Chapter 2

But first it may be demanded, What the Thing we speak of is? Or what the Facetiousness (or _Wit_ as he calls it before) doth import? To which Questions I might reply, as _Democritus_ did to him that asked the Definition of a Man, _'Tis that we all see and know._ Any one better apprehends what it is by Acquaintance, than I can inform him by Description. It is indeed a Thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many Shapes, so many Postures, so many Garbs, so variously apprehended by several Eyes and Judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain Notion thereof, than to make a Portrait of _Proteus_, or to define the Figure of the fleeting Air. Sometimes it lieth in pat Allusion to a known Story, or in seasonable Application of a trivial Saying, or in forging an apposite Tale: Sometimes it playeth in Words and Phrases, taking Advantage from the Ambiguity of their Sense, or the Affinity of their Sound: Sometimes it is wrapp'd in a Dress of humorous Expression: Sometimes it lurketh under an odd Similitude: Sometimes it is lodged in a sly Question, in a smart Answer, in a quirkish Reason, in a shrewd Intimation, in cunningly diverting, or cleverly retorting an Objection: Sometimes it is couched in a bold Scheme of Speech, in a tart Irony, in a lusty Hyperbole, in a startling Metaphor, in a plausible Reconciling of Contradictions, or in acute Nonsense; Sometimes a scenical Representation of Persons or Things, a counterfeit Speech, a mimical Look or Gesture passeth for it. Sometimes an affected Simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous Bluntness giveth it Being. Sometimes it riseth from a lucky Hitting upon what is Strange; sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious Matter to the Purpose. Often it' consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable, and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless Rovings of Fancy, and Windings of Language. It is, in short, a Manner of Speaking out of the simple and plain Way (such as Reason teacheth, and proveth Things by) which by a pretty, surprizing Uncouthness in Conceit or Expression, doth affect and amuse the Fancy, stirring in it some Wonder, and breeding some Delight thereto. It raiseth Admiration, as signifying a nimble Sagacity of Apprehension, a special Felicity of Invention, a Vivacity of Spirit, and Reach of Wit, more than vulgar; it seeming to argue a rare Quickness of Parts, that one can fetch in remote Conceits applicable; a notable Skill that he can dextrously accommodate them to the Purpose before him; together with a lively Briskness of Humour, not apt to damp those Sportful Flashes of Imagination. (Whence in _Aristotle_ such Persons are termed "epidexioi", dexterous Men, and "eutropoi", Men of facile or versatile Manners, who can easily turn themselves to all Things, or turn all Things to themselves.) It also procureth Delight, by gratifying Curiosity with its Rareness, or Semblance of Difficulty. (As Monsters, not for their Beauty, but their Rarity; as juggling Tricks, not for their Use, but their Abstruseness, are beheld with Pleasure;) by diverting the Mind from its Road of serious Thoughts, by instilling Gaiety, and Airiness of Spirit; by provoking to such Disposition of Spirit in Way of Emulation, or Complaisance; and by seasoning Matters otherwise distasteful or insipid, with an unusual and thence grateful Tange.

This Description, it is easy to perceive, must have cost the Author of it a great deal of Labour. It is a very full Specimen of that Talent of entirely _exhausting_ a Subject, for which Dr. _Barrow_ was remarkable; and if the _Point_ was, to exhibit all the various Forms and Appearances, not of WIT only, but of _Raillery_, _Satire_, _Sarcasms_, and of every Kind of _Poignancy_ and _Pleasantry_ of Sentiment, and Expression, he seems to have perfectly succeeded; there being perhaps no Variety, in all the Extent of these Subjects, which he has not presented to View in this Description.--But he does not pretend to give any _Definition_ of WIT, intimating rather that it is quite impossible to be given: And indeed from his Description of it, as a _Proteus_, appearing in numberless various Colours, and Forms; and from his mistaking, and presenting for WIT, other different Mixtures and Substances, it is evident that his Idea of it was quite confused and uncertain: It is true, he has discovered a vast Scope of Fertility of Genius, and an uncommon Power of collecting together a Multitude of Objects upon any Occasion, but he has here absolutely mistaken his work; for instead of exhibiting the Properties of WIT in a clearer Light, and confuting the _false Claims_ which are made to it, he has made it his whole Business to perplex it the more, by introducing, from all Corners, a monstrous Troop of new unexpected _Pretenders_.

