BOOK II.

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CHAP. I.

_Of the Interior Causes of Decline, arising from the Possession of Wealth.--Its general Operation on the Habits of Life, Manners, Education, and Ways of thinking and acting of the Inhabitants of a Country_.

As necessity was the first cause of industry and invention, from which wealth and power arise, it is natural that, when the action of that necessity becomes less urgent, those exertions to which it gave rise will gradually fall away. Though habit may sometimes counteract this tendency, in the individual, yet, taken upon a general scale, and from generation to generation, it must inevitably take place.

In this case, an individual who has obtained wealth enjoys an advantage, which no nation ever can expect. With only common prudence, he may cease from exertion or industry, and remain in affluence. If he has property in land, he may let it, and live on the rent; if in money, he may lend it, and live on the interest; but one nation cannot let its lands, or lend its capital to another. It must, by its own industry, render them productive. The great bulk of every nation, then, must be industrious, however wealthy it may be; otherwise, the wealth will soon be dissipated and disappear. The people of Flanders cannot, for example, cultivate the fields of the French, and live in Flanders; and, if the agriculture of a country is neglected, that country must soon become poor and miserable. {67}

--- {67} We have seen what became of the Romans, when the tribute paid by other nations enabled them to live in idleness. The influx of wealth from America produced nearly the same effect on Spain: though it lasted for a very short time, yet it ruined the country. -=-

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It is not absolutely necessary, then, for an individual to conciliate affluence with industry, or, which is the same thing, to preserve one of the effects of necessity, after the necessity has ceased to exist. But if it were possible for a sum of money, or property of any sort, to be given to each individual in a nation, which would be sufficient, in the midst of an industrious people, to enable him to live in perfect idleness, the whole nation could not become idle. Such a case never can exist, as that of all the individuals in a country becoming sufficiently rich to live without labour. But something approaching towards that state of things actually does take place, when, by the general increase of wealth, the necessity for labour is diminished. The number of idle people is constantly augmenting; and even those who continue to labour do it less intensely than when the operation of necessity was more severe. When a cause is diminished, the effect must in time fall off in proportion.

With individuals, nature has given very powerful auxiliaries to necessity, which strengthen and prolong its operation, but which do not operate equally on nations.

Habit or custom is the one auxiliary, and ambition or avarice is the other.

Habit, in all cases, diminishes the reluctance to labour, which is inherent in the most part of mankind, and sometimes entirely overcomes it. {68} Ambition, which appears under many different forms, renders labour absolutely an enjoyment. Sometimes ambition is merely a desire of amassing property, an avaricious disposition: sometimes it is a desire to create a family; and even, sometimes, the vain and delusive idea of retiring from business, and becoming happy in a state of total idleness, spurs a man on to labour. It is a very curious, but well-known fact, that, after necessity has entirely ceased to promote industry, the love of complete idleness, and the hope of enjoying it at some distant date, leads the wealthy man on, to his last hour, in a train of augmented industry. Thus has nature most wisely counteracted

--- {68} There are many instances where habit has rendered a particular sort of labour absolutely a want. It has become a necessary,--a means of enjoyment without which life has become a burthen. -=-

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the disposition of man to idleness; by making the very propensity to it, after a certain time, active in promoting industry.

But this can never be the case with a race of men: {69} and, as a nation consists of a greater number of individuals, so, also, its existence consists of successive generations.

There is a difference between idleness and inaction. It is the natural propensity of man to be idle, but not to be inactive. Enjoyment is his aim, after he has secured the means of existence. Enjoyment and idleness are supposed, in many cases, to go hand in hand; at any rate, they can be reconciled, whereas inaction and enjoyment are irreconcilable. {70}

But we may still go farther. As taste for any particular enjoyment is acquired when a man is young, and the same taste continues in a more advanced age; a man who has been long in business has had no time to acquire a taste for those enjoyments that are incompatible with, or perhaps that admit of being substituted for it.

Reading the study of the fine arts, and such other means of employing time as men enjoy, who, at an early period of life, are exempted from labour, afford no amusement to the man who has been always accustomed to a life of business, {71} with whom there is an absolute ne-

--- {69} It is perhaps amongst chances that seem likely enough; the only one that has never happened, that of a race of misers, in the same lineal descent, for several generations. The reason why I say it never has happened is, that, if it had, the effects would have become so conspicuous, by the riches accumulated, that they could not have passed unobserved.

{70} By inaction is not meant the opposite of loco-motion, such as laying =sic= in bed, or basking in the sun; it is supposed that a man, to enjoy himself, must be reading, talking, in company, or _doing something_.

{71} They sometimes affect this, but it is little else than through vanity. It would be easy to give a hundred striking proofs, but their frequency renders that unnecessary.

Hunting and fishing, the two most anxious and painful occupations in the world, are, in all countries, followed by the affluent and idle as amusements; they want to interest the mind, and occupy themselves. Gaming, which is attended with very painful sensations, is followed much more frequently from propensity than from the love of gain; and, indeed, it would appear, that a life without occupations that interest the mind, is of all others the most insipid: it appears to be worse, it appears to be miserable. -=-

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cessity of filling up the time in one way or another. A certain portion of time may be spent in company; but even that, to be enjoyed, must be spent in the society of men of the same class. The inducement, then, to a man who has dedicated the first part of his life advantageously to industry, to become idle, is not great, even when he is at free liberty to follow his inclination.

It is totally different with a young man; his propensity is to idleness, without any of those favourable circumstances that counteract that propensity. Necessity alone can be expected to operate on him; it is in vain to seek for any other substitute. Not that we mean, by idleness, to signify inaction; but that sort of idleness, which resists regular labour. There is a natural propensity to action, but then it is a propensity that operates irregularly, unless under the influence of necessity. It is a continued and regular exertion, directed to a proper object, that is wanted to obtain wealth; to procure this, it is well to imitate nature, and create necessity.

But, in proportion as a nation grows wealthy, that necessity is done away. It is of the art of prolonging necessity, or rather of reconciling necessity with affluence and ease, for which we are going to search, that we may, by that means, reconcile affluence with industry.

We must, in the first place, find what the natural operation is by which industry leaves a country.

When a country is in a state of poverty, it maintains the same degree of industry, from generation to generation, without any effort. The new race is brought up in the same way that the former was before it, and the same pressure of necessity, acting on the same desire (but no greater desire) to shun labour, produces the same effect at one time that it did at another. The son of a man, who has arrived at a greater degree of affluence than that to which he was born, is generally brought up differently. He is not brought up so hardily in his infancy as his father was, nor so soon called to labour; and probably when he is called to it, he is neither called with so imperious a voice, nor is he so willing to obey the call.

Though we do not live long enough to see an example of this operation on a whole nation, the progression being too slow for the life [end of page #84] of a man, yet we see it in different parts of the same country, that are in different degrees of advancement. How frequent are the instances of men, bred in distant counties, (particularly in the North,) bringing all that industry and those habits of labour to London, that the poverty of their parents, and the state of their part of the country naturally occasioned. Some of those have arrived at affluence, and many of them have to competency; and even those who do not arrive at a comparatively higher rank in London, than their father held in his own county, bring up their children in a very different manner.

Suppose, for example, a blacksmith, from Northumberland, or a baker, from Scotland, settles in London, as his father did at Newcastle or Edinburgh, his son or sons will be bred very differently from what he was; and, after their father's death, the business will most probably go to some new comer, from a distant county.

The father was brought up with the necessity of labouring, or the alternative of wanting food to eat. From his earliest days, he considered himself as fortunate if he could obtain a competent living by honest industry; and this impression, with the habits acquired while it was strong, lead a man, so brought up, to fill his place in life with honour and advantage.

The son, who sees that his father is in affluence, and who partakes of the fruits of a whole life of industry, seldom considers that he must continue that industry, otherwise, that the affluence will cease with the life of his father. It is impossible to make a young man, brought up in this manner, feel as his father did; and, not having the same impulse given to him at first, he never can set off in his course of life with the same energy.

But the cause of this evil does not stop here. Frequently the mother is an enemy to the industry of her son; and between the workings of real affection, badly exercised, which leads her to humour the lad; and a sort of silly vanity, equally misplaced, she encourages him, if not in idleness, at least, in the hope that he will never need to stoop to incessant industry. It is not necessary to ascertain the absolute portion of idleness and pride that is infused into the young man; that depends [end of page #85] on particular circumstances: {72} but, in most cases, it is sufficient to prevent his following the footsteps of his father with equal energy.

Perhaps the capital, or the connections a father leaves in trade, may, in some degree, and for some time, compensate for this; but the instances where they do so are not numerous.

This is an example of the manner in which every succeeding generation is brought up differently from that preceding it; but it is an extreme example, and one that, though very real in the individuals, can never suddenly take place on a national scale.

The difference between the general affluence of a nation, and the change of its manners during the life of a man, is by no means equal to the difference between a remote province and the capital of an empire; but, though the example is extreme, the same effect is produced, in the course of several generations upon a nation, that was occasioned by change of place in one individual family from father to son. {73}

When a change like this takes place in one family, (and there are numerous instances of it every day,) poverty comes on again, and the children fall back into the laborious class of society, probably in a degraded state; but as the evil is supplied by new people rising up, it is little felt on the nation; if, however, it occurs very generally, it must have a bad effect; and, indeed, the best thing that can happen for the

--- {72} If the mother has been herself born in affluence, she generally has a sort of smothered contempt for the mean origin of her husband. She seldom is fully sensible of the merit by which he has raised himself, and consequently cannot be capable of appreciating the advantage of bringing up her boy in the same way; on the contrary, the habits of industry, which the father acquired at an early age, under the pressure of necessity, are generally secret objects of ridicule to the rest of the family. If, again, the woman has been of low origin in herself, and is become affluent, then matters are ten times worse. Then there is all the pride and vanity that ignorance, and a desire to hide that mean extraction create. Incapable of shewing delicacy and fine breeding in herself, she spoils her harmless children by converting them into specimens of the gentility of the family. For more of this, see the chapter on Education.

{73} In Rome, after the taking of Carthage; and in Portugal, immediately after it got possession of the trade to India; the change must have been as great over the whole of the people in one generation, as it is generally between a remote province and near the capital. -=-

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general welfare is, that such men may return to a state of insignificance and labour as fast as possible; for, while they remain above that, and in a declining state, they are filling their place in society badly.

It is different where the change goes on through a whole country, then no one can supply the place, they are all going the same way, and at nearly the same rate; {74} the consequence will be, that this will not be the fall of a family, but the fall of a whole people; the motion will, indeed, be much more slow, but the moving body will be vastly greater, and the effect will be in proportion.

In every nation in Europe there is, between the capital and the distant provinces, a difference of affluence, of wealth, &c. equal to what probably takes place in a nation in one or two centuries. The inhabitants of the capital have some great advantages over those that come from a distance; they have connections, they have money and stock; and, generally speaking, in their early years, they possess a more ready and marketable knowledge. But all these avail nothing against habits of industry, and being taught to expect nothing from others, but to depend all on one's own powers. With this single, but signal, advantage, the sons of the wealthy citizens are always yielding to the son of the peasant; they are one by one giving way, and their places are filled by a new race; while their descendants are sinking into poverty, and filling prisons, poor-houses, and hospitals.

This vicissitude is so observable, that it would be unnecessary to dwell upon it were it, =sic= not of such infinite importance. {75}

The alarming and lamentable increase of the poor, in proportion as

--- {74} It is always to be observed, that this reasoning is only applicable in general, and not in every particular case. It has been remarked by the writer of the notes on the Wealth of Nations, that where a fortune is not realized in a family, sufficient to enable it to withdraw entirely from trade, it seldom remains wealthy above two generations. The sons most frequently want intelligence or industry to augment what their father got, and the grandsons have generally dissipation enough to squander entirely away what remains. This is so frequent a case in London, that it may be called the regular routine of the business; and, what arises by regular routine, must be derived from some general and natural cause.

{75} In the chapter on Education, this subject is entered into more fully, and the education of women makes a principal part. A subject not noticed by the author of the Wealth of Nations, though very important. -=-

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a nation becomes rich, is a proof that it is not in capital cities alone that the effect takes place, but over the whole of a country. {76}

In England, the number of inhabitants is about six times the number of those in Scotland; and, perhaps, it costs twice as much to maintain a poor person in the former as in the latter. The sum necessary for the maintenance of the poor in England may then be reckoned at about twelve times as much as in Scotland, in order to preserve a just proportion between the two countries. But the poor cost more than sixty times as much in England as in Scotland; that is, at least five times more than the true proportion that ought to be !!!

This, it may be said, is owing to the different manner of managing the business, and, in some degree, it no doubt is; {77} but, as the poor are only maintained in England, and as they are also maintained in Scotland, it would be wrong to allow so great a difference for that alone.

In order, however, to put the matter out of all doubt, let us compare England with itself, and we shall find that the poor's rates, or the expense of maintaining the indigent, has increased more rapidly than the price of provisions, or the price of labour. This ought not to be the case, as they would only have augmented in the same proportion, unless the number of poor was increased as well as the price of the provisions they eat, at the same time that the nation is growing more wealthy.

Of whom do the poor in every nation consist, but of the lame, the sick, the infirm, the aged, or children unprovided for? Of those, the number, in proportion to the total number of inhabitants, will be pretty nearly the same at all times; for it is nature that produces this species of helpless poverty. It would then appear that there is another species of poverty, not of nature's creation, that comes in and destroys the proportion. It would likewise appear, that that new species of poverty

--- {76} The Poor's Rate, and regulations respecting that augmenting class of persons, are treated in a chapter by itself.

{77} For this see the chapter on the Poor, in which the subject is investigated at considerable length. At present, it is only mentioned by way of illustrating the effect of wealth on the manners of the people; and to prove, that it is not confined to the capital alone, but is general all over the country of England. -=-

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is occasioned by the general wealth, since it increases in proportion to it.

If we find, then, that the increase of wealth renders the descendants of a particular family helpless, and unable to maintain their place in society; if we find, also, that it gives those portions of a country, which are the least advanced, an advantage over those which are the most advanced; and, if we find that the number of indigent increase most where the wealth is greatest, we surely must allow, that there is a strong tendency to decay that accompanies the acquisition of wealth. The same revolutions that arise amongst the rich and poor inhabitants of a country, who change places gradually, and without noise, must naturally take place between the inhabitants of rich and poor countries, upon a larger scale and in a more permanent manner. {78} Such changes are generally attended with, or, at least, productive of, violent commotions. Nations are not subservient to laws like individuals, but make forcible use of the means of which they are possessed, to obtain the ends which they have in view.

As this tendency is uniformly felt by a number of individuals over the whole of a country, when it advances in wealth, and over whole districts that are more advanced than the others, it must operate, in length of time, in producing the decline of a whole nation, as well as it does of a certain portion of its people at all times.

Changes, in the interior of a nation, take place by piece-meal or by degrees; the whole mass sees nothing of it, and, indeed, it is not felt. {79} But it is vain to think, that the same cause that gives the poorer inhabitants of a nation an advantage over the richer, will not likewise

--- {78} As we find that wealth seldom goes amongst people of business past the second, and almost never past the third generation, families that rise so high as to be partners in profit, and not in labour or attention, are an exception. Nations resemble the families that acquire enough to be affluent, but not enough to retire from business. A nation can never retire; it must always be industrious. The inference is clear and cannot be mistaken; neither can the fact stated be denied.

{79} The number of bankruptcies have been considered as signs of wealth; and their increase is a sign most undoubtedly of more trade; but this is a barometer, of which it requires some skill to understand the real index. -=-

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give poor nations an advantage over rich ones; or, at least, tend to raise the one and draw down the other. Though we find, from the history of the various revolutions that have taken place in different countries, that they arose from a variety of causes, some peculiar to one nation, and some to another; yet we have found a change of manners and ways of thinking and acting, more or less operating in all of them.

Amongst the interior causes of the decline of wealthy nations, arising from the wealth itself, we must set this down as one of a very general and natural operation. We must be particularly careful to remove this, as far as possible, if we mean to avert those evils which hitherto have arisen from a superior degree of wealth and power in every nation.

We are now going to examine other internal causes; but though they are separate from this, yet this is at the root of all, this is perpetually operating, we meet with it in every corner and at every turning. It is what Mr. Pope says, speaking of the master-passion in individuals:

"The great disease that must destroy at length,

Grows with our growth, and strengthens with our strength."

This radical case of decline is augmented by an ill conceived vanity in the parents, as well as by necessity ceasing to act on the children. Each is following a very natural inclination; the one to indulge, the other to be indulged. It is the duty and the interest of the state to counteract this tendency, and the manner how that it is to be done will be inquired into in the first chapter of the third book of this work. =sic --there is none.=

But it is not merely a neglect of industry and the means of rising in society, or keeping one's place in it that is hurtful; the general way of thinking and acting becomes different, and, by degrees, the character of a nation is entirely altered. This change was the most rapid, and the most observable in the Roman republic, and was the cause that brought it to an end, and prepared the people for submitting to be ruled by the emperors. The human character was as much degraded under them, when the citizens were rich, as it ever had been exalted under their consular government, when the people were indigent. [end of page #90]

The various effects of this change in manners will be considered under different heads, but it is too deeply rooted in human nature ever to be entirely counteracted, much less entirely done away. It is firmly connected with the first principles of action in man, and can no more be removed than his entire nature can be altered. What is in the extreme, if dangerous, may be diminished; and that is all that it would be any way useful to attempt: it may be rendered less formidable in its operation, and that is all that can be expected.

The degradation of moral character; the loss of attention to the first principles to which a society owes its prosperity and safety, both of which accompany wealth, are most powerful agents in the decline of nations. We have seen that the Romans, the greatest of all nations, were ruined, chiefly, by degradation of character, by effeminacy, by ignorance; for we generally find that idleness degenerates, at last, into sloth and inaction. To a love of justice, and a power of overcoming danger, or of preventing it, listlessness and a total want of energy succeed: at length, the mind becomes estranged from hope, and the body incapable of exertion. This is the case with those who have for a time enjoyed luxury when they begin to decline; their fall is then inevitable. The Eastern empire, as well as the Western, fell by this means; and it may be said to have been the ordinary course in the decline of nations that have fallen gradually.

The Turks, {80} the Spaniards, and the Portuguese, all owe part of their present feebleness to this cause; and the government of France certainly, in a great measure, owed its downfal =sic= to the same. There the courtiers had sunk in character, and it was become impossible even for the energy, the activity, and intelligence of the nation at large, to counteract the baneful effect of the change that had taken place amongst those who regulated its affairs.

In history we have seen scarcely any thing similar to this, for it was the effect operating on the rulers of the nation only; the strength of the great body of the nation, on which it did not operate, supported that

--- {80} Those nations resemble each other in feebleness, and in the cause of it, though, with respect to the Turks, it has existed for a longer period. -=-

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pride and ignorance; whereas in Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, this evil being general throughout the state, those who have the conducting of affairs are held in some check by the general feebleness of the nation. {81} This not only limits the power of action, but is so visible, that it is impossible for those who govern not to be led to reflection, and to be taught moderation by it.

The power of laying on taxes and the means of defending itself against other nations are regulated by the situation of the people; but the wisdom with which the affairs are conducted is dependent on the rulers, and those who govern. It is therefore fortunate, when the rulers are so far sensible of the feeble state of the country as to be moderate and reasonable. {82}

None of the nations that know their own weakness would ever have risked the experiment that was made on St. Domingo by the French; neither would any nation, in the vigour of acquiring riches, have done so. It required a nation, ruled by men who were ignorant of the true principles, who were corrupted with wealth, and, at the same time, had a vigorous nation to govern, to admit of such a situation of things. {83} Had the nation been less wealthy or weaker, so as to have made the poverty or weakness obvious, this could not have happened; or, had the rulers been less corrupted and ignorant, it could not have taken place. {84}

--- {81} The French nation, in reality, was never so powerful and wealthy as at the time of the revolution breaking out. The effects of luxury had only perverted the city of Paris and the court. The power which the energies of the people at large put at the disposition of the government was ill applied.

{82} Perhaps some of the greatest advantages that arise from a form of government like that of England are, that those who have ruled, owe their places to their abilities, and not to favour; that they maintain their situations by exertion, and not by flattery; and that the situation of the nation never can be long disguised. Without the turbulence of a democracy, we have most of the advantages that arise from one, while we have, at the same time, the benefits that proceed from the stability and order of established monarchy.

{83} When the Portuguese were for abandoning the India trade, it was a case pretty similar.

{84} Though the men who overturned the commerce of France were not the same with the members of the ancient government, yet they also were men ignorant of the true interests of the nation. A few amongst them were bent upon an experiment, regardless of the ruin with which it might be attended. -=-

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In all the interior causes, for the decline of nations, which we are endeavouring to investigate, we shall find a change of manners, and ways of thinking, constantly producing some effect in the direction towards decline. This takes place, from the time that a nation becomes more wealthy than its neighbours; until then, when it is only struggling to equal them, a nation cannot be said to be rich, but to be emerging from poverty.

The great aim then should be, to counteract this change of mind and manners, that naturally attends an increased state of prosperity.

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CHAP. II.

_Of the Education of Youth in Nations increasing in Wealth.--the Errors generally committed by Writers on that Subject.--Importance of Female Education on the Manners of a People.--Not noticed by Writers on Political Economy.--Education of the great Body of the People the chief Object.--In what that consists_

The changes of which we have spoken, that take place, gradually, in a nation, from the increasing luxury and ease in which every succeeding generation is raised, cannot be prevented. They are the natural consequences of the situation of the parents being altered. But when that period of life comes, when children enter upon what is called education, then a great deal may be done; for, though the fathers and mothers have still power over their offspring, it is a diminished power; besides which, they are seldom so much disposed to exert even what power remains, as at an earlier period.

