CHAPTER XI

Chapter 223,946 wordsPublic domain

ANARCHISM AND ITS SPECIES

I.--ERRORS ABOUT ANARCHISM AND ITS SPECIES

It has now become possible to set aside some of the numerous errors about Anarchism and its species.

I. It is said that Anarchism has abolished morality and bases itself upon scientific materialism,[1170] that its ideal of society is determined by its peculiar conception of the way things come to pass in history.[1171] If this were correct, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tucker, Tolstoi, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would have to be regarded as not Anarchistic.

2. It is asserted that Anarchism sets up the happiness of the individual as final goal,[1172] that it appraises every human action from the abstract view-point of the unlimited right of the individual,[1173] that to it the supreme law is not the general welfare but every individual's free preference.[1174] Were this really the case, we should have to look upon the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tolstoi, and a multitude of other recognized Anarchistic teachings, as not Anarchistic.

3. The moral law of justice is set down as Anarchism's supreme law.[1175] Were this assertion correct, the teachings of Godwin, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and numerous other recognized Anarchistic teachings, could not rank as Anarchistic.

4. It is said that Anarchism culminates in the negation of every programme,[1176] that it has only a negative goal.[1177] If this were in accordance with truth, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and well-nigh all other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would not admit of being regarded as Anarchistic.

5. It is asserted that Anarchism rejects law,[1178] the compulsion of law.[1179] If this were so, the teachings of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, could not rank as Anarchistic.

6. It is declared that Anarchism rejects society,[1180] that its ideal consists in wiping out society to make a fresh start,[1181] that for it fellowship exists only to be combated.[1182] Were this correct, we should have to look upon the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and pretty nearly all other recognized Anarchistic teachings, as not Anarchistic.

7. It is said that Anarchism demands the abolition of the State,[1183] wills to destroy the State off the face of the earth,[1184] wills to have the State in no form at all,[1185] wills to have no government.[1186] If this were correct, the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin, and all the other recognized Anarchistic teachings which only foresee the abolition of the State but do not demand it, could not rank as Anarchistic.

8. It is asserted that in Anarchism's future society the individual's consent binds him only so long as he is disposed to keep it up.[1187] Were this really so, then the teachings of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would have to be looked upon as not Anarchistic.

9. It is said that Anarchism wills to put a federation in the place of the State,[1188] that what it is striving for is the ordering of all public affairs by free contracts among federalistically instituted communes and societies.[1189] Were this in accordance with truth, the teachings of Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would not admit of being regarded as Anarchistic, and no more would the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin and the rest of the recognized Anarchistic teachings that do not demand, but only foresee, a fellowship of contract.

10. It is declared that Anarchism rejects property.[1190] If this were correct, we should have to rate the teachings of Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and all the other recognized Anarchistic teachings that affirm property either unconditionally or at any rate in some particular form, as not Anarchistic.

11. It is asserted that Anarchism rejects private property,[1191] endeavors to establish community of goods,[1192] is necessarily communistic.[1193] Were Anarchism necessarily communistic, then, in the first place, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi, and all the other recognized Anarchistic teachings which negate property in every form, even as the property of society, could not rank as Anarchistic; and furthermore, neither could the teachings of Tucker and Bakunin, and such other recognized Anarchistic teachings as affirm private property either in all things or at least in goods for direct consumption. And if in addition to this it were a matter of rejection or endeavor, then not even Kropotkin's teaching, and the rest of the recognized Anarchistic teachings which do not demand, but foresee, a communistic form of property, could be regarded as Anarchistic.

12. A distinction is made between Communist, Collectivist, and Individualist Anarchism,[1194] or simply between Communist and Individualist Anarchism.[1195] Were the first division a complete one, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi, and all the other recognized Anarchistic teachings that do not affirm property in any form, could not rank as Anarchistic; were the second complete, these again could not, nor yet could Bakunin's teaching and such other recognized Anarchistic teachings as affirm a property in the means of production only for society, but in the supplies of consumption for individuals also.

