, a short retrospect is necessary.

Special rights of free fishing in English waters had been granted to the Hollanders and Zeelanders, as early as 1295, by King Edward I, and afterwards renewed by several of his successors. Finally a treaty was concluded, dated February 24, 1496, known as the _Magnus Intercursus_, between Henry VII and Philip the Fair, Duke of Burgundy, which was destined to regulate the commercial relations between England and the Netherlands during the whole of the Tudor period, and was still in force in 1609. Article XIV of this treaty ran as follows:--

'Conventum, concordatum et conclusum est quod Piscatores utriusque Partis Partium praedictarum (cujuscunque conditionis existant) poterunt ubique Ire, Navigare per Mare, secure Piscari absque aliquo Impedimento, Licentia, seu Salvo Conductu.'

Nothing could be more explicit or complete, and it was to this clause of the _Magnus Intercursus_ and the rights it had so long recognized that Oldenbarneveldt referred when he spoke to Winwood of the Dutch fishermen's 'accustomed Liberty and antient Privelidges.'

The rights of the Netherlanders to trade and navigate in Scottish waters, 'sine aliquo salvo conductu aut licentia generali aut speciali', were guaranteed by the Treaty of Binche, dated December 15, 1550, which had been confirmed by James himself, as King of Scotland, in 1594. But neither in this treaty of 1550, nor in an earlier treaty of 1541 to which it expressly refers, '_circa Piscationem et liberum usum Maris, ea quae per Tractatum anno 1541_ ... inita, conclusa ac conventa fuerint debite ac sincere observari debebunt', is there any definite statement that the free use of the sea carried with it the right to fish without payment, though undoubtedly that right seems to be implied, and was certainly exercised without let or hindrance before 1609.

The question at issue was of vital consequence to the Dutch. It may be asserted without any exaggeration that the commerce and prosperity of Holland and Zeeland had been built upon the herring fishery, and rested upon it. The discovering of the art of curing the herring by Willem Beukelsz at the close of the fourteenth century had transformed a perishable article of local consumption into a commodity for traffic and exchange. Soon the 'great fishery', as it was called, afforded, directly or indirectly, occupation and a means of livelihood to a large part of the entire population of the Province of Holland.[7] Not only did many thousands of Hollanders put out to sea to follow the track of the herring shoals along the British coasts, but thousands more found employment on shore in building the busses, pinks, and other boats engaged in the lucrative industry, and in providing them with ropes, nets, and other necessaries. The profit from the fishery alone before the outbreak of the revolt was estimated by Guicciardini at 500,000 Flemish pounds. But such an estimate was far from representing the real value of what was styled by the States-General in an official document 'one of the chiefest mines of the United Netherlands'.[8] Salt was required for the curing. It was brought in Dutch bottoms in its rough state from French and Spanish ports, or direct from Punta del Rey on the coast of Venezuela, and salt-refineries quickly sprang up at Enkhuysen, Hoorn, and other fishing centres. In a land which had no natural products, the cured herrings and the refined salt which were not required for home use served as articles of commerce, and freights were dispatched to the neighbouring lands but specially to the Baltic to be exchanged for corn, timber, hemp, and other 'Eastland' commodities. The enterprising Hollanders and Zeelanders, at first competed with the Hanse towns in the Baltic ports, but long before the opening of the seventeenth century had practically driven their rivals from the field, and at the time with which we are dealing it has been computed that no less than 3,000 Dutch vessels were engaged in the 'Eastland' traffic through the Sound. The corn in its turn brought by so vast a fleet far more than sufficed even for the needs of a country where no corn was grown. Some thousands of other ships laden with grain voyaged along the coast of France, the Peninsula and the Western Mediterranean, discharging their cargoes and returning with freights of wine, silk, olive oil, and other staple products of the South. The Spaniards and Portuguese were in fact largely dependent upon the Hollanders for their necessary food supplies, and these keen traders had no scruples in enriching themselves at the cost of their foes. An abundance of timber and hemp also came from the Baltic and furnished the raw material for flourishing shipbuilding and ropemaking industries. Sawmills sprang up on the banks of the Zaan, and before long Zaandam became the chief centre of the timber trade of Europe. It will thus be seen at once how many Dutch interests were involved in the full maintenance of the rights to free fishing on the British coasts guaranteed by treaty, and why it was that the States-General under pressure from the States of Holland should have determined to send a special embassy to protest strongly and firmly against the edict of King James, and should have meantime promised the fishermen their protection in case of any attempt being made to compel them by armed force to pay the licences.