It is necessary and fair, after the severe censure that has been passed on parents, for bringing up children wrong, at an early period, to admit, that for the most part, they would not run into that error, and spoil their children, if they were sensible of doing so; and that, as they grow up, they would have them properly instructed, if it were in their power: that is to say, if they had the means.

There are certain things for which individuals can pay, but which it is impossible for them to provide individually; and if they attempt to do it collectively, it is liable to great abuse, and to be badly done.

Individuals never could afford to send their letters, from one end of the kingdom to the other, without combining together, unless government furnished them the means: but, by the aid of the government, they are enabled to do it at a very cheap rate, with expedition and safety, whilst a profit arises to government greater than any regular business in the world produces.

There is a possibility of an individual sending a letter by a particu- [end of page #94] lar messenger, at his own expense, to the greatest distance, provided he can afford it; but, as it happens, there are many more letters require sending than there are messengers to send, or money to defray the expenses.

It is the same with the education of youth. A man may have a tutor to his son, and educate him privately, if he can afford it; but it happens, as with the letters, that there are many more sons to educate than there are tutors to be found, or money to pay them.

As the individual, in the case of the letters, would be obliged to depend on some self-created carrier, if government did not interfere, so they are with regard to the education of their children; and, as in the one case they would be very badly served, so they generally are in the other.

In the first place, the plans of education are every where bad, and the manner of executing still worse.--Those to whom the education of youth, one of the most important offices in society, is intrusted undergo no sort of examination, to ascertain whether they are fit for the business. They, in general, depend upon their submissive conduct towards the parents and improper indulgence of the children for their success. It was found that the judges of criminal and civil law could not be intrusted with the administration of justice, while they depended on the pleasure of the crown. Can it then be expected that a much more numerous set of men, who are, in every respect, inferior in rank and education, to judges, will maintain that upright and correct conduct that is necessary, when they are infinitely more dependent than the judges ever were at any period?

This is one of the questions that is to be argued on the same principles, that the independence, under a monarchical or democratic government, is decided. Under the dominion of one chief, on particular occasions, which occur but seldom, it may be necessary to yield to his will, if the ruler is shameless enough and infamous enough to insist upon it; but, with a community for one's master, there is a complete system of submission, a perpetual deviation from that which is right.

In the first place, the fathers and mothers are no judges themselves of the merits of the master, or the proficiency of the boy, whom the [end of page #95] master is obliged to treat with indulgence, that he may not complain. Where there is a complete ignorance of the right and wrong of the case, any thing will turn the balance; and it is clear, that where there is no proof of superior merit, there must be good will, flattery, or some other method taken, to obtain a preference.

There are, occasionally, men of real merit, who distinguish themselves as teachers; and who, having a solid claim to a preference, use no mean arts to obtain it. It is but justice to parents in general, to say that such men are always encouraged, while they keep their good qualities uncontaminated by some fault that counterbalances them. {85}

As this is a case where individuals cannot serve themselves, nor provide the means of being properly served, it is one of those in which the government of every country ought to interfere. Not in giving salaries, at the public expense, to men, who, perhaps, would do no duty; but in seeing that the men who undertake the task of education are qualified, and that when they have undertaken it they do their duty, and follow a proper system.

There should be proper examinations, from time to time, and registers should be kept of the number of scholars, and the satisfaction they have given to those who examined them.

Parents would then have a measure, by which they could estimate the merit of a school; the master would have another motive for action, and there would be an emulation amongst the scholars. The business professed to be done, and undertaken, would then be performed. At present, at about three times the expense necessary, children learn about half what they are intended to be taught.

Interfering in this manner would be no infringement on private liberty; nothing would be done that could hurt, in any way, the individuals, but what must greatly benefit them. The evil habits that are contracted in early childhood, at home, would be counteracted, and the

--- {85} As even those find it is necessary to make a strong impression on the minds of parents, (and as some wish their children to be treated with rigour,) there are teachers, who obtain a credit by overstraining the discipline, after having obtained a fair reputation, by carrying it only to a proper length. -=-

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youth would be taught to know what it is that renders a man happy in himself, and respected and valued by society.

But the consideration of the system to be followed is not the least important part of the business. The useful should be preferred to the useless, and in this the example of the ancients might be followed with advantage. They had no dead languages to study, and the mind appears to have been in many cases expanded, far beyond its present compass.

Nothing, indeed, can equal the ignorance of the most part of boys, when they leave school; those who are considered as bad scholars, have lost the good opinion of themselves, that ought to be maintained throughout life; they think every thing difficult or impossible. Those, again, who have excelled, are something less ignorant, but become vain and conceited, owing perhaps to their having learnt some useless and superfluous pieces of knowledge.

Education, on the general principle, consists in learning what makes a man useful, respectable, and happy, in the line for which he is destined, whether for manual labour, or for study; for a high or a low occupation.

What is useful becomes a question, in some sort depending upon place, and still more on circumstances, it will therefore be better to discuss it at length in the Third Book, where England is the place, and particular circumstances are taken into consideration.

There are, however, some general rules that apply to all places and to all situations.

Good principles, honour, honesty, and integrity, are equally necessary in every rank of society; with those qualities, even a beggar is respectable, and will be respected; without them, no man ever was or ever will be so. In every mode of education, the importance of those should be inculcated; and that they may be adhered to, every man, either by inheritance, or by talents, or by habits of industry, should have it put in his power to command the means of living in the way that he has been brought up.

Were this attended to, many scenes of misery and vice would be prevented. Admitting that there are propensities in some minds, [end of page #97] that lead to evil, independent of every possible check or control, it must be allowed that the far greater proportion of those who do well or ill in the world owe it to the manner in which they have been brought up in their early days.

It follows, from this general rule, that parents should carefully avoid bringing up children in a manner in which they have not the means of being afterwards maintained; and that, in the second place, when they cannot leave them in an independent fortune, they should, by making them learn a trade or profession, give them the means of obtaining what they have been accustomed to consider as necessary for them to enjoy.

There are, indeed, great numbers, and the greatest numbers of all; unable even to have their children taught what is called a trade. But there are none whom poverty prevents from bringing their children up to industry; and, if they have been taught to live according to their situation, they will find themselves above their wants, and therefore the same general rule will still apply.

Most writers have considered the subject of education as relative to that portion of it only which applies to learning; but the first object of all, in every nation, is to make a man a good member of society; and this can never be done, unless he is fitted to fill the situation of life for which he is intended.

Governments and writers on education fall, generally speaking, into the same errors. They would provide for the education of persons destined for the learned professions and sometimes for the fine arts; but agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, are totally left out: {86} the most essential, the most generally useful, are not noticed at all.

As so much value is set upon the language of the Greeks and Romans, surely we might pay a little attention to the example of those distinguished nations.

The Greeks studied the Egyptian learning, and improved upon it; but this was only confined to those who followed learning as a profes-

--- {86} Lord Somerville has some excellent observations, relative to this, in his publication on Agriculture, published in 1800. -=-

[end of page #98]

sion, or whose means allowed them to prosecute it as a study. The common education of citizens was different; it consisted in teaching them to perform what was useful, and to esteem what was excellent. It was a principle with them that all men ought to know how happiness is attained, and in what virtue consists; but they neither trusted to precept nor example. They enforced by habit and practice, and in this the Romans followed the plan the Greeks had laid down, and, by that means, they surpassed all other nations.

When those great nations of antiquity abandoned their attention to the useful parts of education, they soon sunk in national character. It so happens, in this case, that the mode of education and the manners of a people are so closely connected that it is difficult, from observation, to know which is the cause, and which the effect. Youth, badly educated, make bad men, and bad men neglect the education of their children; they set them a wrong example: such is the case, when a government does not interfere. How this is to be done with advantage is the question.

Writers on political economy have, in general, considered female education as making no part of the system; but surely, if the wealth and happiness of mankind is the end in view, there can scarcely be a greater object, for none is more nearly connected with it.

Let it be granted that, in the first instance, women are not educated with any view to carry on those labours and manufactures, on which wealth is considered as depending. Let all this be admitted, and that, in an early state of life, they are of no importance in this respect; yet, surely, when they become wives and mothers, when the economy of the family, and the education of the younger children depend chiefly on them, they are then of very great importance to society. Their conduct, in that important situation, must be greatly influenced by their education.

Female education ought then to be considered as one of the things, on the conducting of which well the prosperity of a state does in a great measure depend; it ought, therefore, to be attended to in the same manner as the education of youth of the other sex.

In this case, also, so much depends on place and circumstances, [end of page #99] that we shall follow the same rule as with male education. It shall be treated of as for England, and with the different ranks of society as they are; but there are some general rules not to be forgotten, and which are applicable to all places and all countries.

The great error, in female education, does not consist in neglecting to instil good principles; for that is, in most countries, for obvious reasons, pretty well attended to; but good principles, without the means of adhering to them, are of little avail. If a desire for dress, or other enjoyments, that cannot be gratified fairly, and by the means of which they are possessed, are encouraged, principles will be abandoned in order to gratify passions.--Females are taught frivolous accomplishments in place of what would be useful, and expensive vanity is substituted for that modest dignity that should be taught; the consequence is, that, in every rank of life, according to her station, the woman aims at being above it, and affects the manners and dress of her superiors.

There is too much pains taken with adorning the person, and too little with instructing the mind, in every civilized country; and when women are wise, and good, and virtuous, it is more owing to nature than to education.

As, indeed, the duties of a woman, in ordinary life, are of a nature more difficult to describe than those of a man, who, when he has learnt a trade, has little more to do, the care employed in seeing that proper persons only are intrusted with the important office of teaching them to perform those duties ought to be proportionally great.

The farther remarks on the subject of education are deferred to the Fourth Book =sic--there is none.=, where place and circumstances come into consideration. It is, however, to be observed, that, in all cases, as a nation becomes more wealthy, the business of education becomes more important, and has a natural tendency to be worse managed; it therefore demands a double share of attention.

If the women of a nation are badly educated, it must have a great effect on the education of their sons, and the conduct of their husbands. The Spartan and Roman mothers had the glory of making [end of page #100] their sons esteem bravery, and those qualities in a man that were most wanted in their state of society. It should be one part of female education to know and admire the qualities that are estimable in the other sex. To obtain the approbation of the other sex, is, at a certain time of life, the greatest object of ambition, and it is never a matter of indifference.

The great general error consists in considering the woman merely in her identical self, without thinking of her influence on others. It appears to be for this reason, that writers on political economy have paid no attention to female education; but we find no state in which the virtue of men has been preserved where the women had none; though there are examples of women preserving their virtues, notwithstanding the torrent of corruption by which that of the men has been swept away. [end of page #101]

CHAP. III.

_Of increased Taxation, as an Interior Cause of Decline.--Its different Effects on Industry, according to the Degree to which it is carried.--Its Effects on the People and on Government_.

There has been no instance of a government becoming more economical, or less expensive, as it became older, even when the nation itself was not increasing in wealth; but, in every nation that has increased in wealth, the expenditure, on the part of government, has augmented in a very rapid manner.

Amongst the interior causes of the decline of nations, and the overthrow of governments, the increase of taxes has always been very prominent. It is in the levying of taxes that the sovereign and the subject act as if they were of opposite interests, or rather as if they were enemies to each other.

In every case almost, where the subjects have rebelled against their sovereign, or where they have abandoned their country to its enemies, the discontents have been occasioned by taxes that were either too heavy, imprudently laid on, or rigorously levied.

Sometimes the manner of laying on the tax has given the offence; sometimes its nature, and sometimes its amount. The revolution in England, in Charles the first's time, began about the manner of levying a tax. The revolution of the American colonies began in the same way; and it is generally at the manner that nations enjoying a certain degree of freedom make objection. The excise had very nearly proved fatal to the government of this country, as the stamp duties did to that of France, and as the general amount and enormity of taxes did to the Western Empire. {87}

--- {87} The system of taxation was ill understood amongst the Romans, and its execution, under a military government, is always severe. The Romans were so tormented, at last, that they lost all regard for their country. Taxes seem to be the price we pay for the con-[end of page #102] stitution we live under, and as they increase, the value of the purchase lessens. The difference between value paid, and value received, constitutes the advantage or loss of every bargain. -=-

Perhaps the chief motive for submitting to the difficulties, the oppressions, and the burthens, which people submit to under republican forms of government arises in deception. They seem to be paying taxes to themselves, and for themselves, when, in reality, they are not doing so any more than under a monarchy, where the taxes, in proportion to the service done, are generally less than in a republic.{88}

--- {88} America is an exception, but then there is no similarity between the United States and any other country in the world. Their existence, as an independent country, is only of twenty-five years standing; they have had no wars during that time, and the revolutionary war cost little in actual money. The comparison between the states and other nations will not hold, but, if we compare the expense of their government now, and when under the British, it will be found they pay near thirty times as much; and, even allowing their population to have risen one-half, they still pay proportionately twenty times as much. Their revenue now amounts to 16,000,000 of dollars. The public expense, in 1795, when they revolted, was about 350,000 dollars. -=-

This was the case in Holland and Venice. In England, the first great increase of taxes took place under the long Parliament and Commonwealth.

The only administration carried on by delegated authority, that is from necessity obliged to be executed with unabaiting rigour, is the department of finance. Money is a thing of such a nature, that strict rules are absolutely necessary in its administration. There is here a great distinction between money and other property, or money's worth. A menial servant, of whose honesty there is no proof, and even when it may be dubious, is habitually trusted with the care of property to a considerable amount, and the account rendered is seldom very rigorous; but, in the case of trusting with money, every precaution is first taken, as to being trust-worthy. Security is generally demanded, and neither friendship, confidence, nor the highest respectability, will supply the place of a strict account, which, when not rendered, leaves an indelible stain. There are many causes for this, but they are so generally understood, or, at least, so generally felt, that it is not necessary to examine them; the consequences are in some cases, however, not so evident. One of the most important is, that the accuracy with [end of page #103] which those appointed to collect taxes are obliged to render their accounts, compels them to a strictness in doing their duty that appears frequently rigorous to an extreme degree, and scarcely consistent with justice or humanity.

A king is considered as an unrelenting creditor, and he certainly appears in that character; but it should be considered why he is obliged to be so; for, as a master, he is generally the most indulgent in his dominions.

No duty or service is exacted with less rigour than that belonging to a civil department under government, when it is not connected with accountability in money; none so rigorous where money is concerned. How is this to be accounted for, unless it is by shewing that the nature of the situation admits of giving way to the feelings of humanity in one case, and not in the other? A few examples will illustrate this point, which is very important, very well known, but not well understood.

A clerk in a public office wants, either for health or private business, or, perhaps, only for amusement, to absent himself from duty; if his conduct merits any indulgence, and if his request is any way reasonable, it is immediately granted, though his salary during his absence may amount to a considerable sum; but he receives the gift under the form of time, not of money. If the same clerk is in arrear for taxes to one-twentieth part of the amount, if he does not pay, his furniture will be seized, and that perhaps by order of the same superior from whom he obtained the leave of absence from his duty. {89}

The consequences would be fatal if the case were reversed. Supposing that leave of absence had been refused, and that a remission of taxes had been granted, the man who remitted the tax would be liable to suspicion, which he could never do away; the receipt of the revenue would never be secure, and the clerk, who had demanded a fair indulgence, would be disgusted and provoked at the refusal.

We cannot, however, alter the nature of things. Taxes cannot be remitted, in any case, without discretional authority, and that it would

--- {89} Accountability in money may be compared to military discipline, when on duty. No allowances are to be made for negligence or deviation from rule. Of this we have lately had a most striking and memorable example. -=-

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be ruinous to the revenue to give, we must, therefore, never expect that the augmentation of taxes will take place without an increase of discontent, or, at least, an augmented indifference towards government.

Perhaps nothing evinces more the general feeling, (even of the respectable part of society,) with regard to the revenues of the state, than the disposition to profit by evading the payment of duties imposed upon articles of consumption.

The most respectable of the nobility or gentry will conceal a contraband article, or one on which there is a heavy duty, on their return from abroad: and what is more, if detected, they are more ashamed, on account of their want of address, than on account of the crime; for such it is, whatever custom may have taught us to think.

A man who is rigorously treated, by what is commonly called a lawful creditor, whom he would never attempt to defraud must naturally feel doubly incensed, when still more rigorously treated by one whom he would think it very little harm, and no disgrace, to defraud. It is then very clear, that, the common habits of thinking on the subject of debts due to the king, is such as does not favour taxation, or incline people to submit willingly to rigorous modes of recovery.

All taxes raise the prices of the articles taxed, but those are most felt and most obnoxious which fall on personal property, or on persons themselves.

All taxes, then, when they pass a certain point, have a tendency to send away persons, and property, and trade, from a country, which, if they do, its decline is inevitable. The extent, however, of that effect must depend on a great variety of circumstances, such as the comparative situation of other nations, their distance, the difficulty of removing, &c.

If America were as near to England as France is, the industrious class would emigrate in multitudes; and, if in France, property and persons were as safe and free as in England, part of both would go there; but, as matters are, to the former it is impossible to remove, and, to the latter, the risk surpasses the advantage.

An increase of taxation tends to raise the wages of labour, and, where it does so in due proportion, the labourer pays almost nothing; he still for all that seems to pay, and he has the same disagreeable feeling [end of page #105] as if he did pay. No feeling is more disagreeable than that of being obliged, after earning money that can ill be spared, to pay it away to a surly tax-gatherer, who treats a man and his family with insolence, while he receives the money that should purchase them bread. Besides this, though the prices of many articles keep pace with the wages of labour, yet many others do not. Thus, in a country where wages are rapidly altering, though some are bettered by it, penury is entailed on others, who have not the means of raising their prices.

If heavy taxes are levied on a few articles of consumption, then they become inefficient, and if they are divided amongst a great many, they become troublesome, so that either way they are attended with inconvenience and difficulty.

In every country, where taxation has been carried to a great height, it has, at last, become necessary to bear heavily upon personal property. Such taxes are always attended with disagreeable feelings, and peculiar inconveniency. The tax always comes in the form of a debt, and whether convenient to be paid or not, it admits at best but of little delay. {90}

In England the nature of the government, the disposition of the people, and the same sort of genius that made them succeed in commercial intercourse and regulation, led them to adopt the least objectionable modes of taxation.

The customs were the first great branch of revenue at the time of the revolution. The excise, land-tax, and stamps, rose next, none of which can be objected to; for the person who pays the tax to government only advances the money, and is reimbursed by the consumer, who, again on his part, when he really pays the tax (for good and all) does it under the form of an advance in price. Thus, then, the tax is disguised to him that really pays it, and it is optional, inasmuch as he

--- {90} It will be seen, in a future part of this work, that the farmers have lost nothing, but rather got by the high prices of grain in this country, and it is so probably in all others. Those who sell necessaries raise the price; those who make or sell superfluities have no such resource, and therefore pay in the severest manner. -=-

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may avoid the tax, by not consuming the article. He never can be sued for the tax, and he pays it by degrees, as he can spare the money. {91}

Some time before the taxation which the American war rendered necessary, it was thought that the customs and excise could not be carried much farther. Ministers did not chuse =sic= to venture on an additional tax on land, and, consequently, stamps were augmented and extended, as were also duties on windows. A variety of new taxes on particular articles of consumption were resorted to. Those sort of taxes harassed and tormented individuals more than they filled the treasury, yet still, when, after an interval of a few years of peace, new burthens became necessary, in 1793, the same plan was pursued, till it was found ineffectual, being too troublesome and tedious, besides being unequal to the increase of expenditure.

It was necessity that suggested a plan, which is the simplest and easiest of any, so long as it succeeds and is productive. =sic= To increase the excise and customs by an additional five or ten per cent. on the articles that were supposed able to bear it. This has been done again and again with those two branches of revenue, and with the stamps likewise.

But the necessities of the state still outrun the means, and the assessed taxes, the worst and most obnoxious of all, were augmented in the same way; but even those were not productive. The inducement to privation was too great, and the restraints laid on expenditure, suggested the adoption of a tax on income; that is, on the means a man has to pay, which carries in its very name a description of its nature.

We have mentioned the influence that necessity has on industry. One of the effects of taxes, as well as of rent, is to prolong the operation of necessity, or to increase it. A man who has neither rent nor taxes to pay, as is the case in some savage nations, only labours to supply his wants. Whatever proportion rent and taxes bear to the wants of

--- {91} The land-tax is not precisely the same, but very nearly. It operates as a tax on the produce of land, that is on commodities for the use of man, the same as those articles subject to duties of customs or excise. The landholder just feels as the brewer, distiller, or importer of foreign goods, he gets the tax reimbursed by the farmer, and the farmer is reimbursed by the consumer. -=-

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a people their industry will be increased in the same proportion, unless their forces are exceeded, and then the operation is indeed very different.

It follows, from this, that both rent and taxes, to a certain degree, increase the wealth of a people, by augmenting their industry. As rent is not compulsive, it never can in general be carried beyond the point that augmented industry will bear; but taxes are not either regulated by the industry of the individual, or of the community; they may therefore be carried too far, and when they are, the people become degraded, disheartened, their independent spirit is lost and broken, and industry, in place of increasing, as it did in the first stages of taxation, flies away.

The government, in this case, generally becomes more severe, and certainly more obnoxious. The broken spirit of the people makes submission a matter of course, so that there is no effectual resistance made to its power. Incapacity to pay comes at last, and defeats the end; but, between incapacity and resistance, the difference is very wide.

