Part 3

The position therefore, that general councils, as representing the Church of Christ, are infallible, labours under a total want of Scripture Evidence. There is not a single precept given for assembling them; not one solitary rule for determining their proceedings. As the learned Albert Pighius, an advocate of pontifical infallibility, very justly argues: “There is not a word about general councils in the canonical books of Scripture; nor did the primitive Church of Christ receive by Apostolical institution any special direction respecting them.” {24b} This able writer represents the practice of summoning a general council in cases of ecclesiastical emergency, to be an expedient piously introduced by the Emperor Constantine for the purpose of composing the dissensions of the Church. But the same author insinuates a charge of great ignorance against the Emperor and his council, who in adopting this course, appeared not to know that the privilege of infallibility belonged to the Papal chair, and that Rome was the proper Delphos where he might receive the infallible oracles. This imperial ignorance is a remarkable admission by the advocate of the Papacy in his zeal against general councils. He succeeds in demolishing the latter; but acknowledges at the same time a fact which is fatal to the former. For if Constantine and the Bishops of his court were ignorant of the papal pretensions, it must be obvious that such pretensions either could not have been put forth at all, or could not at that time have been generally recognized.

But if the Scripture, instead of being totally silent on the subject, had plainly and categorically declared, that general councils are infallible, we should only be involved in fresh perplexities: for the question would immediately arise, _what is a general council_? How do we know a spurious from a genuine council? Councils have been assembled by opposite parties on purpose to give opposite decrees; and how shall we distinguish the fallible and heretical, from the orthodox and infallible assembly? This vital question cannot be determined by the numbers present, or the portion of the Christian world represented by them. The orthodox Athanasius was condemned successively by councils representing the Eastern and the Western Church. Various councils condemned by the Church of Rome for heresy, were as numerously and respectably attended, as more orthodox conventions. The Council of Milan consisted of 300 Bishops. At Ariminum not less than 400 Bishops were assembled. The Council of Ephesus included 10 Metropolitans and 130 Bishops. The Council of Constantinople included 338 Bishops. And when the rival Councils of Sardica and Philippopolis fulminated mutual anathemas, the latter, which was heretical, consisted of 94 Bishops, while their orthodox opponents amounted only to 76. As most of these councils were convened by imperial authority; represented large portions of Christendom; and included men of the greatest learning and ability, there seems nothing to distinguish them from other synods, which are acknowledged to be general and infallible—nothing, if we except the sanction of the Roman Pontiff.

Here we are informed by our pertinacious disputant, that the papal sanction is commonly regarded in the Church of Rome, as the essential distinction between a mere provincial synod, and a general council; that the decrees of an alleged general council, not ratified by the Pope, are not infallible; while the decrees of any council, after that ratification, must be looked upon as infallibly determined.

But our ingenuity must again be exercised in finding our way through this labyrinth: for, first of all, no Scriptural reason can be found, or is even pretended, for the limitation of infallibility to councils of the description mentioned. The authority, therefore, exists only in the well-stored imagination of our Romish friend. {26} And in addition, we are perplexed to ascertain how two authorities, separately fallible, should become infallible by their conjunction. The council is fallible. The Pope is fallible. But unite these two fallibles, and you give them infallibility. If it be asked, Is the council liable to err which passes the decree?—Certainly, is the answer: for otherwise the council would, without the Pope, be all-sufficient. If it be further demanded, Is the Pope, also liable to err who confirms the decree?—Certainly, is again the answer: for he would otherwise be all-sufficient without the council. This is a strange dilemma: we must believe the decree to be infallibly determined, and yet must neither ascribe infallibility to the council which passes it, nor to the Pope who confirms it.

