PART II.

THE AFRICAN COMMERCE,

OR

SLAVE TRADE.

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CHAP. I.

As we explained the History of Slavery in the first part of this Essay, as far as it was necessary for our purpose, we shall now take the question into consideration, which we proposed at first as the subject of our inquiry, viz. how far the commerce and slavery of the human species, as revived by some of the nations of Europe in the persons of the unfortunate Africans, and as revived, in a great measure, on the principles of antiquity, are consistent with the laws of nature, or the common notions of equity, as established among men.

This question resolves itself into two separate parts for discussion, into _the African commerce (as explained in the history of slavery)_ and _the subsequent slavery in the colonies, as founded on the equity of the commerce_. The former, of course, will be first examined. For this purpose we shall inquire into the rise, nature, and design of government. Such an inquiry will be particularly useful in the present place; it will afford us that general knowledge of subordination and liberty, which is necessary in the case before us, and will be found, as it were, a source, to which we may frequently refer for many and valuable arguments.

It appears that mankind were originally free, and that they possessed an equal right to the soil and produce of the earth. For proof of this, we need only appeal to the _divine_ writings; to the _golden age_ of the poets, which, like other fables of the times, had its origin in truth; and to the institution of the _Saturnalia_, and of other similar festivals; all of which are so many monuments of this original equality of men. Hence then there was no rank, no distinction, no superiour. Every man wandered where he chose, changing his residence, as a spot attracted his fancy, or suited his convenience, uncontrouled by his neighbour, unconnected with any but his family. Hence also (as every thing was common) he collected what he chose without injury, and enjoyed without injury what he had collected. Such was the first situation of mankind; [036]a state of _dissociation_ and _independence_.

In this dissociated state it is impossible that men could have long continued. The dangers to which they must have frequently been exposed, by the attacks of fierce and rapacious beasts, by the proedatory attempts of their own species, and by the disputes of contiguous and independent families; these, together with their inability to defend, themselves, on many such occasions, must have incited them to unite. Hence then was _society_ formed on the grand principles of preservation and defence: and as these principles began to operate, in the different parts of the earth, where the different families had roamed, a great number of these _societies_ began to be formed and established; which, taking to themselves particular names from particular occurrences, began to be perfectly distinct from one another.

As the individuals, of whom these societies were composed, had associated only for their defence, so they experienced, at first, no change in their condition. They were still independent and free; they were still without discipline or laws; they had every thing still in common; they pursued the same, manner of life; wandering only, in _herds_, as the earth gave them or refused them sustenance, and doing, as a _publick body_, what they had been accustomed to do as _individuals_ before. This was the exact situation of the Getæ and Scythians[037], of the Lybians and Goetulians[038], of the Italian Aborigines[039], and of the Huns and Alans[040]. They had left their original state of _dissociation_, and had stepped into that, which has been just described. Thus was the second situation of men a state of _independent society_.

Having thus joined themselves together, and having formed themselves into several large and distinct bodies, they could not fail of submitting soon to a more considerable change. Their numbers must have rapidly increased, and their societies, in process of time, have become so populous, as frequently to have experienced the want of subsistence, and many of the commotions and tumults of intestine strife. For these inconveniences however there were remedies to be found. _Agriculture_ would furnish them with that subsistence and support, which the earth, from the rapid increase of its inhabitants, had become unable spontaneously to produce. An _assignation_ of _property_ would not only enforce an application, but excite an emulation, to labour; and _government_ would at once afford a security to the acquisitions of the industrious, and heal the intestine disorders of the community, by the introduction of laws.

Such then were the remedies, that were gradually applied. The _societies_, which had hitherto seen their members, undistinguished either by authority or rank, admitted now of magistratical pre-eminence. They were divided into tribes; to every tribe was allotted a particular district for its support, and to every individual his particular spot. The Germans[041], who consisted of many and various nations, were exactly in this situation. They had advanced a step beyond the Scythians, Goetulians, and those, whom we described before; and thus was the third situation of mankind a state of _subordinate society_.

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FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 036: This conclusion concerning the dissociated state of mankind, is confirmed by all the early writers, with whose descriptions of primitive times no other conclusion is reconcileable.]

[Footnote 037: Justin. L. 2. C. 2.]

[Footnote 038: Sallust. Bell. Jug.]

[Footnote 039: Sallust. Bell. Catil.]

[Footnote 040: Ammianus Marcellinus. L. 31. C. 2. et. inseq.]

[Footnote 041: Agri pro Numero Cultorum ab universis per vicos occupantur, quos mox inter se secundum dignationem partiuntur. Tacitus. C. 26. de Mor. Germ.]

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CHAP. II.

As we have thus traced the situation of man from unbounded liberty to subordination, it will be proper to carry our inquiries farther, and to consider, who first obtained the pre-eminence in these _primoeval societies_, and by what particular methods it was obtained.

There were only two ways, by which such an event could have been produced, by _compulsion_ or _consent_. When mankind first saw the necessity of government, it is probable that many had conceived the desire of ruling. To be placed in a new situation, to be taken from the common herd, to be the first, distinguished among men, were thoughts, that must have had their charms. Let us suppose then, that these thoughts had worked so unusually on the passions of any particular individual, as to have driven him to the extravagant design of obtaining the preeminence by force. How could his design have been accomplished? How could he forcibly have usurped the jurisdiction at a time, when, all being equally free, there was not a single person, whose assistance he could command? Add to this, that, in a state of universal liberty, force had been repaid by force, and the attempt had been fatal to the usurper.

As _empire_ then could never have been gained at first by _compulsion_, so it could only have been obtained by _consent_; and as men were then going to make an important sacrifice, for the sake of their _mutual_ happiness, so he alone could have obtained it, (not whose _ambition_ had greatly distinguished him from the rest) but in whose _wisdom, justice, prudence_, and _virtue_, the whole community could confide.

To confirm this reasoning, we shall appeal, as before, to facts; and shall consult therefore the history of those nations, which having just left their former state of _independent society_, were the very people that established _subordination_ and _government_.