As calculators have been predicting the moment of a total stoppage to the increase of revenue for nearly half a century; as ministers, themselves, have never ventured to lay on a new burthen, except when forced to it by necessity. {92} As taxes have been laid on at random, in a manner similar to that in which the streets and houses of old cities were built, without regularity or design, and as the effects predicted have not taken place, it is fair to conclude, that the subject is not well understood. If it were, the evil would be in the way to be obviated; but still the conclusion would be the same, that increased taxation tends to bring on discontent, and to drive men and capital from a country. The degree of tendency, and the rapidity of its operations, are a question; but respecting the tendency itself there can be no question.

Two things more are to be observed, relative to the effects of taxation, as tending towards decline. The first is, that the taxes are levied by and expended on men, who, having income only for their lives,

--- {92} Mr. Pitt seems an exception to this; but the establishment of a sinking fund, at the end of the war, was as necessary for his administration as any of the loans, during the war, were for Lord North; and both measures required new taxes. -=-

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generally leave families in distress. Those who lose their parents when young are often left destitute, and those who are farther advanced are frequently ruined by being educated and accustomed to a rank in life that they are not able to support. This is a very great evil, and is renewed as it were every generation. As the revenues of a country increase, this evil increases also: for, except what goes to the proprietors of money in the stocks, all the public revenue, very nearly, goes to people whose income perishes with themselves. To begin with those who collect the taxes, custom-house officers, excise men, collectors, and clerks of every rank and demonination =sic=, there is not one in ten who does not die in indigence; and if he leaves a family, he leaves it in distress.

It is no doubt the lot of the great bulk of mankind, that is to say, the labouring part of the community in every country, to leave children unprovided for; but then they are left in a rank of society that does not prevent their going to work or to service, which is not the case with the vast number left by those who enjoy, during life, a genteel and easy existence under government.

The education of such persons is either neglected entirely, or ill fitted for the line of life into which they are to go. If the sum-total of human vice and misery was to be divided into shares, and if it were calculated how much fell to each person, there is not a doubt but at least a double portion would fall to the lot of those unfortunate persons who are left by parents enjoying offices for life; who are generally obliged to expend their income as they earn it. As, according to the natural chance of things, a number of such persons must leave young families, the seeds of misery are continually sowing a-fresh, to the great detriment of society. This evil depends in a great degree upon the habits and nature of the people, which augment or diminish it; and, in commercial nations, the evil is far the greatest. Where commerce does not flourish, persons belonging to the revenue-department are seldom highly paid, and they by no means consider themselves as a class of persons distinguished above the general run, or obliged to live more expensively; but, in a manufacturing country, to live without working, implies a degree of gentility that is extremely ruinous to those who enjoy that fatal and flimsy pre-eminence. [end of page #109]

A manufacturer, who is getting a thousand pounds a year, will, perhaps, not assume so much importance as a man in office who does not get one hundred pounds; and the former, as well as his family, knowing that they are beholden to industry for what they have, do not think themselves above following it. {93}

Unfortunately, it also happens, that, in all sorts of occupation where trust is reposed and punctuality required, more than in ordinary business, it is rather late in life before those employed rise to situations of considerable emolument. When they are old, their families are generally young; thus it is, that the persons who are the most unfit to marry late in life are generally those who do so. This order of things cannot easily be changed. In the rate of payments governments are regulated by the service done, and by the dependence that can be placed on the person employed, who, on the other hand, follows the natural propensities of human nature. When young, and on a small allowance, a revenue-officer remains single; but when it is necessary to become serious, attentive, and confidential, and when he finds he has the means, he betakes himself to a domestic life, which is the most natural to men arrived at a certain time of life, and the best fitted for those who are to be depended upon for the correctness of their conduct. It is impossible to prevent this natural state of things; and if let go uncorrected, if not counteracted, the consequences are very pernicious. It is to this, in a great measure, the augmentation of vice and mendicity =sic= is to be attributed in nations, as they become wealthy and great.

Perhaps more depends upon the manner of taxation than the amount; at least it certainly is so in all countries where the amount is not very high. In America, for example, the amount is of no importance; the manner might be of very pernicious consequence. In France, before the revolution, the taxes were more oppressive, from the manner of levying them than from their amount. The same thing might be said

--- {93} This is a very important part of the consideration; but, as education and it are connected, and that comes into the Fourth Book =sic--there is none.=, the whole consideration is left till then; not only the national prosperity is injured, but the feelings of humanity are hurt, and the sum of human misery increased by this consequence. -=-

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of almost every country in Europe, England and Holland excepted. At present, the case is greatly altered, in many countries, by the increase: yet, still, one of the principal evils arises from the manner of levying the taxes; the restraints imposed by them, the inconveniency, the vexation, and, finally, the misery and ruin they, in many cases, occasion.

Of all the examples, where taxation contributed most to the fall of a country, Rome is the greatest. The luxury of the imperial court, and the expenses of a licentious and disorderly army, added to the ignorance of the subject, rendered the taxes every way burthensome. From the fall of Rome, to the time of Louis XIV. the splendour of courts, and their expenses, were objects of no great importance. We are but lately arrived at a new aera in taxation; for, though taxation has been the occasion of much discontent at all times, it was carried to no considerable length, in any country in Europe, except in Spain and Holland, till within this last century.

Indeed, when we consider the great noise that has often been made about raising an inconsiderable sum, it is impossible not to be astonished at the reluctance with which people pay taxes, when they feel that they are paying them, and are not accustomed to the feeling.

Taxation is, then, to the feelings of men, disagreeable; to their manners hurtful; they are also, in their operation, to a certain degree, inimical to liberty. The ultimate consequence of this is, that persons and property have both of them a tendency to quit a country where taxes are high, and to go to one, where, with the same means, there may be more enjoyment.

Taxes may be called a rent paid for living in a country, and operate exactly like the rent of houses or land, or rent for any thing else; that is, they make the tenant remove to a cheaper place, unless he finds advantages where he is to counterbalance the expense.

Unfortunately, the persons who have the greatest disposition to quit a country that is heavily taxed are those, who, having a certain income, which they cannot increase, wish to enjoy it with some degree of economy. They are, likewise, the persons who can remove with the greatest [end of page #111] facility. Thus, people whose income is in money are always the first to quit a country that is become too dear to live in with comfort.

Many circumstances may favour or counteract this tendency, such as the difficulty of finding an agreeable place to retire to, where the money will be secure, or the interest regularly paid; but, an inquiry into that will come more properly when we examine the external causes of decline.

Though the increase of taxes, by augmenting the expense of living, and of the necessaries of life, is little felt by the labouring class, their wages rising in proportion; yet a most disastrous effect is produced on the fine arts, and on all productions of which the price does not bear a proportional rise.

Where taxes are high, and luxury great, there must be some persons who have a great deal of ostentation, even if they have little taste. A picture or a jewel of great value will, very certainly, find a purchaser, but that will only serve as a motive for bringing the fine painting from another country, where the necessaries of life are cheaper, and where men enjoy that careless ease which is incompatible with a high state of taxation.

When Rome became luxurious, to the highest pitch, there were neither poets, painters, nor historians, bred within its walls; buffoons and fiddlers could get more money than philosophers, and they had more saleable talents. Had Virgil not found an Augustus, had he lived three centuries later, he must either have written ballads and lampoons, or have starved; otherwise he must have quitted Italy.

When Rome was full of luxury, and commanded the world and its wealth, there was not an artist in it capable of executing the statues of its victorious generals. {94}

Some Greek island, barren and bare, would breed artists capable of making ornaments for imperial Rome.

--- {94} They were obliged to cut the heads off from ancient statues, as their artists were only sufficiently expert to carve the drapery of the body. -=-

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It is an easy matter, in a rich country, to pay for a fine piece of art, But a difficult matter to find a price for the bringing up a fine artist. {95}

The fine arts have not, indeed, any intimate or immediate connection with the wealth or strength of a nation. The balance of trade has never been greatly increased by the exportation of great masterpieces of art, nor have nations been subdued by the powers of oratory; but the knowledge and the arts, by which wealth and greatness are obtained, follow in the train of the finer performances of human genius.

Where money becomes the universal agent, where it is impossible to enjoy ease or comfort for a single day without it, it becomes an object of adoration, as it were. To despise gold, which purchases all things, is reckoned a greater crime than to despise him to whose bounty we are indebted for all things; consequently, ambition, without which there never is excellence, is, at an early period of life, bent towards the gaining a fortune. A man, indeed, must either be of a singularly odd and obstinate disposition, or very indifferent about the opinion of others, and even about the good things of this world, (as they are termed,) to persevere in obtaining perfection in science or art, while without bread, when he might, with a tenth part of the care and study, live in affluence, and get money from day to day. There are few such obstinate fools; and without them, in a wealthy country, there can be found few men profound in science, or excelling in any of the arts.

The augmentation of taxes, by rendering the produce of industry dearer than in other countries, tends to cut off a nation of that de-

--- {95} This is liable to some exceptions. Natural genius may make a man excel; but, even then, it is ten to one if he is not compelled to labour in order to get bread, in place of trying to obtain fame. It was thus the great Dr. Johnson, with a genius that might have procured him immortal fame, drudged, during life, on weekly or daily labours, which will soon be forgotten. Even his dictionary, wonderful as it is for a single man, is not worthy of the English nation, and Johnson's name is little known beyond the limits of his own country. His genius was great, but his labours were little. His mind was in fetters; it was Sampson grinding at the mill to amuse the Philistines; not Sampson slaying lions, and putting to flight armies. -=-

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scription, from the markets in poorer countries. If all other countries are poorer; and the taxes lower; it has a tendency to shut it out from all the markets in the world.

An operation, that, at the same time that it renders people less happy, less contented, and more indifferent to the fate of their country, and at the same time tends to shut them out from foreign markets, is certainly very hurtful to any country, but particularly so to one, the greatness of which is founded on manufactures and commerce.

It would be useless to enlarge on so self-evident a consequence; yet, even in this case, we shall find something of that mixture of good, along with the bad, which is to be found in all human things.

As exertion originates in necessity or want, which it removes, taxation has the effect of prolonging the operation of necessity, after it would otherwise have ceased, and of rendering its pressure greater than it otherwise would be; the consequence of this is a greater and larger continued exertion on the part of those who have to pay the taxes. Human exertion, either in the way of invention or of industry, is like a spring that is pressed upon, and gains strength according to the pressure, until a certain point, when it gives way entirely.

Those investigators, who have calculated the effect of such and such a degree of taxation, of national debt, &c. have all erred, in not making any, or a sufficient, allowance for the action of this elastic power. Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith, certainly, both of them, men of profound research, have erred completely in this. The former, in calculating the ultimatum of exertion, at a point which we have long since passed; and, the latter, in reasoning on the taxation at the time he wrote, as if nearly the utmost degree, though it has since trebled, and the difficulty in paying seems to be diminished; at least it appears not to have augmented.

To fix the point at which this can stop is not, indeed, very easy; particularly, as the value of gold and silver, which are the measures of other values, do themselves vary. Thus, for example, a working man can, with his day's wages, purchase as much bread and beer as he could have done with it forty years ago. Though the national debt [end of page #114] is five times as great as it was then, at the present price of bread, it would not take twice the number of loaves to pay it that it would have required at that time.

The depreciation of money, then, as well as the continuation and augmented pressure of necessity, counteract, to a certain degree, and for a certain time, the natural tendency of taxes; but that counteraction, though operating in all cases, in its degree and duration, must depend upon particular circumstances; and though, perhaps, it cannot be, with much accuracy, ascertained in any case, it is impossible to attempt resolving the question in a general way; we shall, therefore, return to the subject, when we apply the general principles to the particular situation of England.

One conclusion, however, is, that as taxes, carried to a great extent, are very dangerous, though not so if only carried to a certain point; as that point cannot be ascertained, it ought to be a general rule to lay on as few taxes as possible; and the giving as little trouble and derangement to the contributor as may be, is also another point, with respect to which there cannot be two different opinions. [end of page #115]

CHAP. IV.

_Of the interior Causes of Decline, arising from the Encroachments of public and privileged Bodies, and of those who have a common Interest; on those who have no common Interest_. {96}

From the moment that any particular form of government or order is established in a nation, there must be separate and adverse interests; or, which is the same thing, bodies acting in opposition to each other, and seeking their own power and advantage at the expense of the rest.

In a country where the executive government is under no sufficient control, its strides to arbitrary power are well known; but, in a government poised like that of England, where there are deliberative bodies, with different interests, acting separately, and interested in keeping each other and the executive in check, it is not from the government that much danger is to be apprehended.

It is not meant to dwell on this particular part of the subject. As those governed hold a check on the executive power, which alone can be supposed to profit by oppression, there is a means of defence, in the first instance, and of redress, in the second, which diminishes greatly, if it does not entirely do away all danger from encroachment.

Another thing to be said about this government is, that government and the subject never come into opposition with each other, except where there is law or precedent to determine between them.

The danger, then, of encroachment on that side, is not very great, and it is the less so in this country, that, when there have been contests, they have always ended in favour of the people; whereas, in most

--- {96} The public certainly has a common interest, but it feels it not, and even those who have separate interests make part of that very public.--This will be exemplified, in a variety of instances, in the course of the present chapter. -=-

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other countries, they have terminated in favour of the executive power.

It is not so, however, with many other of the component parts of society. Those deliberating bodies, who have separate interests, and all those who live, as it were, on the public, and have what they call, in France, _l'esprit du corps_, for which we have no proper expression, though it may be defined to be those who have a common interest, a fellow feeling, and the means of acting in concert, are much more dangerous.

In nations where the executive power has no control, the progress of public bodies is less dangerous than where the power of the king is limited. It is always the interest of the sovereign, who monopolises all power, and those around him, to prevent any man, or body of men, from infringing on the liberty of the subject, or becoming rivals, by laying industry under contribution, so we find that, in every such nation, the clergy excepted, all public bodies are kept under proper subjection. {97}

--- {97} In all countries, those who have the care of religious matters must necessarily have some control over the minds of the people, which they can to a certain degree turn either to a good or a bad purpose. It is, therefore, impossible that the government and clergy can, for any length of time, act in opposition to each other: one or other of the two must soon fall, and there have been instances of the triumph of each. We have sometimes seen kings triumph over the clergy, but not very often; and we have frequently seen governments overturned by their means: except, therefore, in a state of revolution, they must mutually support each other. This is the natural state of things; but, in Roman Catholic countries, priests have a superior sway to what they have in any other, for several reasons that are very obvious. In the first place, the sovereign of the nation is not the head of the church; and, in the second, by means of a very superior degree of art and attention, during the dark ages, when the laity were sunk in ignorance, the catholic clergy contrived to entail the church property, from generation to generation, upon the whole body: at the same time, enjoining celibacy, by which all chance of alienation, even of personal property, was done away. As to the means of acquiring property, and of augmenting it; they were many, and, in every contest with the secular authority, they had a great advantage, by speaking, as it were, through ten thousand mouths at once, and giving the alarm to the consciences of the weak. In countries where the protestant religion has been established, the case is widely different. Gothic darkness was nearly fled before the reformation: besides this, the clergy are like other men, with regard to the manner of living; they are fathers and husbands, and, as such, liable to have all the property that is their own alienated, as much as any other set of men [end of page #117] whatever. The reformers, who were neither destitute of penetration nor zeal, and who knew all the abuses of the church of Rome, in matters of regulation as well as of opinion, were very careful to settle the new order of things on such a plan, as to be free from the evils which they had experienced, and against which they had risen with such energy and zeal. -=-

The simple state of the case is, that the interest of the people is that of the sovereign; and, except in cases where there is a profound ignorance of what is good for the nation, every wise sovereign takes the part of the people. But, under a limited monarchy, or in a democracy, the case is different. There, those bodies, which an arbitrary monarch would reduce to obedience at once, stand upon prerogative themselves; they form a band in the legislature, and act true to their own interests; so that the sovereign himself is compelled to admit of abuses, which he is willing but not able to remedy.

It is a great mistake, and one of the greatest into which people have of late been apt to run, that the government and people of a country are of opposite interests; and that governments wish to oppress the people, and rob them of the means of being affluent and happy: the very contrary is the case; all enlightened monarchs have acted quite differently.

Alfred the Great, Edward III. Queen Elizabeth, and nearly all her successors have endeavoured to increase the wealth and happiness of the people in England. Henry IV. of France, even Louis XIV. Peter the Great of Russia, Catherine, and indeed all his successors, as also the Kings of Prussia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and other sovereigns, who know how to shew their disposition, have tried to enrich their people, and render them happy. The great study of the English government has always been directed to that end, and the Romans extended their care even to the nations they subdued. Though there are many sovereigns who have not known how to do this, and therefore have either not attempted it, or erred in the mode they have taken; yet, with very few exceptions indeed, sovereigns have been found to wish for the prosperity of the nations over which they ruled.

In all human institutions there is much that is bad, and something [end of page #118] that is good; and the best, as well as the worst, are only combinations of good and evil, differing in the proportions. In mixt governments, or in limited governments, the people can defend their rights better against the sovereign than against those bodies that spring up amongst themselves: whereas, in pure monarchies, they have only to guard against the encroachments of the sovereign; and he will take care to prevent them from being oppressed by any other power.

This tendency to destruction, from encroachments of public bodies in established governments, is more to be dreaded in limited monarchies, and in democracies, than in pure monarchies; but we have had little occasion to observe the progress in governments of the former sort, excepting the clergy, though the military and the nobles generally play their part.

In Rome, the military never were dangerous, while the armies were only raised, like militias, for the purpose of a particular war; but, when they became a standing body, they were the proximate efficient cause of destroying liberty, though this was only the prelude to that decline which afterwards took place.

In limited monarchies, the lawyers are the greatest body, from which this sort of danger arises, and the reasons are numerous and evident.

United in interest, and constantly occupied in studying the law of the country, while the public at large are occupied on a variety of different objects, and without any bond of union, there can be nothing more natural than that they should contrive to render the business which they alone can understand, of as much importance and profit as possible.

In the criminal law of the country, where the king is the prosecutor, and where the lawyers are not interested in multiplying expense or embarrassment, our laws are administered with admirable attention; though, perhaps, in some cases, they are blamed for severity, they are justly admired over the world for their mode of administration.

It is very different in cases of property, or civil actions, where it is man against man, and where both solicitor and council =sic= are interested in the intricacy of the case. Here, indeed, the public is so glaringly imposed upon, that it would be almost useless to dwell on the sub-[end of page #119] ject, and, as a part of the plan of this work is to offer, or point out, a remedy, it may be sufficient, in this case, to go over the business once, and leave the examples till the relief is proposed.

At present, it is, however, necessary to shew why, as things are constituted in mixed governments like this, no remedy is to be had. The public only acts by representatives; and, in the House of Lords, the law-lords, who have _l'esprit du corps_, may easily contrive to manage every thing. One or two noblemen excepted, no one either has, or pretends to have sufficient knowledge to argue or adjust a point of law. Indeed, it is no easy matter to do so with effect, for, besides that, the law-lords have ministers on their side, or, which is the same thing, are on the side of ministers, the speaker is himself at the head of the law. The other members who look up to the law-lords, and who are generally very few in number on a law-question, generally give their assent. In the House of Commons, in which there are a number of lawyers, they are still less opposed. The country gentlemen profess ignorance. They think that to watch money-bills, the privileges of the house, the general interests of the nation, roads, canals, and inclosures, is their province. The mercantile, and other interests, composed of men getting money with great rapidity, consider the abuses of law as not to them of much importance; they do not feel the inconvenience, and have neither time nor inclination to study the subject. {98}

The prerogative of the king to refuse his assent, might, perhaps, be expected to come in as a protection, but here there is least of all any thing to be expected. In the first place, it is thought to be wise never to use that prerogative, and, in the second place, the lord-high-chancellor is the king's guide in every thing of the sort, insomuch, that he is styled the keeper of the king's conscience.

With power, influence, and interest on one side, and nothing to oppose it on the other, (for the common proverb is true, as all common

--- {98} The law is the widest, and the shortest, and the nearest road to a peerage. A Howe, Nelson, and St. Vincent, play a game, partly of skill, and partly of chance, for title; they must have luck and opportunity. The others are sure with fewer competitors to have more prizes. -=-

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proverbs are, that what is every body's business is nobody's,) the lawyers must encroach on the public, and they have done so to a most alarming degree.

In this case, it is not, as in others, where the great cut out work for and employ the small. No. The great generally (indeed almost always) begin with the advice and by the means of an attorney, who is only supposed to understand law-practice. The proceeding does not originate with the council, who could form some judgment of the justice of the case, so that a mean petty-fogging attorney may, for a trifle, which he puts into his own pocket, ruin two ignorant and honest men; he may set the ablest council to work, and occupy, for a time, the courts of justice, to the general interruption of law, and injury of the public.

This is, perhaps, one of the greatest and most crying evils in the land, and calls out the most loudly for redress, as the effects are very universal. In a commercial country, so many interests clash, and there are such a variety of circumstances, that the vast swarms of attorneys, who crowd the kingdom, find no difficulty in misleading one of the parties, and that is the cause of most law-suits.

As commercial wealth increases the evil augments, not in simple proportion, but in a far more rapid progression; first, in proportion to the wealth and gain to be obtained, and, secondly, according to the opportunities which augment with the business done.

In addition to the real dead expense, the loss of time, the attention, and the misfortune and misery occasioned by the law, are terrible evils; and, if ever the moment comes, that a general dissatisfaction prevails, it will be the law that will precipitate the evil.

The mildness of the civil laws in France, and the restraints under which lawyers are held, served greatly to soften the rigours of the revolution for the first two years. Had they possessed the power and the means they do in England, the revolution must have become much more terrible than it was at the first outset.

The lawyers owe all their power to the nature of the government. An arbitrary monarch will have no oppressor but himself, but here the [end of page #121] different interests are supposed to be poised; and when they are, all goes right, but, when they happen not to be so, the most active interest carries the day.

