CHAPTER X.

THE RELATION OF THE OBJECTIVE TO THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT.

One final postulate has been found to be involved in all religion, namely, that between the human essence spoken of as the subjective element, and the power spoken of as the objective element, "there is held to be a singular correspondence, their relationship finding its concrete expression in religious worship on the one side and theological dogma on the other." Ritual, consecration of things and places, ordination of priests, omens, inspiration of prophets and of books, all of them imply the supposed possibility of such a relation. All of them, however, from their contradictory and variable character, prove that they are but imperfect efforts to find utterance for the emotion which underlies them all. But that this emotion is incapable of an explanation consistent with rational belief is not therefore to be taken for granted.

Consider, first, that in order to be aware of the existence of the ultimate and unknown power, we must possess some faculty in our constitution by which that power is felt. It must, so to speak, come in contact with us at some point in our nature.

Now, no sensible perception can lead us to this conception as a generalization. The whole universe, regarded merely as a series of presentations to the senses, contains not a single object which can possibly suggest it. Nor can any combination of such presentations be shown to include within them any such idea. Neither can the existence of such a power be inferred by the exercise of the reasoning faculty. There is no analogical case from which the inference can be drawn. When we reason we proceed from something known to something unknown, and conclude that the latter, resembling the former in one or more of its qualities, will resemble it also in the quality yet to be established. In exploring, for instance, some deserted spot, we find traces of a building. Now, previous experience has taught us that such buildings are only found where human builders have made them. We conclude, therefore, that we have stumbled upon a work of human hands. Suppose we explore further and find the remains of the building very extensive. We now draw the further inference that it was inhabited by a wealthy man, because we know that only the wealthy can afford to live in magnificent houses. But if prolonged excavation lead to the discovery of long rows of buildings, of various sizes and having streets between them, we confidently assert that we have unearthed a ruined city; for we are aware that no single man, however rich or powerful, is likely to have built so much. Of these three inferences, the first only is, strictly speaking, infallibly true. But the others are rendered by familiar analogies so highly probable as to be practically certain. Now let the thing sought be, not some single cause of a single phenomenon, or the various causes of various phenomena, but the ultimate cause of all phenomena whatever,—where is the corresponding case on which we can proceed to argue? Plainly there is none. There is no _other_ world or system to which we can appeal and say, "Those stars and those planets were made by a God, therefore our own sun and its planets must have been made by a God also." Every single argument we can frame to establish the existence of deity assumes in its major premiss the very thing to be proved. It takes for granted that phenomenal objects require a cause, and were not the idea of this necessity already in the mind it could not take one single step. For if it be contended, say, that the world could not exist without a Creator, we have but to ask, "Why not?" and our adversary can proceed no further with his argument. All he can ever do is to appeal to a sentiment in us corresponding to the sentiment of which he himself is conscious.

Thus it appears that neither direct observation, nor reasoning, which is generalized observation, supplies the material for an induction as to the existence of an Unknowable Cause. Yet this idea is so persistent in the human race as to resist every effort to do without it. In one form or another it invariably creeps in. There is but one possible explanation of such a fact: namely, that it is one of those primary constituents of our nature which are incapable of proof because they are themselves the foundations on which proof must be erected. We cannot demonstrate a single law of nature without supposing a world external to ourselves. And we cannot suppose a world external to ourselves without referring explicitly or implicitly to an unknown entity manifested in that world. The faculty by which this truth is known must be considered as a kind of internal sense. It is a direct perception. And precisely as objects of direct perception by the senses appear widely dissimilar at different distances, to different men, and to the same man at different times, so the object of the religious emotion is variously conceived in different places and ages, by different men, and by the same man at different times. Moreover, as the religious sentiment in the mind of man perceives its object, the Ultimate Being, so that Being is conceived as making itself known to the mind of man through the religious sentiment. A reciprocal relation is thus established; the Unknowable causing a peculiar intuition, the mind of man receiving it. And this is the grain of fact at the foundation of the numerous statements of religious men, that they have felt themselves inspired by God, that he speaks to them and speaks through them, that they enter into communion with him in prayer, and obey his influence during their lives. We need not discard such feelings as idle delusions. In form they are fanciful and erroneous; in substance they are genuine and true. And in a higher sense the adherent of the universal religion may himself admit their title to a place in his nature. To use the words of a great philosopher, "he, like every other man, may consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause;" "he too may feel that when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief" (Spencer's "First Principles," 2d ed., § 34, p. 123).