_Dryden_, in the Preface to his _Opera_, entitled, _The State of Innocence_, or _Fall of Man_, gives the following _Decree_ upon WIT. The _Definition of WIT_, (which has been so often attempted, and ever unsuccessfully by many Poets) is only this: That it is _a Propriety of Thoughts and Words; or in other Terms, Thoughts and Words elegantly adapted to the Subject_.

If Mr. _Dryden_ imagined, that he had succeeded _himself_ in this _Definition_, he was extremely mistaken; for nothing can be more distant from the Properties of WIT, than those he describes. He discovers no Idea of the _Surprize_, and _Brilliancy_ of WIT, or of the sudden _Light_ thrown upon a Subject. Instead of once pointing at these, he only describes the Properties of clear _Reasoning_, which are _a Propriety of Thoughts and Words_;--Whereas WIT, in its sudden _Flashes_, makes no Pretension to _Reasoning_; but is perceived in the pleasant _Surprize_ which it starts, and in the _Light_ darted upon a Subject, which instantly vanishes again, without abiding a strict Examination.

The other Definition he gives, which is, _Thoughts and Words elegantly adapted to the Subject_, is very different from the former, but equally unhappy.

For _Propriety_, in _Thoughts_ and _Words_, consists in exhibiting _clear, pertinent Ideas_, in _precise_ and _perspicuous Words_.

Whereas ELEGANCE consists in the _compt_, _well pruned_ and _succinct Turn_ of a Subject.

The Object of the _First_, is to be _clear_, and _perspicuous_; whence it often appears in pursuit of these, not _compt_ or _succinct_: Whereas the _Essence_ of ELEGANCE is to be _compt_ and _succinct_, for the Sake of which Ornaments it often neglect _Perspicuity_, and _Clearness_.--In short, a _Propriety_ of Thoughts and Words, may subsist without any _Elegance_; as an _Elegance_ of Thoughts and Words may appear without a perfect _Propriety_.

The last _Definition_, as it is thus very different from the former is also equally unhappy: For ELEGANCE is no _essential_ Property of WIT. _Pure_ WIT resulting solely from the _quick Elucidation_ of one Subject, by the sudden _Arrangement_, and _Comparison_ of it, with another Subject.--If the two Objects _arranged_ together are _elegant_, and _polite_, there will then be superadded to the WIT, an _Elegance_ and _Politeness_ of Sentiment, which will render the WIT more amiable. But if the Objects are _vulgar_, _obscene_, or _deformed_, provided the _first_ be _elucidated_, in a lively Manner, by, the sudden _Arrangement_ of it with the _second_, there will be equally WIT; though, the Indelicacy of Sentiment attending it, will render such WIT shocking and abominable.

It is with the highest Respect for the great Mr. _Locke_, that I deliver his Sentiments upon this Subject.

And hence, perhaps, may be given some Reason of that common Observation, that Men who have a great deal of _Wit_, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment or deepest Reason: For _Wit_ lying most in the Assemblage of _Ideas_, and putting those together with Quickness and Variety, wherein can be found any Assemblance or Congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy. _Judgment_, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side; in separating carefully one from another, _Ideas_, wherein can be found the least Difference, thereby to avoid being missed by Similitude, and by Affinity to take one thing for another. This is a Way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion; wherein for the most Part lies that Entertainment and Pleasantry of _Wit_, which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore is acceptable to all People, because its Beauty appears at first Sight, and there is required no Labour of Thoughts to examine what Truth, or Reason, there is in it. The Mind, without looking any further, rests satisfied with the Agreeableness of the Picture, and the Gaiety of the Fancy. And it is a kind of an Affront to go about to examine it by the severe Rules of Truth, and good Reason, whereby it appears, that it conflicts in something that is not perfectly conformable to them.

It is to be observed that Mr. _Locke_ has here only occasionally, and passantly, delivered his Sentiments upon this Subject; but yet he has very happily explained the chief Properties of WIT. It was _his_ Remark _First_, that it lies for the most _Part_ in _assembling_ together with _Quickness_ and _Variety_ Objects, which possess an _Affinity_, or _Congruity_, with each other; which was the _first_ just Information obtained by the literary World, upon this Subject.

