Part 1

Transcriber's Note:

Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

Small capital text has been replaced with all capitals.

The carat character (^) indicates that the following letter is superscripted (example: 17^e).

Minor typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected without note. Irregularities and inconsistencies in the text have been retained as printed.

Mismatched quotes are not fixed if it's not sufficiently clear where the missing quote should be placed.

* * * * *

ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY

DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

BEING THE FORD LECTURES

DELIVERED AT OXFORD IN 1910

BY THE

REV. GEORGE EDMUNDSON, M.A. F.R.G.S. F.R. HIST. S.

LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE HONORARY MEMBER OF THE DUTCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY (UTRECHT) FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE SOCIETY OF NETHERLANDS LITERATURE (LEYDEN)

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1911

HENRY FROWDE, M.A. PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

PREFACE

The varying fortunes of the obstinate and fiercely contested struggles with the Dutch for maritime and commercial supremacy in the days of the Commonwealth and the Restoration are familiar to all readers of English history, and especially of English naval history. Never did English seamen fight better than in these Dutch wars, and never did they meet more redoubtable foes. The details of the many dogged contests marked by alternate victory and defeat are now more or less unintelligible save to the expert in the naval strategy and tactics of the times, but legends have grown round the story of Martin Tromp sailing down the Channel with a broom at his mast-head, and of the exploit of Michael de Ruyter in burning the English ships at Chatham, which are never likely to be forgotten. The names of these two famous seamen are probably better known to Englishmen than those of any of the contemporary English admirals save that of Robert Blake alone. This fact should bespeak for the attempt that is here made to trace the causes and the growth of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry at sea and in commerce, which culminated in the collision between Blake and Tromp off Dover on May 29, 1652, and the declaration of war that followed. It has been my object in these Ford Lectures to treat of the relations between England and the United Provinces during the half-century that preceded the first outbreak of hostilities, and to make it clear that these wars of 1652-4, 1665-7, 1672-4 were the inevitable outcome of a long-continued clashing of interests, which were of fundamental importance and indeed vital to the welfare of both nations.

The first half of the seventeenth century was one of the most critical periods in English history. In any account of the reigns of the first two sovereigns of the House of Stewart political and religious questions of primary significance thrust themselves into the foreground of a picture full of deepening dramatic interest, with the result that other questions, apparently subordinate but in reality closely bound up with the national destinies, have been either relegated to the background or wholly overlooked and neglected. It has been so in regard to the questions dealt with in these pages.

The history of the revolt of the Netherlands and of the rise of the Dutch Republic shows to us Englishmen and Dutchmen united by bonds of sympathy and fighting side by side against a common foe. To both alike the Spaniard and the Inquisition were hateful, and in shedding their blood freely for the cause of Dutch freedom Englishmen were in fact acting in their own self-defence against the ambitious projects of Philip II. At first sight then it appears strange that the conclusion of the truce for twelve years in 1609 should have been followed by a coolness and growing estrangement in the relations between the two countries, and by a series of endless bickerings, grievances, and disputes which all the resources of diplomacy in protracted negotiations proved unable to settle amicably to the satisfaction of both parties. The truth is that the very points of resemblance in the racial characteristics of the English and the Dutch brought them into collision in almost every part of the world. Born colonizers, traders, and explorers, each people was instinctively conscious that its destiny was upon the water, and that mastery of the seas was a necessity of national existence. Hence a rivalry which was unavoidable, inexorable, a rivalry which could eventually have only one of two issues, either the voluntary submission of one of the rivals to the other, or a trial of strength by ordeal of battle.

James I and Charles I, whatever the deficiencies and mistakes of their foreign policies, were not blind to the significance of the appearance of this new sea-power on the other side of the 'narrow seas', and were quick to recognize that the Dutch menace to the essential interests of their island kingdom was at least as formidable as the Spanish menace had ever been. The diplomacy of both these kings was on the face of it vacillating, uncertain, and opportunist, but it is unjust to attribute this wholly to constitutional infirmity of purpose, or to an innate propensity to carry through their schemes by tortuous by-ways and dubious intrigues. There was no lack of steadfast determination on the part either of James or Charles in their resolute attempts to conduct the government and administration of their kingdoms autocratically without that adequate financial aid which Parliament alone could grant. But in consequence their treasury was generally empty, and it is therefore not surprising that, confronted with the constant fear of imminent bankruptcy, they were compelled to be shifty in their dealings with foreign powers, and to work for the achievement of their ends by the processes of a devious diplomacy rather than risk the costly charges of an appeal to arms. Nevertheless it will be seen that in their negotiations with the United Provinces never for a single moment would either James or Charles make the slightest concession in regard to the claims of the British Crown to undisputed sovereignty 'in the narrow seas', and they insisted that every foreign vessel should recognize that sovereignty by striking its flag when meeting a British war-ship in those waters.