But we may go still deeper in our examination of the nature of the relation between the Ultimate Being and the mind of man. To do so we must briefly recur to the philosophical questions touched upon in the eighth chapter of this Book. We there discussed four possible modes of viewing the great problem presented by the existence of sensible objects: Common and Metaphysical Realism, Moderate and Complete Idealism. Let us briefly reconsider these several systems to discover whether any of them affords a satisfactory solution.

Common Realism is excluded by the consideration that it treats the qualities of external objects as existing in those objects and not in the percipient subject. It requires but little reflection to prove that such qualities are modes of consciousness, not modes of absolute being. This defect is surmounted in Metaphysical Realism, which, however, is liable to the fatal objection, that it takes for granted an abstract substance in material things, which substance is like the Unknowable, utterly inconceivable, yet is not the Unknowable, and is incapable of accounting for any of the manifestations belonging to the mental order. So that we should have a superfluous entity brought in to form the substance of matter, of which entity neither our senses, nor our reason, nor our emotions, give us any information. For matter, in the abstract, is not the matter perceived by the senses; nor is it the object of the religious sentiment; nor is its existence capable of any kind of proof save that which consists in establishing the necessity of some kind of Permanent Reality below phenomena. And this Reality is not only the substratum of material, but of all phenomena whatsoever. Moderate Idealism is in no better case. For in denying all true existence except to living creatures it fails utterly to give any rational account of that order of events which is universally and instinctively referred to external causes, nor can it find any possible origin for the living creatures in whose reality it believes. Extreme Idealism recognizes no problem to be dealt with, and can therefore offer no solution.

Each of these systems, however, while false as a whole, contains a partial truth. Extreme Idealism is the outcome of the ordinary, unreflecting Realism; for if the Common Realist be convinced that appearances do not imply existence, and if he believe in no existence but appearances, the ground is cut from under his feet, and he remains standing upon nothing. He knows only phenomena, and the phenomena are mere ideas of his own mind. The truth common to these two extremes is that so emphatically asserted by Berkeley, that the _esse_ of material objects is _percipi_; that we exhaust the physical phenomenon when we describe its apparent qualities, and need not introduce besides these a material substance to which those qualities are related as its accidents. They are not the accidents, but the actual thing, in so far as it is material. Metaphysical Realism and moderate Idealism are united in the recognition of the truth that the phenomena are not the ultimate realities, and that the qualities of bodies, when analyzed, are subjective, not objective; forms of the human mind, and not independent, external existences.

Hence these various philosophies, like the various religions of which they are in some sort metaphysical parallels, must be considered as preparing the way for the admission of that all-embracing truth which is the common ground of metaphysics and religion.

Examine a simple objective phenomenon. Then you find that you can separate it into all its component qualities: its color, taste, smell, extension, and so forth; and that after all these qualities have been taken into account nothing of the object remains save the vague feeling of an unknown cause by which the whole phenomenon is produced. All the apparent qualities, without exception, are resolvable into modes of consciousness, but the whole object is not so resolvable. For the question still remains, How did we come to have those modes of consciousness? Thus the analysis of the commonest material object leads us straight to an unknowable origin of known manifestations. And each particular phenomenon brings us to the same result. But are we to assume a special Unknowable for each special object? A little consideration will show that the division and subdivision we make of the objects of sensible perception resembles their apparent qualities in being purely subjective, and indeed more than subjective, arbitrary. For I consider an object as one or many, according to the point of view from which I regard it. The glass which I hold in my hand is at this moment one; but the next moment it is shivered into a thousand atoms, and each of these atoms is of complex character, and resolvable into still simpler parts. The planet we inhabit is, for the astronomer, one object; for the geologist a number of distinct rocks; for the botanist it is composed of mineral and vegetable constituents, and of these, the latter, which alone engage his attention, are numerous and various; for the chemist it consists of an infinite multitude of elementary atoms variously combined. Hence unity and multiplicity are mere modes of subjective reflection; not ultimate modes of objective being. And the Unknowable cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as either one or many, since each alike implies limitation and separation from something else. Rather is it all-comprehending; the Universal Foundation upon which unity and multiplicity alike are built.