13. It is said that Anarchism preaches crime,[1196] looks to a violent revolution for the initiation of the new condition,[1197] seeks to attain its goal with the help of all agencies, even theft and murder.[1198] If Anarchism conceived of its realization as taking place by crime, we should have to look upon the teachings of Godwin and Proudhon and very many more recognized Anarchistic teachings as not Anarchistic; and, if it conceived of its realization as taking place by criminal acts of violence, the teachings of Tucker and Tolstoi and numerous other recognized Anarchistic teachings would also have to be regarded as not Anarchistic.

14. It is asserted that Anarchism recognizes the propaganda of deed as a means toward its realization.[1199] If this were correct, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and most of the other recognized Anarchistic teachings, could not rank as Anarchistic.

2.--THE CONCEPTS OF ANARCHISM AND ITS SPECIES

It is now possible, furthermore, to determine the common and special qualities of the Anarchistic teachings, to assign them a place in the total realm of our experience, and thus to define conceptually Anarchism and its species.

I. _The common and special qualities of the Anarchistic teachings._

1. The Anarchistic teachings have in common only this, that they negate the State for our future. In the cases of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tucker, the negation means that they reject the State unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere; in the case of Tolstoi it means that he rejects the State, though not unconditionally, yet for our future; in the cases of Bakunin and Kropotkin it means that they foresee that in future the progress of evolution will do away with the State.

2. As to their basis, the Anarchistic teachings are classifiable as _genetic_, recognizing as the supreme law of human procedure merely a law of nature (Bakunin, Kropotkin) and _critical_, regarding a norm as the supreme law of human procedure. The critical teachings, again, are classifiable as _idealistic_, whose supreme law is a duty (Proudhon, Tolstoi), and _eudemonistic_, whose supreme law is happiness. The eudemonistic teachings, finally, are on their part further classifiable as _altruistic_, for which the general happiness is supreme law (Godwin), and _egoistic_, for which the individual's happiness takes this rank (Stirner, Tucker).

As to what they affirm for our future in contrast to the State, the Anarchistic teachings are either _federalistic_--that is, they affirm for our future a social human life on the basis of the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker)--or _spontanistic_--that is, they affirm for our future a social human life on the basis of a non-juridical controlling principle (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi).

As to their relation to law, a part of the Anarchistic teachings are _anomistic_, negating law for our future (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi); the other part are _nomistic_, affirming it for our future (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker).

As to their relation to property, the Anarchistic teachings are partly _indoministic_, negating property for our future (Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi), partly _doministic_, affirming it for our future. The doministic teachings, again, are partly _individualistic_, affirming property, without limitation, for the individual as well as for the collectivity (Tucker), partly _collectivistic_, affirming as to supplies for direct consumption a property that will sometimes be the individual's, but as to the means of production a property that is only for the collectivity (Bakunin), and, finally, partly _communistic_, affirming property solely for the collectivity (Kropotkin).

As to how they conceive their realization, the Anarchistic teachings divide into the _reformatory_, which conceive the transition from the negated to the affirmed condition as without breach of law (Godwin, Proudhon), and _revolutionary_, which conceive this transition as a breach of law. The revolutionary teachings, again, divide into _renitent_, which conceive the breach of law as without the use of force (Tucker, Tolstoi) and _insurgent_, which conceive it as attended by the use of force (Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin).

II. _The place of the Anarchistic teachings in the total realm of our experience._

1. There must be distinguished three lines of thought in the philosophy of law: that is, three fashions of judging law.

The first is _jurisprudential dogmatism_. It judges whether a legal institution ought to exist or not, and it judges quite unconditionally, solely by what the institution consists of, without regard to its effect under this or that particular set of circumstances. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of a _proper law_: that is, the schools that seek to determine what law--for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage--is under all circumstances to be approved or to be disapproved. Its best known form is "natural law."

The weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism lies in its not taking account of the fact that our judgment of legal institutions must depend on their effects, and that one and the same legal institution has under different circumstances altogether different effects.

The second line of thought is _jurisprudential skepticism_. In view of the weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism it foregoes judgment on whether a legal institution ought to exist or not, and pronounces judgment only on whether the tendency of evolution gives ground for expecting that a legal institution will persist or disappear, arise or remain non-existent. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of the _evolution of law_: that is, the schools that undertake to inform us what sort of law is to be expected in future--for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage has a prospect of remaining in force among us. Its best-known forms are the historical school in the science of law, and Marxism.