The commentaries of Cæsar afford us the following accounts of the ancient Gauls. When any of their kings, either by death, or deposition, made a vacancy in the regal office, the whole nation was immediately convened for the appointment of a successor. In these national conventions were the regal offices conferred. Every individual had a voice on the occasion, and every individual was free. The person upon whom the general approbation appeared to fall, was immediately advanced to pre-eminence in the state. He was uniformly one, whose actions had made him eminent; whose conduct had gained him previous applause; whose valour the very assembly, that elected him, had themselves witnessed in the field; whose prudence, wisdom and justice, having rendered him signally serviceable, had endeared him to his tribe. For this reason, their kingdoms were not hereditary; the son did not always inherit the virtues of the sire; and they were determined that he alone should possess authority, in whose virtues they could confide. Nor was this all. So sensible were they of the important sacrifice they had made; so extremely jealous even of the name of superiority and power, that they limited, by a variety of laws, the authority of the very person, whom they had just elected, from a confidence of his integrity; Ambiorix himself confessing, "that his people had as much power over him, as he could possibly have over his people."

The same custom, as appears from Tacitus, prevailed also among the Germans. They had their national councils, like the Gauls; in which the regal and ducal offices were confirmed according to the majority of voices. They elected also, on these occasions, those only, whom their virtue, by repeated trial, had unequivocally distinguished from the rest; and they limited their authority so far, as neither to leave them the power of inflicting imprisonment or stripes, nor of exercising any penal jurisdiction. But as punishment was necessary in a state of civil society, "it was permitted to the priests alone, that it might appear to have been inflicted, by the order of the gods, and not by any superiour authority in man."

The accounts which we have thus given of the ancient Germans and Gauls, will be found also to be equally true of those people, which had arrived at the same state of subordinate society. We might appeal, for a testimony of this, to the history of the Goths; to the history of the Franks and Saxons; to, the history, in short, of all those nations, from which the different governments, now conspicuous in Europe, have undeniably sprung. And we might appeal, as a farther proof, to the Americans, who are represented by many of the moderns, from their own ocular testimony, as observing the same customs at the present day.

It remains only to observe, that as these customs prevailed among the different nations described, in their early state of subordinate society, and as they were moreover the customs of their respective ancestors, it appears that they must have been handed down, both by tradition and use, from the first introduction of _government_.

* * * * *

CHAP. III.

We may now deduce those general maxims concerning _subordination_, and _liberty_, which we mentioned to have been essentially connected with the subject, and which some, from speculation only, and without any allusion to facts, have been bold enough to deny.

It appears first, that _liberty_ is a _natural_, and _government_ an _adventitious_ right, because all men were originally free.

It appears secondly, that government is a [042]_contract_ because, in these primeval subordinate societies, we have seen it voluntarily conferred on the one hand, and accepted on the other. We have seen it subject to various restrictions. We have seen its articles, which could then only be written by tradition and use, as perfect and binding as those, which are now committed to letters. We have seen it, in short, partaking of the _federal_ nature, as much as it could in a state, which wanted the means of recording its transactions.

It appear thirdly, that the grand object of the _contrast_, is the _happiness_ of the people; because they gave the supremacy to him alone, who had been conspicuous for the splendour of his abilities, or the integrity of his life: that the power of the multitude being directed by the _wisdom_ and _justice_ of the prince, they might experience the most effectual protection from injury, the highest advantages of society, the greatest possible _happiness_.

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 042: The author has lately read a work, intitled Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, which, in this one respect, favours those which have been hinted at, as it denies that government was a contract. "No social compact was ever made in fact,"--"it is to suppose it possible to call savages out of caves and deserts, to deliberate upon topicks, which the experience and studies, and the refinements of civil life alone suggest. Therefore no government in the universe begun from this original." But there are no grounds for so absurd a supposition; for government, and of course the social compact, does not appear to have been introduced at the time, when families coming out of their caves and deserts, or, in other words, quitting their former _dissociated_ state, joined themselves together. They had lived a considerable time in _society_, like the Lybians and Gætulians before-mentioned, and had felt many of the disadvantages of a want of discipline and laws, before government was introduced at all. The author of this Essay, before he took into consideration the origin of government, was determined, in a matter of such importance, to be biassed by no opinion whatever, and much less to indulge himself in speculation. He was determined solely to adhere to fact, and, by looking into the accounts left us of those governments which were in their infancy, and, of course in the least complicated state, to attempt to discover their foundation: he cannot say therefore, that upon a very minute perusal of the excellent work before quoted, he has been so far convinced, as to retract in the least from his sentiments on this head, and to give up maxims, which are drawn from historical facts, for those, which are the result of speculation. He may observe here, that whether government was a _contract_ or not, it will not affect the reasoning of the present Essay; since where ever the contract is afterwards mentioned, it is inferred only that its object was "the _happiness of the people_," which is confessedly the end of government. Notwithstanding this, he is under the necessity of inserting this little note, though he almost feels himself ungrateful in contradicting a work, which has afforded him so much entertainment.]

* * * * *

CHAP. IV.

Having now collected the materials that are necessary for the prosecution of our design, we shall immediately enter upon the discussion.

If any man had originally been endued with power, as with other faculties, so that the rest of mankind had discovered in themselves an _innate necessity_ of obeying this particular person; it is evident that he and his descendants, from the superiority of their nature, would have had a claim upon men for obedience, and a natural right to command: but as the right to empire is _adventitious_; as all were originally free; as nature made every man's body and mind _his own_; it is evident that no just man can be consigned to _slavery_, without his own _consent_.

Neither can men, by the same principles, be considered as lands, goods, or houses, among _possessions_. It is necessary that all _property_ should be inferiour to its _possessor_. But how does the _slave_ differ from his _master_, but by _chance_? For though the mark, with which the latter is pleased to brand him, shews, at the first sight, the difference of their _fortune_; what mark can be found in his _nature_, that can warrant a distinction?

To this consideration we shall add the following, that if men can justly become the property of each other, their children, like the offspring of cattle, must inherit their _paternal_ lot. Now, as the actions of the father and the child must be thus at the sole disposal of their common master, it is evident, that the _authority_ of the one, as a _parent_, and the _duty_ of the other, as a _child_, must be instantly annihilated; rights and obligations, which, as they are sounded in nature, are implanted in our feelings, and are established by the voice of God, must contain in their annihilation a solid argument to prove, that there cannot be any _property_ whatever in the _human species_.