Material things, then, are analyzable into modes of consciousness with an unknown cause to which these modes are due. But what is consciousness itself? Like matter, it has its subjective and its objective aspect. The subjective aspect consists of its various phenomenal conditions; the sensations which we ascribe to outward objects as their producing causes, and the emotions, passions, thoughts, and feelings which we conceive as of internal origin. The objective aspect consists of the unknown essence itself which experiences these various states; of the very self which is supposed to persist through all its changes of form; of the actual being which is the ultimate Reality of our mental lives. The existence of this ultimate Ego is known as an immediate fact of consciousness, and cannot be called in question without impugning the direct assurance which every one feels of his own being as apart from his particular and transient feelings. Nobody believes that he is the several sensations and emotions which he experiences in life; he believes that he _has_ them. And if the existence of the Unknowable underlying material manifestations is perceived by a direct, indubitable inference, the existence of the Unknowable underlying mental manifestations is perceived without an inference at all by an intuition from which there is no appeal. For no one can even attempt to reason with me about this conviction without resting his argument upon facts, and inferences from facts, which are in themselves less certain than this primary certainty which he is seeking to overthrow.

Existence, then, is known to us immediately in our own case; mediately in every other—consequently, the only conception we can frame of existence is derived from ourselves. Hence when we say that anything exists, we can only mean one of two things: either that it exists as a mode of human consciousness, as in the case of material things; or that it exists _per se_, and is the very substance of consciousness itself. And the former of these modes of existence is altogether dependent upon a conscious subject. A material object is a congeries of material qualities, none of which can be conceived at all except in relation to some percipient subject. Take away the subject, and color, extension, solidity, sound, smell, and every other quality, vanish into nothing. The existence of these qualities, and hence the existence of matter itself in its phenomenal character, is relative and secondary. There remains therefore only the second of these two modes of existence as absolute and primary. The substance of consciousness, then, is the one reality which is known to exist; and in no other form is existence in its purity conceivable by us. For if we attempt to conceive a something as existent which is neither object nor subject, neither that which is felt nor that which feels, neither that which is thought nor that which thinks, we must inevitably fail. There is no _tertium quid_ which is neither mind nor matter of which we can frame the most remote conception. We may, if we please, imagine the existence of such a _tertium quid_, but the hypothesis is altogether fanciful, and would have nothing in science, nothing in the construction of the human mind, to render it even plausible. Indeed, it would be making an illegitimate use of the word "existence" to apply it in such a sense. Existence to us _means_ consciousness, and never can mean anything else. We cannot by any effort conceive a universe previous to the origin of life in which there was no consciousness; for the moment we attempt to conceive it, we import our own consciousness into it. We think of ourselves as seeing or feeling it. The effort, therefore, to frame an idea of any existing thing without including consciousness in the idea is self-defeating, and when we predicate Existence of the Unknown Cause, we predicate its kinship to that ultimate substance of the mind from which alone our conception of absolute existence is derived.

Here, then, we have a second and more intimate relationship between the objective and the subjective elements in the religious emotion. They are found to be of kindred nature; or, to speak with stricter caution, it is found that we cannot think of them but as thus akin to one another. We must ever bear in mind, however, that our thoughts upon such a subject as this can be no more than partial approximations to the truth; tentative explorations in a dark region of the mind rather than accurate measurements of the ground. Thus, in the present instance, we have spoken of the Unknowable as more or less akin to the mind of man; yet we cannot think of the Unknowable as resembling the fleeting states which are all that we know by direct observation of the constitution of the mind. It is not the passing and variable modes, but the fixed and unchangeable substratum on which these modes are conceived to be impressed, which the Unknowable must be held to resemble. And this substratum itself is an absolute mystery. We can in no way picture it to ourselves without its modes, which nevertheless we cannot regard as appertaining to its ultimate being. One further consideration will establish a yet closer relationship than that of likeness. The Unknown Reality, which is the source of all phenomena whatsoever, mental and physical, must of necessity _include_ within itself that mode of existence which is manifested in consciousness; for otherwise, we must imagine yet another power as the originator of conscious life, and we should then have two unknown entities, still requiring a higher entity behind them both, to effect that entire harmony which actually subsists between them. The Unknowable is, therefore, the hidden source from which both the great streams of being, internal and external, take their rise. Since, then, our minds themselves originate in that Universal Source, since it comprehends every form of existence within itself, we stand to it in the relation of parts to a whole, in which and by which those parts subsist. There is thus not only likeness but identity of nature between ourselves and our unknown Origin. And it is literally true that in it "we live, and move, and have our being."