The weakness of jurisprudential skepticism consists in its not meeting our want of a scientific basis that shall enable us to recognize as correct or incorrect the incessantly-appearing judgments on the value of legal institutions, and to approve or disapprove the manifold propositions for changes in law.

The third line of thought is _jurisprudential criticism_. In view of the weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism it foregoes passing judgment, without regard to the particular circumstances under which a legal institution operates, on whether that institution ought to exist or not; but yet in view of the weakness of jurisprudential skepticism it does not forego answering the question whether a legal institution ought to exist or not. It therefore sets up a supreme governing principle by which legal institutions are to be judged with regard to the particular circumstances under which they operate, the point being whether, under the particular circumstances under which a legal institution operates, it fulfils that supreme governing principle as well as is possible under these circumstances, or at least better than any other legal institution. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of _the propriety of law_: that is, the schools that set up fundamental principles by which it is to be determined what law--for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage--ought under any particular circumstances to exist or not to exist.

2. With respect to the State these three lines of thought in the philosophy of law may arrive at different judgments, each one from its standpoint.

First, to the _affirmation of the State_.

So far as the schools of jurisprudential dogmatism affirm the State, they approve of it unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere, without any regard to its effects under this or that particular set of circumstances.

Among the numerous affirmative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential dogmatism, the teachings of Hobbes, Hegel, and Jhering may perhaps be selected for emphasis as belonging to different sections of history.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential skepticism affirm the State, they foresee, looking to the course evolution is taking, that in our future the State will continue to exist.

The most notable representatives of jurisprudential skepticism, such as Puchta and Merkel, have offered no teaching regarding the State; but affirmative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential skepticism may be found, for instance, in Montaigne and Bernstein.

Finally, so far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism affirm the State, they commend it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.

Jurisprudential criticism has thus far been most clearly set forth by Stammler, who, however, has offered no teaching with regard to the State; but, for instance, Spencer's teaching may rank as an affirmative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism.

Second, the three lines of thought in the philosophy of law may arrive at the _negation of the State_, each one from its standpoint.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential dogmatism negate the State, they reject it unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere, without any regard to its effects under this or that particular set of circumstances.

Negative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential dogmatism are the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tucker.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential skepticism negate the State, they foresee, looking to the course evolution is taking, that in our future the State will disappear.

Negative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential skepticism are the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism negate the State, they reject it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.

A negative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism is Tolstoi's teaching.

3. Therefore, the place of the Anarchistic teachings in the total realm of our experience is defined by the fact that they, as a species of doctrine about the State in the philosophy of law,--to wit, as negative doctrines of the State,--stand in opposition to the other species of doctrine about the State, the affirmative doctrines of the State.

This may be represented as shown in the table on the following page.

III. _The concepts of Anarchism and its species._

1. Anarchism is the negation of the State in the philosophy of law: that is, it is that species of jurisprudential doctrine of the State which negates the State.

2. An Anarchistic teaching cannot be complete without stating on what basis it rests, what condition it affirms in contrast to the State, and how it conceives the transition to this condition as taking place. A basis, an affirmative side, and a conception of the transition to that which it affirms, are necessary constituents of any Anarchistic teaching. With regard to these constituents the following species of Anarchism may be distinguished.

First, as to basis, _genetic Anarchism_, which recognizes as supreme law of human procedure only a law of nature (Bakunin, Kropotkin), and _critical Anarchism_, which regards a norm as supreme law of human procedure; as subspecies of critical Anarchism, _idealistic Anarchism_, whose supreme law is a duty (Proudhon, Tolstoi), and _eudemonistic Anarchism_, whose supreme law is happiness; and, finally, as subspecies of eudemonistic Anarchism, _altruistic Anarchism_, for which the supreme law is the general happiness (Godwin), and _egoistic Anarchism_, for which the supreme law is the individual's happiness (Stirner, Tucker).

Second, as to the condition affirmed in contrast to the State, there may be distinguished _federalistic Anarchism_, which affirms for our future a social human life according to the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker), and _spontanistic Anarchism_, which affirms for our future a social life according to a non-juridical governing principle (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi).