Though the law is the greatest of those bodies that is of a different interest from the public at large, yet there are some others deserving notice, and requiring reformation. It is the interest of all those who are connected with government to do away abuses that tend to endanger its security, or diminish its resources.

As the public revenue is all derived from those who labour, and as it can come from no other persons, if the prosperity and happiness of the subject were a mere matter of indifference, which it cannot be supposed to be; still it would be an object for government to preserve his resources undiminished. It was our lot, in another chapter, to mention the enormous increase of the poor's rate, which was in part attributed to the general increase of wealth; mal-administration is, however, another cause, and, the public is the more to be pitied, that the parish-officers defend their conduct against their constituents at the expense of their constituents.

In an inquiry after truth, it should be spoken without fear of offending; and, in this case, though the feelings of Englishmen may, perhaps, be hurt, and their pride wounded, it must be allowed, that if it were not for the mock-democratical form of administrating =sic= the funds for the maintenance of the poor, they would never suffer the extortion, and the bare-faced iniquities that are committed. {99} The ship- money, the poll-tax, the taxes on the Americans, and others, that have caused so much bloodshed and strife, never amounted to one-tenth, if all added together, of what the English public pays to be applied to maintain the poor, and administered by rude illiterate men, who render scarcely any account, and certainly, in general, evade all regular control. Those administrators, though chosen by the people, always, while in office, imbibe _l'esprit du corps_, and make a common cause.

--- {99} In Brabant and Flanders the people were very jealous of their liberties. They were, however, most terribly oppressed by the churchmen and lawyers. -=-

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The repairs of highways, bridges, streets, and expenses of police in general; whatever falls on parishes, towns, or counties, in the form of a tax or rate, is generally ill-administered, and the wastefulness increases with wealth. The difficulty of controling or redressing those evils proceeds from the same spirit pervading all the separate administrations. Government alone can remedy this; and it is both the interest and duty of the government to keep a strict watch over every body of men that has an interest separate from that of the public at large. Similar to the human body, which becomes stiff and rigid with age, so, as states get older, regulation upon regulation, and encroachment on encroachment, add friction and difficulty to the machine, till its force is overcome, and the motion stops. In the human body, if no violent disease intervenes, age occasions death. In the body politic, if no accidental event comes to accelerate the effect, it brings on a revolution; hence, as a nation never dies, it throws off the old grievances, and begins a new career.

The tendency that all laws and regulations have to become more complicated, and that all bodies, united by one common interest, have to encroach on the general weal, are known from the earliest periods; but we have no occasion to go back to early periods for a proof of that in this country. As wealth increases, the temptation augments, and the resistance decreases. The wealthy part of society are scarcely pressed upon by the evils, and they love ease too well to trouble themselves with fighting the battles of the public. Those who are engaged in trade are too much occupied to spare time; and, if they were not, they neither in general know how to proceed, nor have they any fund at their disposal, from which to draw the necessary money for expenditure.

It sometimes happens, that an individual, from a real public spirit, or from a particular humour or disposition, or, perhaps, because he has been severely oppressed, musters sufficient courage to undertake the redress of some particular grievance; but, unless he is very fortunate, and possesses both money and abilities, it is generally the ruin of his peace, if not of his fortune. He finds himself at once beset with a host of enemies, who throw every embarrassment in his way: his friends [end of page #123] may admire and pity, but they very seldom lend him any assistance. If some progress is made in redressing the grievance, it is generally attended with such consequences to the individual, as to deter others from undertaking a similar cause. Thus the incorporated body becomes safe, and goes on with its encroachments with impunity.

Much more may be said upon this subject; but, as it is rather one of which the operation is regulated by particular circumstances, than by general rules, the object being to apply the result of the inquiry to England, we shall leave it till we come to the application of it to that country, only observing, that the church, the army, and the law, are the three bodies universally and principally to be looked to as dangerous; and each of them according to the situation and the form of government of the respective countries, though, in England, the church has less means than in any country in Europe of extending its revenues or power, the law and corporate bodies the most; and, under arbitrary governments, the church and the military have the most, and the law and corporate bodies little or none. [end of page #124]

CHAP. V.

_Of the internal Causes of Decline, arising from the unequal Division of Property, and its Accumulation in the Hands of particular Persons.-- Its Effects on the Employment of Capital_.

In every country, the wealth that is in it has a natural tendency to accumulate in the hands of certain individuals, whether the laws of the society do or do not favour that accumulation. Although it has been observed in a former chapter that wealth follows industry, and flies from the son of the affluent citizen to the poor country boy, yet that is only the case with wealth, the possessor of which requires industry to keep it; for, where wealth has been obtained, so as to be in the form of land or money at interest, this is no longer the case. {100}

In America, and in countries that are new, or in those of which the inhabitants have been sufficiently hardy, and rash to overturn every ancient institution, precautions have been taken against the accumulation of too much wealth in the hands of one person, or at least to discourage and counteract it; but, in old nations, where we do not chuse =sic= to run such risks, the case is different. The natural vanity of raising a family, the means that a rich man has to accumulate, the natural chance of wealth accumulating by marriages, and many other circumstances, operate in favour of all those rich men, who are freed from risk, and independent of industry. In some cases, extravagance dissipates wealth, but the laws favour accumulation of landed property, and counteract extravagance; the advantages are in favour of all the wealthy in general, and the consequence is, that from the first origin of any particular order of things, till some convulsion takes place, the division of property becomes more and more unequal.

Far from counteracting this by the laws of the land, in all those

--- {100} Amongst the Romans, in early times, property in land was by law to be equally divided; but that absurd law was never strictly attended to, and when the country became wealthy was totally set aside. -=-

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countries, the governments of which took strength during this feudal system, there are regulations leading greatly to accelerate the progress. The law of primogeniture has this effect; and the law of entails, both immoral and impolitic in its operation, has a still greater tendency.

These laws only extend to agricultural property; but commerce, which at first tends to disseminate wealth, in the end, has the same effect of accumulating it in private hands.

Industry, art, and intelligence, are, in the early ages, the spring of commerce; but, as machinery and capital become necessary, a set of persons rise up who engross all the great profits, and amass immense fortunes. {101}

The consequence of great fortunes, and the unequal division of property, are, that the lower ranks, though expensively maintained, become degraded, disorderly, and uncomfortable, while the middling classes disappear by degrees. Discontent pervades the great mass of the people, and the supporters of the government, though powerful, are too few in number, and too inefficient in character to preserve it from ruin.

The proprietors of land or money should never be so far raised above the ordinary class of the people as to be totally ignorant of their manner of feeling and existing, or to lose sight of the connection between industry and prosperity; for, whenever they do, the industrious are oppressed, and wealth vanishes. {102}

It requires not much knowledge, and little love of justice, to see that there must be gradations in society, which, instead of diminishing, increase the general happiness of mankind; but when we

--- {101} Invention has nearly the same effect in commerce that the introduction of gunpowder and artillery have on the art of war. Wealth is rendered more necessary to carry them on. Every new improvement that is made, in either the personal strength and energy of man becomes of less importance.

{102} Some of the greatest proprietors in this kingdom, much to their honour, are the most exemplary men in it, with respect to their conduct to their tenantry; but though the instances are honourable and splendid, they are not general; nor is it in the nature of things that they can be general. In France, matters were in general different; and the inattention of the nobility to their duty was one cause of the revolution; they had forgot, that, if they neglected or oppressed the industrious, they must ruin themselves. -=-

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find that the chance of being born half an hour sooner or later makes one man the proprietor of 50,000 acres and another little better than a beggar; when we consider that, by means of industry, he never may be able to purchase a garden to grow cabbages for his family, it loosens our attachment to the order of things we see before us, it hurts our ideas of moral equity. A man of reflection wishes the evil to be silently counteracted, and if he is violent, and has any disposition to try a change, it furnishes him with arguments and abettors.

When the Romans (with whose history we are tolerably well acquainted) {103} grew rich, the division of property became very unequal, and the attachment of the people for their government declined, the middle classes lost their importance, and the lower orders of free citizens became a mere rabble. When Rome was poor, the people did not cry for bread, but when the brick buildings were turned into marble palaces, when a lamprey was sold for fifty-six pounds, {104} the people became a degraded populace, not much better, or less disorderly than the Lazzeroni of Naples. A donation of corn was a bribe to a Roman citizen; {105} though there is not, perhaps, an order of peasantry in the most remote corner of Europe, who would consider such a donation in ordinary times as an object either worthy of clamour or deserving of thanks. {106}

The Romans, at the time when Cincinatus held the plough, and the conquerors of nations roasted their own turnips, would have thought themselves degraded by eating bread obtained by such means; but it was different with the Romans after they had conquered the world.

In a more recent example, we may trace a similar effect, arising from a cause not very different.

--- {103} We know better about the laws and manners of the Romans 2000 years ago, in the time of the first Punic War, than about those of England, in the time of Henry the Fourth. They had fixed laws, their state was young, and the division of property tolerably equal.

{104} See Arbuthnot on Coins.

{105} Do not the soup-shops of late invention, and certainly well intended, bear some resemblance to these days of Roman wretchedness and magnificence.

{106} It is to be observed, these donations were not on account of scarcity, but to save the people from the trouble of working to earn the corn; they were become idle in body and degraded in mind. -=-

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The unequal division of property in France was one of the chief causes of the revolution; the intention of which was, to overturn the then existing order of things. The ignorance of the great proprietors concerning of their true interests, and the smallness of their numbers, disabled them from protecting themselves. The middle orders were discontented, and wished for a change; and the lower orders were so degraded, that, at the first signal, they became as mutinous and as mean as the Plebians at Rome, in the days of its splendor. {107}

That this was not alone owing to the unequal division of property is certain, there were other causes, but that was a principal one. As a proof that this was so in England, where property is more equally divided than it was in France, the common people are more attached to government, and of a different spirit, though they are changing since the late great influx of wealth into this country, and since difficulties which have accumulated on the heads of the middle orders, while those who have large fortunes feel a greater facility of augmenting them than at any former period.

In those parts of this country, where wealth has made the least progress, the character of the people supports itself the best amongst the lower classes; and the inverse progress of that character, and of the acquisition of wealth, is sufficiently striking to be noticed by one who is neither a very near, nor a very nice observer.

Discontent and envy rise arise from comparison; and, where they become prevalent, society can never stand long. They are enemies to fair industry.

Whatever may have been the delusive theories into which ill- intentioned, designing, and subtile men have sometimes deluded the great mass of the people, they have never been successful, except when they could fight under the appearance of justice, and thereby create discontent. The unequal division of property has frequently served them in this case.

--- {107} The Parisian populace were the instruments in the hand of those who destroyed the former government, as the regular army is in the hands of him who has erected that which now exists. -=-

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while it increased the ignorance, and diminished the number of the enemies they had to encounter.

As this evil has arisen to a greater height in countries which have had less wealth in the aggregate than England, it is not the most dangerous thing we have to encounter; but, as the tendency to it increases very rapidly of late years, we must, by no means, overlook it. A future Chapter will be dedicated to the purpose of inquiring how this may be counteracted in some cases, in others modified and disguised, so as to prevent, in some degree, the evil effects that naturally arise from it.

Of all the ways in which property accumulates, in particular hands, the most dangerous is landed property; not only on account of entails, and the law of primogeniture, (which attach to land alone,) but because it is the property the most easily retained, the least liable to be alienated, and the only one that augments in value in a state that is growing rich.

An estate in land augments in value, without augmenting in extent, when a country becomes richer. A fortune, lent at interest, diminishes, as the value of money sinks. A fortune engaged in trade is liable to risks, and requires industry to preserve it: but industry, it has been observed, never is to be found for any great length of time in any single line of men; consequently, there are few great monied men, except such as have acquired their own fortunes, and those can never be very numerous nor overgrown.

Besides our having facts to furnish proofs that there are no very great fortunes, except landed fortunes; it can scarcely have escaped the notice of any one, that no other gives such umbrage, or shews the inferiority men =sic= who have none so much. {108}

That there is a perpetual tendency to the accumulation of property, in the hands of individuals, is certain; for, amongst the nations

--- {108} If a man has wealth, in any other form, it is only known by the expenditure he makes, and it is quickly diminished by mismanagement; but the great landed estate, which is seldom well attended to, is mismanaged to the public detriment without ruin to the proprietor. -=-

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of Europe, those who are the most ancient, exhibit the most striking contrasts of poverty and riches.

Nations obtaining wealth by commerce are less liable to this danger than any others; at least we are led to believe so, from the present situation of things: we are, perhaps, however, not altogether right in the conclusion.

In France there were, and in Germany, Russia, and Poland, there are some immense fortunes, though general wealth is not nearly equal to that of England: so much for a comparison between nations of the present day. Again, it is certain, there were some fortunes in England, in the times of the Plantagenets and Tudors, much greater than any of the present times. {109} England was not then near so wealthy as it is now, and had very little commerce: it would then appear, that whether we compare England with what it was before it became a wealthy and commercial nation, or with other nations, at the present time, which are not wealthy, commerce and riches appear to have operated in dividing riches, and making that division more equal, rather than in rendering their accumulation great in particular hands, and their distribution unequal.

Before we are too positive about the cause, though we admit this effect, let us inquire whether there are not some other circumstances that are peculiar to the present situation of England, that may, if not wholly, at least in part, account for it.

The form of government in England is different from that of any of those countries. It is also different in its nature, though not in its form, from what it was under the Plantagenets and Tudors. Court favour cannot enrich a family in this country, and the operation of the law is tolerably equal. As neither protection, nor rank, in this country, raise a man above the rest of society, so the richest subject is obliged to obtain, by his expenditure, that consideration which he would ob-

--- {109} Two centuries ago, land was sold for twelve years purchase, and the rents are five times as great as they were then; 10,000 L. employed in buying land then would now produce 5000 L. a year. Had the same money been lent, at interest, it would but produce 500 L. The land, too, would sell for 140,000 L. The monied capital would remain what it was. -=-

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tain by other means, under another form of government, {110} and he is as much compelled to pay his debts as any other man.

It is not, however, the great wealth of one individual, or even of a few individuals, that is an object of consideration. It will be found that the great number of persons, who live upon revenues, sufficiently abundant to exempt them from care and attention, and to enable them to injure the manners of the people, (being above the necessity of economy, feeling none of its wants, and contributing nothing by their own exertion to its wealth or strength,) is a very great evil, and one that tends constantly to increase.

But if this progress goes on, while a nation is acquiring wealth, how much faster does it not proceed when it approaches towards its decline? It is, then, indeed, that the extremes of poverty and riches are to be seen in the most striking degree.

The higher classes can never be made to contribute their share towards the prosperity of a state; where there are no middling classes to connect the higher and lower orders, and to protect the lower orders from the power of the higher, a state must gradually decline.

It is in the middling classes that the freedom, the intelligence, and the industry of a country reside. The higher class may be very intelligent, but can never be very numerous; and being above the feeling of want, except in a few instances, (where nature has endowed the wealthy with innate good qualities,) there is nothing to be expected or obtained of them, {111} towards the general good.

From the working and laborious classes, again, little is to be expected. They fill the part assigned to them when they perform their duty to themselves and families; and they have neither leisure, nor other means of contributing to general prosperity as public men;

--- {110} In France, the richest subject under the crown was a prince of the blood, &c.

{111} In this case, the English form of government is good, because, it not only hinders any man from forgetting that he is a man, but whenever there is any ambition, no one in this country can rise above the necessity of acting with, and feeling for, their inferiors, of whom they sometimes have to ask favours, which they never do under a pure monarchy. -=-

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they, indeed, pay more than their share of taxes in almost every country; {112} but they cannot directly, even by election, participate in the government of the country.

If any number of persons engross the whole of the lands of a nation, then the labourers that live on those lands must be in a degraded situation; they then become less sound and less important members of the state than they would otherwise be.

Necessity does not act with that favourable impulse on people, where property is very unequally divided, that it does where the gradation from the state of poverty to that of riches is more regular.

As the action of the body is brought on by the effect produced on the mind; and as there is no hope of obtaining wealth where it appears very unequally divided, so also there is no exertion where there is no hope. {113}

Where there is no regular gradation of rank and division of property, emulation, which is the spur to action, when absolute necessity ceases to operate, is entirely destroyed; thus the lower classes become degraded and discouraged, as is universally found to be the case in nations that have passed their meridian; the contrary being as regularly and constantly the case with rising nations.

Besides the degradation and listlessness occasioned in the lower ranks, by an unequal distribution of property, the most agreeable, and the strongest bond of society is thereby broken. The bond that

--- {112} This is less the case in England than in any other country.

{113} It is strange how possibility, which is the mother of hope, acts upon, and controuls, the passions. Envy is generally directed to those who are but a little raised above us. They are reckoned to be madmen who envy kings, or fall in love with princesses, and, in fact, they are such, unless when they belong to the same rank themselves.

Love, for example, which is not a voluntary passion, or under the controul of reason, ought, according to the chances of things, sometimes to make a sensible and wise man become enamoured of a princess, but that never happens. It would appear, that, in order to become the object of desire, there must be a hope founded on a reasonable expectation of obtaining the object. This can be but very small in the lower classes, when they look at the overgrown rich, and have no intermediate rank to envy or emulate. -=-

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consists, in the attachment of the inferior classes, to those immediately above them. Where the distance is great, there is but little connection, and that connection is merely founded upon conveniency, not on a similarity of feeling, or an occasional interchange of good actions, or mutual services. By this means, the whole society becomes, as it were, disjointed, and if the chain is not entirely broken, it has at least lost that strength and pliability that is necessary, either for the raising a nation to greatness, or supporting it after it has risen to a superior degree of rank or power.

Amongst the causes of the decline of wealthy nations, this then is one. The great lose sight of the origin of their wealth, and cease to consider, that all wealth originates in labour, and that, therefore, the industrious and productive classes are the sinews of riches and power. The French nation, to which we have had occasion to allude already, was in this situation before the revolution. Rome was so likewise before its fall. We are not, however, to expect to find this as a principal cause in the fall of all nations; many of them fell from exterior and not interior causes. Venice, Genoa, and all the places that flourished in the middle ages, fell from other causes. Whatever their internal energy might have been, their fate could not have been altered, nor their fall prevented. The case is different with nations of which the extent is sufficiently great to protect them against the attacks of their enemies; and where the local situation is such as to secure them from a change taking place in the channels of commerce, a cause of decline which is not to be resisted by any power inherent in a nation itself.

In Spain and Portugal the internal causes are the preponderating ones, and, in some measure, though not altogether so, in Holland. If England should ever fall, internal causes must have a great share in the catastrophe. In this inquiry, then, we must consider the interior state of the country as of great importance.

When property is very unequally divided, the monied capital of a nation, upon the employment of which, next to its industry, its wealth, or revenue, depend, begins to be applied less advantageously. A preference is given to employments, by which money is got with most ease and [end of page #133] certainty, though in less quantity. A preference also is given to lines of business that are reckoned the most noble and independent.

Manufacturers aspire to become merchants, and merchants to become mere lenders of money, or agents. The detail is done by brokers, by men who take the trouble, and understand the nature of the particular branches they undertake, but who furnish no capital.

The Dutch were the greatest example of this. Independent of those great political events, which have, as it were, completed the ruin of their country, they had long ceased to give that great encouragement to manufactures, which had, at first, raised them to wealth and power in so surprising a manner. They had, in the latter times, become agents for others, rather than merchants on their own account; so that the capital, which, at one time, brought in, probably, twenty or twenty- five per cent. annually, and which had, even at a late period, produced ten or fifteen, was employed in a way that scarcely produced three.

If it were possible to employ large capitals with as much advantage, and to make them set in motion and maintain as much industry as small ones are made to do, there would scarcely be any limit to the accumulation of money in a country; but a vast variety of causes operate on preventing this.

Whatever, therefore, tends to accumulate the capital of a nation in a few hands (thereby depriving the many) not only increases luxury, and corrupts manners and morals, but diminishes the activity of the capital and the industry of the country. {114}

In all the great places that are now in a state of decay, we find families living on the interest of money, that formerly were engaged in manufactures or commerce. Antwerp, Genoa, and Venice, were full

--- {114} It is a strange fact, that when this country was not nearly so far advanced as it is now, almost all the merchants traded on their own capitals; they purchased goods, paid for them, sold them, and waited for the returns; but now it is quite different. They purchase on credit, and draw bills on those to whom they sell, and are continually obliged to obtain discounts; or, in other words, to borrow money, till the regular time of payment comes round; they may, therefore, be said to be trading with the capital of money-lenders, who afford them discount. -=-

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of such, but those persons would not have ventured a single shilling in a new enterprise. The connection between industry and revenue was lost in their ideas. They knew nothing of it, and the remnants of the industrious, who still cultivated the ancient modes of procuring wealth, were considered as an inferior class of persons, depending upon less certain means of existence, and generally greatly straitened for capital, which, as soon as they possessed in sufficient quantity, enabled them to follow the same example, and to retire to the less affluent, but more esteemed and idle practice of living upon interest.

In countries where there are nobility, the capital of the commercial world is constantly going to them, either by marriage of daughters, or by the other means, which rich people take to become noble. Even where there are no nobility, the class of citizens living without any immediate connection with trade consider themselves as forming the highest order of society, and they become the envy of the others. There appears to be no means of preventing capital, when unequally divided, from being invested in the least profitable way that produces revenue. When more equally divided, it is employed in the way that produces the greatest possible income, by setting to work and maintaining the greatest possible quantity of labour.