* * * * *

From the summit to which we have at length attained, we may survey the ground we have already traversed, and comprehend, now that they lie below us, a few of the intricacies which we met with on our way. The apparent puzzle of automatism, for example, may be resolved into a more comprehensive law. It was shown, at the conclusion of the preceding chapter, that a train of physical events could in no way impinge upon, or pass over into, a train of mental events, nor a state of consciousness be converted into physical movements. But it was hinted that, while the distinction between the two great series of manifestations, those of mind and those of matter, was ultimate in the order of thought, it need not be ultimate in the order of things. Of this suggested possibility we have now found the confirmation; for we have seen that material phenomena, analyzed to their lowest terms, resolve themselves into forms of consciousness, and forms of consciousness, analyzed in their turn, prove to be the varied modes of an unknown subject; and this unknown subject has its roots in the ultimate Being in which both these great divisions of the phenomenal universe find their foundation and their origin. The distinction, therefore, between the mental and the material train belongs to these trains in their character of phenomena alone. They are distinguished in the human mind, not in the order of nature. Thus, if we recur to the illustration used in explaining automatism, we pointed out that in the circumstance of hearing a call and going to the window, two series might be thus distinguished: 1. The material series, consisting of atmospheric undulations, affections of the nerves and matter of the brain, movements of the body; 2. The mental series, consisting of the sensations of sitting still, and hearing of the thought of a person, of the sensations of motion, and seeing the person. Now, if we take the trouble to observe the terms of which the first series is composed, we shall see that they also express states of consciousness, though states of a different kind from those contained in the terms of the second series. Undulations, nervous affections, movements, and so forth, are only intelligible by us as modifications of our consciousness. To conceive in any degree the atmospheric perturbations which are the physical correlatives of sound, we must imagine them as somehow felt or perceived—for instance, as a faint breeze. To conceive the cerebral changes implied in hearing, we must imagine ourselves as dissecting and examining the interior of the brain. In other words, the external train of events to which consciousness runs over parallel can only be represented in thought by translating it into terms of consciousness; and the absolute harmony of both these trains, the fact that while states of consciousness do not originate the movements of our bodies, they yet bear so unvarying a relation to them as to be mistaken for their causes, finds its solution in the reflection that, when we look below the appearances to the reality pervading both, it is the same Universal Being which is manifested in each alike.

Hence, too, the sense of independent power to produce physical effects in accordance with mental conceptions, which forms the great obstacle to the general admission of the doctrine of human automatism. Reason as we may, we still feel that we are reservoirs of force which we give out in the shape of material movement whenever we please and as we please. And if the doctrine of the Persistence of Force appears, by showing that every physical consequent has a purely physical antecedent, to contradict this feeling, we naturally give the preference to the feeling over the doctrine. But since the Persistence of Force is itself no less firmly seated in consciousness than the sense of independent power—since all nature would be a chaos without the Persistence of Force—it is the part of true philosophy to give its due to each. And this may be done by admitting the particle of truth contained in the belief that the human will influences the external world. We are indeed reservoirs of force. But it is not our own peculiar force that is exerted through us; it is the Universal Force, which is evinced no less in the actions of men than in the movements of inanimate nature. And since those actions are in constant unison with their wishes, there is not, and cannot be, the sense of constraint which is usually opposed to voluntary performance. Thus, to take a simple illustration, the necessities of our physical constitution absolutely compel us to support ourselves by food; yet no man feels that in eating his meals he is acting under external compulsion.

It would be a strange except ion indeed to the universal prevalence of unvarying law, if human beings were permitted to exert independent influence upon the order of events. Not in so slovenly a manner has the work of nature been performed. We are no more free to disturb the harmony and beauty of the universe than are the stars in their courses or the planets in their orbits. Our courses and orbits are no less fixed than theirs, and it is but the imperfection of our knowledge, if they have not been, and cannot yet be discovered. But it would be a lamentable blot upon a universe, where all things are fixed by a Power "in whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning," were there permitted to exist a race of creatures who were a law unto themselves.