We may consider also, as a farther confirmation, that it is impossible, in the nature of things, that _liberty_ can be _bought_ or _sold_! It is neither _saleable_, nor _purchasable_. For if any one man can have an absolute property in the liberty of another, or, in other words, if he, who is called a _master_, can have a _just_ right to command the actions of him, who is called a _slave_, it is evident that the latter cannot be accountable for those crimes, which the former may order him to commit. Now as every reasonable being is accountable for his actions, it is evident, that such a right cannot _justly_ exist, and that human liberty, of course, is beyond the possibility either of _sale_ or _purchase_. Add to this, that, whenever you sell the liberty of a man, you have the power only of alluding to the _body_: the _mind_ cannot be confined or bound: it will be free, though its mansion be beset with chains. But if, in every sale of the _human species_, you are under the necessity of considering your slave in this abstracted light; of alluding only to the body, and of making no allusion to the mind; you are under the necessity also of treating him, in the same moment, as a _brute_, and of abusing therefore that nature, which cannot otherwise be considered, than in the double capacity of _soul_ and _body_.

But some person, perhaps, will make an objection to one of the former arguments. "If men, from _superiority_ of their nature, cannot be considered, like lands, goods, or houses, among possessions, so neither can cattle: for being endued with life, motion, and sensibility, they are evidently _superiour_ to these." But this objection will receive its answer from those observations which have been already made; and will discover the true reason, why cattle are justly to be estimated as property. For first, the right to empire over brutes, is _natural_, and not _adventitious_, like the right to empire over men. There are, secondly, many and evident signs of the _inferiority_ of their nature; and thirdly, their liberty can be bought and sold, because, being void of reason, they cannot be _accountable_ for their actions.

We might stop here for a considerable time, and deduce many valuable lessons from the remarks that have been made, but that such a circumstance might be considered as a digression. There is one, however, which, as it is so intimately connected with the subject, we cannot but deduce. We are taught to treat men in a different manner from brutes, because they are so manifestly superiour in their nature; we are taught to treat brutes in a different manner from stones, for the same reason; and thus, by giving to every created thing its due respect, to answer the views of Providence, which did not create a variety of natures without a purpose or design.

But if these things are so, how evidently against reason, nature, and every thing human and divine, must they act, who not only force men into _slavery_, against their own _consent_; but treat them altogether as _brutes_, and make the _natural liberty_ of man an article of publick commerce! and by what arguments can they possibly defend that commerce, which cannot be carried on, in any single instance, without a flagrant violation of the laws of nature and of God?

* * * * *

CHAP. V.

That we may the more accurately examine the arguments that are advanced on this occasion, it will be proper to divide the _commerce_ into two parts; first, as it relates to those who _sell_, and secondly, as it relates to those who _purchase_, the _human species_ into slavery. To the former part of which, having given every previous and necessary information in the history of servitude, we shall immediately proceed.

Let us inquire first, by what particular right the _liberties_ of the harmless people are invaded by the _prince_. "By the _right of empire_," it will be answered; "because he possesses dominion and power by their own approbation and consent." But subjects, though under the dominion, are not the _property_, of the prince. They cannot be considered as his _possessions_. Their _natures_ are both the same; they are both born in the same manner; are subject to the same disorders; must apply to the same remedies for a cure; are equally partakers of the grave: an _incidental_ distinction accompanies them through life, and this--is all.

We may add to this, that though the prince possesses dominion and power, by the consent and approbation of his subjects, he possesses it only for the most _salutary_ ends. He may tyrannize, if he can: he may alter the _form_ of his government: he cannot, however, alter its _nature_ and _end_. These will be immutably the same, though the whole system of its administration should be changed; and he will be still bound to _defend_ the lives and properties of his subjects, and to make them _happy_.

Does he defend those therefore, whom he invades at discretion with the sword? Does he protect the property of those, whose houses and effects he consigns at discretion to the flames? Does he make those happy, whom he seizes, as they are trying to escape the general devastation, and compels with their wives and families to a wretched _servitude?_ He acts surely, as if the use of empire consisted in violence and oppression; as if he, that was most exalted, ought, of necessity, to be most unjust. Here then the voice of _nature_ and _justice_ is against him. He breaks that law of _nature_, which ordains, "that no just man shall be given into slavery, against his own _consent_:" he violates the first law of _justice_, as established among men, "that no person shall do harm to another without a previous and sufficient _provocation_;" and he violates also the sacred condition of _empire_, made with his ancestors, and necessarily understood in every species of government, "that, the power of the multitude being given up to the wisdom and justice of the prince, they may experience, in return, the most effectual protection from injury, the highest advantages of society, the greatest possible _happiness_."

But if kings then, to whom their own people have granted dominion and power, are unable to invade the liberties of their harmless subjects, without the highest _injustice_; how can those private persons be justified, who treacherously lie in wait for their fellow-creatures, and sell them into slavery? What arguments can they possibly bring in their defence? What treaty of empire can they produce, by which their innocent victims ever resigned to them the least portion of their _liberty_? In vain will they plead the _antiquity_ of the custom: in vain will the _honourable_ light, in which _piracy_ was considered in the ages of barbarism, afford them an excuse. Impious and abandoned men! ye invade the liberties of those, who, (with respect to your impious selves) are in a state of _nature_, in a state of original _dissociation_, perfectly _independent_, perfectly _free_.

It appears then, that the two orders of slaves, which have been mentioned in the history of the African servitude, "of those who are publickly seized by virtue of the authority of their prince; and of those, who are privately kidnapped by individuals," are collected by means of violence and oppression; by means, repugnant to _nature_, the principles of _government_, and the common notions of _equity_, as established among men.

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CHAP. VI.

We come now to the third order of _involuntary_ slaves, "to convicts." The only argument that the sellers advance here, is this, "that they have been found guilty of offences, and that the punishment is just." But before the equity of the sentence can be allowed two questions must be decided, whether the punishment is _proportioned_ to the offence, and what is its particular _object_ and _end_?

To decide the first, we may previously observe, that the African servitude comprehends _banishment_, a _deprivation_ of _liberty_, and many _corporal_ sufferings.

On _banishment_, the following observations will suffice. Mankind have their _local_ attachments. They have a particular regard for the spot, in which they were born and nurtured. Here it was, that they first drew their infant-breath: here, that they were cherished and supported: here, that they passed those scenes of childhood, which, free from care and anxiety, are the happiest in the life of man; scenes, which accompany them through life; which throw themselves frequently into their thoughts, and produce the most agreeable sensations. These then are weighty considerations; and how great this regard is, may be evidenced from our own feelings; from the testimony of some, who, when remote from their country, and, in the hour of danger and distress, have found their thoughts unusually directed, by some impulse or other, to their native spot; and from the example of others, who, having braved the storms and adversities of life, either repair to it for the remainder of their days, or desire even to be conveyed to it, when existence is no more.