[7] The Zeelanders in the seventeenth century, though they sent out many fishermen to the Dogger Bank, to Greenland and Spitzbergen, did not take much part in the herring fishery. See note.

[8] Groot Placaet-Boek (July 19, 1606).

The step taken by King James had, however, from the English point of view much to recommend it. The English people saw the growing maritime strength and rapidly increasing commercial prosperity of the Dutch with jealous eyes. Their practical monopoly of the British fisheries was deeply resented. Pamphlets were written lamenting the decadence of English shipping and trade.[9] It was felt that the ancient claim of England to the sovereignty and dominion of the narrow seas was being challenged, and that its maintenance depended upon the numbers and the experience of the sea-faring population, for whom the fisheries were the best and most practical school. A petition is extant from the fishermen of the Cinque Ports to the King, showing that the Netherlanders drive them from their fishing, and sell fresh fish contrary to the laws, and beseeching His Majesty to impose on them a tax of fifteen shillings upon every last of fish, the same as they imposed on the English.[10] James was far from indisposed to listen to their complaints. Early in his reign, in 1604, an attempt had been made to enforce the eating of fish in England on fast-days, and the motive of it was plainly stated. It had little to do with religious observances. It was 'for the better increase of Seamen, to be readie at all times to serve in the Kings Majesties Navie, of which the fishermen of England have euer been the chiefest Seminarie and Nurserie.'[11] The suggestion that licences should be required for which a tax or toll should be paid naturally presented itself to the King, at this time in sore straits for money and at his wit's end how to obtain it, as a welcome expedient. It also afforded a means by which the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the British King in the British seas could be asserted and his regalities safeguarded.[12] The large revenue derived by Christian IV of Denmark from the tolls in the Sound had no doubt often made the impecunious James envious of his brother-in-law, whose right to levy such an import in Danish waters differed in no way from the right, which as King of Great Britain and Ireland he was now asserting, to demand a licence from all foreigners who desired to fish on the British coasts. His decision to issue the proclamation was confirmed by the appearance in March, 1609, of the famous treatise of Hugo Grotius, entitled _Mare Liberum_. The argument in this work seemed to be directed against the principle of a _dominium maris_ such as the English Kings had claimed for centuries in the 'narrow seas', and its publication at this time aroused the resentment of James, always tenaciously jealous of any infringement of his sovereign prerogatives. As a matter of fact, as has been shown by the late Professor Robert Fruin[13], the _Mare Liberum_ was originally a chapter of a larger unpublished work of Grotius, written to prove that the Portuguese had no exclusive rights in the Indian Ocean but that the Eastern seas and all others were open to the traders of every nation. The most burning question in the negotiations for the twelve years' truce, then just drawing to a close, had been that of the liberty to trade in the Indies, demanded with insistence by the Dutch, refused up to the very last peremptorily by the Spanish King, and conceded by him finally not directly but by a kind of subterfuge. The _Mare Liberum_ of Grotius saw the light at a time when it was hoped that his learned arguments might tend to allay the acuteness of the dispute by showing the reasonableness and legality of the position taken up by the Dutch. It is clear now that these arguments, though their application was general, had their special reference to Portuguese and not to British pretensions. Curiously enough, as will be seen later, it was in the long succession of Anglo-Dutch negotiations over the fisheries in the seas over which the Crown of England claimed paramount sovereignty and jurisdiction that the thesis put forward by the author of the _Mare Liberum_ was destined to be the source of embittered controversy. The acute mind of King James was quick in grasping its importance.

[9] _A Pollitique Platt_, by Robert Hitchcock, 1580.

_Observations made upon the Dutch fishery about the year 1601_, by John Keymer. Ralegh, _Works_, i. 144.

Sir Thomas Overbury's observations in his travels in 1609: _Harleian Misc._ viii. 349.

Discourse addressed to the King by Sir Nicholas Hales, on the benefit derived by the Dutch from English fisheries. Terms suggested for granting them a licence to fish for twenty-one years. _Calendar of State Papers, Dom. Ser., 1603-10_, p. 509.

[10] _Cal. State Papers, Dom. Ser., 1603-10_, p. 509.

[11] _Statutes of the Realm_, iv. 2, p. 1058.

[12] Letter of Salisbury to Cornwallis, June 8, 1609. Winwood's _State Papers_, iii. 44-50.

[13] Fruin's _Verspreide Geschriften_, vol. iii, pp. 408-45.