The period with which I am dealing was one of chartered companies, of trade monopolies, and of commercial protection in its most aggressive form. Probably at that stage in the world's history no other economical system was conceivable or would have proved workable. In any case most of the disputes and differences between the English and the Dutch at this time arose from questions connected with trading privileges, and these lectures contain much concerning them. It is still, however, extremely interesting and not without instruction to read the arguments that were used and the principles that were upheld by these statesmen and diplomatists of former days. Economical questions are always with us, and men's opinions differ now as to their right solution as much as they did three centuries ago.

GEORGE EDMUNDSON.

11 SUMNER PLACE, S.W. _May 24, 1911._

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I: 1600-1610

The Elizabethan spirit of enterprise. Elizabeth and the revolt of the Netherlands. Mission of Leicester. Rise of the Dutch Republic. Its cumbrous form of government. Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice of Nassau. Character of Elizabeth's policy. Treaty of 1598. Attitude of James I to the Dutch. Negotiations for the twelve years' truce. Intrigues of the Spaniards to gain James's support. The Venetian, Nicolo Molin's review of the situation. Conclusion of the truce. Changed relations between England and the States. Royal proclamation of 1609 restricting liberty of fishing in the British seas. Indignation in Holland. Dutch embassy sent to London. The States-General promise protection to their fishermen. Winwood's interview with Oldenbarneveldt. The Fisheries question. _Magnus Intercursus._ Treaty of Binche. The Great (or Herring) Fishery. Its importance. The basis of Dutch trade. The Proclamation popular in England. James's motives. Grotius's _Mare Liberum_. Conferences with the Dutch envoys. The Jülich-Cleves Succession. Siege of Jülich. Execution of Fisheries Proclamation postponed. The Spanish Marriage question. Situation in 1611 as reported by the Venetian, Marcantonio Correr PAGES 11-33.

II: 1610-1618

Growing rivalry between the English and Dutch. English public opinion expresses itself in pamphlets. Ralegh's _Observations_. _England's Way to Win Wealth_, by Tobias Gentleman. _The Trades' Increase_, by J. R. Views of the Venetian, Pietro Contarini. Gondomar, Spanish ambassador in London. His influence with James. Deaths of Robert Cecil and Prince Henry. Effect on English policy. Rapid progress of the United Provinces in trade and wealth. Oldenbarneveldt ransoms the Cautionary Towns. Sir Dudley Carleton, ambassador in Holland. The Greenland (or Spitzbergen) Fishery dispute. Monopoly granted to the Muscovy Company. Dutch opposition. The rival claims. Sir H. Wotton's mission. Armed collision of 1618. History of the cloth trade between England and the Netherlands. The Merchant Adventurers. Alva expels them from Antwerp. Their settlement at Middelburg, 1598. Revocation of Charter by James, 1615. Patent granted to Cockayne's Company. Dutch prohibition. Failure of Cockayne. Adventurers' Charter restored. Anger of James. Attempt to levy a toll on the Dutch fishing busses. The John Browne affair. Browne arrested. English reprisals. Satisfaction given by the States. Fishing dispute remains an open sore. Rivalry of the two East India Companies. The spice trade. Situation acute. Carleton demands that a special embassy be sent to London to discuss all points of difference PAGES 34-57.

III: 1618-1623

Civil discord in the United Provinces. The embassy of 1618 to England. Its powers limited to the Greenland and East Indian questions. The herring fishery and cloth disputes not to be discussed. James demands peremptory settlement of fishery question. Reply of the States' envoys. Difficulties insuperable. James grants a brief delay. Long discussions upon the Greenland and East Indian differences. No agreement arrived at. Outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. Disasters of the Elector Palatine in Bohemia. Confronted by a common danger, English and Dutch negotiators become more amenable. Temporary _modus vivendi_ agreed upon. James's Spanish proclivities feared in Holland. Dutch embassy of 1621. Presses for an alliance for mutual defence and recovery of the Palatinate. James's difficulties with his Parliament and financial straits. Strong influence of Gondomar with the King. James demands settlement of disputes as the preliminary to an alliance. Embassy returns without result. The Merchant Adventurers set up their Court and Staple at Delft. Another Dutch embassy in 1622. Francis Aerssen van Sommelsdijk at its head. Its instructions. Conferences in London. Testiness and ill-humour of the King. An East Indian accord. After fourteen months in England the embassy returns, leaving all other points of dispute unsettled PAGES 58-81.

