Chapter 31

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

A contest greater than with Pyrrhus and the Greek cities, more memorable in its incidents, and more important in its consequences, now awaited the Romans. This was with Carthage, the greatest power, next to Rome, in the world at that time—a commercial State which had been gradually aggrandized for three hundred years. It was a rich and powerful city at the close of the Persian wars. It had succeeded Tyre as the mistress of the sea.

(M829) We have seen, in the second book, how the Carthaginians were involved in wars with Syracuse, when that city had reached the acme of its power under Dionysius. We have also alluded to the early history and power of Carthage. At the time Pyrrhus landed in Sicily, it contained nearly a million of people, and controlled the northern coast of Africa, and the western part of the Mediterranean. Carthage was strictly a naval power, although her colonies were numerous, and her dependencies large. The land forces were not proportionate to the naval; but large armies were necessary to protect her dependencies in the constant wars in which she was engaged. These armies were chiefly mercenaries, and their main strength consisted in light cavalry.

(M830) The territories of Carthage lay chiefly in the islands which were protected by her navy and enriched by her commerce. Among these insular possessions, Sardinia was the largest and most important, and was the commercial depot of Southern Europe. A part of Sicily, also, as we have seen (Book ii., chap. 24), was colonized and held by her, and she aimed at the sovereignty of the whole island. Hence the various wars with Syracuse. The Carthaginians and Greeks were the rivals for the sovereignty of this fruitful island, the centre of the oil and wine trade, the store-house for all sorts of cereals. Had Carthage possessed the whole of Sicily, her fleets would have controlled the Mediterranean.

(M831) The embroilment of Carthage with the Grecian States on this island was the occasion of the first rupture with Rome. Messina, the seat of the pirate republic of the Mamertines, was in close alliance with Rhegium, a city which had grown into importance during the war with Pyrrhus. Rhegium, situated on the Italian side of the strait, solicited the protection of Rome, and a body of Campanian troops was sent to its assistance. These troops expelled or massacred the citizens for whose protection they had been sent, and established a tumultuary government. On the fall of Tarentum, the Romans sought to punish this outrage, and also to embrace the opportunity to possess a town which would facilitate a passage to Sicily, for Sicily as truly belonged to Italy as the Peloponnesus to Greece, being separated only by a narrow strait. A Roman army was accordingly sent to take possession of Rhegium, but the defenders made a desperate resistance. It was finally taken by storm, and the original citizens obtained repossession, as dependents and allies of Rome. The fall of Rhegium robbed the pirate city of Messina of the only ally on which it could count, and subjected it to the vengeance of both the Carthaginians and the Syracusans. The latter were then under the sway of Hiero, who, for fifty years, had reigned without despotism, and had quietly developed both the resources and the freedom of the city. He collected an army of citizens, devoted to him, who expelled the Mamertines from many of their towns, and gained a decisive victory over them, not far from Messina.

(M832) The Mamertines, in danger of subjection by the Syracusans, then looked for foreign aid. One party looked to Carthage, and another to Rome. The Carthaginian party prevailed on the Mamertines to receive a Punic garrison. The Romans, seeking a pretext for a war with Carthage, sent an army ostensibly to protect Messina against Hiero. But the strait which afforded a passage to Sicily was barred by a Carthaginian fleet. The Romans, unaccustomed to the sea, were defeated. Not discouraged, however, they finally succeeded in landing at Messina, and although Carthage and Rome were at peace, seized Hanno, the Carthaginian general, who had the weakness to command the evacuation of the citadel as a ransom for his person.

(M833) On this violation of international law, Hiero, who feared the Romans more than the Carthaginians, made an alliance with Carthage, and the combined forces of Syracuse and Carthage marched to the liberation of Messina. The Romans, under Appius, the consul, then made overtures of peace to the Carthaginians, and bent their energies against Hiero. But Hiero, suspecting the Carthaginians of treachery, for their whole course with the Syracusans for centuries had been treacherous, retired to Syracuse. Upon which the Romans attacked the Carthaginians singly, and routed them, and spread devastation over the whole island.

This was the commencement of the first Punic war, in which the Romans were plainly the aggressors. Two consular armies now threatened Syracuse, when Hiero sought peace, which was accepted on condition of provisioning the Roman armies, and paying one hundred talents to liberate prisoners.

The first Punic war began B.C. 264, and lasted twenty-four years. Before we present the leading events of that memorable struggle, let us glance at the power of Carthage—the formidable rival of Rome.

