CHAPTER IV
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF READINESS CAPABILITY OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE
A. INTRODUCTION
An earthquake of catastrophic magnitude, with or without credible warning, happens suddenly. The potential for disaster, however, does not occur suddenly. The degree of preparedness and commitment to comprehensive planning and mitigation programs for the inevitable event will largely determine the degree of hardship to be experienced through loss of life, human suffering, property destruction, and the other related economic, social, and psychological aspects of disruption to day-to-day community activities. The impacts can be reduced substantially from current expected levels through the development and implementation of improved and more widely practiced earthquake hazards reduction measures. These include _coordinated emergency preparedness plans and procedures_, _earthquake prediction and warning systems_, _improved construction techniques_, and _effective public education and information programs_.
The State of California Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA conducted an analysis of the readiness capability for potential catastrophic earthquakes in California at the Federal, State, and local government levels. The planning of 22 counties and 38 cities, of 34 State agencies, and of 17 Federal organizations were reviewed with the following objectives: (a) identify opportunities for improvement; (b) provide a basis for making decisions that would strengthen program direction and planning efforts; and (c) specify resource needs and potential legislative initiatives. Annex 2 summarizes current Federal and California earthquake planning.
The environment in which preparedness planning in California occurs is characterized by the following observations of public expectations and attitudes:
» There is widespread public support for government action.
» Most people have some ideas as to what government should be doing.
» There is understanding of the need for hazard reduction as well as emergency response planning.
» People are willing, in the abstract, to have government funds spent for hazard mitigation.
» The public is not very satisfied with what government officials have done.
» Public officials perceive that current preparedness plans and response are inadequate at best.
As discussed below, the review indicates that all is not well in earthquake plans and preparedness. Current plans and preparedness are judged to be adequate for the "moderate" earthquakes most likely to occur frequently in California. By moderate it is meant an event causing property damage on the order of $1 to $2 billion. Such an event, however, will severely tax existing resources and provide a major test of management relationship among different governmental jurisdictions and levels. For a catastrophic earthquake, current plans and preparedness are clearly inadequate, leading to a high likelihood that Federal, State, and local response activities would become disorganized and largely fail to perform effectively for an extended period of time.
B. STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
Although there are widely differing approaches, local emergency planning in California generally consists of a basic plan and a series of contingency plans. The basic plan establishes the authority, sets forth references, addresses hazard vulnerability, states the planning assumptions, establishes an emergency services organization, assigns tasks, formulates a mutual aid system, and directs the development of specific support annexes. For those hazards identified in the basic plan, a separate contingency plan is then developed to address the unique nature of the hazardous event. The contingency plan contains service support plans for each of the functional operations, including detailed standard operating procedures. The planning efforts of local jurisdictions are coordinated with adjacent jurisdictions and the California OES for consistency.
A plan is not considered complete without the support annexes which make the plan operational. The survey undertaken for this assessment disclosed that approximately 93 percent of the jurisdictions examined have existing, basic plans; 50 percent have completed annexes; 28 percent of the basic plans addressed an earthquake hazard vulnerability; 35 percent have planned for earthquake contingency; and only 1 percent (one city) has a plan to respond to an earthquake prediction.
At the State level, the California OES, as an integral part of the Governor's Office, functions as his immediate staff and coordinating organization in carrying out the State's emergency responsibilities. Specific emergency assignments have been made to 34 State agencies by the OES Director through a series of Administrative Orders. During emergencies the activities of these agencies and departments are coordinated by the California OES.
The State OES is also responsible for maintaining and updating the California Emergency Plan (CEP) and associated readiness plans. As in the case of local plans, the basic document is supported by operational annexes as listed below:
CONTINGENCY MUTUAL AID
Earthquake Fire and Rescue Earthquake Prediction Law Enforcement Oil Spill Medical Nuclear Blackmail Utilities Reactor Accident Military Support Radioactive Material Incident Flood
SUPPORTING SYSTEMS EMERGENCY RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Warning Construction and Housing Emergency Broadcast System Economic Stabilization Emergency Public Information Food Intelligence Operations Health Radiological Defense Industrial Production Manpower Petroleum Telecommunications Transportation Utilities
Based on this planning concept, the review assessed quantitatively the preparedness activities of the 34 State agencies that have preparedness responsibilities in accordance with the CEP. The quantitative data are listed in the following table.
TABLE 4
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES
Number of Percent of Preparedness Element Agencies 34 Agencies ----------------------------------------------------------------- Existence of Plan 22 65 Conduct of Exercises 27 79 Public Education Activities 10 29 Public Information Activities 9 26 Operational Capability 32 94 -----------------------------------------------------------------
The quality of the plans, activities, and operational capabilities were then evaluated on a scale of 1 (expected to fail/inadequate) to 5 (expected to succeed well/adequate). The qualitative results are shown below.
TABLE 5
QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES
Preparedness Element Capability Rating ---------------------------------------------------------- Planning 2.67 Exercises 2.64 Public Education 1.44 Public Information 1.50 Operational Capability 2.91 ----------------------------------------------------------
It should be emphasized that these ratings apply to the State's _present_ level of planning and preparedness for response to a major destructive earthquake (magnitude 8), not a moderate (San Fernando-type) event.