If there is not sufficient means of employing capital within a nation or country that has a very unequal division of wealth, there are plenty of opportunities furnished by poorer nations. Accordingly, every one of the nations, states, or towns, that has ever been wealthy, has furnished those who wanted it with capital, at a low interest. Amsterdam has lent great sums to England, to Russia, and France. The French owed a very large sum to Genoa at the beginning of the revolution. Antwerp, Cologne, and every one of the ancient, rich, and decayed towns had vested money in the hands of foreign nations, or lent to German princes, or to the great proprietors of land, on the security of their estates. The American funds found purchasers amongst the wealthy all over Europe, when they could not find any in their own states; and, it is probable, that the far greater portion of their debt is at this time in the hands of foreigners.

Thus it is that wealthy nations let the means by which the wealth [end of page #135] was acquired go out of their hands; each individual in a new state, or in an old, follows his own interest and disposition in the disposal of his property. In the new state, the individual interest and that of the country are generally the same; in the old one, they are in opposition to each other, and that opposition is greatly increased by the unequal division of property. The middling class of proprietors never seek the most profitable employment for their money; the very wealthy are always inclined to seek for good security and certain payment, without any consideration of the interest of their country.

To counteract the tendency of property to accumulate, without infringing on the rights of individuals, will be found desirable. In the Fourth Book =sic--there is none.=, a mode of doing this shall be attentively taken into consideration.

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CHAP. VI.

_Of the Interior Causes of Decline, which arise from the Produce of the Soil becoming unequal to the Sustenance of a luxurious People.-- Of Monopoly_.

It has already been mentioned, and we have seen, in the case of Rome and Italy, that the country which was sufficient to maintain a certain population, when the manners of the people were simple, becomes incapable of doing so, when wealth has introduced luxury.

The case of the Romans, though the most clearly ascertained of any, and the circumstances the best known, is only in part applicable to an inquiry into the effects of luxury at the present day. The nature of luxury, the nature of the wants of man, and the diffusion of that luxury, its distribution amongst the different classes, are so unlike to what they were, that the comparison scarcely holds in any single instance.

A most enormous increase of population (a forced population as it were) in a small country, together with large tracts of land converted from agriculture to the purposes of pleasure were the principal causes why Italy, in latter times, was incapable of supplying itself with corn. Wherever wealth comes in more easily and in abundance, by other means than by agriculture, that is to a certain degree neglected. To cultivate ceases to be an object where it is more easy to purchase. This certainly is, at all times, and in all places, one of the consequences of an influx of wealth, from wheresoever it comes, or by whatever means it is acquired; though, in Italy, it was felt more than perhaps in any other part of the world. The manner in which wealth comes into a nation has a great effect on the consumption of produce, owing to the description of persons into whose hands it first comes. In Rome, the wealth came into the hands of the great. The slaves and servants, though more numerous, were, perhaps, fed in the same manner with the slaves in earlier periods, though probably not with so much economy. In a manufacturing country, [end of page #137] the greatest part of the wealth comes first into the hands of the labouring people, who then live better and consume more of the produce of the earth; not by eating a greater quantity, but by eating of a different quality.

In every manufacturing or commercial country, wealth displays itself in general opulence amongst the lower orders, and the means of supplying that greater consumption is the same as it was in Rome. The money that arrives from other countries enables the community to purchase from other countries the deficiency of provisions, and prevents the evil effects from being felt at the moment.

When, in course of time, there comes to be a difficulty of obtaining the supply, from the want of produce in the country itself, then the decline begins; and as no wealth, arising either from conquest, colonies, or commerce, bears any great proportion to the daily food of a people, its effect is soon felt in a very ruinous and terrible manner.

England is the greatest country for extensive commerce that ever existed, yet the amount of the whole of its foreign trade would not do much more than furnish the people with bread, and certainly not with all the simple necessaries of life. If, therefore, a country, such as this is, were unable to furnish itself with the necessaries of life, the whole balance of trade, now in its favour, would not be sufficient to supply any considerable deficiency.

The desire of eating animal food, in place of vegetables, is very general and, amongst a people living by manufactures, will always be indulged. If the country was fully peopled, before animal food was so much used; that is, if the population was as great as the vegetable produce of the country was able to supply; as the same quantity of ground cannot feed the same number of people with animal food, there will be a necessity of importing the deficiency.

The change that this produces, when once it begins to operate, is a most powerful and effectual cause of decline; and, without the intervention of conquest, or any violent revolution, would of itself be sufficient to impoverish, in the first instance, and, in the second, to depopulate a country.

We find every country that was once wealthy, but that has fallen [end of page #138] into decline, is thinly peopled; and if it were not for the want of information, from which the cause may be traced, a deficiency of food might most probably be found to be one of the most efficient.

Flanders, which is one of the most fertile countries in Europe, and has experienced a partial decline, is probably not near so fully peopled as it once was. Its present population would not support those armies, or give it that rank amongst nations which it at one time maintained. It is true there have been persecutions and emigrations, which must have reduced the population of the country for a time, but not to an extent that would account for such a diminution in its numbers, as there is reason to think has taken place.

Ghent, a town of an amazing size, could, at one time, send out fifty thousand fighting men. It certainly could not now (that is to say, at the time the French subdued the country) have furnished one-fourth part of the number. Ghent is not the only town in this situation, the others have all fallen off in the same manner. When manufactures declined, the people did not go to live in the country, for that also is thinly inhabited, the richness of the soil being taken into consideration.

The peasants of that country lived much better than their French neighbours; they apparently brought up their children with more ease, and fed them more fully; but the country was not so populous, in proportion to its fertility.

In southern climates, where the heat of the sun is great, and vegetation difficult, unless the crop is of a nature to protect the ground from its effects, natural grass is never luxuriant; and the cattle are neither so large nor so fat as in more northerly latitudes. Corn, on the other hand, which rises to a sufficient height, before the hot season, to protect the ground from the rays of the sun, is a more profitable crop; and, indeed, the only one that could (potatoes excepted) support a great population.

In such countries, scarcely any degree of general affluence would enable the labouring classes to eat animal food. No degree of wealth, that can well be supposed, would enable the inhabitants of the southern parts of France, or of Spain, to live on butcher-meat, which, [end of page #139] if it became to be in general demand, would be dearer than poultry, or even than game. The absolute necessity of living on vegetables, or rather the absolute impossibility of contracting a habit of living on animal food, must, then, in those countries, counteract the taste, and prevent depopulation being produced by that cause.--But it is very different with more northerly countries, where it is almost a matter of indifference, in point of expense, to an individual who enjoys any degree of affluence, whether he lives on vegetable or animal food, and where he gives a decided preference to the former. {115}

It is probable that nature (so admirable in adapting the manners of the inhabitants to the nature of the country) has made heavy animal food less congenial to the taste of southern nations than to those of the north. There is, indeed, reason to believe it is so, but, whether it is or not, as natural philosophy is not here the study, but political economy, the fact is, that if southern nations had the same propensity, it would be impossible to indulge it to an equal extent.

As wealth and power are intimately connected with population, and depend in a great measure upon it, wherever they are the cause of introducing a taste that will, in the end, depopulate a country, they must, in so far, undermine their own support, and bring on decay. This is a case that applies to all northern nations, and particularly to Britain; in order, therefore, to treat the subject at full length, it will be better to enter into the minute examination when we come to apply the case directly to this country, and seek for a remedy.

--- {115} The proportion between the prices of bread and butcher meat will help to a conclusion on this subject. The warmer and dryer the climate, the cheaper bread is in proportion. At Paris, which is a dry, but not a very warm climate, the proportion, in ordinary times, was as four to one. A loaf of bread of four pounds, and a pound of meat, were supposed to be nearly the same price, but the meat was generally the higher of the two. In England, the proportion (before the late revolution in prices) was about two to one, and, in Ireland, where the soil and climate are more moist, and better for cattle, flesh meat was still cheaper, in proportion. The poverty of the people, indeed, prevented them from living on animal food, but buttermilk, (an animal production) and potatoes, a cheaper vegetable, are their chief sustenance. -=-

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Though this cause of depopulation, arising from wealth, increasing the consumption of food, is peculiar to northern nations, yet there are others that have a similar effect, that fall more heavily on the inhabitants of the south.

Rest from labour is, in warm climates, a great propensity, and easily indulged. In no northern nation could there be found so idle a set of beings as the Lazzeroni of Naples. If the nations of the north have a desire to indulge themselves in consuming more, those of the south have a propensity to be idle, and produce less, the effect of which is in nearly the same; for, whether they produce any thing or not, they must consume something. The same listlessness and desire of rest, that produces idleness and beggary amongst the poor, makes the rich inclined to have a great retinue of servants, and, as those servants are idly inclined, they serve for low wages, on condition of having but light work to perform. Thus it is that the fertility of the soil, and the other natural advantages are destroyed by the disposition of the inhabitants.

It does not appear, however, that this disposition was indulged or encouraged to any hurtful extent, until wealth had vitiated the original manners of the inhabitants. The Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, all of them performed works requiring great exertion. They encouraged industry and arts, and became great, wealthy, and populous; but, when once they fell to decline, the same fate attended the descendants of them all. {116}

Of all the countries that were once great, and have fallen to decay, Italy has retained its population the best; but, for this, there is an evident cause to be found in the natural fertility of the country, and the resource still drawn from foreigners, who have never ceased to visit that once famous seat of arts and military glory.

The number of horses and of domestic animals maintained by the

--- {116} After the Augustan age, the populace of Rome seem to have degenerated with great rapidity, as the donations of corn clearly prove. Had the tributary countries not furnished the means of providing food, the Goths would have been saved the trouble of sacking the city, as the people must have perished for want. -=-

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fruits of the earth, but producing nothing, as they increase, in every country where wealth prevails, may be considered as a cause of depopulation, confined to no part of the world. Thus we find either the same cause acting throughout, or different causes producing the same effect in different countries; thereby reducing them all much more nearly to an equality than we could at first imagine.

It has been observed, that when wealth comes to the working orders, and makes them indulge in animal food, it produces a greater effect, with respect to the consumption of produce, than if the same wealth came into the hands of the rich; this is, however, in some degree, compensated by their not keeping pleasure horses, the greatest of all consumers of the produce of the earth. One horse will consume as much as a family of four persons living on corn, and the ordinary vegetables used in England; and as much as two families, living as they do in Ireland or Scotland, on oat-meal, milk, and potatoes.

As we find depopulation one of the effects that is universally occasioned by decline, it must originate in some cause equally general, and that cause must be one attending the state of wealth and greatness, for it does not appear to be a necessary effect of decline. We can very easily conceive a people, degraded and numerous, reduced to live poorly, as they do in Naples, Cairo, and some other particular spots: but taking the whole of those countries together, we find evident marks of a falling off in population; and we find it not progressive, but of long standing. Those countries seem to have found a new maximum of population, far inferior to the former standard, immediately after they ceased to be wealthy and flourishing.

Perhaps it was from this cause that the idea of sumptuary laws originated; for though, in some cases, the pride of being distinguished might occasion the sovereign to enact, or the higher orders of society to solicit them, yet they were always considered as tending to prevent ruinous extravagance. When states become very wealthy, they may consider such regulations as ridiculous, and perhaps they may neither be necessary nor effectual; yet, nevertheless, there must be some cause for the general opinion of their utility. Though it is not the fashion of the present times to hold an opinion as good be-[end of page #142] cause it is general, and its prevalence in ignorant times is considered as a mark of its being erroneous; yet, observation and common sense have never been wanting at any period, and it is from those sources that such maxims and opinions arise. Any man who had travelled, first through Italy and Spain, and then through England and America, would be very likely to invent sumptuary laws, if he had never heard of such a thing before. In the application of sumptuary laws, as a device, for preventing decline, the traveller might, perhaps, be very whimsical; sometimes forbidding what would never be attempted; but there would be nothing at all ridiculous in his general intention. {117}

It will certainly be found that, in all the causes of the decay of nations, the increase of consumption, and decrease of production, takes the greatest variety of forms, and disguises itself the most; it is, therefore, one that is much to be guarded against, particularly as its effects seem to be difficult to remedy.

As the manner in which a country acquires riches has a considerable influence on the habits of the people, a country acquiring riches by conquest, or colonies, must naturally expend it in splendour and magnificence.

Merchants are less splendid than conquerors and planters. Their ostentation is of a different sort; and, as the fortunes made in that way are rather more equally divided, they cannot launch out quite so far. Besides, merchants are seldom entirely independent of credit and industry; at least, when acquiring their fortunes they were not so; and, therefore, whether the necessity continues or not, the habit, once contracted, is never quite effaced.

Manufacturers, again, are still less splendid than merchants. With them, the gifts of fortune are more equally divided than with either of the other three, and they seldom arrive at more than an ordinary degree of affluence; which affords the means of gratifying personal wants, of living with hospitality, ease, and comfort.

--- {117} If, for example, it were a law at Manchester or Birmingham, that no man should keep above fifty servants in livery, or burn more than three-dozen wax-lights at a time, it would be like mockery, and would be perfectly useless; at Rome it would be very useful. -=-

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The greatest part of manufacturing wealth, and that, indeed, is divided with a pretty equal hand, is that which goes to the working people, who spend nearly the whole on personal enjoyment.

The quantity of food that an individual may consume is nearly limited by nature; but the extent of ground on which that food grows depends chiefly on the quality. Thus, for example, it will require nearly ten times the number of acres to maintain one hundred people, who live on animal food, that =sic= it would require to supply the same persons living on vegetables; and, as wealth increases, animal food always obtains the preference. This is evident, from so many proofs, that it scarcely needs illustration. In London, which is the most wealthy part of England, there is more animal food consumed than in any other part, in proportion to the numbers; and, in the country there is always less than in the towns. In the country, and in the towns of England, there is more than in any proportional part of Scotland, or in France, or, indeed, any part of Europe. Expensive as animal food is here, still it bears less proportion to the wages of labour, or the general wealth, than in any other country. In every country, as riches have increased, the consumption of the produce of the earth has augmented.

The Dutch seem to have been well aware of the danger of wealth making the people consume too much. A man in moderate circumstances loses his credit there, who roasts his meat instead of boiling it. It is reckoned wastefulness, and, as such, is the occasion of confidence being withdrawn from him: it has nearly as bad an effect on a man's credit, as if he were seen coming from a gaming-house.

It will, perhaps, be said, that the parsimony of the Dutch is ridiculous, but we ought not to attribute this merely to parsimony, but to a feeling similar to what we have very properly in England when we see bread wasted. It arises from a feeling of the general want, not of the particular loss, which is totally a different thing. If a man give away imprudently, that loss is to himself, not to the community. As there cannot be givers without receivers it is a change of hands, but there ends the matter. A habit of wasting is another [end of page #144] thing, it is a general loss, and, therefore, hurts the community at large as well as the individual.

When this augmented consumption takes place, to any great extent, it is the infallible cause of depopulation. How nearly depopulation and decline are connected with each other is very easily and well understood; indeed, it is impossible not to see their intimate connection. {118}

While the exports of a country amount to a great sum, a few millions can be spared for the importation of provisions, without any great difficulty; but the evil may increase imperceptibly, till it becomes impossible to remedy it. The distress that must be occasioned, in such a case, is beyond the power of calculation; for though, in times of plenty, animal food is preferred, whenever there comes any thing like want, that can only be supplied by corn, and there is no wealth sufficient, in any country, to procure that for a number of years, to any great extent. {119}

It is calculated, by the author of the notes on Dr. Smith's Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, that, if the supply of corn were to fall short, one-fourth part, in England, for a number of years running, there would be no means of finding either corn to buy, ships to transport it, or money to pay for it, without totally deranging the commerce of the country.

In every country there are a number of persons who can afford to

--- {118} Till within these twelve or fourteen years, England always was able to export some grain; but now the demand for importation is great and regular. It has had a vast influence on the balance of trade, which, though it has been great some years, has not, upon the whole, been equal to what it was previous to the American war, when the whole amount of foreign commerce was not one-half of what it has been for these last ten years.

{119} If it could be done, it would bring on poverty; but, as the excess of crops over the consumption is not, in any nation, equal to one-tenth of its whole revenue; and, as the expense of eatables amount to nearly one-half, the wealth of a nation would soon be destroyed, if it were possible to produce from other nations a supply. The calculation would be nearly as under for England, putting the population at nine millions.

In ordinary times, nine millions of people living on bread, potatoes, &c. would require about four millions of acres; but nine millions, living on animal food, will require thirty-six millions of acres. -=-

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live in a more expensive way than the rest; perhaps, this may be reckoned at one-fourth, but, in countries that are poor, even that fourth cannot afford to eat animal food. If, however, a country becomes sufficiently rich for one-sixth to live chiefly on animal food, and the other five-sixths to live one day in the week on that food, the effect will be as if one-third lived on it constantly, which would require two- thirds more territory than when the whole lived on bread.

Those who think that such matters find their own level, and regulate themselves, may be right in the long run, for so they indeed do. But how? When poverty and want came, no doubt the consumption of flesh-meat would be diminished; when the country had no means of supplying itself as it did when it was rich, famine would play its part in becoming one of the regulators; but, before this regulation could be effected, the evil we wish to prevent would have taken place. The country would be depopulated and ruined. We must, therefore, in trying to avert the decline of a nation, not set any thing down for the counteracting and adjusting power, which is known sometimes to interfere so very advantageously in the affairs of men. Though it is true that it does interfere, it is in all cases of this sort too late, it is an effect of the cause which we wish to avoid; we can only look to it here for stopping the career in process of time, but, never for preventing it. We know that the extravagance of an individual impairs his fortune, and, that the diminution of means will, at length, counteract the extravagance; but, then it will do so when it is too late, and after he is ruined. Wastefulness may be stopped, but it cannot possibly stop itself, as the diminution of means is the cause of the extravagance ceasing, and itself is an effect of the prior existence of the extravagance.

Regarding men merely then as producing and consuming, (the proportion between which regulates the wealth of a nation,) we find that, in their own persons, there is a rooted tendency to bring on the decline. But we shall farther find that not only do people in wealthy and luxurious nations produce less and consume more than in nations less advanced, but they increase the number of unproductive labourers, all of whom consume without producing. They also main- [end of page #146] tain animals who consume, but do nothing towards production. {120} No country, in which the people live much upon animal food, can be well peopled. Two hundred persons to a square mile of country is nearly the highest population of any nation in Europe, that is, as near as may be, three acres and a quarter to each person; but, on an average, even in France, there are more than four acres to each.

Supposing that one-half of the land is cultivated, then that gives about two acres to each person.

Supposing, again, that one-third of this is consumed by horses or other animals who labour; or, supposing that they do not serve for the food of man, then there will be nearly about one acre and a quarter for the maintenance of each person.

It will, however, only require half an acre to one person, if they all lived on field vegetables; {121} and, if they all lived on fresh meat, it would require four acres; the natural conclusion is, that one-fourth live on animal food, and the other three-fourths on vegetables, or what is the same thing, that the proportions of the two sorts of food are as one to three.

According to the proportion of the prices in France, of four to one, it would certainly cost double the price to live on animal food that =sic= it does on vegetables; that is to say, if the only vegetable was bread, supposing which is the case, that one pound of meat supplies the place of two pounds of bread, as it certainly does. In England, where beef is only twice the price of bread, {122} it is almost a matter of indifference as to price, whether a working man lives on vegetables or animal food. To the taste and the stomach, however, it is no matter of indifference, the animal food, therefore, is preferred; but if it were a matter of some importance, in point of economy, that would not prevent the people of a country, flourishing by manufactures, from

--- {120} One good horse well kept, whether for pleasure or labour (it has already been said) will consume nearly as much as a moderate family.

{121} Vegetables raised in the kitchen-garden would go vastly further, but this is a rough average, the subject neither admitting of, nor requiring accurate investigation.

{122} That is about the usual proportion, though about a year ago it was four times as much in France. -=-

[end of page #147]

eating it, and thereby at length sinking to a lower degree of population than a poor country living on vegetable food.

In all nations getting wealthy this is a consideration, but most so when the wealth is acquired by manufactures, when the lower and numerous class have an opportunity of gratifying themselves by indulging in the species of food which they find the most agreeable.

This, like the other changes of manners, of which it is only a part, is a natural consequence of a propensity inherent in human nature; it cannot, therefore, be prevented or done away, though it may, to a certain degree, be counteracted. The manner of counteracting it not being a general manner, but depending on circumstances, shall be treated of when investigating the increasing danger, arising from this cause, in the English nation.

It remains at present for us to examine another evil attendant on the inadequacy of the soil to supply the consumption of a country.

One of the most alarming circumstances attendant on this situation of things is, that provisions become an object of monopoly, and the most dangerous and destructive of all objects. The law has interfered in regulating the interest of money, but not in the rent of houses or of other use of property. Circumstances may occur, in which the necessity of procuring a loan of money is so great, as to induce the borrower to engage to pay an interest that would be ruinous to himself, and that would grant the lender the means of extortion, or of obtaining exorbitant profit. The same interference would be just as reasonable, wherever the same sort of necessity, by existing, puts one man in the power of another. This is the case with every necessary article of provision, which, indeed, may be considered as all one article, for the price of one is connected with the prices of all the others.

Provisions, indeed, are, in general, articles that cannot be preserved for any very great length of time; but then, again, they are articles of a nature that the consumers must have within a limited time also, and for which they are inclined to give an exorbitant price rather than not to have. The interference of the law between a man and the use of his property, ought to be as seldom as possible; but it has never been maintained as a general principle, that it ought never to interfere. [end of page #148] If it is at any time, or in any case, right to interfere legally, the question of when it is to be done becomes merely one of expediency, one of circumstance, but not one that admits of a general decision.