As to what he adds, That the Intention, and Effects, of this _Assemblage_ of _similar_ Objects, is _to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy_, it is, as I humbly apprehend, not quite perfect: For the Business of this _Assemblage_ is not merely to raise pleasant Pictures in the Fancy, but also to _enlighten_ thereby the _original_ Subject.--This is evident; because in such _Assemblages_, the only Foundation upon which the _new Subject_ is suddenly introduced, is the _Affinity_, and consequently the _Illustration_, it bears to the _first_ Subject.--The Introduction of pleasant Pictures and Visions, which present not a new _Illustration_, and _Light_, to the _original_ Subjects, being rather wild Sallies of _Vivacity_, than well-aimed, apposite Strokes of WIT.

It is Mr. _Locke_'s Conclusion, at last, That WIT _consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to Truth, and good Reason_.--This is a _Problem_ of some Curiosity; and I apprehend Mr. _Locke_'s Determination upon it to be right:--For the _Direction_ of WIT is absolutely different from the _Direction of_ TRUTH and GOOD REASON; It being the Aim of WIT to strike the _Imagination_; of TRUTH and GOOD REASON, to convince the _Judgment_: From thence they can never be perfectly coincident.

It is however true, that there may be Instances of WIT, wherein the _Agreement_ between the two Objects shall be absolutely _just_, and perceived to be such at the first Glance. Such Instances of WIT, will be then also _Self-evident_ TRUTHS. They will _both_ agree in their obvious, and quick _Perspicuity_; but will be still different in this, that the Effort of the _One_ is to strike the _Fancy_, whereas the _Other_ is wholly exerted in gratifying the _Judgment_.

The Sentiments of Mr. _Addison_ upon WIT, are professedly delivered in the _Spectator_ Nº. 62. annexed to the following _Essay_. He has there justly commended Mr. _Locke_'s Description of WIT; but what he adds, by Way of Explanation to it, that the _Assemblage_ of Ideas must be such as shall give _Delight_, and _Surprize_, is not true, in regard to the Former, _Delight_ being no _essential_ Property of WIT; for if the _original_ Subject be unpleasant, or deformed, the sudden unexpected _Arrangement_ of a _similar_ Object with it, may give us _Surprize_, and be indisputably WIT, and yet be far from creating any _Delight_.

This Gentleman has also given the following Example, in order to illustrate the Necessity there is, that _Surprize_ should be always an Attendant upon WIT.

"When a Poet tells us, the Bosom of his Mistress is as white as Snow, there is no _Wit_ in the Comparison; but when he adds, with a Sigh, that it as cold too, it then grows to Wit."

--To compare a Girl's _Bosom_ to _Snow_ for its _Whiteness_ I apprehend to be WIT, notwithstanding the Authority of so great a Writer to the contrary. For there is a _Lustre_ resulting from the _natural_ and _splendid Agreement_ between these Objects, which will _always_ produce WIT; such, as cannot be destroyed, though it will quickly be rendered _trite_, by frequent Repetition.

This _Problem_, _How far_ SURPRIZE _is, or is not, necessary to_ WIT, I humbly apprehend, may be thus solved.--In Subjects which have a _natural_ and _splendid Agreement_, there will always be WIT upon their _Arrangement_ together; though when it becomes _trite_, and not accompanied with _Surprize_, the _Lustre_ will be much faded;--But where the _Agreement_ is _forced_ and _strained_, _Novelty_ and _Surprize_ are absolutely necessary to usher it in; An unexpected _Assemblage_ of this Sort, striking our Fancy, and being gaily admitted at first to be WIT; which upon frequent Repetition, the _Judgment_ will have examined, and rise up against it wherever it appears;--So that in short, in Instances where the _Agreement_ is _strained_ and _defective_, which indeed are abundantly the most general, _Surprize_ is a necessary _Passport_ to WIT; but _Surprize_ is not necessary to WIT, where the _Agreement_ between the two Subjects is _natural_ and _splendid_; though in these Instances it greatly heightens the _Brillancy_.

The subsequent Remark of Mr. _Addison_, _That the Poet, after saying his Mistress's Bosom is as white as Snow, should add, with a Sigh, that it is as cold too, in order that it may grow to_ WIT, is I fear, very incorrect. For as to the _Sigh_, it avails not a Rush; and this Addition will be found to be only a _new_ Stroke of WIT, equally _trite_, and less perfect, and natural, than the former Comparison.

It may also be observed, That Mr. _Addison_ has omitted the _Elucidation_ of the _original_ Subject, which is the grand Excellence of WIT. Nor has he prescribed any _Limits_ to the Subjects, which are to be arranged together; without which the Result will be frequently the SUBLIME or BURLESQUE; In which, it is true, WIT often appears, but taking their whole Compositions together, they are different Substances, and usually ranked in different _Classes_.