Again, the relation now established between the human mind and the ultimate Source both of mind and matter, serves to throw light upon that dark spot in the hypothesis of evolution—the origin of consciousness. For while in this hypothesis there is a continual progression, of which each step is the natural consequence of another, from the gaseous to the solid condition of our system, from inorganic to organic substances, from the humblest organization to the most complex, there is absolutely no traceable gradation from the absence to the presence of conscious life. No cunning contrivance of science can derive sensation from non-sentient materials, for the difference between the two is not a difference in degree of development, but in kind. There is a radical unlikeness between the two, and it is unphilosophic, as well as unscientific, to disguise the fact that a mere process of material evolution can never lead from the one to the other. "The moment of arising of consciousness," says Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, "is the most important break in the world of phenomena or nature taken as a whole; the phenomena above and the phenomena below it can never be reduced completely into each other; there is a certain heterogeneity between them. But this is not the only instance of such a heterogeneity" (Hodgson's "Theory of Practice," vol. i. p. 340). I venture to say that it is the only instance, and that there is nothing else in nature which can properly be compared with it. The instances of similar heterogeneity which Mr. Hodgson gives appear to me less carefully considered than might have been expected from so careful a writer. That between Time and Space, which is his first case, is involved in that between mind and matter, and is only another expression of it (see _supra_, p. 447); while "curves and straight lines," and "physical and vital forces," are not truly heterogeneous at all, unless under "vital forces" we include mental effort, and so again illustrate the primary unlikeness by a case included under it. But the last example is remarkable. "Until Mr. Darwin propounded his law of natural selection, it was supposed also [that there was heterogeneity] between species of living organisms in physiology." Now it is the great triumph of the evolutional system to have rid us of this unintelligible break, and to have shown that the whole of the material universe, inorganic and organic, is the result of the unchangeable operation of laws which are no less active now than they have ever been. In other words, evolution dispenses with the necessity of supposing the existence, at some point in the history of the planet, of a special law for the production of species brought into operation _ad hoc_.

But the general principles which apply to the origin of organic products must apply also to the origin of conscious life. This also must be figured as an evolution. This also must take place without the aid of a special law brought into operation _ad hoc_. Like the evolution of material products, it can only be conceived as taking place from a preëxisting fund, containing potentially the whole of the effects which are afterwards found in actual existence.

Let us test this by trying to conceive the process in other ways. Consciousness might be supposed to arise in two ways: by special creation, and by uncaused origin, from nothing. Both possibilities are in absolute contradiction to the fundamental principles of evolution. Creation by a superior power is a hypothesis standing on a level with that of the creation of man out of the dust of the earth. To realize it in thought at all we must suppose the very thing intended to be denied, namely, the material of mind already existing in the universe, as that of body existed—in the earth. Otherwise, we should be obliged to admit the unthinkable hypothesis of the origin of something from nothing. This latter difficulty presses with its full force upon the second supposition. Mind would thereby be represented as suddenly springing into being without any imaginable antecedent. For no material antecedent can produce it without an exception to the Persistence of Force, which requires a material consequent. And it cannot arise without any antecedent but by a similar exception.

Neither creation nor destruction can in fact be represented as occurring in nature. We cannot conceive a new being arising out of nothing, or passing into nothing. As the development of the physical universe takes place by the change, composition, decomposition, and re-composition of preëxisting constituents, so it must be with the development of mind. We cannot suppose the origin of sensation, its advance to more varied and complex kinds, through emotions, passions, and reasonings to the most subtle feelings and the profoundest thoughts, without believing that all of these have their source in the Ultimate Reality of nature, which comprehends not these only, but every further perfection of which we may yet be capable in ages to come.

Here, then, is the solution of the difficulty which was shown (p. 690) to beset the theory of abiogenesis; a theory which, if ultimately accepted by science, as I believe it will be, will for the first time bring perfect unity into our conceptions of the development of the world we live in. While science will thus show that there is no impassable break between inorganic and organic forms of matter, philosophy will confirm it by showing, that there is no real distinction between the universal life which is manifested in the (so-called) inanimate forces and constituents of our system and the fragmentary life which comes to light in animated creatures. There is heterogeneity nowhere. There are no breaks in nature. There are no unimaginable leaps in her unbroken course.

From the point of view now reached we can understand also—so far as understanding is possible in such a case—the apparent riddle of our knowledge of the existence of the Unknowable. We can explain the universal sentiment of religious minds that there is some direct relation between them and the object of their worship. The sense of an intuitional perception of that object, the sense of undefinable similarity thereto, the sense of inspiration and of guidance thereby, are included under and rendered intelligible by the actual identity in their ultimate natures of the subject and the object of religious feeling. And the incomprehensibility of the latter is shown to have an obvious reason. For the part cannot comprehend the whole of which it is a part. It can but feel that there is a whole, in some mysterious way related to itself. But what that whole is, the conditions of its existence render it impossible that it should even guess.