Another consideration is the uncertainty and arbitrariness of this papal act of confirmation. The Protestant must not take for granted that the eighteen Councils, acknowledged by the Church of Rome to be general, have the seal of St. Peter affixed to all their canons and decrees. In some cases a general council is partly confirmed and partly rejected (_partim confirmatum_, _partim reprobatum_); {27a} in some cases neither confirmed nor rejected (_neque approbatum neque reprobatum_): in some it is pronounced uncertain whether the decrees are confirmed or rejected; and in others they are confirmed by one Pope, and rejected by another. Sometimes the general council did not proceed with due form (_conciliariter_), or did not proceed with due deliberation (_re diligenter examinatâ_); sometimes the questions to be determined were not stated with sufficient clearness (_satis apertè_), and sometimes there is a want of evidence whether the council was general or provincial. “All this,” exclaims Bishop Taylor, “is the greatest folly and most prodigious vanity.” {27b}

Again, we might observe, that if infallibility be granted to the Church through its representatives in a general council, the privilege has been for many centuries in abeyance, and (considering the aspect of Christendom) is never likely to be renewed. And further, with respect to the reception of these infallible decrees by provincial Churches, we might bring forward the doubts which have prevailed among Romanists, whether the decrees are binding immediately on being passed, or only after they have been received. {27c} Next with reference to the doctrines which they inculcate, these are often grievously contradictory to reason and Scripture. Transubstantiation, for example, is contrary to reason. If therefore we believe the infallibility of general councils on grounds of reason, the reasons against transubstantiation must be fairly balanced in our minds with the reasons in favour of infallibility. And as examples of contradiction to Scripture, we might instance the adoration of the Blessed Virgin, the worshipping of images and relics, the invocation of saints and angels, purgatory, and the sacrifice of the mass. We might then go on to show that if the infallibility of general councils be Scripturally maintained, the texts adduced in support of infallibility are to be weighed against the numerous and explicit texts which oppose these corrupt doctrines and idolatrous practices. Lastly, we might contend that, in the primitive ages, when councils were continually assembled, neither those councils themselves, nor any one writer who defended their decrees, ever spoke of them as infallible. We need scarcely add that councils could not be infallible without knowing it; nor would hear their infallible decrees disputed without asserting their infallibility.

3. Having now vainly endeavoured to procure conclusive and satisfactory information on two of the essential points indispensable for our conversion to Romanism; namely, first, by what _organ_ the infallible oracles are delivered, and, secondly, by what _evidence_ the claim to infallibility is established; we proceed to the third and last topic of investigation, and inquire on what _security_ we can rely, that we shall not misunderstand the doctrine propounded to our belief?

We have already seen that the Romanist is unable to decide with certainty in what person or persons infallibility resides; and that he cannot prove the person or the persons for whom he claims it, namely, a Pope or Council, jointly or severally, to be infallible. Let us next consider, in conclusion, (and the consideration need not occupy us long,) whether he is more successful in establishing the third particular, which we began by laying down as necessary to the tranquillization of our minds; whether, in short, it can be proved to us incontestably, that we shall comprehend with clearness and practical certainty the bulls and canons promulgated for our guidance to the truth.

Security on this point is obviously indispensable. The inspired volume is allowed by all Christians to contain unerring rules of faith and practice. But our erring reason, we are told, is liable to misconceive them. Hence the supposed necessity for another guide. But the very same liability to error which exposes us to mistake in interpreting the Scriptures, exposes us to mistake also in interpreting the bulls of a Pope, or the canons of a general council. God Himself inspired his chosen servants to write the Scriptures “for our learning.” God nevertheless is misunderstood. Neither Pope nor Council, therefore, is secure from being so. Their decisions, jointly or separately, may be misinterpreted through our weakness of apprehension. We consequently need a new interpreter for expounding their interpretation. But the expositions of this new interpreter may, like those of his unerring predecessors, be erroneously understood; and thus we should require an infinite series of infallible guides, and at the end of this elaborate process we should not be nearer to infallibility than we found ourselves at the beginning. {29a}

Accordingly, we read, without surprise, that there are disputes among Romanists in regard to the right construction of their infallible decrees and canons; disputes as constant and as vehement as those unhappily subsisting among Protestants, in regard to the meaning of our inspired Scriptures. {29b} In the celebrated Council of Trent, the last, and by the Romanists regarded as the greatest ever held, many points of doctrine which had called forth the most violent and argumentative disputation were purposely expressed with ambiguity in the canons, that the consent of all parties might be obtained. Even on that all-important article of faith, respecting the proper object of religious adoration, the Tridentine Fathers were satisfied with a vague declaration, that “due worship should be given to images,” without informing the conscientious worshipper, (in a strait betwixt the danger of profaneness on one hand and of idolatry on the other,) what kind of worship that doubtful phrase was intended to imply. {29c} It may be also noticed that there are several controverted points in religion, (the very points, in fact, most frequently contested among Protestants,) on which no unerring oracle has yet pronounced a decision, and on which variations of opinion may be discovered in the papal Church analogous to those prevailing throughout Protestant communions. I allude to the numerous questions connected with election, foreknowledge, predestination, grace, free-will, and the perseverance of the Saints.