All that Mr. _Congreve_ has delivered upon WIT, as far as I know, appears in his _Essay_ upon HUMOUR, annexed to this Treatise. He there says, To define HUMOUR, perhaps, were as difficult, as to define WIT; for, like that, it is of infinite Variety. --Again, he afterwards adds, But though we cannot certainly tell what WIT is, or what HUMOUR is, yet we may _go near_ to shew something, which is not WIT, or not HUMOUR, and yet often mistaken for both. --In this _Essay_, wherein he particularly considers HUMOUR, and the Difference between _this_, and WIT, he may be expected to have delivered his best Sentiments upon both: But these Words, which I have quoted, seem to be as important and precise, as any which he has offered upon the Subject of WIT. As such, I present them, without any Remarks, to my Reader, who, if he only _goes near_ to be _edified_ by them, will discover a great Share of _Sagacity_.

The Sentiments of these eminent Writers upon WIT, having thus been exhibited, I come next to the Subject of HUMOUR. This has been _defined_ by some, in the following Manner, with great _Perspicuity._ --HUMOUR is the genuine WIT of _Comedies_,--which has afforded vast Satisfaction to many _Connoissures_ in the _Belles Lettres_; especially as WIT has been supposed to be incapable of any _Definition._

This Subject has also been particularly considered by the _Spectatator_ Nº. 35. inserted at the End of the following _Essay_. Mr. _Addison_ therein _gravely_ remarks, that It is indeed much easier to describe what is not HUMOUR, than what it is; which, I humbly apprehend, is no very _important_ Piece of Information.--He adds, And very difficult to define it otherwise, than as _Cowly_ has done WIT, by Negatives. This Notion of _defining_ a Subject by _Negatives_, is a favourite _Crotchet_, and may perhaps be assumed upon other Occasions by future Writers: I hope therefore I shall be pardoned, if I offer a proper Explanation of so good a _Conceit_;--To declare then, _That a Subject is only to be_ DEFINED _by_ NEGATIVES, is to cloath it in a _respectable_ Dress of _Darkness_. And about as much as to say, That it is a _Knight_ of _tenebrose Virtues_; or a _serene Prince_, of the _Blood_ of _Occult Qualities_.

Mr. _Addison_ proceeds, Were I to give my own Notions of HUMOUR, I should deliver them after _Plato's_ Manner, in a Kind of Allegory; and by supposing HUMOUR to be a Person, deduce to him, all his Qualifications, according to the following Genealogy: TRUTH was the Founder of the Family, and the Father of GOOD SENSE; GOOD SENSE was the Father of WIT, who married a Lady of a collateral Line called MIRTH, by whom he had Issue HUMOUR. --It is very unfortunate for this _Allegorical_ Description, that there is not one Word of it just: For TRUTH, GOOD SENSE, WIT, and MIRTH, represented to be the immediate _Ancestors_ of HUMOUR; whereas HUMOUR is derived from the _Foibles_, and whimsical _Oddities_ of _Persons_ in real Life, which flow rather from their _Inconsistencies_, and _Weakness_, than from TRUTH and GOOD SENSE; Nor is WIT any _Ancestor_ of HUMOUR, but of a quite different _Family_; it being notorious that much HUMOUR may be drawn from the Manners of _Dutchmen_, and of the most formal and dull Persons, who are yet never guilty of WIT. Again, MIRTH is not so properly the _Parent_ of HUMOUR, as the _Offspring_.--In short, this whole _Genealogy_ is a _nubilous_ Piece of Conceit, instead of being any _Elucidation_ of HUMOUR. It is a formal Method of trifling, introduced under a deep Ostentation of Learning, which deserves the severest Rebuke.--But I restrain my Pen, recollecting the _Visions_ of MIRZA, and heartily profess my high Veneration for their admirable Author.

The _Essay_ upon HUMOUR, at the End of this Treatise, written by Mr. _Congreve_, is next to be considered. It appears, that at first he professes his absolute Uncertainty in regard to this Subject; and says, "_We cannot certainly tell what_ WIT _is, or what_ HUMOUR _is_." But yet, through his whole Piece, he neglects the Subject of HUMOUR in general, and only discourses upon the HUMOUR, by which he means barely the _Disposition_, of Persons: This may particularly appear from the following Words.