C. FEDERAL RESPONSE
At the Federal level the principal capability to respond to a catastrophic earthquake in California resides in FEMA, the agency responsible by law to coordinate Federal activities in all emergencies. FEMA has developed a basic plan for supplemental Federal assistance for a major earthquake in the San Francisco Bay area. This plan, however, covers only the emergency phase of response (first few days of efforts to save lives and protect property). In addition, FEMA is participating in a broader effort concentrating in Southern California. This cooperative effort is getting under way with State and local governments, other Federal departments, voluntary agencies, practicing professions, business and commercial interests, labor, educators, and researchers. It is expected to develop an effective program to respond to an earthquake or a credible earthquake prediction in that part of the State. The emphasis is being placed on _public safety, reduction of property damage, self-help on the part of individuals, socioeconomic impacts, improved response and long-range recovery planning, mitigation activities, and public participation for both the post-prediction and immediate post-earthquake periods_. This pilot effort is expected to be usable in other highly seismic areas of California as well as in other States.
In the event of a catastrophic earthquake, a substantial number of Federal agencies would provide support to and be coordinated by FEMA. Illustrative are the following:
1. Department of Defense (DOD)
Initially, local military commanders may provide necessary support to save lives, alleviate suffering, or mitigate property damage. Normally, additional DOD resources would not be committed until a presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster. When this occurs, the Secretary of the Army is DOD Executive Agent for military support. The Commander, Sixth U.S. Army, at the Presidio, San Francisco, has been further delegated authority to coordinate disaster relief operations in the western portion of the United States. Extensive planning and coordination have taken place between the Sixth U.S. Army and FEMA Region IX. DOD emergency functions include: _damage survey_, _search and rescue_, _emergency medical care_, _identification and disposition of dead_, _emergency debris clearance_, _emergency roads and bridge construction_, _airfield repair_, and _identification and demolition of unsafe structures_. Specific units have been identified to respond to an earthquake in any of the major population centers of California. For example, at this time the following units would be prepared for commitment within 8 hours after a disaster is declared by the President:
» Six medical units with a 1,320 bed capacity
» Seven helicopter units with 90 utility helicopters and 36 medium helicopters
» One Infantry brigade of 1,500 personnel
» Two engineer units with 78 pieces of heavy equipment
» Two transportation units with 124 cargo trucks and trailers
These as well as additional DOD assets could be made available, contingent on defense priorities.
2. The National Communication System
This Agency's plan, the "National Plan for Communications Support in Emergencies and Major Disasters," provides for planning and using national telecommunications assets and resources during presidentially declared emergencies and major disasters. The plan, which has been exercised repeatedly in past disasters, provides the management structure and the communications staff to support FEMA. Restoration priorities have been assigned to all critical circuits.
3. Department of Transportation (DOT)
DOT has established an Office of Emergency Transportation. This office has developed and maintains comprehensive emergency plans and procedural manuals for natural disasters and other civil crises. It constantly monitors the civil transportation system for indications of potential adverse impacts from all hazards. It conducts scheduled periodic training and readiness exercises for DOT emergency personnel and maintains quick response cells and emergency operating facilities at DOT headquarters and in the field to provide an immediate reaction capability. The system has been activated several times in the recent past (e.g., Three Mile Island, 1979 Energy/Fuel Crisis, Independent Truckers' Strike, and the Mt. St. Helens eruption).
D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVING RESPONSE CAPABILITY
Earthquake prediction has not been incorporated into existing plans. Response to predictions in the current environment, if given, would be _ad hoc_. The State of California has only a rudimentary plan and the Federal Government none. The City of Los Angeles has examined the problem extensively, but only considers its own jurisdiction and has not produced an actionable plan. Current planning for the recovery period is incomplete, uncoordinated, and not functional. State and local governments have done little to plan for the recovery period when, following the emergency lifesaving phase, efforts and resources are concentrated on restoring the functioning of the community. They presume that the Federal Government will "step in" after a presidential declaration. The Federal Government has an untested draft plan for the San Francisco area that is not fully coordinated with the State plans. Current Federal plans are geared to the provision of assistance on the order of a few hundred million dollars. Thus, there is little confidence that they would function under the requirements for tens-of-billions-of-dollars and concomitant service demands.
Both Federal and State agencies need to commit the financial resources and assignment of personnel to maintain and enhance earthquake plans and preparedness. Earthquake preparedness, although responding to high damage expectation, is still based upon a relatively low probability occurrence. When it is in competition with pressing social needs for a portion of limited resources, social needs tend to prevail at all levels of government. Without a clear commitment, future development of earthquake preparedness, as in the past, is problematic and its implementation is in considerable doubt. The Federal earthquake preparedness effort needs to focus on a high state of readiness.
History in the area of natural hazard mitigation suggests that assignment of responsibility, even by the President, when not followed by leadership and regular oversight over the allocation of financial resources, seldom leads to programs which can be expected to function. The same weakness is evidenced at the State and local government levels with few exceptions. The stresses likely to occur in emergency response programs after a catastrophic earthquake will be such that effective response will require a cooperative, integrated effort among different jurisdictions and levels of government.
Experience in other areas of planning and preparedness, particularly for civil defense, indicates that damage to existing programs occurs when the Federal Government raises expectations of the public and of other levels of government and then fails to follow through with implementation and funding. It is better to maintain the _status quo_ with minor changes at the margin than to announce substantial program initiatives and not meet their requirements.