(M834) As has been narrated, Carthage was founded upon a peninsula, or rocky promontory, sixty-five years before the foundation of Rome. The inhabitants of Carthage, descendants of Phœnicians, were therefore of Semitic origin. The African farmer was a Canaanite, and all the Canaanites lacked the instinct of political life. The Phœnicians thought of commerce and wealth, and not political aggrandizement. With half their power, the Hellenic cities achieved their independence. Carthage was a colony of Phœnicians, and had their ideas. It lived to traffic and get rich. It was washed on all sides, except the west, by the sea, and above the city, on the western heights, was the citadel Byrsa, called so from the word βύρσα, a hide, according to the legend that Dido, when she came to Africa, bought of the inhabitants as much land as could be encompassed by a bull’s hide, which she cut into thongs, and inclosed the territory on which she built the citadel. The city grew to be twenty-three miles in circuit, and contained seven hundred thousand people. It had two harbors, an outer and inner, the latter being surrounded by a lofty wall. A triple wall was erected across the peninsula, to protect it from the west, three miles long, and between the walls were stables for three hundred elephants, four thousand horses, and barracks for two thousand infantry, with magazines and stores. In the centre of the inner harbor was an island, called Cothon, the shores of which were lined with quays and docks for two hundred and twenty ships. The citadel, Byrsa, was two miles in circuit, and when it finally surrendered to the Romans, fifty thousand people marched out of it. On its summit was the famous temple of Æsculapius. At the northwestern angle of the city were twenty immense reservoirs, each four hundred feet by twenty-eight, filled with water, brought by an aqueduct at a distance of fifty-two miles. The suburb Megara, beyond the city walls, but within those that defended the peninsula, was the site of magnificent gardens and villas, which were adorned with every kind of Grecian art, for the Carthaginians were rich before Rome had conquered even Latium. This great city controlled the other Phœnician cities, part of Sicily, Numidia, Mauritania, Lybia—in short, the northern part of Africa, and colonies in Spain and the islands of the western part of the Mediterranean. The city alone could furnish in an exigency forty thousand heavy infantry, one thousand cavalry, and twenty thousand war chariots. The garrison of the city amounted to twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, and the total force which the city could command was more than one hundred thousand men. The navy was the largest in the world, for, in the sea-fight with Regulus, it numbered three hundred and fifty ships, carrying one hundred and fifty thousand men.

Such was this great power against which the Romans were resolved to contend. It would seem that Carthage was willing that Rome should have the sovereignty of Italy, provided it had itself the possession of Sicily. But this was what the Romans were determined to prevent. The object of contention, then, between these two rivals, the one all-powerful by land and the other by sea, was the possession of Sicily.

(M835) During the first three years of the war, the Romans made themselves masters of all the island, except the maritime fortresses at its western extremity, Eryx and Panormus. Meanwhile the Carthaginians ravaged the coasts of Italy, and destroyed its commerce. The Romans then saw that Sicily could not be held without a navy as powerful as that of their rivals, and it was resolved to build at once one hundred and twenty ships. A Carthaginian quinquereme, wrecked on the Bruttian shore, furnished the model, the forests of Silo the timber, and the maritime cities of Italy and Greece, the sailors. In sixty days a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships was built and ready for sea. The superior seamanship of the Carthaginians was neutralized by converting the decks into a battle-field for soldiers. Each ship was provided with a long boarding-bridge, hinged up against the mast, to be let down on the prow, and fixed to the hostile deck by a long spike, which projected from its end. The bridge was wide enough for two soldiers to pass abreast, and its sides were protected by bulwarks.

(M836) The first encounter of the Romans with the Carthaginians resulted in the capture of the whole force, a squadron of seventeen ships. The second encounter ended in the capture of more ships than the Roman admiral, Cn. Scipio, had lost. The next battle, that of Mylæ, in which the whole Roman fleet was engaged, again turned in favor of the Romans, whose bad seamanship provoked the contempt of their foes, and led to self-confidence. The battle was gained by grappling the enemy’s ships one by one. The Carthaginians lost fourteen ships, and only saved the rest by inglorious flight.

(M837) For six years no decided victories were won by either side, but in the year B.C. 256, nine years from the commencement of hostilities, M. Atilius Regulus, a noble of the same class and habits as Cincinnatus and Fabricius, with a fleet of three hundred and thirty ships, manned by one hundred thousand sailors, encountered the Carthaginian fleet of three hundred and fifty ships on the southern coast of Sicily, and gained a memorable victory. It was gained on the same principle as Epaminondas and Alexander won their battles, by concentrating all the forces upon a single point, and breaking the line. The Romans advanced in the shape of a wedge, with the two consuls’ ships at the apex. The Carthaginian admirals allowed the centre to give way before the advancing squadron. The right wing made a circuit out in the open sea, and took the Roman reserve in the rear, while the left wing attacked the vessels that were towing the horse transports, and forced them to the shore. But the Carthaginian centre, being thus left weak, was no match for the best ships of the Romans, and the consuls, victorious in the centre, turned to the relief of the two rear divisions. The Carthaginians lost sixty-four ships, which were taken, besides twenty-four which were sunk, and retreated with the remainder to the Gulf of Carthage, to defend the shores against the anticipated attack.

(M838) The Romans, however, made for another point, and landed in the harbor of Aspis, intrenched a camp to protect their ships, and ravaged the country. Twenty thousand captives were sent to Rome and sold as slaves, besides an immense booty—a number equal to a fifth part of the free population of the city. A footing in Africa was thus made, and so secure were the Romans, that a large part of the army was recalled, leaving Regulus with only forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry. Yet with this small army he defeated the Carthaginians, and became master of the country to within ten miles of Carthage. The Carthaginians, shut up in the city, sued for peace; but it was granted only on condition of the cession of Sicily and Sardinia, the surrender of the fleet, and the reduction of Carthage to the condition of a dependent city. Such a proposal was rejected, and despair gave courage to the defeated Carthaginians.