IV: 1623-1629

Prince Charles and Buckingham at Madrid. The English and Scottish regiments in the Dutch service. The Dutch West India Company. Conciliatory policy of the States General. Effect of the failure of the Spanish Marriage project. James's hand forced. Interview of Carleton with Maurice of Nassau. Mission of Aerssen and Joachimi, February, 1627. Defensive alliance concluded, June 15. English levies for the Netherlands. Negotiations interrupted. Death of Caron, December 12; James I, March 27; Maurice of Nassau, April 25. Albert Joachimi succeeds Noel Caron as Dutch resident minister in England. Francis van Aerssen and Rienck van Burmania, with Joachimi, sent (June, 1625) on special embassy to Charles I on his accession. Treaty of Southampton (an offensive and defensive alliance) signed September 17. A Dutch squadron takes part in the ill-fated expedition to Cadiz. The old differences between the two countries revive. States-General refuse to give the English Resident a seat on the Council of State. Complaints of the Merchant Adventurers. Right of search for contraband. Jacob Cats goes to London, 1627. The massacre of Amboina, and fishery questions. Dutch policy of delay. No settlement reached. Comment of Aitzema on the Cats' mission. Difficulties of Charles I. The disastrous expedition to La Rochelle. Lord Carleton sent as envoy extraordinary to the Hague. His secret instructions and attempts at negotiation. Another Dutch embassy dispatched to England, January, 1628. Lord Carlisle sent to join Carleton at the Hague with further instructions (May). Small results of so much diplomacy. Assassination of Buckingham. Final breach of Charles with his Parliament. Dutch mediation brings about peace with France, April 24, 1629 PAGES 82-104.

V: 1629-1641

Vacillating foreign policy of Charles I. Alliance between France and the United Provinces, 1635. Cornelis van Beveren sent by the States-General (March, 1636) to try in conjunction with the French ambassador at Whitehall to draw England into a triple alliance. Charles issues a Proclamation (April), prohibiting fishing upon His Majesty's coasts and seas without a licence and payment of a toll. John Selden's _Mare Clausum seu Dominium Maris_. Joachimi summoned to the Hague. An English fleet sails north to enforce payment of the toll. Instructions given to Joachimi. He returns and meets the King at Woodstock, September 3. The King obdurate. Dutch squadron sent to protect the fishermen. No collision between the rival fleets. The toll uncollected. Van Beveren renews negotiations. Offers Dutch co-operation in the Palatinate for withdrawal of fishing proclamation. Charles undertakes not to enforce the licence, but will not yield on question of the sovereignty of the seas. Conference arranged at Hamburg for conclusion of a quadruple Protestant alliance. Insincerity of Charles. Suspicions of the Dutch. Difficulties, delays and intrigues. Failure of the Conference. The King turns again to Spain. Sailing of Spanish armada under Admiral Oquendo in 1639. Encounter with a Dutch squadron, September 21. Driven to seek refuge in English waters. Battle of the Downs, October 21. Total destruction of the Spanish fleet by Tromp. Infringement of English neutrality. Indignation of Charles. Aerssen sent over on a mission of conciliation. His diplomatic skill and tact. The matter hushed up. The King has no alternative. His bankrupt state. Compelled to summon Parliament. His domestic complications and difficulties. Meeting of the Long Parliament. Evidence to show that the King did not invite the Spaniards to take refuge in English waters. They arrived unexpectedly and as unwelcome guests. Heenvliet arrives in London to negotiate a marriage between William, the only son of the Stadholder, and Mary, Princess Royal of England. His overtures successful. The marriage takes place amidst public rejoicings, May 12, 1641 PAGES 105-31.

VI: 1641-1653

Ominous political state of England at the time of the marriage of William and Mary. Confidential relations of Heenvliet with Henrietta Maria. Visit of the Queen to Holland. Her efforts to secure help for the royalist cause. Goodwill of Frederick Henry. The Dutch people generally anti-royalist. Mission of Walter Strickland from the Parliament. The States-General refuse to receive him. Under pressure from Holland they declare for strict neutrality. They send two envoys in 1644 to offer mediation between the King and the Parliament. After more than a year of futile effort they return. Death of Frederick Henry, March, 1647. Peace of Munster, January, 1648. Character and ambitions of William II, Prince of Orange. His affection for and generosity to his English relatives. Mission of Dr. Doreslaar. The States-General will not grant him audience. Adrian Pauw and Albert Joachimi commissioned to intercede for the life of Charles I. The news of the King's execution excites universal horror and detestation in the States. Condolences are officially offered to King Charles II. The English Council of State send over Isaac Doreslaar and Walter Strickland to propose closer relations between the two republics. Doreslaar is assassinated. Recall of Strickland. Joachimi ordered to leave London. The province of Holland takes independent action. The States of Holland send Gerard Schaep to London to bring about a better understanding, January, 1650. The Prince of Orange engages in a struggle for supremacy with the States of Holland. Supported by the States-General, he compels the submission of the Hollanders by armed force. His ultimate aim with the aid of France to attempt a Stewart restoration. His sudden death by small-pox, November 6, 1650. His death followed by revolution. The Stadholderate is abolished. The Great Gathering. Holland supreme in the State. The Commonwealth recognized. Joachimi returns to London. St. John and Strickland make a state entry into the Hague. Hostile reception. Negotiations for 'a more strict and intimate alliance and union'. Divergence of views. No prospect of agreement. The English envoys leave the Hague, July, 1651. Bitterness in England against the Dutch. All the old grievances raked up. Navigation Act. Deadly blow to Dutch commerce. Mission of Cats, Schaep, and Perre, December 27, 1651. Both sides arming. Exorbitant English demands. Refusal of the Dutch to accept them. Conflict between Tromp and Blake off Dover, May 19. Final negotiations. Dutch envoys leave England, June 30. War declared PAGES 132-57.