Third, as to the conception of the transition to the affirmed condition, there may be distinguished _reformatory Anarchism_, which conceives the transition from the State to the condition affirmed in contrast thereto as taking place without breach of law (Godwin, Proudhon), and _revolutionary Anarchism_, which conceives this transition as a breach of law; as subspecies of revolutionary Anarchism, _renitent Anarchism_, which conceives the breach of law as without the use of violence (Tucker, Tolstoi), and _insurgent Anarchism_, which conceives it as attended by the use of violence (Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin).

3. An Anarchistic teaching may be complete without taking up a position toward law or property. Whenever, therefore, an Anarchistic teaching takes up a position toward the one or the other, it contains an accidental adjunct. The Anarchistic teachings that contain this adjunct may be classified according to its character; but, since Anarchism as such can be classified only according to the character of the necessary constituents of every Anarchistic teaching, such a classification _does not give us species of Anarchism_.

So far as the Anarchistic teachings take up a position toward law, they are either _anomistic_--that is, they negate law for our future (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi)--or _nomistic_--that is, they affirm it for our future (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker).

So far as they take up a position toward property, they are either _indoministic_, negating property for our future (Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi), or _doministic_, affirming it for our future; the doministic teachings, again, are either _individualistic_, affirming property, without limitation, for the individual as well as for the collectivity (Tucker), or _collectivistic_, affirming as to supplies for direct consumption a property which may be the individual's, but as to the means of production a property that is only for the collectivity (Bakunin), or, last of all, _communistic_, affirming property for the collectivity alone (Kropotkin).

All this is brought before the eye in the table on page 302.

[**Symbol: hand pointing right][The table is given as compiled by Eltzbacher. For correction of errors either certain or probable, see footnotes to pages 80, 97, 278; note also that under "condition affirmed" the distinction is excessively fine between Stirner, who would have men agree on the terms of a union which they are to stick to as long as they find it advisable, and Bakunin and Tucker, who would have them bound together by a contract limited by the inalienable right of secession.]

KEY: A - Genetic B - Idealistic C - Altrustic D - Egoistic E - Federalistic F - Spontanistic G - Reformatory H - Renitent I - Insurgent J - Anomistic K - Nomistic L - Indoministic M - Individualistic N - Collectivistic O - Communistic

===================================================================== | _Doctrines of the State_ | _Anarchistic Teachings_ | | _in the Philosophy of Law_ | _may possibly be_ | |-----------------+--------------------+ | | Affirmative | Negative | | | Doctrines | Doctrines | | | of the State | of the State | | |-----------------+ | | | ANARCHISM | | |-----------------+---------+----------+--------+-------------------| | |_As to |_As to its| _As to | _As to their | | |condition|conception| their | attitude toward | | |affirmed | of the |attitude| property_ | |_As to its basis_| in |transition| toward | | | |contrast | to the | law_ | | | | to the | affirmed | | | | | State_ |condition_| | | |---+-------------+---------+--+-------+---+----+----+--------------| | | Critical | | | |Revolu-| | | | Doministic | | +----+--------+ | | |tionary| | | +--------------| | | |Eudemon-| | | +-------+ | | | | | | | | | istic | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +--------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F |G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | |---+----+----+---+---+-----+--+---+---+---+----+----+----+----+----| | | | Go | | |Go* |Go| | | Go| | Go | | | | |---+----+----+---+---+-----+--+---+---+---+----+----+----+----+----| | | Pr | | |Pr | |Pr | | | | Pr |Pr* | | | | |---+----+----+---+---+-----+---+--+---+---+----+----+----+----+----| | | | |St | | St* | | |St |St*| |St* | | | | |---+----+----+---+---+-----+---+--+---+---+----+----+----+----+----| |Ba | | | |Ba | | | |Ba | | Ba | | | Ba | | |---+----+----+---+---+-----+---+--+---+---+----+----+----+----+----| |Kr | | | |Kr | | | |Kr | | Kr | | | | Kr | |---+----+----+---+---+-----+---+--+---+---+----+----+----+----+----| | | | |Tu |Tu | | |Tu| | | Tu | | Tu | | | |---+----+----+---+---+-----+---+--+---+---+----+----+----+----+----| | | To | | | | To | |To| |To | | To | | | | =====================================================================

* [See note, p. 301.]