Nor will the force of our objections be evaded by the reply that _actual_ conformity of faith to the decisions of Popes and Councils is not required; that _intentional_ conformity will suffice; and that every man, whatever be his errors and misconceptions, is capable of salvation who is willing and inclined _to believe as the Church believes_. For if the Romanist is willing to believe as his Church believes, the Protestant is willing to believe as the Apostles and Evangelists believed. If then this willingness will suffice for the Romanist, why should it not be sufficient for the Protestant? If the one, when he falls into error, is held excused by intentional conformity to the Romish creed, why should not intentional conformity to the creed of the Apostles and Evangelists excuse the errors of the other? Let this be granted, and both parties are equally safe, equally infallible. {30}

Thus we find that in all respects the Romish system fails to afford the religious comfort and security we are endeavouring to acquire. Our Romanist adviser has promised what he proves himself incompetent to perform. He has held out to us the enjoyment of an infallible assurance that we have attained to sound doctrine, if we will only profit by the unerring oracles of his Church; but he cannot point with certainty to the proper organ of infallibility, nor establish on credible evidence the claim of that organ to be infallible; nor give any positive security that we shall understand infallibly the oracular truths proposed to our assent. On the contrary, we have seen abundant reasons for being morally certain, that the incapability of error which he speaks of has no existence.

We have now sufficiently considered all the topics proposed for discussion at the commencement of this essay; but before concluding we must advert to one further point, too important to be overlooked, which could not before be conveniently introduced, viz., the newly-devised Theory of Development. We request our Romish counsellor to inform us, whether in his judgment the doctrines of modern Rome have the sanction of primitive antiquity, and can be proved by the writings of the early Fathers? He replies, that up to a very recent period he would at once have answered in the affirmative; but that he is now obliged to hesitate. “From time immemorial,” he says, “the doctors of our Church unanimously insisted, and the Council of Trent infallibly declared, that every article of our Creed was sanctioned by the concurrent testimony of the Fathers, as many as were of the true Church of Christ.” “But,” he proceeds, “within the last few years a party has arisen among us who take a different view. Treatises have been widely circulated and favourably received, in which it is maintained, that the position of which we always boasted as our stronghold is, after all, untenable; that antiquity must be abandoned; that, in primitive times, our present doctrines were absolutely unknown or imperfectly discovered; that Christianity, in the days of the Apostles and for several centuries afterwards, was merely in an embryo, rudimental state; that it has since been infallibly developed; that St. Cyprian, St. Chrysostom, and St. Athanasius, were only partially acquainted with many truths which have since been canonically evolved and explained; and that, consequently, the sanction of antiquity to any doctrine of modern Rome may be as easily dispensed with as the authority of Holy Scripture.” As an example of development, our Romish guide refers to the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin—“a doctrine,” he observes, “in primitive times utterly unheard of; in the middle ages vehemently opposed; in later times gradually matured; and now at last, in the nineteenth century, fully and pontifically established under penalty of everlasting condemnation.”

This inability of the Romanist to determine whether Romanism is or is not supported by antiquity, and whether it is a new or an old religion, may be regarded as a climax to the difficulties and perplexities in which, as we have already seen, his whole system is involved. {32a}

Besides the Romanist there are many other counsellors who, with undoubting confidence, offer to relieve our minds from all anxiety as to the soundness of our belief. Among these parties I may now particularly mention the Sceptic and the Mystic; because their systems, and that of the Romanist, however opposite in other respects, have one essential point of agreement. They all have a decided tendency to supersede our own exertions for the discovery of religious truth—the Sceptic by affirming that religious truth is unimportant; the Mystic by alleging that religious truth is passively received by the mind from divine illumination; and the Romanist by inculcating an unconditional acquiescence in the dictates of infallible authority. {32b} This remarkable coincidence suggests to us, that in respect to our employment of means and opportunities, the way of truth is the very opposite to the way of error; that the right path to saving knowledge does not consist in the _disuse_, but in the _strenuous exertion_ of our intellectual and moral faculties; that the inclination to improve our advantages for attaining spiritual information is designed to try our moral character; and that we have a full security from deadly heresy in the co-operation of Divine Providence, and of Divine grace with our own sincere endeavours after truth.