APPENDIX

PAGES

A. THE GREAT OR HERRING FISHERY 158-61

B. THE NARROW SEAS 161-2

C. THE JÜLICH-CLEVES SUCCESSION QUESTION 162-3

D. THE ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE MERCHANT ADVENTURERS 163-8

E. THE INTERLOPERS 169

F. THE ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH REGIMENTS IN THE DUTCH SERVICE 169-73

G. KING CHARLES'S PROCLAMATION ON THE RESTRAINT OF FISHING, 1636 173-4

BIBLIOGRAPHY 175

I: 1600-1610

The last two decades of the sixteenth century hold a place apart in English History. The exploits of the great Elizabethan seamen helped to shatter the supremacy of Spain upon the sea, but they did more than this. They aroused in the English people the instinct of their true destiny, as a maritime, trading, and colonizing power. The granting of Charters to the Eastland (Baltic) Company (1579), to the Levant Company (1581), to the Guinea Company (1588), the foundation of the great East India Company (1600), the opening out by the Muscovy Company of a new trade route to Persia by way of Astrachan, the daring efforts to discover a North-West and a North-East passage to Cathay and the Indies, the first attempts to erect colonies in Virginia and Newfoundland, all testify to the spirit of enterprise which animated the nation, a spirit whose many-sided activity never failed to command the Queen's sympathy and encouragement. In thus entering, however, upon that path of colonial and commercial expansion which in later times was to become world-wide, the Englishman found himself in the first half of the seventeenth century confronted by a more formidable rival than the Spaniard. The defeat of the Invincible Armada was followed[1] by the rise of a new Sea-Power. At the opening of the seventeenth century the Dutch Republic had not only succeeded in resisting all the efforts made for its subjugation to Spanish rule, but, after more than thirty years of continuous and desperate struggle, was thriving in the midst of war. In the course of that struggle much help had been given, both in money and men, by Elizabeth. But the English Queen was not for many years whole-hearted in her support. She saw in the revolt of the Netherlands a means for draining the resources of a dangerous adversary. It was no small relief to her that the coast lying opposite to the mouth of the Thames, with its many ports and hardy sea-faring population, should no longer be at the disposal of the master of the strongest navy in the world. She felt a certain amount of sympathy with the Dutch on religious grounds, but a sympathy tempered by political considerations, and strictly subordinated to them. To support the rebellion of subjects against their legitimate ruler was to the instincts of the Tudor Queen a course which only necessity could justify. Hence her repeated refusal of the proffered sovereignty, her niggardly aid, her temporizing and apparently capricious attitude. As a matter of fact, throughout this critical period of her reign the policy of Elizabeth was not governed either by sentiment or by caprice. She always kept steadily in view the welfare and the security of England, with whose interests those of her own throne were identified, and she held aloof from entanglements which might be dangerous to the safety of her kingdom. Not until after the assassination of William the Silent, followed by the success of Parma in capturing Antwerp, August, 1585, did she make reply to the threatening attitude of Spain by openly taking sides with the rebel provinces. Still refusing the sovereignty, she sent Leicester at the head of a strong body of English troops to act in her name, as Governor-General, at the same time characteristically bargaining that the seaports Flushing and Brill with the fort of Rammekens should be delivered to her in pledge for the repayment of her costs. The mission of Leicester was a failure, whether it be regarded from the military or the political standpoint, but it gave the Dutch at a transition period of disorganization and pressing peril a disciplined force to assist in their defence, and a breathing space for recuperation.

[1] See the admirable monograph on the subject by the late Professor Robert Fruin, _Tien Jaren uit de Tachtigjarigen Oorlog, 1588-98_.