FOOTNOTES:

[1170] "_Der Anarchismus und seine Traeger_" pp. 127, 124, 125.

[1171] Reichesberg p. 27.

[1172] Lenz p. 3.

[1173] Plechanow p. 80.

[1174] Rienzi p. 43.

[1175] Bernatzik pp. 2, 3.

[1176] Lenz p. 5.

[1177] Crispi p. 4.

[1178] Stammler pp. 2, 4, 34, 36.

[1179] Lenz pp. 1, 4.

[1180] Garraud p. 12, Tripels p. 253.

[1181] Silio p. 145.

[1182] Reichesberg pp. 14, 16.

[1183] Bernstein p. 359.

[1184] Lenz p. 5.

[1185] Bernatzik p. 3.

[1186] "_Hintermaenner_" p. 14.

[1187] Reichesberg p. 30.

[1188] "_Hintermaenner_" p. 14.

[1189] Lombroso p. 31.

[1190] Silio p. 145, Dubois p. 213.

[1191] Proal p. 50.

[1192] Lombroso p. 31.

[1193] Sernicoli vol. 2 p. 67, Garraud pp. 3, 4.

[1194] "_Die historische Entwickelung des Anarchismus_" p. 16; Zenker p. 161.

[1195] Rienzi p. 9; Stammler pp. 28-31; Merlino pp. 18, 27; Shaw p. 23.

[1196] Garraud p. 6; Lenz p. 5.

[1197] Sernicoli vol. 2 p. 116; Garraud p. 2; Reichesberg p. 38; Van Hamel p. 113.

[1198] Lombroso pp. 31, 35.

[1199] Garraud pp. 10-11; Lombroso p. 34; Ferri p. 257.

CONCLUSION

1. The personal want that impelled us toward a scientific knowledge of Anarchism has met with some satisfaction.

The concepts of Anarchism and its species have been defined; the most important errors have been removed; the most prominent Anarchistic teachings of earlier and recent times have been presented in detail. We have become acquainted with Anarchism's armory. We have seen all that can be objected against the State from all possible standpoints. We have been shown the most diverse orders of life as destined to take the State's place in future. The transition from the State to these orders of life has been represented to us in the most manifold ways.

He who would know Anarchism still more intimately, investigate the less notable teachings as well as the most prominent, and assign to both these and those their place in the causal nexus of historical events, will now find at least the foundation laid for his work. He knows with what sorts of teachings, and what parts of these teachings, he must concern himself, and what questions he must put to each of them. In this investigation he must expect many surprises: the teaching of the unknown Pisacane will astonish him by its originality, and that of the much-talked-of Most will show itself to be only a coarsened form of Kropotkin's. But on the whole it is hardly likely that the investigation will be worth the trouble it takes: the special ideas that Anarchism has to offer are given with tolerable completeness in the seven teachings here presented.

2. The external want on account of which Anarchism had to be scientifically known may now also be satisfied.

One thing we must at any rate do with regard to Anarchism: examine its teachings, as to their soundness or unsoundness, with courage, composure, and impartiality. But success in this task can be expected only if we no longer wander about aimlessly in the night of jurisprudential skepticism, or try to light it up with the lantern of dogmatism, but rather keep our eye fixed upon the guiding star of criticism.

Whether, besides this, it is requisite to oppose Anarchism or at least one or another of its species by especial instrumentalities of power,--whether, in particular, crime committed for the realization of Anarchistic teachings is a more serious misdeed than any political or even ordinary crime,--as to this the legislators of each country must decide with a view to the special conditions existing therein.

INDEX

OF DETAILS, EXEMPLIFICATIONS, AND CATCHWORDS IN THE QUOTATIONS FROM THE SEVEN WRITERS

The following index is not a translation of Eltzbacher's, and does not index his part of the work, but only the matter quoted from the seven writers. Furthermore, it does not index such parts of their work as are readily found by consulting the table of contents and