But separately from these their _local_, they have also their _personal_ attachments; their regard for particular men. There are ties of blood; there are ties of friendship. In the former case, they must of necessity be attached: the constitution of their nature demands it. In the latter, it is impossible to be otherwise, since friendship is founded on an harmony of temper, on a concordance of sentiments and manners, on habits of confidence, and a mutual exchange of favours.

We may now mention, as perfectly distinct both from their _local_ and_ personal_, the _national_ attachments of mankind, their regard for the whole body of the people, among whom they were born and educated. This regard is particularly conspicuous in the conduct of such, as, being thus _nationally_ connected, reside in foreign parts. How anxiously do they meet together! how much do they enjoy the fight of others of their countrymen, whom fortune places in their way! what an eagerness do they show to serve them, though not born on the same particular spot, though not connected by consanguinity or friendship, though unknown to them before! Neither is this affection wonderful, since they are creatures of the same education; of the same principles; of the same manners and habits; cast, as it were, in the same mould; and marked with the same impression.

If men therefore are thus separately attached to the several objects described, it is evident that a separate exclusion from either must afford them considerable pain. What then must be their sufferings, to be forced for ever from their country, which includes them all? Which contains the _spot_, in which they were born and nurtured; which contains their _relations_ and _friends_; which contains the whole body of the _people_, among whom they were bred and educated. In these sufferings, which arise to men, both in bidding, and in having bid, adieu to all that they esteem as dear and valuable, _banishment_ consists in part; and we may agree therefore with the ancients, without adding other melancholy circumstances to the account, that it is no inconsiderable punishment of itself.

With respect to the _loss_ of _liberty_, which is the second consideration in the punishment, it is evident that men bear nothing worse; that there is nothing, that they lay more at heart; and that they have shewn, by many and memorable instances, that even death is to be preferred. How many could be named here, who, having suffered the _loss_ of _liberty_, have put a period to their existence! How many, that have willingly undergone the hazard of their lives to destroy a tyrant! How many, that have even gloried to perish in the attempt! How many bloody and publick wars have been undertaken (not to mention the numerous _servile_ insurrections, with which history is stained) for the cause of _freedom_!

But if nothing is dearer than _liberty_ to men, with which, the barren rock is able to afford its joys, and without which, the glorious fun shines upon them but in vain, and all the sweets and delicacies of life are tasteless and unenjoyed; what punishment can be more severe than the loss of so great a blessing? But if to this _deprivation_ of _liberty_, we add the agonizing pangs of _banishment_; and if to the complicated stings of both, we add the incessant _stripes, wounds_, and _miseries_, which are undergone by those, who are sold into this horrid _servitude_; what crime can we possibly imagine to be so enormous, as to be worthy of so great a punishment?

How contrary then to reason, justice, and nature, must those act, who apply this, the severest of human punishments, to the most insignificant offence! yet such is the custom with the Africans: for, from the time, in which the Europeans first intoxicated the African princes with their foreign draughts, no crime has been committed, no shadow of a crime devised, that has not immediately been punished with _servitude_.

But for what purpose is the punishment applied? Is it applied to amend the manners of the criminal, and thus render him a better subject? No, for if you banish him, he can no longer be a subject, and you can no longer therefore be solicitous for his morals. Add to this, that if you banish him to a place, where he is to experience the hardships of want and hunger (so powerfully does hunger compel men to the perpetration of crimes) you force him rather to corrupt, than amend his manners, and to be wicked, when he might otherwise be just.

Is it applied then, that others may be deterred from the same proceedings, and that crimes may become less frequent? No, but that _avarice_ may be gratified; that the prince may experience the emoluments of the sale: for, horrid and melancholy thought! the more crimes his subjects commit, the richer is he made; the more _abandoned_ the subject, the _happier_ is the prince!

Neither can we allow that the punishment thus applied, tends in any degree to answer _publick happiness_; for if men can be sentenced to slavery, right or wrong; if shadows can be turned into substances, and virtues into crimes; it is evident that none can be happy, because none can be secure.

But if the punishment is infinitely greater than the offence, (which has been shewn before) and if it is inflicted, neither to amend the criminal, nor to deter others from the same proceedings, nor to advance, in any degree, the happiness of the publick, it is scarce necessary to observe, that it is totally unjust, since it is repugnant to _reason_, the dictates of _nature_, and the very principles of _government_.

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CHAP. VII.

We come now to the fourth and last order of slaves, to _prisoners of war_. As the _sellers_ lay a particular stress on this order of men, and infer much, from its _antiquity_, in support of the justice of their cause, we shall examine the principle, on which it subsisted among the ancients. But as this principle was the same among all nations, and as a citation from many of their histories would not be less tedious than unnecessary, we shall select the example of the Romans for the consideration of the case.

The law, by which prisoners of war were said to be sentenced to servitude, was the _law of nations_[043]. It was so called from the universal concurrence of nations in the custom. It had two points in view, the _persons_ of the _captured_, and their _effects_; both of which it immediately sentenced, without any of the usual forms of law, to be the property of the _captors_.

The principle, on which the law was established, was the _right of capture_. When any of the contending parties had overcome their opponents, and were about to destroy them, the right was considered to commence; a right, which the victors conceived themselves to have, to recall their swords, and, from the consideration of having saved the lives of the vanquished, when they could have taken them by the laws of war, to commute _blood_ for _service_. Hence the Roman lawyer, Pomponius, deduces the etymology of _slave_ in the Roman language. "They were called _servi_[044], says he, from the following circumstance. It was usual with our commanders to take them prisoners, and sell them: now this circumstance implies, that they must have been previously _preserved_, and hence the name." Such then was the _right of capture_. It was a right, which the circumstance of _taking_ the vanquished, that is, of _preserving_ them alive, gave the conquerors to their persons. By this right, as always including the idea of a previous preservation from death, the vanquished were said _to be slaves_[045]; and, "as all slaves," says Justinian, "are themselves in the power of others, and of course can have nothing of their own, so their effects followed the condition of their persons, and became the property of the captors."