(M839) They made one grand effort while Regulus lay inactive in winter quarters. The return of Hamilcar from Sicily with veteran troops, which furnished a nucleus for a new army, inspired the Carthaginians with hope, and assisted by a Lacedæmonian general, Xanthippus, with a band of Greek mercenaries, the Carthaginians marched unexpectedly upon Regulus, and so signally defeated him at Tunis, that only two thousand Romans escaped. Regulus, with five hundred of the legionary force, was taken captive and carried to Carthage.

(M840) The Carthaginians now assumed the offensive, and Sicily became the battle-field. Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, landed on the island with one hundred and forty elephants, while the Roman fleet of three hundred ships suffered a great disaster off the Lucanian promontory. A storm arose, which wrecked one hundred and fifty ships—a disaster equal to the one which it suffered two years before, when two-thirds of the large fleet which was sent to relieve the two thousand troops at Clupea was destroyed by a similar storm. In spite of these calamities, the Romans took Panormus and Thermæ, and gained a victory under the walls of the former city which cost the Carthaginians twenty thousand men and the capture of one hundred and twenty elephants. This success, gained by Metellus, was the greatest yet obtained in Sicily, and the victorious general adorned his triumph with thirteen captured generals and one hundred and four elephants.

(M841) The two maritime fortresses which still held out at the west of the island, Drepanum and Lilybæum, were now invested, and the Carthaginians, shut up in these fortresses, sent an embassy to Rome to ask an exchange of prisoners, and sue for peace. Regulus, now five years a prisoner, was allowed to accompany the embassy, on his promise to return if the mission was unsuccessful. As his condition was now that of a Carthaginian slave, he was reluctant to enter the city, and still more the Senate, of which he was no longer a member. But when this reluctance was overcome, he denounced both the peace and the exchange of prisoners. The Romans wished to retain this noble patriot, but he was true to his oath, and returned voluntarily to Carthage, after having defeated the object of the ambassadors, knowing that a cruel death awaited him. The Carthaginians, indignant and filled with revenge, it is said, exposed the hero to a burning sun, with his eyelids cut off, and rolled him in a barrel lined with iron spikes.

(M842) The embassy having thus failed, the attack on the fortresses, which alone linked Africa with Sicily, was renewed. The siege of Lilybæum lasted till the end of the war, which, from the mutual exhaustion of the parties, now languished for six years. The Romans had lost four great fleets, three of which had arms on board, and the census of the city, in the seventeenth year, showed a decrease of forty thousand citizens. During this interval of stagnation, when petty warfare alone existed, Hamilcar Burca was appointed general of Carthage, and in the same year his son Hannibal was born, B.C. 247.

(M843) The Romans, disgusted with the apathy of the government, fitted out a fleet of privateers of two hundred ships, manned by sixty thousand sailors, and this fleet gained a victory over the Carthaginians, unprepared for such a force, so that fifty ships were sunk, and seventy more were carried by the victors into port. This victory gave Sicily to the Romans, and ended the war. The Roman prisoners were surrendered by Hamilcar, who had full powers for peace, and Carthage engaged to pay three thousand two hundred talents for the expenses of the war.

(M844) The Romans were gainers by this war. They acquired the richest island in the world, fertile in all the fruits of the earth, with splendid harbors, cities, and a great accumulation of wealth. The long war of twenty-four years, nearly a whole generation, was not conducted on such a scale as essentially to impoverish the contending parties. There were no debts contracted for future generations to pay. It was the most absorbing object of public interest, indeed; but many other events and subjects must also have occupied the Roman mind. It was a foreign war, the first that Rome had waged. It was a war of ambition, the commencement of those unscrupulous and aggressive measures that finally resulted in the political annihilation of all the other great powers of the world.

But this war, compared with those foreign wars which Rome subsequently conducted, was carried on without science and skill. It was carried on in the transition period of Roman warfare, when tactics were more highly prized than strategy. It was by a militia, and agricultural generals, and tactics, and personal bravery, that the various Italian nations were subdued, when war had not ripened into a science, such as was conducted even by the Greeks. There was no skill or experience in the conduct of sieges. The navy was managed by Greek mercenaries.

(M845) The great improvement in the science of war which this first contest with a foreign power led to, was the creation of a navy, and the necessity of employing veteran troops, led by experienced generals. A deliberative assembly, like the Senate, it was found could not conduct a foreign war. It was left to generals, who were to learn marches and countermarches, sieges, and a strategical system. The withdrawal of half the army of Regulus by the Senate proved nearly fatal. Carthage could not be subdued by that rustic warfare which had sufficed for the conquest of Etruria or Samnium. The new system of war demanded generals who had military training and a military eye, and not citizen admirals. The final success was owing to the errors of the Carthaginians rather than military science.