Imagine the whole of the atmosphere divided into two great currents: a hot current continually ascending, and a cold current continually descending. And let the hot current represent the stream of conscious life, the cold current the stream of material things. To complete the simile, conceive that there is a sharp boundary between the two currents, so that atoms of air can never cross to and fro; while yet the conscious atoms in the hot current are aware of the existence of the unconscious atoms in the cold one. Now if the atoms or particles in the conscious current should be gifted with senses in proportion to their size, they will see and feel an infinitely minute portion both of the ascending current in which they they themselves are placed, and of the descending current they are passing by. But of the whole of the atmosphere of which they are themselves fragmentary portions they will be able to form no conception whatever. Its existence they will be aware of, for it will be needed to explain their own. But of its nature they will have no idea, except that in some undefinable way it is like themselves. Nor will they be able to form any picture of the cause which is continually carrying them upwards, and forcing their homologues in the opposite current downwards. While, if we suppose these opposite movements to represent the elements of Time and Space, they will be conscious of themselves only in terms of movement upwards, and of the unconscious particles in terms of movement downwards. They will suppose these two movements to be of the very essence of hot and cold particles, and will be able to conceive them only under these terms. Suppose, lastly, that at a certain point in their progress the hot particles become cold and pass into the opposing current, losing their individual, particular life, then their fellow-particles in the hot current will lose sight of them at that point, and they will be merged in the general stream of being to emerge again in their turn into the stream of conscious being.

Imperfect as this simile is, and as all such similes must be, it serves in some faint measure to express the relation of the mind of man to its mysterious Source. And it serves also to illustrate the leading characteristics of Religion and Theology, or Faith and Belief, the function of the first having ever been to conceive the existence of that relation, and the function of the second to misconceive its character. Thus there runs through the whole course of religious history a pervading error and a general truth. In all its special manifestations these two have been mingled confusedly together, and the manifold forms of error have generally obscured from sight the single form of truth.

The relation held by Faith to Belief, by the true elements to the false, in special creeds, may be thus expressed: That the creeds have sought to individualize, and thus to limit that which is essentially general and unlimited. Thus worship, in its purest character a mere communing of the mind with its unknown Source, has been narrowed to the presentation of petitions to a personal deity. Particular places and peculiar objects have been selected as evincing, in some exceptional manner, the presence of the infinite Being which pervades all places and things alike. Certain men have been regarded as the exclusive organs of the ultimate Truth; certain books, as its authorized expressions; whereas the several races of men in their different modes of life, and in the diverse products of their art and their culture, are all in their variety, and even in their conflict, inspired workers in the hands of that Truth which is manifested completely in none, partially in all.

And as it has been with the special objects upon which Theology has fixed its gaze, so it has been with the general object which underlies them all. This, too, has been individualized, limited and defined. It has been forgotten that we are but forms of that which we are seeking to bring within the grasp of our reason, and cannot therefore see around it, above it, and below it. But this truth, which Theology is ever forgetting, Religion must ever proclaim. The proclamation of this truth is the title-deed of its acceptance by mankind. Without this, it would sink into the dishonored subject of incessant wranglings and profitless dispute. When it begins to define the Infinite, it ceases, in the purer sense of the word, to be Religion, and can only command the assent of reasonable beings in so far as its assertions comply with the rigorous methods of logical demonstration. But this condition is in fact impossible of fulfillment, for the nature of the object concerning which we reason, renders the exact terms of logical propositions misleading and inadequate. The Unknowable Reality does not admit of definition, comprehension, or description. How should we, mere fragments of that Reality, define, comprehend, or describe the Infinite Being wherein we have taken our rise, and whereto we must return?

* * * * *

Thus is Religion analyzed, explained and justified. Its varied forms have been shown to be unessential and temporary; its uniform substance to be essential and permanent. Belief has melted away under the comparative method; Faith has remained behind. From two sides, however, objections may be raised to the results of this analysis. Those who admit no ultimate residuum of truth in the religious sentiment at all, may hold that I have done it too much honor in conceding so much; while those who adhere to some more positive theology than is admitted here, will think that I have left scarcely anything worth the having in conceding so little.