To examine this right, by which the vanquished were said to be slaves, we shall use the words of a celebrated Roman author, and apply them to the present case[046]. "If it is lawful," says he, "to deprive a man of his life, it is certainly not inconsistent with nature to rob him;" to rob him of his liberty. We admit the conclusion to be just, if the supposition be the same: we allow, if men have a right to commit that, which is considered as a greater crime, that they have a right, at the same instant, to commit that, which is considered as a less. But what shall we say to the _hypothesis_? We deny it to be true. The voice of nature is against it. It is not lawful to kill, but on _necessity_. Had there been a necessity, where had the wretched captive survived to be broken with chains and servitude? The very act of saving his life is an argument to prove, that no such necessity existed. The _conclusion_ is therefore false. The captors had no right to the _lives_ of the captured, and of course none to their _liberty_: they had no right to their _blood_, and of course none to their _service_. Their right therefore had no foundation in justice. It was founded on a principle, contrary to the law of nature, and of course contrary to that law, which people, under different governments, are bound to observe to one another.

It is scarce necessary to observe, as a farther testimony of the injustice of the measure, that the Europeans, after the introduction of Christianity, exploded this principle of the ancients, as frivolous and false; that they spared the lives of the vanquished, not from the sordid motives of _avarice_, but from a conscientiousness, that homicide could only be justified by _necessity_; that they introduced an _exchange_ of prisoners, and, by many and wise regulations, deprived war of many of its former horrours.

But the advocates for slavery, unable to defend themselves against these arguments, have fled to other resources, and, ignorant of history, have denied that the _right of capture_ was the true principle, on which slavery subsisted among the ancients. They reason thus. "The learned Grotius, and others, have considered slavery as the just consequence of a private war, (supposing the war to be just and the opponents in a state of nature), upon the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_. Now as the law of nature, which is the rule of conduct to individuals in such a situation, is applicable to members of a different community, there is reason to presume, that these principles were applied by the ancients to their prisoners of war; that their _effects_ were confiscated by the right of _reparation_, and their _persons_ by the right of _punishment_."--

But, such a presumption is false. The _right of capture_ was the only argument, that the ancients adduced in their defence. Hence Polybius; "What must they, (the Mantinenses) suffer, to receive the punishment they deserve? Perhaps it will be said, _that they must be sold, when they are taken, with their wives and children into slavery_: But this is not to be considered as a punishment, since even those suffer it, by the laws of war, who have done nothing that is base." The truth is, that both the _offending_ and the _offended_ parties, whenever they were victorious, inflicted slavery alike. But if the _offending_ party inflicted slavery on the persons of the vanquished, by what right did they inflict it? It must be answered from the presumption before-mentioned, "by the right of _reparation_, or of _punishment:_" an answer plainly absurd and contradictory, as it supposes the _aggressor_ to have a _right_, which the _injured_ only could possess.

Neither is the argument less fallacious than the presumption, in applying these principles, which in a _publick_ war could belong to the _publick_ only, to the persons of the _individuals_ that were taken. This calls us again to the history of the ancients, and, as the rights of reparation and punishment could extend to those only, who had been injured, to select a particular instance for the consideration of the case.

As the Romans had been injured without a previous provocation by the conduct of Hannibal at Saguntum, we may take the treaty into consideration, which they made with the Carthaginians, when the latter, defeated at Zama, sued for peace. It consisted of three articles[047]. By the first, the Carthaginians were to be free, and to enjoy their own constitution and laws. By the second, they were to pay a considerable sum of money, as a reparation for the damages and expence of war: and, by the third, they were to deliver up their elephants and ships of war, and to be subject to various restrictions, as a punishment. With these terms they complied, and the war was finished.

Thus then did the Romans make that distinction between _private_ and _publick_ war, which was necessary to be made, and which the argument is fallacious in not supposing. The treasury of the vanquished was marked as the means of _reparation_; and as this treasury was supplied, in a great measure, by the imposition of taxes, and was, wholly, the property of the _publick_, so the _publick_ made the reparation that was due. The _elephants_ also, and _ships of war_, which were marked as the means of _punishment_, were _publick_ property; and as they were considerable instruments of security and defence to their possessors, and of annoyance to an enemy, so their loss, added to the restrictions of the treaty, operated as a great and _publick_ punishment. But with respect to the Carthaginian prisoners, who had been taken in the war, they were retained in _servitude:_ not upon the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_, because the Romans had already received, by their own confession in the treaty, a sufficient satisfaction: not upon these principles, because they were inapplicable to _individuals:_ the legionary soldier in the service of the injured, who took his prisoner, was not the person, to whom the _injury had been done_, any more than the soldier in the service of the aggressors, who was taken, was the person, who had _committed the offence:_ but they were retained in servitude by the _right of capture_; because, when both parties had sent their military into the field to determine the dispute, it was at the _private_ choice of the legionary soldier before-mentioned, whether he would spare the life of his conquered opponent, when he was thought to be entitled to take it, if he had chosen, by the laws of war.

To produce more instances, as an illustration of the subject, or to go farther into the argument, would be to trespass upon the patience, as well as understanding of the reader. In _a state of nature_, where a man is supposed to commit an injury, and to be unconnected with the rest of the world, the act is _private_, and the right, which the injured acquires, can extend only to _himself:_ but in _a state of society_, where any member or members of a particular community give offence to those of another, and they are patronized by the state, to which they belong, the case is altered; the act becomes immediately _publick_, and the _publick_ alone are to experience the consequences of their injustice. For as no particular member of the community, if considered as an individual, is guilty, except the person, by whom the injury was done, it would be contrary to reason and justice, to apply the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_, which belong to the people as a collective body, to any individual of the community, who should happen to be taken. Now, as the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_ are thus inapplicable to the prisoners, taken in a _publick_ war, and as the _right of capture_, as we have shewn before, is insufficient to intitle the victors to the _service_ of the vanquished, it is evident that _slavery_ cannot justly exist at all, since there are no other maxims, on which it can be founded, even in the most equitable wars.

But if these things are so; if slavery cannot be defended even in the most _equitable_ wars, what arguments will not be found against that servitude, which arises from those, that are _unjust?_ Which arises from those African wars, that relate to the present subject? The African princes, corrupted by the merchants of Europe, seek every opportunity of quarrelling with one another. Every spark is blown into a flame; and war is undertaken from no other consideration, than that _of procuring slaves:_ while the Europeans, on the other hand, happy in the quarrels which they have thus excited, supply them with arms and ammunition for the accomplishment of their horrid purpose. Thus has Africa, for the space of two hundred years, been the scene of the most iniquitous and bloody wars; and thus have many thousands of men, in the most iniquitous manner, been sent into servitude.