A writer of great (and deservedly great) reputation has said so much on this subject, and treated it in a way that both reason and experience prove to be wrong, that it is become indispensably necessary to argue the point. {123} Monopoly, regrating, and forestalling, which two last are only particular modes of monopolizing, have been considered as chimeras, as imaginary practices that have never existed, and that cannot possibly exist. They have been likewise assimilated to witchcraft, an ideal belief, arising in the times of ignorance. It is now become the creed of legislators and ministers, that trade should be left to regulate itself, that monopoly cannot exist.

With all the respect justly due to the learned writer who advanced so bold an opinion, it may be asked, since many instances occur, both in sacred and profane history, in ancient times, and in our own days, of provisions, on particular occasions, selling at one hundred times their natural price, (and, every price above the natural one, is called a monopoly price,) how can it be asserted that they may not become an object of monopoly in a more general way, though not at so exorbitant a price?

How, it may be asked, can this thing, that has so often occurred in an extreme degree, a thing that is allowed to be possible, be compared with the miraculous effect of witchcraft, of the existence of which there does not appear to be one authentic record? The one, at all events, a natural, and the other, a supernatural effect. How are those to be admitted in fair comparison?

If we know that, at the siege of Mantua, the provisions rose to one hundred times their usual price, we may believe the same thing possible, at the siege of Jerusalem, two thousand years ago, and at the siege of Leyden, or at that of Paris. If we know that a guinea is given for a

--- {123} Dr. Smith, in his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. The author of the notes, and continuation, has, indeed, answered his arguments; but that does not render it less necessary to do so here. -=-

[end of page #149]

bad dinner at an inn, which is not worth a shilling, merely because some particular circumstance has drawn more people together than can be provided for; and, because hunger admits not patiently of delay, can we dispute the inclination to extortion on the one hand, and the disposition to submit to it on the other?

If that is admitted, the interference of the law is allowable on the same principle on which it regulates the interest of money, though not to the same extent; that is, it is allowable, in particular instances, where the effects are similar, but not in all instances, because, in all instances, they are not similar. {124}

The rate of provisions is then liable, on particular occasions, to rise to a monopoly price, such as that of those rare productions of nature, the quantity of which cannot be increased, whatever the demand may be. {125} It follows, as an evident consequence, that the price increases as the scarcity augments; but, if it only did so, the evil would not be so great as it really is. In the first place, the anxiety attendant on the risk of wanting so necessary an article creates a greater competition amongst buyers than the degree of scarcity would occasion in an article of less necessity and importance. In a wealthy nation, the evil is still farther increased, by two other causes.

The high price which one part of the society is able to afford, and the wealth of those who sell, enables them to keep back the provisions from the market; the first cause operates in all countries nearly alike, for, the anxiety to have food is nearly equal all the world over. But the last two operate more or less, according to the wealth of the buyers and of the sellers, as the eagerness and ability of the former to purchase, and the interest and ability of the latter to keep back from selling, are regulated by the degree of wealth in a country. {126}

--- {124} The law concerning money is a general law, because, at all times, there are some individuals in want of it, and would be liable to grant exorbitant interest. It is not so with provisions, for, it is only occasionally that they cannot be had at reasonable prices.

{125} Dr. Smith divides produce into three different sorts; the two first are such as can be only produced in a certain quantity, whatever the demand may be; and such as can be produced always in sufficient quantity.

{126} This was proved by what happened in Paris in 1789, and in England in 1790. The [end of page #150] want in Paris was so real that there often was not, in that great city, bread, and materials to make it, more than sufficient for twenty-four hours: yet it never rose to above double the usual price, or twopence English the pound, (that is, sixteen sols for the four-pound loaf,) although the people were obliged to wait from six in the morning till two or three in the afternoon, before they could get a loaf a piece, and more they were not permitted to purchase or carry away. In London, where bread could always be had in plenty, for money, it rose to more than three times the usual price, (one and tenpence the quartern loaf,) yet bread is a much more necessary article to the poor in Paris than in London. But the case was, in London, the people are richer, and, in each place, it rose as high as the people were found able to pay. -=-

When the necessaries of life become dear, and arrive at a monopoly- price, then all taxes and other burthens laid on the people become a matter comparatively of little importance. In England, where the taxes are higher than in any nation in the world, they do not come on the poor to above three pounds a head; {127} and, of those, at least one- half can be avoided by a little self-denial. But, when the provisions increase one-half in price, it amounts to at least four pounds a head to each person; so that the effect falls on the population of the country, with a most extraordinary degree of severity.

But, great as this evil is, it has, by the circumstances and nature of things, a tendency to increase the very cause in which it originates. Though the highness of price diminishes the consumption of victuals in general, it diminishes the consumption of vegetable food, or bread, more than it does that of animal food. Though all sorts of eatables rise in price, in times of scarcity, yet bread, being the article that excites the greatest anxiety, rises higher in proportion than the others. This affords an encouragement to gratify the propensity for eating animal food; and this propensity is encouraged by an absurd and mistaken policy, by which (or perhaps rather an affectation of policy) economy in bread is prescribed, and not in other food; so that when people devour animal food, and increase the evil, they think they are most patriotically and humanely diminishing it. {128}

--- {127} The whole taxes in this country do not amount to above four pounds a head, of which one-third is paid entirely by those wealthy, or at least affluent; it is, then, putting the share paid by the labouring body very high to put it at three pounds each person.

{128} Both in France and England, during the last scarcity, the use of every other sort of [end of page #151] food was recommended, to save the consumption of bread-corn. Potatoes are the only substitute that tended really to relieve the distress; all others, and, in particular, animal food, had an effect in augmenting it. -=-

The danger of wanting food, though very formidable, does not act so instantaneously as to serve as an excuse for want of reflection, like an alarm of fire, where the anxiety to escape sometimes prevents the possibility of doing so; yet the fact is, that all the measures that have generally been taken, in times of scarcity, have tended rather to increase than to diminish the evil.

In monopoly, a sort of combination is supposed to exist between the sellers of an article, when the article does not happen to be all in the hands of one person, or one body of persons. But combinations are of various sorts; there are express combinations entered into by people having the same interest for a particular purpose. Those are done by a sort of an agreement, when the interest of the individual and of the body are the same. Such combinations are generally effectual, {129} but unlawful. There are combinations not less effectual, that arise merely from circulating intelligence of prices, and certain circumstances on which prices are known to depend, amongst all those concerned, who immediately know how to act in unison.--This is not unlawful.

An elegant historian has said that there was a time when the sovereign pontiff, like the leader of a band of musicians, could regulate all the clergy in Europe, so that the same tones should proceed from all the pulpits on the same day. The list of prices, at a great corn-market, has the same effect on the minds of all the sellers within a certain distance. Intelligence now flies so swift that there is no interval of uncertainty; the whole of the dealers know how to act, according to circumstances, and they are all led to act nearly as if they were in one single body. Like gamesters, who have won a great deal, rather than hasten to sell, even when they fear that prices may fall, they keep back their stock, and risk to lose something of what they have gained, by continuing to speculate on the agreeable and winning chance by which they have already profited.

--- {129} There are sometimes combinations which it is the interest of a whole body to preserve, but of each individual to break, if he can with impunity; such generally soon fall to the ground. -=-

[end of page #152]

The dealers in an article of ready sale, or for which there is a certain demand, have never any difficulty, in a wealthy country, of procuring money to make purchases, or to enable them to keep their stock; and the gains are so immense that there is no speculation equally attractive.

As the rent of land, in England, is reckoned at twenty-five millions a year; and it is reckoned that, in a common year, the rent is worth one- third of the produce; it follows that, of all sorts of produce of land, the value is seventy-five millions. But, in the year 1799, when the prices were more than doubled, the value was one hundred and fifty millions, of which the landlord received (as usual) twenty-five to his share, leaving for the farmer, &c. one hundred and twenty-five, instead of fifty, the usual sum. As the wages of servants remained the same, and, in an ordinary year, would amount to one-third of the rent, eight millions went for that, leaving one-hundred and seventeen millions, in place of forty-two, the usual residue. Two-thirds of the value of rent, or sixteen millions, is, in an ordinary year, supposed to go for seed, the maintenance of cattle, and labourers; so that, in that year, the portion so consumed must be estimated at double value, or thirty-four millions, which, deducted from one hundred and seventeen, leaves eighty-three for the farmers, in place of twenty-five, in an ordinary year: so that, when the price doubles, the farmers =sic= profit does more than triple. In the year 1799, the farmers were known to have the profit of four ordinary years, supposing that they had been the actual sellers in the market. The fact was otherwise no doubt, with regard to those who pocketed the profit, which went in part only to farmers, and the rest went to the monopolists, dealers, regraters, forestallers, &c. who advanced money to keep up the price. To the public who paid, the matter is the same, and, to the business itself, there is little difference as to who profited, or who found capital; for, as they shared the profit amongst them, and as they received three times as much as in an ordinary year, they could, out of the sales of the first four or five months, make all the payments [end of page #153] for the whole year to the landlord; and, therefore, could have the means of keeping the remainder, just as long as they thought proper.

Thus, then, while there is any degree of scarcity, the provisions of a country are at a monopoly-price; and the dealers act, though individually, as if they enjoyed one general monopoly. {130}

Before leaving his important subject, it is necessary to observe, that, though dealers in provisions, in times of any degree of scarcity, that is, when there is not quite enough fully to supply the consumption of the country, act, in keeping up prices, as if they had an exclusive privilege for monopoly, yet that is the only cases =sic= in which they do so. A single monopolizer can diminish the quantity, and perhaps destroy a part of it with advantage to himself. Thus the Dutch East India company were said to have done with the spices. {131} But the individual dealer, though he is interested in a general high price and monopoly, is still more interested in selling as much as he can; and the higher the price, the more careful he is not to waste or consume more than he can help. In this respect, the monopoly of the many is not half so hurtful as the individual monopoly. This proves that all the vulgar errors, which occasion reports of farmers and dealers destroying their corn, are not only without foundation, but would produce an effect quite contrary to the avaricious principle, by which such men are considered as being governed. {132}

--- {130} There is one moment only when they do not, that is, when they find out, for certain, that prices are going to fall. There, for a moment, individual interest, and general interest are opposite, and they hasten to sell, and to reduce the price too much. But even this does not relieve the public; for, though it makes the reduction very rapid for a time, and may sometimes bring it below the level, it quickly rises again and finishes when the panic amongst the dealers is over, by remaining higher than it ought to be.

{131} If diminishing the quantity one-quarter rises =sic= the price one-half, then the monopolist gains, if he possesses the whole market; but the individual dealer, if he were to burn his whole stock, would not diminish the quantity in the country one-thousandth part, and therefore make no sensible difference.

{132} Both in London and Paris, the reports of this sort, and, (making a little allowance for the language and nature of the people,) exceedingly similar in nature and tendency, prevailed during the scarcity of 1789 and 1799. -=-

[end of page #154]

Monopoly of this sort, by raising the prices of the necessaries of life, in the end, augments the prices of labour, the rent of land, and the taxes of a country. We have already examined the tendency of all this; it is only necessary to observe that the rise in prices, or depreciation of money, which other causes bring on by degrees, this brings on violently and suddenly. {133} This cause will always exist in a country that cannot provide enough for its own subsistence.

How far this may go it is not easy to say; for if it is clear that the farmer, by double prices, gets eighty-three pounds in place of twenty- five, he can certainly afford to give his landlord something more. If he gave him double the usual rent, it would still leave more than double for himself. {134}

Of all the causes, then, that hasten the crisis of a country, none is equal to that of the produce becoming unequal to the maintenance of the inhabitants; for it is only in that case that the effects of monopoly are to be dreaded.

In the case of animal food becoming too much in request, there is a remedy which may be easily applied; of which it will be our purpose to speak, in treating of the application of the present inquiry to the advantage of the British dominions.

--- {133} The few years of dearth altered wages and rent more than had been known for half a century before. Wages rose more, from 1790 to 1802, than they had done from 1740 to 1790.

{134} As the usual rent was twenty-five, and the usual profit twenty- five, the landlord and tenant had fifty to divide, at ordinary prices; but, at double prices, they had eighty-three added to twenty-five, or one hundred and seven to divide: so that, if the farmer gave fifty, that is, double, he would still have fifty-seven to himself, which is more than double, by nearly one-third over and above.

No allowance has been made in this calculation for the diminution in quantity. The reason is, that was comparatively very small; increased consumption, rather than deficiency of produce, being the cause. Besides, we only stated the rise as being double the usual price, whereas, it was three times greater. [end of page #155] -=-

CHAP. VII.

_Of the Increase of the Poor, as general Affluence becomes greater.-- Of Children left unprovided for.--Of their Division into two Classes-- Those that can labour more or less, and those that can do no Labour_.

In the career of wealth, in its early state, when individual industry is almost without any aid from capital, men are as nearly on an equality as the nature of things can admit. But, in proportion as capital comes in to the aid of industry, that equality dies away, and men, who have nothing but industry, lose their means of exerting it with advantage, some become then incapable of maintaining their rank in society altogether.

At the same time that this is taking place, articles of every sort, that are necessary for the existence of men, are becoming dearer. As some ranks of society have been described as bringing up their children not to know the existence of necessity, others, who are depressed below the natural situation of men, are bringing them up to feel the extreme pressure of want.

There is no situation of things in which a man, with natural strength, and a very slender capacity, may not gain sufficient to maintain himself, if he will be industrious; but, in a wealthy country, numbers are so pressed upon by penury, in their younger years, that neither the powers of their body, nor of their mind, arrive at maturity.

Accustomed, from an early age, to depend rather upon chance, or charity, for existence, than upon industry, or energy of their own, they neither know the value of labour, nor are they accustomed to look to it for a supply to their wants.

Whilst the foundation of idleness and poverty is laid in, for one part of a nation, from the affluence of their parents, another portion seems as if it were chained down to misery, from the indigence in which they were born and brought up. [end of page #156]

The depressed and degraded populace of great and wealthy cities are not the accidental victims of misfortune; they are born to its hard inheritance, and their numbers contaminate more, who, were it not for their own misconduct and imprudence, might have shared a better lot.

When nations increase in wealth, the fate of individuals ceases to become an object of attention; and, of all the animals that exist, and are capable of labour, the least value is set upon the human species. {135} Like individuals who rise to wealth, and forget their origin, societies forget the first foundation of all wealth, happiness, and power. That individuals should do so is not to be wondered at. They never saw society in an infant state; nor is it the business of individual citizens to occupy themselves with public affairs; but those who are intrusted with their management, and whose business is to know the original sources of prosperity, ought to attend to and counteract this growing evil.

When the Romans were poor, the people depended on exertion, and they enjoyed plenty; but when Lucullus and other citizens were squandering millions, at a single banquet, the people were clamouring for bread. While the person of a Roman lady was ornamented with the wealth of a province, the multitude were covered with rags, and depressed with misery. It would have been no hard matter, then, to have foretold the fate of Rome. The natural order of things was deranged to too violent an extreme to be of long duration. The state was become like a wall that had declined from the perpendicular, while age was every day weakening the cement, by which it was held together, and though of the time and hour of destruction no man knew, the event was certain.

It would, at first sight, appear that great cities are the only places in which misery of this description arises; but that is not the case.

--- {135} It was never heard of, that a young horse, or any useful animal of the brute creation, was left to die with hunger in a land of plenty; but it happens to many of the human race, because there is no provision made, by which those who furnish them food may be repaid by their labour, which would be a very easy matter to adjust, if a little attention were paid to the subject. -=-

[end of page #157]

Great cities are the refuge of the miserable, who, perhaps, find it in some shapes augmented, by a residence in so friendless an asylum; but there they avoid shame, they see not the faces that have smiled upon them in better days; they are more at ease amongst strangers, and they are kept in countenance by companions in penury and want. {136}

In every wealthy nation, the rich shun the view of wretchedness, which is attended with a silent reproach. Those who have property, mistrust the honesty, and blame the conduct of those who have none. In this state of things, the country affords no retreat nor residence, and want and wretchedness find the evils of a crowded society, where they pass unnoticed, much more tolerable.

In most countries, the law has taken precautions to punish, or to stop the evil in the individual; but in no great and wealthy country has it been thought of sufficient importance to take effectual means to prevent it.

In small states, when society is new, and under some absolute sovereigns, (remarkable for their penetration, genius, and love of their people,) a momentary stop has been put to this career of misery; but, in the first place, there has been no such monarch in any wealthy country; and, in the second, as soon as power fell into other hands, the progress has begun again where it left off.

One great cause of the increase of mendicity is the increase of unproductive labourers, as a state becomes more wealthy, who, dying before their children are able to provide for themselves, increase the number of the indigent. Men living by active industry naturally marry at an early age; menial servants, revenue officers, and all those who administer to the gratifications of a wealthy and luxurious people, marry later in life; and besides their not having an industrious example to set before their children, are torn from them sooner, by the course of things.

--- {136} If one of the brute creation is in want, it will supply that where it is most easily to be had, physical difficulty is the only one it knows; bodily pain the only one it feels. But men are different, they often undergo great want amongst strangers, to avoid more insufferable feelings amongst friends. -=-

[end of page #158]

It has been noticed, that, in every society, as wealth increases hospitality dies away. And those good offices interchanged between man and man, to which life owes many of its comforts in a less advanced state of society, and which protect individuals from the frowns of fortune, gradually disappear. The social feelings become less active, and men turn selfish and interested, thinking for themselves, and careless for the community; while, on the other hand, the causes for poverty increase; on the other, the means of relief are misapplied, neglected, or squandered away. The funds that ought to be administered with disinteredness and integrity are committed to the hands of men who live on the general misfortune, and thus the wretched, who are relieved, are not fairly treated, while the public, that is burthened with their misfortunes, is loaded far beyond its proper degree.

The population of a country is diminished in a double ratio as the poor increases: they create nothing, but they consume; and if a country sees one-tenth of its population living on charity, it is equivalent at least to seeing one-seventh diminished in numbers altogether.

Most sorts of labour require those employed in it to have some capital, such as decent clothes, or tools, or money to live upon till wages are due. Little as that capital is, yet thousands are reduced to absolute beggary for want of it; their industry finding no means of exertion. A man becomes dependant =sic= on charity for existence; and, though able to work, eats the bread of idleness, and that without being in fault.

The number of persons absolutely unable to labour is nearly the same in every country, and is not much augmented by its wealth; so that if there were, as there easily might be, always employment for those who would otherwise be entitled to relief, and if they were allowed a fair price for their labour, they would then cease either to be a burthen to themselves or to the public.

Little coercion would, in this case, be necessary. A few proper regulations, to prevent theft and losses, would be all that could be wanted with those who could labour; and those who could not, being few in number, would be provided for in a better manner than when [end of page #159] they can be, where their portion is shared with those who are able to procure for themselves an existence.

We must by no means look for relief, in cases of this sort, from difficult or intricate management and regulation. If we look at the nature of things, it points out the way.

Those that cannot labour are the only persons who ought to be a burthen on the public; and they are the only ones that would be so, if the matters were properly regulated and attended to. As it is in most countries, there are many who cannot get work to do, and those are provided for in different ways, but always at the expense of the public. Sometimes it is by a regular assessment, sometimes by theft and depredation, sometimes by individual charity, or those other means to which a man has recourse before he will absolutely starve for want.

Those who, from philanthropy, are for relieving all, soon find themselves deceived, and unable to proceed. Those who, disgusted with the vices of a few, consider them all as equally culpable are much to blame. Surely, the individual case of a fellow-creature in misfortune is worth attending to; and he must be ignorant indeed who cannot, in most instances, avoid deception. [end of page #160]

CHAP. VIII.

_Of the Tendency of Capital and Industry to leave a wealthy Country, and of the Depreciation of Money in agricultural and commercial Countries_.

As the increase of capital in every country is the consequence of former productive industry, so also is it the support of future exertion.

When the capital of a country has become sufficient for all the employment that can be procured for it, the first effect is the lowering of interest, which sinks down under the rate appointed by law, and under the rate at which it is lent out at in other countries.

When capital is not in sufficient quantity, those who want to borrow are more numerous than those who have money to lend; then the competition is amongst the borrowers to obtain the preference, and they all give as high an interest as the law allows, and would give more if they could avoid the penalty, which, in all countries, has been attached to accepting more than the regulated sum; a sum regulated merely to prevent the effect of competition, which might induce people to give more than in the end they would find they could afford to pay.

When capital becomes over abundant, the very reverse takes place; the lenders become rivals, and offer to lend at an under rate of interest.

The first effect of this is, that people who were but scantily supplied with capital before borrow, and carry on business more at ease, so that more capital is employed in business, and new employments are found out for capital.

The usual employments for a superabundant capital are improving lands, building houses, erecting machines, digging canals, &c. for the use of trade; and finally, giving longer credit to merchants in other countries, {137} as well as to those who are running in debt in their own. The stock on hand in manufactured goods increases something also. But when all these have taken place, to as great an extent as wanted, then the money begins to flow into other countries. By degrees, more money is sent away than should go, and the persons who are the proprietors of it frequently follow.

If the capital that leaves a country were only that which cannot find employment in it, the harm would not be great, though it would tend to enrich other countries, and bring them nearer a level. But that is not the case, the advantage of lending money abroad, if regularly paid at a higher interest than can be obtained at home, induces people to draw their money from trade, and vest it in the hands of foreigners. The Venetians, the Genoese, the Dutch, the Hanseatic Towns, and the cities of Flanders, did this; and the capital, which, when employed at home, formerly maintained perhaps one hundred people in affluence and industry, only supported one single family living in indolence and splendid penury. {138}

After being in possession of money for a considerable time, men prefer a certain employment at a low interest to one attended with risk, even where the interest is higher; and when great sums have been got by trade, those who have got them retire and live on the interest, which men, who have only gained a small capital cannot do.