This principle, which pervades the whole of Scripture, {33} is not to be confounded with the fallacies above adverted to. We do not call it infallibility, because we readily admit that rectitude of opinion may exist, in various degrees, among persons, all of whom are in the path of salvation. It differs from infallibility as maintained by Romanists, because we do not consider any individual, nor any number of individuals, to be incapable of error. It differs from the infallibility of the enthusiast, because we lay no claim to exemption from mistake: we insist only that, using faithfully the means at our disposal, we shall escape unpardonable heresy. It differs, thirdly, from the infallibility of the sceptic, because he conceives all doctrines equally excellent, provided their operation in society adapts itself to his confined notions of moral duty. Whereas our method implies that one doctrine differs materially, as to truth and excellence from another, and that we are therefore bound to select the best.

To make this selection of what is best, must be the paramount desire of every rightly-disposed mind: and it now only remains for us, before concluding this essay, to give some rules, as briefly as we can, for determining our choice. Error and misconception on this subject are so lamentably common, that even our few imperfect suggestions may not be useless nor unacceptable. We shall only premise that the spiritual exercises which we recommend are arranged in the order here given them, with a view to convenience and clearness; and not from an impression that any of our readers can have occasion to begin from the commencement of the series.

1. Our first rule is: to employ all the strength of our faculties in the study and investigation of natural religion: till we become impressed sincerely and practically with our awful responsibility, as reasonable beings, to our Creator, Benefactor, and Judge eternal.

2. To establish clearly in our minds the evidences and principles of Revelation; and to ascertain, by diligent inquiry, that the Scriptures “given for our learning,” are “given by inspiration of God; and are profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and instruction in righteousness.” {34a}

3. To acquire a persuasion (according to the principle asserted in the Scriptures, maintained by all antiquity, and revived at the Reformation,) that the pages of Revelation are not “a sealed book” to us; but that we are bound to “search the Scriptures,” {34b} to “prove all things,” {34c} and “to be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh us a reason of the hope that is in us.” {34d}

4. To satisfy ourselves that, on points of Christian doctrine, our only real standard of faith is the Bible; and that tradition (however useful as its interpreter and guardian) is not, as Romanists contend, a co-ordinate authority with the sacred text. {34e}

5. To use in our interpretation of the inspired volume all the helps within our reach; whether spiritual or temporal; whether derivable from the living or from the dead. Among these helps, the most important and indispensable are prayer and a holy life. With respect to prayer, the promises in Holy Scripture, that guidance to the truth shall be given to him that asks it, are, as we have seen, numerous and indisputable. {34f} And as regards a holy life, or the labours of the humble and diligent individual, who, from desire to do the will of God, conscientiously exerts himself to know it, our Lord Himself expressly declares, “If any man will do (θέλει ποιεῖν, or is desirous to do) his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.” {34g} To these helps may be added others equally obvious, so far as they are consistent with the opportunities, station, or profession of the individual—such as familiarity with Scripture in the original, knowledge of history, and particularly of the manners, laws, customs, and opinions of antiquity, Jewish as well as Christian; joined to acquaintance with sound principles of Biblical interpretation, criticism, and translation.

But a point which more particularly seems, under this rule, to require illustration, is the _degree of value_ at which the conscientious inquirer after sound religious knowledge ought to estimate ecclesiastical antiquity. Many pious individuals (in their well-meant zeal against Romish errors) have thought themselves obliged to discard ecclesiastical antiquity, under a persuasion that by attaching any value to ancient writers, they would violate the great Protestant axiom of resting on the sole authority of God’s written word.