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FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 043: _Jure Gentium_ servi nostri sunt, qui ab hostibus capiuntur. Justinian, L. 1. 5. 5. 1.]

[Footnote 044: _Serverum_ appellatio ex eo fluxit, quod imperatores nostri captivos vendere, ac per hoc _servare_, nec occidere solent.]

[Footnote 045: Nam sive victoribus _jure captivitatis_ servissent, &c. Justin, L. 4. 3. et passim apud scriptores antiquos.]

[Footnote 046: Neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem honestum est necare. Cicero de officiis. L. 3. 6.]

[Footnote 047: 1. Ut liberi suis legibus viverent. Livy, L. 30. 37. 2. Decem millia talentum argenti descripta pensionibus æquis in annos quinquaginta solverent. Ibid. 3. Et naves rostratas, præter decem triremes, traderent, elephantosque, quos haberent domitos; neque domarent alios; Bellum neve in Africa, neve extra Africam, injussu P. R. gererent, &c. Ibid.]

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CHAP. VIII.

We shall beg leave, before we proceed to the arguments of the _purchasers_, to add the following observations to the substance of the three preceding chapters.

As the two orders of men, of those who are privately kidnapped by individuals, and of those who are publickly seized by virtue of the authority of their prince, compose together, at least[048], nine tenths of the African slaves, they cannot contain, upon a moderate computation, less than ninety thousand men annually transported: an immense number, but easily to be credited, when we reflect that thousands are employed for the purpose of stealing the unwary, and that these diabolical practices are in force, so far has European _injustice_ been spread, at the distance of a thousand miles from the factories on the coast. The _slave merchants_, among whom a quantity of European goods is previously divided, travel into the heart of the country to this amazing distance. Some of them attend the various markets, that are established through so large an extent of territory, to purchase the kidnapped people, whom the _slave-hunters_ are continually bringing in; while the rest, subdividing their merchandize among the petty sovereigns with whom they deal, receive, by an immediate exertion of fraud and violence, the stipulated number.

Now, will any man assert, in opposition to the arguments before advanced, that out of this immense body of men, thus annually collected and transported, there is even _one_, over whom the original or subsequent seller can have any power or right? Whoever asserts this, in the first instance, must, contradict his own feelings, and must consider _himself_ as a just object of prey, whenever any daring invader shall think it proper to attack _him_. And, in the second instance, the very idea which the African princes entertain of their villages, as _parks_ or _reservoirs_, stocked only for their own convenience, and of their subjects, as _wild beasts_, whom they may pursue and take at pleasure, is so shocking, that it need only be mentioned, to be instantly reprobated by the reader.

The order of slaves, which is next to the former in respect to the number of people whom it contains, is that of prisoners of war. This order, if the former statement be true, is more inconsiderable than is generally imagined; but whoever reflects on the prodigious slaughter that is constantly made in every African skirmish, cannot be otherwise than of this opinion: he will find, that where _ten_ are taken, he has every reason to presume that an _hundred_ perish. In some of these skirmishes, though they have been begun for the express purpose of _procuring slaves_, the conquerors have suffered but few of the vanquished to escape the fury of the sword; and there have not been wanting instances, where they have been so incensed at the resistance they have found, that their spirit of vengeance has entirely got the better of their avarice, and they have murdered, in cool blood, every individual, without discrimination, either of age or sex.

The following[049] is an account of one of these skirmishes, as described by a person, who was witness to the scene. "I was sent, with several others, in a small sloop up the river Niger, to purchase slaves: we had some free negroes with us in the practice; and as the vessels are liable to frequent attacks from the negroes on one side of the river, or the Moors on the other, they are all armed. As we rode at anchor a long way up the river, we observed a large number of negroes in huts by the river's side, and for our own safety kept a wary eye on them. Early next morning we saw from our masthead a numerous body approaching, with apparently but little order, but in close array. They approached very fast, and fell furiously on the inhabitants of the town, who seemed to be quite _surprized_, but nevertheless, as soon as they could get together, fought stoutly. They had some fire-arms, but made very little use of them, as they came directly to close fighting with their spears, lances, and sabres. Many of the invaders were mounted on small horses; and both parties fought for about half an hour with the fiercest animosity, exerting much more courage and perseverance than I had ever before been witness to amongst them. The women and children of the town clustered together to the water's edge, running shrieking up and down with terrour, waiting the event of the combat, till their party gave way and took to the water, to endeavour to swim over to the Barbary side. They were closely pursued even into the river by the victors, who, though they came for the purpose of _getting slaves_, gave no quarter, _their cruelty even prevailing over their avarice_. They made no prisoners, but put all to the sword without mercy. Horrible indeed was the carnage of the vanquished on this occasion, and as we were within two or three hundred yards of them, their cries and shrieks affected us extremely. We had got up our anchor at the beginning of the fray, and now stood close in to the spot, where the victors having followed the vanquished into the water, were continually dragging out and murdering those, whom by reason of their wounds they easily overtook. The very children, whom they took in great numbers, did not escape the massacre. Enraged at their barbarity, we fired our guns loaden with grape shot, and a volley of small arms among them, which effectually checked their ardour, and obliged them to retire to a distance from the shore; from whence a few round cannon shot soon removed them into the woods. The whole river was black over with the heads of the fugitives, who were swimming for their lives. These poor wretches, fearing _us_ as much as their conquerors, dived when we fired, and cried most lamentably for mercy. Having now effectually favoured their retreat, we stood backwards and forwards, and took up several that were wounded and tired. All whose wounds had disabled them from swimming, were either butchered or drowned, before we got up to them. With a justice and generosity, _never I believe before heard of among slavers_, we gave those their liberty whom we had taken up, setting them on shore on the Barbary side, among the poor residue of their companions, who had survived the slaughter of the morning."

We shall make but two remarks on this horrid instance of African cruelty. It adds, first, a considerable weight to the statements that have been made; and confirms, secondly, the conclusions that were drawn in the preceding chapter. For if we even allow the right of capture to be just, and the principles of reparation and punishment to be applicable to the individuals of a community, yet would the former be unjust, and the latter inapplicable, in the present case. Every African war is a robbery; and we may add, to our former expression, when we said, "that thus have many thousands of men, in the most iniquitous manner, been sent into servitude," that we believe there are few of this order, who are not as much the examples of injustice, as the people that have been kidnapped; and who do not additionally convey, when we consider them as prisoners of war, an idea of the most complicated scene of murder.