There are many other circumstances, besides the abundance of capital, that tend to carry it away from a wealthy country. The depreciation of money that takes place, in every country that grows

--- {137} As the subject is here treated in the general way, applicable to all nations, the employment found by national debt, and the funds rising is not taken into account, as it will be noticed in the case of England. When money is plenty, all individuals in trade give longer credit; but this employs little more capital, when they give it to each other it employs no more, but when to consumers it does.

{138} The manner in which those families live is peculiar to themselves; great shew with great economy, and without the smallest spark of love, either for their fellow-citizens or their country. -=-

[end of page #162]

rich, falls nearly all on the lender at interest, {139} who, as he cannot bring back things to their former value, seeks enjoyment in another country, and obtains, by change of place, what he lost by lapse of time.

The weight of taxes is another cause that drives capital from wealthy to poorer countries; and last of all, in case of anxiety, or of mistrust, the capitalists are generally the first to emigrate. [{140}] Anxiety and mistrust are periodical amongst a wealthy people.

As the burthens sustained by a people in prosperity are generally great, in proportion to their capital and industry, it is clear, that when capital and industry diminish, the burthens, (which do not admit of being diminished in the same proportion,) fall more heavily on those who remain; this increased cause produces, naturally, an increased effect. Thus, like a falling column, the weight increases, and the momentum becomes irresistible.

It is then that necessity, the spur to industry in new and rising nations, (that spur which taxes and rent continue to excite, for the good of mankind, for a certain period,) begins to crush what it had raised, and to stab where it formerly stimulated. Then it is that the money-lenders, who, at first, sent off their capital, having ceased to be engaged in trade, withdraw, by degrees, and rather content themselves with a diminished income in another country, than struggle with the difficulties they find they have to encounter in their own.

--- {139} Money lent out at interest loses, money laid out in purchases gains, in a country that is advancing in riches.

If a man, who had 2000 L. thirty years ago, had laid out 1000 L. at interest, and, with the other bought land, he would, indeed, have got less rent for his land at first, but now it would be doubled, he would get 60 L. a year, and if he wished to sell he would get 2000 L. whereas, the other 1000 L. would only produce 50 L. and, if called in, the single thousand would be all he would receive.

{140} [Transcriber's note: footnote not assigned a place in the original text, intended location assumed to be as shown] This was seen at the beginning of the French revolution, though the assignats, by lowering the rate of exchange, frightened many from transferring their money, at an apparent loss of twelve or fifteen per cent. But those that overlooked this loss have rejoiced in it ever since, as the others have repented bitterly the avarice that made them risk all to save a little, and to become beggars. -=-

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It is difficult to say at what point this would stop, if the effect produced did not affix the boundary.

The prices of land, of rent, of houses, and of provisions, sink low, and induce some people to remain; for, as those articles cannot be transported, or carried off, and are always worth possessing and enjoying, it is clear there must be a term set to the decay and emigration, by the nature of things. Unfortunately for countries that have been great, that term does not seem to arrive till it is reduced far below the level of other nations. {141}

There are, however, some peculiar causes that operate in some modern nations, in counteracting this effect, so far as it is occasioned by a superabundance of capital; but, as this is not general to all nations, the proper place for speaking of it will be when we come to treat of the tendency of capital to quit this country.

The effects, arising from that depreciation of money, which takes place in every wealthy country, are great and numerous, and have been always found where wealth abounded. The people in such countries can easily command the labour of others that are not so rich, but the others cannot afford to pay for theirs; this tends to remove industry. On the other hand, if a supply of the necessaries of life are wanted in a rich country, they may be obtained from countries where the value of money is less, without throwing prices out of their level; whereas, in the country where money is of great value, that is not the case.

The price of bread, for instance, is, at Paris, one penny the pound, and in London at eight-pence the quartern loaf, which weighs just four French pounds, the price is exactly double. If every thing was conducted in a fair way, corn, from all countries, where it is equally as cheap as in France, might be brought and sold in London, at the

--- {141} At Bruges, (in Flanders) at Antwerp, Cologne, Ghent, or any of those decayed towns, house-rent was fallen, before the French revolution, to little more than an acknowledgement for occupation, where the houses were large and retired. This induced people to live at those places, who would not otherwise have done so. Small houses, lately built, were more expensive than the large old ones, built in the time that commerce flourished. -=-

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usual market price; but, before Paris could get a supply from London, the bread would cost three times its usual price. This circumstance, if properly managed, might be turned to advantage; why it is not, is difficult to say, and is a proof that there are either regulations, or practices without regulation, that counteract the true nature of things; for it would not cost a farthing a pound to bring the corn from Paris to the London market.

Paris is only mentioned here for the sake of comparison, and because the average prices have nearly the proportion of one to two. The reasons why corn is not brought from thence are no secret, but the same reasoning will apply to American corn, corn from Barbary, or the Baltic, and from other places, where the value of money is greater than in England. {142}

The principal of the other effects of the depreciation of money are to be found in the chapter on the exterior Causes of the Decline of Nations, as it is in its foreign transactions that the depreciation of money is the most felt.

In the interior, that depreciation only acts when there is a considerable lapse of time, during which the value has altered; it has, in general, no effect on transactions that are begun and finished within a short period, and in the interior of the country itself.

The depreciation of money, wherever it takes place, would cause an increase of taxes, even if there were no other reason for it; but, in so far it counteracts itself, by making them to be more easily born. =sic= Whatever its particular effects may be, and however complicated they are, the general tendency of the depreciation of money is to depress industry in that country, and to encourage it in others, where the value is greater than in it.

--- {142} In America the value of money is less than in England, compared with wages; but the usual proportion, between the wages of labour and the price of corn, is different in that country from every other with which we have any connection. -=-

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CHAP. IX.

_Conclusion of the interior Causes.--Their Co-operation.--Their general Effect on the Government and on the People.--The Danger arising from them does not appear till the Progress in Decline is far advanced_.

Though these causes enumerated have all one general tendency, yet their distinguishing characteristics deserve attention.

Some begin their operation from the moment the wealth of a country commences, others are only felt late in the progress of its decline. The effects of some may be diminished greatly, others may be prevented entirely; but, in all cases, the attention of government is necessary, and that before the operation of decline is actually commenced; for, prevention, and not remedy, is what ought to be aimed at, besides which, when decline has once begun, governments are too feeble to be capable of any effectual regulations.

To assist nature, in every case where her operations are favourable to the enjoyment and happiness of men, and to counteract those that are unfavourable, is the business of individuals and of states. What the individual is unable to do, should be done by those to whom the care of public affairs is given; by those who act for the benefit of all, and in the name of all.

From the first approaches of a state to wealth and greatness, we find that there are a combination of causes that begin to operate in promoting its decline. The first moving principle, necessity, is gradually done away, and with it flies industry; so that, from one generation to another, both the moral and physical man becomes changed, till he is unable to sustain the weight that he has raised; and, at last, he is crushed by the decent =sic= of the ponderous mass.

While a gradual progress destroys that industry, from which all wealth springs, other causes act to remove or misapply the labour [end of page #166] that is left, while others again are putting capital to flight, or leading to a misapplication of it.

Last of all come discord and war, the most universal cause of all those that tend to depopulate a country, and to diminish as well as degrade the inhabitants, thus giving durability to misfortune, and rendering hopeless the fate of a fallen nation.

Amongst all the causes of decline, one alone is found that has a double effect, and counteracts in one direction what it promotes in another.

This is taxation, a very certain cause of ruin if carried too far, and always dangerous; but, for a length of time, having a very powerful effect in repressing the progress of luxury, in continuing the action of necessity, the mother of industry, and in preventing that species of consumption that lays the foundation for the depopulation of a country.

From this it would seem to be almost as dangerous to take off the burthens that have been laid upon a people, as to lay them on with too heavy a hand. There is not any example worth noticing of such a case, therefore, it must stand on its own ground: history informs us nothing on the subject.

The supposed case would be thus. That a nation should rise to a high pitch of wealth by industry, and support a heavy load of taxes, still increasing in wealth, and superior to most other nations. We are to suppose the load of taxes greatly diminished, and then to investigate the consequences.

Perhaps this is an useless hyyothesis =sic=, the case never has been, and perhaps never will be; but, still it is, at least, a possible case; it is a matter of curiosity, at least, if it is not one of utility, and I have a great example to plead as my apology. Dr. Adam Smith amused himself in his inquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations =sic= in a similar manner, by a hypothesis concerning the taxation of the British colonies.

Supposing the pressure of necessity were to be suddenly taken away, those whose income is regulated by their efforts would relax in exertion; that is to say, the productive labourers of the country would relax, while those whose incomes are fixed, that is principally [end of page #167] the unproductive labourers, would become comparatively more opulent, and their luxury would increase.

This is an effect very different from what the public expects. The most useful class would gain little or nothing, while the drones of society would find their wealth greatly augmented, which would be one of the most unfortunate effects that could well be conceived, and might very soon bring about a very serious and disagreeable event.

In the course of investigating the national debt of England, in the Fourth Book =sic--there is none.=, it will be necessary to examine this at length, but, there it will be attended with another circumstance, not one of general consideration; (as national debt is not any general or necessary appendage to a government) namely, the letting loose a great monied capital, which must either be employed here, or it will seek employment in another country, which may rise on the ruin of this.

In considering the reduction of taxes that have been long standing, and have risen to a great amount, there is certainly reason to fear evil consequences, though this is no argument in favour of taxation; on the contrary, it is a reason for avoiding it, for, it is in all cases dangerous to do what it will be attended with danger to undo.

Though the precise case of taxes being done away may never come before us, there is, at this time, an operation going on that is nearly similar, and the result of which will soon be known.

The French people were loaded with nearly twenty-five millions sterling annually to the church, and they do not now pay three. This, indeed, was partly in taxes, and part in church-lands; they have also got rid of a great deal of rent, by the sale of emigrant estates, the lands have got into the hands of men, who mostly cultivate them themselves, and have no rent to pay.

On the supposition that the new government is not more expensive than the old, (and it ought not to be so, the debts having been nearly all wiped off,) the burthens on industry will be much less than formerly, it will then be curious to observe if agriculture flourishes more, if prices are reduced, and if the taxes that still remain are better paid. There are, indeed, many concomitant circumstances that will tend to derange the experiment, or render the conclusion uncertain; but, still it is an in-[end of page #168] teresting and a great event, and will be worth attentive observation. {143}

We must, so far as this investigation goes, conclude, that, unless the natural tendency of things to decline is powerfully counteracted, every country that rises to wealth must have a fall; and that, therefore, it merits investigation, whether it is or is not possible to counteract the tendency to decline, without interrupting the progress towards greater prosperity, and, to manage matters so, that whether it is not possible, after having attained the summit of wealth, we may remain there instead of immediately descending, as most nations have hitherto done.

From individuals, the exertion necessary is not to be expected; but, it may be looked for from the government of a country, which, though composed of individuals, the succession of persons is differently carried on; it is not from age to age, and from an old father to a young son, but from men in the vigour of life, to men in the vigour of life, who, while they are occupied in public affairs, may be considered, with respect to whatever is to be done for the good of the nation, (for its prosperity, defence, or protection,) as animated with the same spirit, without any interruption.

With respect to the interior causes of decline, they may be counteracted always with more or less effect, by a proper system of govern-

--- {143} The burthens on the industry of old France, were,

Livres. Rent of land 700,000,000 Revenues of clergy 600,000,000 Taxes, including the expense of levying 800,000,000 ____________ 2,100,000,000

In sterling money L. 87,500,000 Half land now occupied by the cultivators, } and the remainder let at lower rents } 350,000,000 Revenues of clergy, and the expenses 50,000,000 Taxes as before 800,000,000 _____________ 1,200,000,000 Or in sterling money L. 50,400,000

This makes a diminution of L. 37,100,000; or something more than a third of the whole expense, and more than all the taxes to the state estimated at the highest rate. -=-

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ment. In the latter portion of this work we shall endeavour to shew how that may be attempted with safety, if not accomplished with full success.

Before, however, we conclude this subject, and rely on government, it is necessary to mention that, in treating with other nations, a kind of overbearing haughty pride is natural to those who govern a powerful and wealthy people. In that case, they act as individuals, and are not to be trusted; and the less so, that a nation of proud pampered citizens is but too apt to applaud insolence in those who govern them.

This pride has been a very constant forerunner of the fall of wealthy and great nations, and, in Rome excepted, it has never failed. The emperors of Rome were much less haughty than the ambassadors of the republic; a love of false splendour had supplanted a ferocious affectation of dignity, yet, the former was the less humiliating of the two to other nations. {144}

While the rulers of wealthy nations are apt to act haughtily to others, they are liable to fall into another error, in mistaking the strength of their own people, and loading them too heavily, trusting too much both to their internal energy, and external force.

As the near observers of the inability of the people are generally afraid to carry unwelcome tidings to their superior; and, if they did, as he is seldom inclined to give credit to unwelcome news, the ruin of a nation has probably made a very considerable progress before he, whose business it is to put a stop to it, is aware of the danger.

The continual clamour that is made about every new burthen that is laid on, and the cry of ruin, which perpetually is sounded in the ears of a minister, and of those who execute his orders, are some ex-

--- {144} The appearance of virtue and self-command, which the republican Romans preserved, added to the bravery with which they maintained whatever claims they put in, overawed a great part of their enemies; and those, who were not absolutely overawed thought that defeat and submission were, at least, robbed of their shame, when such was the character of the conqueror; and the claim once allowed was no longer questioned. Very different was the case, when the emperor was a fidler, or a buffoon, the senators puppets, and the pro- consuls themselves robbers. -=-

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cuses for their not attending to them; but the consequence is not the less fatal to the nation on that account.

A nation that is feeble has, at least, the advantage of knowing it, and is not insensible if she receives a wound; but the government of a powerful nation is like the pilot of a ship, who navigates in a sea, the depth of which he cannot sound, and who spreads all his sails: if he strikes upon a rock, his ship is dashed to pieces in a moment. The other, sailing amongst shallows and sands, proceeds with caution, avoids them if possible, and, if she touches, it is so gently, that even her feeble frame is scarcely injured.

The rulers of nations appear, in general, not to be aware of the evil that arises from the government they have to manage becoming too unwieldly =sic=, or too complicated; in either case, a check, though but of short duration, is irretrievable. This is a great oversight, and, at least, greatly augments the chances against the durability of a government. In proportion as the machine is unmanageable and complex, the embarrassment of those who have the conduct of it will be great, and the enemies will be proportionately bold and audacious. In all such conflicts, much depends on the spirit of the combatants, and more still on that of those who, at first, are lookers on, who act in consequence of the opinion they have of the force or feebleness of either party. {145}

The tendency that a nation has to decline is not, then, in general, counteracted, by the government; but, on the contrary, is pushed on by it, and precipitated into the gulf. No wonder, then, that the career is rapid, and the fall irretrievable.

It is, nevertheless, to the government, and to it alone, that we must look for that counteracting force that is to stay the general current. Individuals can only look to their own conduct, and they neither can

--- {145} Not only when the French revolution began, but a hundred times afterwards, did the party triumph that appeared the strongest, merely because it appeared so. All those who stand neutral at first, take a side the moment they have fixed their opinion as to the strength of the contending parties, and this decision is always in favour of the party they think the strongest. -=-

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be expected to have time nor inclination to study the public welfare, and, even if they had, they would want the means.

Government can never be better employed than in counteracting this tendency to decay. It has the means, and is but performing its duty in doing so. The previous step to all this, however, is a knowledge of what is to be done, a full sense of the necessity of doing it, and a disposition to submit to the regimen necessary.

For this purpose, both the government and the people must give up something. The people must allow government to interfere in the education of children, and, in that, give up a little of their liberty; {146} and those who govern must attend to many things which are generally neglected. To do the routine business of the day is the occupation of most of the governments of Europe, whether in war or at peace; they therefore habitually become agents of necessity, and what can be procrastinated is never done; that is to say, what is good is very seldom done, and what is necessary to prevent immediate evil, is always the chief, and sometimes the only, occupation.

There are some men in the world who prosper merely because they look beforehand, and conduct their affairs. There are others who, with equal industry, and much more trouble and care, are always a little behind, and allow their affairs to conduct them; such men never succeed, and, if they can keep off the extreme of misfortune, it is all that is to be expected.

Most governments, in wealthy nations, are like those latter species of individuals,--they do not conduct their affairs, but are conducted by them, and think they succeed, when the necessary business of the day is done. This listlessness must be done away, and, though the

--- {146} From the impossibility of a nation, once immersed in sloth and luxury, returning to the tone and energy of a new people, we may judge of the impossibility of a nation going on progressively towards wealth, not suffering from the manner of educating children. The leading distinction between a rising and a fallen people is the disposition to industry and exertion, in the one, and to sloth and negligence, in the other. It is while a nation is increasing in wealth that this alteration gradually takes place; and, as this is the main point on which all depends, the nation is safe when it is well attended to, even if other things are, in some degree, neglected. -=-

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governments of countries that are wealthy have no occasion, like Peter the Great, or the founders of new states, to create new institutions, and eternally try to ameliorate, they ought to be very carefully and constantly employed in preventing those good things that they enjoy from escaping their grasp, so far as it depends upon interior arrangement. Exterior causes are not within their power to regulate, therefore they should be the more attentive to those that are; and, though exterior causes are out of their dominion, yet, sometimes, by wise interior regulations, the evil effects of exterior ones may be prevented. Nothing of all this can be done, however, until the government rises above the routine business of the day, and until all the necessary and pressing business is got over. The first thing, then, for a government is to extricate itself from the situation of one who struggles with necessity, after which, but not before, it may study what is beneficial, and of permanent utility.

So far it would appear all nations are situated alike, with regard to the general tendency to decay; {147} and so far all of them may be guided by general rules, but as to the particular manner of applying those rules, it must depend on the peculiar circumstances of the nation to which they are meant to be applied.

In general, revenue has become the great object with modern nations: and, as their rulers have not ventured to tax the necessaries of the people to any high degree, but have laid their vices, rather than their wants, under contribution, the revenue-system, (as it may be called,) tends to make a government encourage expensive vice, by which it profits, and check innocent enjoyment, by which it has nothing to gain. This is a terrible, but it is a very prevalent system; it is immoral, inhuman, and impolitic.

So far as this goes, a government, instead of checking, accelerates the decline of a people; but, as this is not a natural cause of decline, as it is not universal or necessary, it is to be considered with due

--- {147} The Chinese, and, in general, the nations of Asia have not been considered as included in this inquiry. The Chinese, in particular, are a people in a permanent situation: they do not increase in riches, and they seem to have no tendency to decline. Their laws and mode of education and living remain the same. -=-

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regard to particular circumstances. In general, we may say, that, in place of inviting the lower classes to pass their time in drinking, by the innumerable receptacles that there are for those who are addicted to that vice, every impediment should be put in the way. Drinking is a vice, the disposition to which grows with its gratification; most other avocations (for drinking in moderation is only such) have no tendency of the sort. Those enjoyments which have a tendency to degenerate into vice should be kept under some check; those which have no such tendency ought to be encouraged; for, where the main and general mass of the population of a country is corrupted, it is impossible to prevent its decline. If it remains uncorrupted, the matter is very easy, or, more properly, it may be said that prosperity is the natural consequence.

Manners will always be found of more consequence than laws, and they depend, in a great measure, on the wise regulations of government in every country.

Not only do most governments profit by laying the vices of the people under contribution; but, as revenue is, by a very false rule, taken as a criterion from which the prosperity of a nation may be estimated, the very evil that brings on decay serves to disguise its approach. A nation may be irretrievably undone, before it is perceived that it has any tendency to decline; it is, therefore, unwise for governments to wait till they see the effects of decay, and then to hope to counteract them; they must look before-hand, and prevent, otherwise all their exertions will prove ineffectual. [end of page #174]

CHAP. X.

_Of the external Causes of Decline.--the Envy and Enmity of other Nations.--their Efforts, both in Peace and War, to bring Wealthy Nations down to their level_.

The external causes of the decline of nations are much more simple in themselves than the internal ones, besides which, their action is more visible; the way of operation is such as to excite attention, and has made them thought more worthy of being recorded.

The origin of envy and enmity are the same. The possession of what is desirable, in a superior degree, is the cause of envy. That occasions injurious and unjust proceedings, and enmity is the consequence, though both originated in the same feeling at first, they assume distinct characteristics in the course of time.

The desire of possession, in order to enjoy, is the cause of enmity and envy; and all the crimes of nations, and of individuals, have the same common origin.

It follows, as a natural consequence, arising from this state of things, that those nations which enjoyed a superior degree of wealth, became the objects of the envy of others. If that wealth was accompanied by sufficient power for its protection, then the only way to endeavour to share it was by imitation; but if the wealth was found unprotected, then conquest or violence was always considered as the most ready way of obtaining possession.

The wandering Arabs, who are the only nations that profess robbery at the present day, (by land,) follow still the same maxim with regard to those whose wealth they mean to enjoy. If too powerful to be compelled by force to give up what they have got, they traffic and barter with the merchants of a caravan; but if they find themselves able to take, they never give themselves the trouble to adopt the legitimate but less expeditious method of plunder and robbery =sic=. [end of page #175]

As it has been found that wealth operates, by degrees, in destroying the bravery of a people, after a certain time, so it happens that, in the common course of things, a moment arrives when it is considered safe, by some one power or other, to attack the wealthy nation, and partake of its riches; thus it was that the cities of Tyre and of Babylon were attacked by Alexander; and thus it was that his successors, in their turn, were attacked and conquered by the Romans; and, again, the Romans themselves, by the barbarous nations of the north.

Besides those great revolutions, of which the consequences were permanent, there have been endless and innumerable struggles for the possession of wealth, amongst different nations; but the real and leading causes are so uniform, and so evident, that there is not a shadow of a doubt left on that subject.