A Man may change his Opinion, but I believe he will find it a Difficulty to part with his HUMOUR; and there is nothing more provoking than the being made sensible of that Difficulty. Sometimes we shall meet with those, who perhaps indifferently enough, but at the same time impertinently, will ask the Question, WHY ARE YOU NOT MERRY? WHY ARE YOU NOT GAY, PLEASANT, AND CHEARFUL? Then instead of answering, could I ask such a Person, WHY ARE YOU NOT HANDSOME? WHY HAVE YOU NOT BLACK EYES, AND A BETTER COMPLEXION? Nature abhors to be forced.

The two famous Philosophers of _Ephesus_ and _Abdera_, have their different Sects at this Day. Some weep, and others laugh at one and the same Thing.

I don't doubt but you have observed several Men laugh when they are angry; others, who are silent; some that are loud; yet I cannot suppose that it is the Passion of ANGER, which is in itself different, or more or less in one than t'other, but that it is the HUMOUR of the Man that is predominant, and urges him to express it in that Manner. Demonstrations of PLEASURE, are as various: One Man has a HUMOUR of retiring from all Company, when any thing has happened to please him beyond Expectation; he hugs himself alone, and thinks it an Addition to the Pleasure to keep it a Secret, &c.

All which, I apprehend, is no more than saying; That there are different _Dispositions_ in different _Persons_.

In another Place, he seems to understand by _Humour_, not only the _Disposition,_ but the _Tone_ of the _Nerves_, of a Person, thus,

"Suppose MOROSE to be a Man naturally splenetic, and melancholy; is there any thing more offensive to one of such a DISPOSITION (where he uses the Word instead of _Humour_) than Noise and Clamour? Let any Man that has the Spleen (and there are enough in England) be Judge. We see common Examples of this HUMOUR in little every Day. 'Tis ten to one, but three Parts in four of the Company you dine with, are discomposed, and started at the cutting of a Cork, or scratching of a Plate with a Knife; it is a Proportion of the same HUMOUR, that makes such, or any other Noise, offensive to the Person that hears it; for there are others who will not be disturbed at all by it.

At this Rate every _Weakness_ of _Nerves_, or _Particularity_ of _Constitution,_ is HUMOUR.

It is true, he justly points out in another Place the different Sentiments, which ought to be adapted to different _Characters_ in _Comedy_, according to their different _Dispositions_, or, as he phrases it, _Humours_: As for Instance, he very rightly observes, That a Character of a splenetic and peevish HUMOUR, Should have a satirical WIT. A jolly and sanguine HUMOUR should have a facetious WIT. --But still this is no Description of what is well felt, and known, by the general Name of HUMOUR.

However, as what I have already quoted, may appear to be only his looser Explanations, it will be necessary to deliver his more closed and collected Sentiments upon this Subject. These he gives in the following Words, I should be unwilling to venture, even in a bare _Description_ of _Humour_, much more to make a _Definition_ of it; but now my Hand is in, I will tell you what serves me instead of either. I take it to be, _A singular and unavoidable Manner of doing or saying any thing, peculiar and natural to one Man only, by which his Speech and Actions are distinguished from those of other Men." --This Description is very little applicable to HUMOUR, but tolerably well adapted to other Subjects.--Thus, a Person, who is happy in a particular _Grace_, which accompanies all his Actions, may be said to possess _a singular and unavoidable Manner of doing or saying any thing, peculiar and natural to him only, by which his Speech and Actions are distinguished from those of other Men_. And the same may be said of a Person of a peculiar _Vivacity_, _Heaviness_, or _Awkwardness_.--In short, this Description is suited to any _Particularity_ of a Person in general, instead of being adapted to the _Foibles_ and _whimsical Oddities_ of Persons, which alone constitute HUMOUR.

These are the only Pieces upon WIT, and HUMOUR, which have fallen within my Knowledge; I have here fairly delivered them at length; and from the Respect which is due to such eminent Writers, have distinctly and deliberately examined the Merit of each.--As to my own _Performance_, which is now submitted to the Public, I have to wish, that it may gain a candid and strict Examination. It has been my Endeavour to give _Definitions_ of the Subjects, upon which I have treated; A _Plan_ the most difficult of all others to be executed by an Author; But such an one, as I apprehend, deserves to be more generally introduced, and established. If once it was expected by the Public, that _Authors_ should strictly _define_ their Subjects, it would instantly checque an Inundation of Scribbling. The _desultory_ Manner of Writing would be absolutely exploded; and _Accuracy_ and _Precision_ would be necessarily introduced upon every Subject.