The order of _convicts_, as it exists almost solely among those princes, whose dominions are contiguous to the European factories, is from this circumstance so inconsiderable, when compared with either of the preceding, that we should not have mentioned it again, but that we were unwilling to omit any additional argument that occurred against it.

It has been shewn already, that the punishment of slavery is inflicted from no other motive, than that of gratifying the _avarice_ of the prince, a confederation so detestable, as to be sufficient of itself to prove it to be unjust; and that it is so disproportionate, from its _nature_, to the offence, as to afford an additional proof of its injustice. We shall add now, as a second argument, its disproportion from its _continuance:_ and we shall derive a third from the consideration, that, in civil society, every violation of the laws of the community is an offence against the _state_[050].

Let us suppose then an African prince, disdaining for once the idea of emolument: let us suppose him for once inflamed with the love of his country, and resolving to punish from this principle alone, "that by exhibiting an example of terrour, he may preserve that _happiness of the publick_, which he is bound to secure and defend by the very nature of his contract; or, in other words, that he may answer the end of government." If actuated then by this principle, he should adjudge slavery to an offender, as a just punishment for his offence, for whose benefit must the convict labour? If it be answered, "for the benefit of the state," we allow that the punishment, in whatever light it is considered, will be found to be equitable: but if it be answered, "for the benefit of any _individual whom he pleases to appoint_," we deny it to be just. The state[051] alone is considered to have been injured, and as _injuries cannot possibly be transferred_, the state alone can justly receive the advantages of his labour. But if the African prince, when he thus condemns him to labour for the benefit of an _unoffended individual_, should at the same time sentence him to become his _property_; that is, if he should make the person and life of the convict at the absolute disposal of him, for whom he has sentenced him to labour; it is evident that, in addition to his former injustice, he is usurping a power, which no ruler or rulers of a state can possess, and which the great Creator of the universe never yet gave to any order whatever of created beings.

That this reasoning is true, and that civilized nations have considered it as such, will be best testified by their practice. We may appeal here to that _slavery_, which is now adjudged to delinquents, as a punishment, among many of the states of Europe. These delinquents are sentenced to labour at the _oar_, to work in _mines_, and on _fortifications_, to cut and clear _rivers_, to make and repair _roads_, and to perform other works of national utility. They are employed, in short, in the _publick_ work; because, as the crimes they have committed are considered to have been crimes against the publick, no individual can justly receive the emoluments of their labour; and they are neither _sold_, nor made capable of being _transferred_, because no government whatsoever is invested with such a power.

Thus then may that slavery, in which only the idea of _labour_ is included, be perfectly equitable, and the delinquent will always receive his punishment as a man; whereas in that, which additionally includes the idea of _property_, and to undergo which, the delinquent must previously change his nature, and become a _brute_; there is an inconsistency, which no arguments can reconcile, and a contradiction to every principle of nature, which a man need only to appeal to his own feelings immediately to evince. And we will venture to assert, from the united observations that have been made upon the subject, in opposition to any arguments that may be advanced, that there is scarcely one of those, who are called African convicts, on whom the prince has a right to inflict a punishment at all; and that there is no one whatever, whom he has a power of sentencing to labour for the benefit of an unoffended individual, and much less whom he has a right to sell.

Having now fully examined the arguments of the _sellers_[052], and having made such additional remarks as were necessary, we have only to add, that we cannot sufficiently express our detestation at their conduct. Were the reader coolly to reflect upon the case of but _one_ of the unfortunate men, who are annually the victims of _avarice_, and consider his situation in life, as a father, an husband, or a friend, we are sure, that even on such a partial reflection, he must experience considerable pain. What then must be his feelings, when he is told, that, since the slave-trade began, [053]_nine millions_ of men have been torn from their dearest connections, and sold into slavery. If at this recital his indignation should arise, let him consider it as the genuine production of nature; that she recoiled at the horrid thought, and that she applied instantly a torch to his breast to kindle his resentment; and if, during his indignation, she should awaken the sigh of sympathy, or seduce the tear of commiseration from his eye, let him consider each as an additional argument against the iniquity of the _sellers_.

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FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 048: The total annual exportation from Africa, is estimated here at 100,000 men, two thirds of whom are exported by the British merchants alone. This estimate is less than that which is usually made, and has been published. The author has been informed by disinterested people, who were in most of the West India islands during the late war, and who conversed with many of the most intelligent of the negroes, for the purpose of inquiring by what methods they had originally been reduced to slavery, that they did not find even two in twenty, who had been reduced to that situation, by any other means than those mentioned above. The author, desirous of a farther confirmation of this circumstance, stopped the press till he had written to another friend, who had resided twenty years in the West-Indies, and whose opinion he had not yet asked. The following is an extract from the answer. "I do not among many hundreds recollect to have seen but one or two slaves, of those imported from Africa, who had any scars to shew, that they had been in war. They are generally such as are kidnapped, or sold by their tyrants, after the destruction of a village. In short, I am firmly of opinion, that crimes and war together do not furnish one slave in an hundred of the numbers introduced into the European colonies. Of consequence the trade itself, were it possible to suppose convicts or prisoners of war to be justly sentenced to servitude, is accountable for ninety-nine in every hundred slaves, whom it supplies. It an insult to the publick, to attempt to palliate the method of procuring them."]

[Footnote 049: The writer of the letter of which this is a faithful extract, and who was known to the author of the present Essay, was a long time on the African coast. He had once the misfortune to be shipwrecked there, and to be taken by the natives, who conveyed him and his companions a considerable way up into the country. The hardships which he underwent in the march, his treatment during his captivity, the scenes to which he was witness, while he resided among the inland Africans, as well as while in the African trade, gave occasion to a series of very interesting letters. These letters were sent to the author of the present Essay, with liberty to make what use of them he chose, by the gentleman to whom they were written.]

[Footnote 050: Were this not the case, the government of a country could have no right to take cognizance of crimes, and punish them, but every individual, if injured, would have a right to punish the aggressor with his own hand, which is contrary to the notions of all civilized men, whether among the ancients or the moderns.]

[Footnote 051: This same notion is entertained even by the African princes, who do not permit the person injured to revenge his injury, or to receive the convict as his slave. But if the very person who has been _injured_, does not possess him, much less ought any other person whatsoever.]