Mr. Burke had good reason to say that the external causes were much easier traced, and more simple, than the internal ones; for, the Romans excepted, the instances of rich nations attacking and conquering poor ones are very rare indeed.

The Romans had erected their republic on a different plan from that of any other; they had neither arts, industry, nor territory of their own, and they conquered nations upon speculation, and for the sake of civilizing the people, and making them contribute revenue; how they were successful has been explained. But even the Romans would not have attacked poor nations, if they had been, at an earlier period, possessed of the means of attacking those that were wealthy.

Necessity obliged them to begin with Italy: their safety made them defend themselves against the Gauls, and, till they had a navy, it was impracticable to carry their conquests into Asia or Africa; but, after they had conquered Carthage, they lost very little time in attacking Egypt, and those countries occupied by the successors of Alexander.

The taking of Constantinople was the last decided victory of this sort, and in nothing but time and circumstance did it differ from the others; in all the great outlines it was exactly the same. [end of page #176]

The effeminacy and luxury of the rich, those interior causes, of which we have already spoken, always give facility to those efforts which envy and avarice excite.

The rivalship, in time of peace, is a contest confined to modern nations; or, at least, but little known to the ancients. Indeed, it is only amongst commercial nations that it can exist. There can be no competition in agriculture; and, indeed, it is only in war, or in commerce, that nations can interfere with each other.

The Phoenicians were the only commercial people of antiquity. Carthage was the colony, and received the Indian produce at second hand. It was in no way a rival.

When Solomon mounted on the throne of his father David, he applied himself to commerce; but the wisdom and power he possessed were such as bore down all opposition during his reign. Having married the daughter of the King of Egypt, who assisted him in several conquests, he founded the city of Palmyra, or Tadmore in the Wilderness, for the greater conveniency of the Eastern trade. The King of Tyre was his ally, but he was so, most probably, from necessity, for the alliance was very unnatural; and, soon after the death of Solomon, the Tyrians excited the King of Babylon to destroy Jerusalem: so, that if there had been, in ancient times, more people concerned in commerce, there is no doubt there would likewise have been more envy and rivality. =sic=

The cities of Italy, the Dutch, the Flemish, the English, and the French, have been incessantly struggling to supplant each other in manufactures and commerce; and the war of custom-house duties and drawbacks has become very active and formidable.

This modern species of warfare is not only less bloody, but the object is more legitimate, and the consequences neither so sudden nor so fatal as open force; to which is to be added, that if a nation will but determine to be industrious, it never can be greatly injured. If it enjoyed any peculiarly great advantages, those may, indeed, be wrested from it, but that is only taking away what it has no right to possess, and what it may always do without. [end of page #177]

The intention of this inquiry is not to discover a method by which a nation may engross the trade that ought to belong to others, it is only to enable it, by industry and other means, to guard against the approaches of adversity, which tend to sink it far below its level, thereby making way for the elevation of some other nation, on the ruins of its greatness.

As, in the interior causes of decline, we have traced the most part to the manners and habits of the people, so, in the exterior causes, it will be found that much depends upon the conduct of the government. [end of page #178]

CHAP. XI.

_Why the Intercourse between Nations is ultimately in Favour of the poorer one, though not so at first_.

In all commercial intercourse with each other, (or competition in selling to a third nation,) the poorer nation has the advantage in its gain; but this advantage is generally prevented by the length of credit which the wealthy nation is enabled to give, by which manufacturers are sometimes ruined in their own country by strangers, who can neither rival them in lowness of price nor goodness in quality.

In countries that are poor, those who have the selling, but not the manufacturing of goods, are so much greater gainers by selling goods purchased on credit, of which they can keep a good stock and assortment, than in selling from a shop or store scantily supplied with ready money, that there is not almost any question about either price or quality; there is not scarcely an alternative. In one line, a man can begin who has scarcely any capital, and do a great deal of business; he can even afford to sell the articles he purchases on credit with very little profit, because they procure him ready money; whereas, if he sells an article upon which he has no credit, he must replace it with another, by paying money immediately. The consequence is, that while those who sell to the public are poor, the nation or manufacturer that gives the longest credit will have the preference; but this is daily diminishing, for even with the capital of the rich nation itself, the manufactures of the poor one are encouraged; the manner is as follows:

A, at New York, purchases goods for one thousand pounds from B, at London, which he sells without any profit, and, perhaps, at a considerable loss; because B gives him twelve months credit. But A, who has, by this means, got hold of money, as if by a loan, will not lay that out with B, nor let him touch it till the year's end; and, having made no profit by the sale of B's goods, he must turn to advantage the money he obtained for them. According to the situation of mat-[end of page #179] ters in the country, and the nature of A's concerns, he will make more or less, but what he makes it is not the business to investigate; it is sufficient to know, that he will lay his ready money out with those who will sell cheap, in order to get by it; that is to say, he will lay it out with some person in his own country. {148} Thus, though the rich nation sells goods on credit at a price which cannot be obtained for them by the purchaser, yet its capital serves to give activity to the manufacturers in the poor country. It is true, that this operation is slow, but it produces an effect in time, and finishes by robbing the wealthy nation of its superiority, obtained by giving credit. It is thus that in all their intercourse, the first advantage is to the rich nation, but terminates in favour of the poor; for whenever equality of prices are the question, and both can give sufficient credit, the poorer nation has the advantage in point of price.

With regard to rivalling each other, in a third place, the poor nation has the advantage, if the merchants there have the means of paying with ready money, because the price is lower than that of the richer country. {149} If they have not that means, they cannot deal with them, but must wait till they have, by perseverance; and, in course of time, come to have the means when the poor nation is certain to enter into competition with advantage.

But this is not the only way in which the capital of a rich nation is employed in fostering a rivalship in a poorer nation. Were the manufacturers the only persons who sold goods, it would be confined to this; but that is not the case, for merchants, who are the sellers, study only where they can purchase the cheapest; thus English merchants purchase cloths in Silesia, watches in Switzerland, fire- arms at Liege,

--- {148} The Dutch used to give long credit, and buy with ready money, by which means they had great advantage for a long time; but, at last, the ready money they paid to some, and the credit they gave to others, set their industry at work, and they became rivals. Dutch capital was, at one period, of great service to the English, as that of England now is to the Americans.

{149} This is not meant to apply to any particular sort of manufacture. In some, a nation may have a permanent advantage over another; in others, only a temporary one, and in the greater portion no other advantage than what arises from superior capital. -=-

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in preference to laying out the money in England or Ireland; and they will give credit, as before explained, to the nation that wants it.

In this manner it is, that the capital of a rich country supplies the want of it in poorer ones, and that, by degrees, a nation saps the foundation of its own wealth and greatness, and gives encouragement to them in others.

It is then that the weight of taxes, the high price of commodities, and the various causes which encumber those who live in wealthy nations, begin to produce a pernicious effect. The tendency of industry is to remove its abode, and the capital of the merchants, who know no country, but understand arithmetic, and the profits of trade, gives the industry the means of doing it with more ease and promptitude.

The Dutch, for the last century, employed their capital in this manner, and, at one time, were the chief carriers, for they secured custom by paying readily and giving credit largely. They ruined many of their own manufactures in this manner, but it is impossible to separate the calculation of gain from the mercantile system and mercantile practice in individuals; therefore it is no reproach to their patriotism, for patriotism cannot be the rule in purchasing goods from an individual. A merchant can have no other rule, but his own advantage, or, if he has, he will soon be ruined.

There are many manufactures in England that originally rose by means of Dutch capital, not lent capital, but by ready money paid for goods, which were carried to other nations, and sold here upon credit.

The English have, for a long time, been able to do this piece of business for themselves; and, of course, the Dutch did not find the same means of supporting their carrying trade; and as they had ruined many of their own manufactures, they sunk both as a commercial and manufacturing people.

If the time should ever come that capital should be so abundant in all nations, as that obtaining credit will not be an object, then it will be seen that no nation will have so very great a share of manufactures and commerce more than others, as has hitherto been the case.

In countries where the common practice is to sell, chiefly, for [end of page #181] ready money, great fortunes are seldom gained. Even in wealthy countries, in branches of business where no credit is given, great fortunes are very seldom got, and for a very simple reason. The business is pretty equally divided. But in a country that gives long credits, or in a branch of trade on which long credits are given, we always see some individuals gaining immense fortunes, by means of doing a great deal more business than others, who, having less capital, are enabled to do less.

There is not any one thing in which a nation resembles an individual so much, as in mercantile transactions; the rule of one is the rule of all, and the rich individual acts like a rich nation, and the poor one like a poor nation. The consequences are the same in both cases. The rich carry on an extensive trade, by means of great capital; the poor, a limited one, dependant =sic= chiefly on industry; but wherever the poor persevere in good conduct, they finish by getting the command of the capital of the rich, and then becoming their rivals.

There is one thing peculiar to the intercourse of rich and poor nations, in which it differs from the intercourse between rich and poor individuals in the same country. Money, which is the common measure of value, has a different price in different countries, and, indeed, in different parts of the same country. If a man, from a poor country, carries a bushel of corn with him into a rich, he can live as long upon it as if he had remained where he was; but if he carry the money, that would have bought a bushel of corn at home, he perhaps may not be able to live upon it half so long. {150}

The effect that this produces, in the intercourse between two countries, is, that in proportion as the difference becomes greater, the rich country feels it can command more of the industry of the poor, and the poor feels it can command less of the industry of the rich; so that

--- {150} In common life, this difference, between carrying money and necessaries, is perfectly well understood, but it is experience that is the teacher; and the rough countryman, or woman, when they have the opportunity of judging from fact, understand the motives as well as the most profound and ingenius =sic= writer on political economy. -=-

[end of page #182]

when their industry can be both applied, with any degree of equality, to the same object, the poor supplies the rich, and therefore increases its own wealth.

It is thus that great numbers of the people in London are fed with butcher-meat from Scotland, and wear shoes from Yorkshire; but there would be a very limited sale in either of those places for meat from Smithfield, or shoes manufactured in London. {151}

This diminution of the value of money, that takes place in all rich countries, serves farther to increase the advantage of poorer ones in manufacturing, and accelerates the natural effect of competition, which is facilitated, as has been said, by the capital of the rich country giving activity to the industry of the poorer one.

This last neither can be called an exterior nor an interior cause, as it is derived entirely from the relative situations of the two countries, and belongs to both, or originates in both; but, as it raises the poor nation nearer the level of the rich one, its effect gradually becomes less powerful. Though there is no means of preventing the operation of two nations coming nearly to a level by this means, yet it does not appear to be a necessary consequence that the nation that was the richer should become the poorer. As this, however, has been a general case, we must conclude it to be a natural one, but there we stop, and make a distinction between what is natural only, and what is a necessary effect. Their coming to a level was a necessary effect; but, though the other may be natural, it cannot be necessary, and therefore may be counteracted; to find the means of doing this, is all that is proposed by the present inquiry.

--- {151} If it was not for taxes and rent, that are chiefly spent in large towns, as well as law-expenses, and the prices of luxuries, of dress, and furniture, the cities, like London, would soon be reduced. -=-

[end of page #183]

CHAP. XII.

_Conclusion of exteror Causes.--Are seldom of much Importance, unless favoured by interior ones.--Rich Nations, with care, capable, in most Cases, of prolonging their Prosperity.--Digression on the Importance of Public Revenue, illustrated by a statistical Chart_.

The exterior causes of the decline of any nation, that has risen above its level, though formidable, are nothing, in comparison to the interior causes, and are of no great effect without their co-operation.

As the government of a country has an influence over the interior causes, so its alliances, and the laws of nations, though not very well attended to, (yet seldom altogether forgot,) have a tendency to stop the progress of the exterior causes, before they advance too far; that is to say, before they absolutely depress a nation.

For several centuries, the stronger nations of Europe protected the weaker, and the matter was carried so far, that the weak powers generally gained the most. Prussia and Sardinia are two examples of nations rising by political connections; and though the system is lately changed, and Poland has been despoiled and divided amongst nations, to each of which it was superior in power only two centuries ago, and though Holland and Switzerland groan under the yoke of France, yet, it is to be hoped, the old system is not abandoned, otherwise there will be no end to the encroachments of the great powers on the smaller.

The means of communicating, between nations, are now easy; they have felt the advantage of preserving a sort of balance, {152} and the ad-

--- {152} The expression, balance of power, gives a false idea. It seems to imply, that alliances in Europe were so nicely arranged, as to make the force of nations, in opposite interests, equal; but this never was the case for half an hour, nor was it ever intended. The whole [end of page #184] that is meant, is to prevent the present order from being overturned, by one nation annihilating or subduing another; and then, by their united strength, swallowing up a third, as was the case with the Romans. -=-

vantages are so great, that they probably never will be entirely abandoned, though we have strong proofs, of late years, that they are not always held very sacred.

The chart subjoined to this, giving a statistical representation of the powers of Europe, shews nearly in what manner power is distributed at this time; the population and extent are there represented with accuracy: these are the foundation of power; and the amount of the revenue may be said to shew the means, which a nation has of exerting that power. (For the description and explanation see the page opposite the chart). [Transcriber's note: seemingly a reference to Chart No. 2; the explanation in fact appears on page 190.]

The balance of power, however well attended to, could not prevent the decline of a nation from interior causes. It may prevent the operation of exterior causes from pushing a nation to the extreme of humiliation, by taking advantage of its internal situation. But the decline of almost every nation has commenced within its own bosom, and has been completed by causes acting from without.

The common termination of the interior causes of decline is revolt, or a division into parties, when the party that has the disadvantage generally calls in some neighbour to its aid. This is the most miserable fate that can befal =sic= a country, and no punishment is sufficiently severe for the men, who have so far lost every sentiment of patriotism as to have recourse to such a step.

The exterior causes of decline, namely, rivalship in peace and the combined efforts of enemies in war may be considered as irresistible, if the government, which has the direction of a nation, does not act wisely; but, if it does, they may be put at defiance. If a nation preserves its interior sources of prosperity, and acts with moderation and firmness towards others, their envy and efforts will be without effect, and need never be a cause of much uneasiness.

In its relation to other nations, the government of a country acts like an individual. The first thing is to regulate its interior affairs, and, the next is, in treating with others, to consider circumstances, and take justice and moderation for a rule of conduct. [end of page #185]

The circuitous politics attributed to ambassadors, who represent states, is a common theme of invective: as custom has established it as a sort of rule, in all such transactions as they conduct, to conceal a part of what is meant, to demand more than is expected to be obtained, and offer less than is intended to be given, there is no immediate remedy; but this is only in the mode and manner of treating, and does not necessarily imply unfair intention. If it has become a custom to ask three by way of obtaining two, and of offering only two to prevent the necessity of giving four, (which would be expected if three, the number intended to be given, were offered at first) it is an abuse of language, in so far that what is expressed is neither meant by one, nor understood by the other to be meant; but, it is nothing more: neither is it a custom void of meaning; it is founded on the nature of man.

If men were perfect, and capable of seeing at one view what was fair, each might come prepared to ask exactly what he wanted, and determined not to yield any thing; and it would result from their being perfect, that each would just demand what was right, and the other was disposed to give; but, as men are not perfect, and as it is the inclination and even the duty of each to obtain the most favourable terms he can, (and as he does not see exactly what is right,) he naturally demands more than he has a right to expect, or than the other is disposed to give. If ambassadors met together with a determination to speak explicitly at first, and with a determination not to recede, the consequence would probably be, that they would not treat at all, so that the mode of receding a little does not absolutely imply that more is asked than is wished for, but that each party over-rates its own pretensions, in order to obtain what is right.

One thing is certain, that the treaties that have been the best observed have been those founded on equity, where the contracting parties were neither of them under the influence of fear or necessity.

The exterior dangers of a country are not only more simple in their nature than the interior ones, but, being less silent and gradual in their progress have been more noticed by historians.

Even the ambitious rapacity of the Romans was first directed [end of page #186] against Carthage, on account of its pride and injustice in attacking other states; and, in the history of the nations of the world, there is scarcely a single example of national prosperity being unattended with some degree of pride, arrogance, and injustice; nor can it easily be otherwise, for, notwithstanding all the boasted law of nations, power seems amongst them to be one of the principal claims on which right is founded, though, in the moral nature of things, power and right have not the most distant connection.

It is then an object for those who govern nations, in the first place, to counteract as much as possible the internal tendency to decline, arising from the causes that have been enumerated; and, after having done that, to regulate their conduct with regard to other nations, so as to protect themselves from those external causes of decline, on the existence of which they have no direct influence, but which are not capable of producing any great effect, unless favoured by the internal state of the country, and by the unwise conduct of those by whom it is governed.

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_Digression concerning the Importance of Public Revenue_.

No state, what ever its wealth may be, can possess power, unless a certain portion of that wealth is applicable to public purposes. As the want of revenue has not been a very common cause of weakness, we shall give, as an example, the almost solitary, but very strong, case of Poland. Its feebleness, in repelling the attacks of its enemies, was occasioned, in a great measure, by want of revenue. It was with far superior population, with more fertile soil, and a people no way inferior in bravery, greatly inferior in actual exertion to Prussia. When, at last, the Poles, seeing their danger, united together, and were willing to make every personal exertion and sacrifice, to preserve their country, they had no means of executing their good intentions. They had not kept up an army when it was not wanted, and they could not, on the emergency, create one when it was become necessary. [end of page #187]

The definition given of power makes it a relative thing, and, therefore, the revenue necessary to maintain that power or force must be relative also; it, therefore, depends on circumstances, what is to be considered as a sufficient or insufficient revenue.

If the United States of America were accessible with ease to European nations, or if they had powerful neighbours on their own soil, they would find their present revenues quite unequal to preserving their independence; but, as it is, perhaps they are the most wealthy civilized nation in the world, if an excess of revenue constitutes wealth.

In Europe, whatever nations are unable to keep up forces sufficient to make those exertions which, according to their alliances and dangers, may be necessary, they are weak from want of revenue, and ought to augment it.

In the course of making greater exertions than the revenues would bear, some nations have contracted debts. It is not the purpose here to enter into the complication such debts occasion, and the alterations they make on the revenue, and the disposal of the revenue of a country; but, so far as that subject is yet understood, it appears that the clear revenue, after paying the interest of the debt, ought to be as great as it would be altogether, if there were no debt; that is to say, after paying interest, there ought to remain a sufficient surplus to pay all the expenses necessary for government and defence.

The money that goes for the payment of interest has some tendency to increase the influence of government at home, but is of no manner of use with regard to enemies.

From the statistical chart here annexed, which shews the relative proportion of the revenues of all the nations in Europe, as well as their actual amount, it is perfectly clear, that, great and extensive as the Russian empire is, it will not be very powerful until its revenues are considerably increased.

The great value of money, and the prices of provisions, and many sorts of warlike stores, enable great armies to be maintained in that country, even with small revenues; but the Russians can make no great effort, at a distance from home, till their revenues are augmented.

The revenues of Spain are considerable; but the free revenue is not, [end of page #188] and it has no credit to supply the place. The same thing may be said of Portugal; and if England had no credit, it would be in the same situation; but as it has better credit than any nation ever had, so, likewise, it is the only one whose efforts have never been in any way, or at any time, either restricted or suspended, for want of money to carry them into effect.

The Dutch were, at one time, situated nearly as England is now; they had not sufficient free revenue, but they had good credit; of which, however, they were not willing to make the necessary use, and the French marched into Amsterdam with greater ease than the Russians did into Warsaw.

The greatest victories of the French, during the revolution, were gained at a time when her regular revenues were inconsiderable, and when she was in a state of absolute bankruptcy. This is considered by some as a proof that force is independent of revenue, and that Frederick the Great was mistaken in saying, that money was the sinews of war; but this case has been misunderstood as well as misrepresented.

Though, in general, regular resources for money are necessary to support war, and regular resources imply revenue, it never was asserted, that, if irregular resources could be obtained, they would not answer the same purpose, so long as they lasted. During the first five years of the French revolution, a sum equal to at least four hundred millions sterling was consumed, besides what was pillaged from the enemy. So that at the time that France was without regular revenue, she was actually expending seventy-five millions sterling per annum: a sum greater than any other nation ever had at its disposal.

The impossibility of such a resource continuing is of no importance in the present argument, although it is luckily of very great importance to the peace of mankind. France supported war, for a certain time, by consuming capital, and without revenue, but not without money; so that what his Prussian Majesty said, stands uncontroverted, and the necessity of revenue, regular and durable, for the maintenance of regular and durable force, is established beyond the power of contradiction. [end of page #189]

EXPLANATION OF STATISTICAL CHART, NO. 2.

In this chart, the different nations of Europe are represented by circles, bearing the proportion of their relative extent. This is done in order to give a better idea of the proportions than a geographical map, where the dissimilar and irregular forms prevent the eye from making a comparison.

The graduated scale of lines represents millions of pounds sterling; and the red lines, that rise on the left of each circle, express the number of inhabitants in millions, which may be known by observing at what cross-line the red one stops.

The yellow lines, on the right of the circles, shew the amount of revenue in pounds sterling.

The nations stained green, are maritime powers; those stained pale red, are only powerful by land.

The dotted lines, to connect the extremities of the lines of population and revenue, serve, by their descent from right to left, or from left to right, to shew how revenue and population are proportioned to each other.

The impression made by this chart is such, that it is impossible not to see by what means Sweden and Denmark are of little importance, as to wealth or power; for, though population and territory are the original foundation of power, finances are the means of exerting it.

What must the consequences be if the Russian empire should one day become like other nations? If ever that should happen, it either will be divided, or it will crush all Europe.

The prodigious territory of Russia, and the immense revenues of England, are the most astonishing things represented in that chart; they are out of all proportion to the rest. [end of page #190]

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