[Footnote 052: There are instances on the African continent, of _parents_ selling their _children_. As the slaves of this description are so few, and are so irregularly obtained, we did not think it worth our while to consider them as forming an order; and, as God never gave the parent a power over his child to make him _miserable_, we trust that any farther mention of them will be unnecessary.]

[Footnote 053: Abbè Raynal, Hist. Phil. vol. 4. P. 154.]

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CHAP. IX.

It remains only now to examine by what arguments those, who _receive_ or _purchase_ their fellow-creatures into slavery, defend the _commerce_. Their first plea is, "that they receive those with propriety, who are convicted of crimes, because they are delivered into their hands by _their own magistrates_." But what is this to you _receivers_? Have the unfortunate _convicts_ been guilty of injury to _you_? Have they broken _your_ treaties? Have they plundered _your_ ships? Have they carried _your_ wives and children into slavery, that _you_ should thus retaliate? Have they offended _you_ even by word or gesture?

But if the African convicts are innocent with respect to you; if you have not even the shadow of a claim upon their persons; by what right do you receive them? "By the laws of the Africans," you will say; "by which it is positively allowed."--But can _laws_ alter the nature of vice? They may give it a sanction perhaps: it will still be immutably the same, and, though dressed in the outward habiliments of _honour_, will still be _intrinsically base_.

But alas! you do not only attempt to defend yourselves by these arguments, but even dare to give your actions the appearance of lenity, and assume _merit_ from your _baseness_! and how first ought you particularly to blush, when you assert, "that prisoners of war are only purchased from the hands of their conquerors, _to deliver them from death_." Ridiculous defence! can the most credulous believe it? You entice the Africans to war; you foment their quarrels; you supply them with arms and ammunition, and all--from the _motives of benevolence_. Does a man set fire to an house, for the purpose of rescuing the inhabitants from the flames? But if they are only purchased, to _deliver them from death_; why, when they are delivered into your hands, as protectors, do you torture them with hunger? Why do you kill them with fatigue? Why does the whip deform their bodies, or the knife their limbs? Why do you sentence them to death? to a death, infinitely more excruciating than that from which you so kindly saved them? What answer do you make to this? for if you had not humanely preserved them from the hands of their conquerors, a quick death perhaps, and that in the space of a moment, had freed them from their pain: but on account of your _favour_ and _benevolence_, it is known, that they have lingered years in pain and agony, and have been sentenced, at last, to a dreadful death for the most insignificant offence.

Neither can we allow the other argument to be true, on which you found your merit; "that you take them from their country for their own convenience; because Africa, scorched with incessant heat, and subject to the most violent rains and tempests, is unwholesome, and unfit to be inhabited." Preposterous men! do you thus judge from your own feelings? Do you thus judge from your own constitution and frame? But if you suppose that the Africans are incapable of enduring their own climate, because you cannot endure it yourselves; why do you receive them into slavery? Why do you not measure them here by the same standard? For if you are unable to bear hunger and thirst, chains and imprisonment, wounds and torture, why do you not suppose them incapable of enduring the same treatment? Thus then is your argument turned against yourselves. But consider the answer which the Scythians gave the Ægyptians, when they contended about the antiquity of their original[054], "That nature, when she first distinguished countries by different degrees of heat and cold, tempered the bodies of animals, at the same instant, to endure the different situations: that as the climate of Scythia was severer than that of Ægypt, so were the bodies of the Scythians harder, and as capable of enduring the severity of their atmosphere, as the Ægyptians the temperateness of their own."

But you may say perhaps, that, though they are capable of enduring their own climate, yet their situation is frequently uncomfortable, and even wretched: that Africa is infested with locusts, and insects of various kinds; that they settle in swarms upon the trees, destroy the verdure, consume the fruit, and deprive the inhabitants of their food. But the same answer may be applied as before; "that the same kind Providence, who tempered the body of the animal, tempered also the body of the tree; that he gave it a quality to recover the bite of the locust, which he sent; and to reassume, in a short interval of time, its former glory." And that such is the case experience has shewn: for the very trees that have been infested, and stripped of their bloom and verdure, so surprizingly quick is vegetation, appear in a few days, as if an insect had been utterly unknown.

We may add to these observations, from the testimony of those who have written the History of Africa from their own inspection, that no country is more luxurious in prospects, none more fruitful, none more rich in herds and flocks, and none, where the comforts of life, can be gained with so little trouble.

But you say again, as a confirmation of these your former arguments, (by which you would have it understood, that the Africans themselves are sensible of the goodness of your intentions) "that they do not appear to go with you against their will." Impudent and base assertion! Why then do you load them with chains? Why keep you your daily and nightly watches? But alas, as a farther, though a more melancholy proof, of the falsehood of your assertions, how many, when on board your ships, have put a period to their existence? How many have leaped into the sea? How many have pined to death, that, even at the expence of their lives, they might fly from your _benevolence_?

Do you call them obstinate then, because they refuse your favours? Do you call them ungrateful, because they make you this return? How much rather ought you receivers to blush! How much rather ought you receivers to be considered as abandoned and execrable; who, when you usurp the dominion over those, who are as free and independent as yourselves, break the first law of justice, which ordains, "that no person shall do harm to another, without a previous provocation;" who offend against the dictates of nature, which commands, "that no just man shall be given or received into slavery against his own consent;" and who violate the very laws of the empire that you assume, by consigning your subjects to misery.

Now, as a famous Heathen philosopher observes, from whose mouth you shall be convicted[055], "there is a considerable difference, whether an injury is done, during any perturbation of mind, which is generally short and momentary; or whether it is done with any previous meditation and design; for, those crimes, which proceed from any sudden commotion of the mind, are less than those, which are studied and prepared," how great and enormous are your crimes to be considered, who plan your African voyages at a time, when your reason is found, and your senses are awake; who coolly and deliberately equip your vessels; and who spend years, and even lives, in the traffick of _human liberty_.

But if the arguments of those, who _sell_ or _deliver_ men into slavery, (as we have shewn before) and of those, who _receive_ or _purchase_ them, (as we have now shewn) are wholly false; it is evident that this _commerce_, is not only beyond the possibility of defence, but is justly to be accounted wicked, and justly impious, since it is contrary to the principles of _law_ and _government_, the dictates of _reason_, the common maxims of _equity_, the laws of _nature_, the admonitions of _conscience_, and, in short, the whole doctrine of _natural religion_.

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FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 054: Justin, L. 2. C. 1.]

[Footnote 055: Cicero de Officiis. L. 1. C. 8.]

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