To the first class of objectors I may perhaps be permitted to point out the extreme improbability of the presence in human nature of a universally-felt emotion without a corresponding object. Even if they themselves do not realize in their own minds the force of that emotion they will at least not deny its historical manifestations. They will scarcely question that it has been in all ages known to history as an inspiring force, and often an overmastering passion. They will believe the evidence of those who affirm that they are conscious of that emotion now, and cannot attribute it to anything but the kind of Cause which religion postulates. The actual presence of the emotion they will not deny, though the explanation attempted of its origin they will. But those who make the rather startling assertion that a deep-seated and wide-spread emotion is absolutely without any object resembling that which it imagines to be its source, are bound to give some tenable account of the genesis of that emotion. How did it come into being at all? How having come into being, did it continue and extend? How did it come to mistake a subjective illusion for an objective reality?

These are questions pressing for an answer from those who ask us to believe that one of our strongest feelings exists merely to deceive. But it will be found, I believe, that all explanations tending to show that this emotion is illusory in its nature assume the very unreality they seek to prove. Should it, for example, be contended that human beings, conscious of a force in their own bodies, extend the conception of this force to a superhuman being, which extension is illegitimate, it is assumed, not proved, in such an argument as this, that the force manifested in the universe at large is not in some way akin to that manifested in human beings. Again, should it be urged that man, being aware of design in his own works, fancies a like design in the works of nature, it is a mere assumption that this attribution of the ideas of his own mind to a mind greater than his is an unwarrantable process. The argument from design may be, and in my opinion is, open to other grave objections; but its mere presence cannot be used as explaining the manner in which the religious emotion has come to exist. Rather is it the religious emotion which has found expression in the argument from design. The same criticism applies to all accounts of this sentiment which aim at finding an origin for it sufficient to explain its presence without admitting its truth. They all of them assume the very point at issue.

But the real difficulty that is felt about religion lies deeper than in the mere belief that a given emotion may be deceptive. It lies in the doubt whether a mere emotion can be taken in evidence of the presence in nature of any object at all. Emotions are by their very nature vague, and this is of all perhaps the vaguest. Nor are emotions vague only; they are inexpressible in precise language, and even when we express them as clearly as we can, they remain unintelligible to those who have not felt them. Now this general and unspecific character of emotions renders it hard for those who are wanting in any given emotion to understand its intensity in others, and even fully to believe in their statements about it. Were religion a case of sensible perception they would have no such doubt. Color-blind persons do not question the faculty of distinguishing colors in others. But while the sharp definitions of these senses compel us to believe in the existence of their objects, the comparatively hazy outlines drawn by the emotions leave us at least a physical possibility of disputing the existence of theirs.

Yet the cases are in their natures identical. We see a table, and because we see it we infer the existence of a real thing external to ourselves. The presence of the sensations is conceived to be an adequate warrant for asserting the presence of their cause. Precisely in the same way, we feel the Unknowable Being, and because we feel it we infer the existence of a real object both external to ourselves and within ourselves. The presence of the emotion is conceived to be an adequate warrant for asserting the presence of its cause. Undoubtedly, the supposed object of the sensations and the supposed object of the emotion _might_ be both of them illusory. This is conceivable in logic, though not in fact. But there can be no reason for maintaining the unreality of the emotional, and the reality of the sensible object. Existence is believed in both instances on the strength of an immediate, intuitional inference. The mental processes are exactly parallel. And if it be contended that sensible perception carries with it a stronger warrant for our belief in the existence of its objects than internal feeling, the reasons for this contention must be exhibited before we can be asked to accept it; otherwise, it will again turn out to be a pure assumption, constituting, not a reason for the rejection of religion by those who now accept it, but a mere explanation of the conduct of those who do not.

In fact, however, the denial of the truth of religion is no less emotional than its affirmation. It is not denied because those who disbelieve in it have anything to produce against it, but because the inner sense which results in religion is either absent in them, or too faint to produce its usual consequences. For this of course they are not to blame, and nothing can be more irrational than to charge them with moral delinquency or culpable blindness. If the Unknown Cause is not perceptible to them, that surely is not a deficiency to be laid to their charge. But when they quit the emotional stronghold wherein they are safe to speak of those to whom that Unknown Cause is perceptible as the victims of delusion, these latter may confidently meet them on the field which they themselves have chosen.

First, then, it is at least a rather startling supposition that their fellow creatures have always been, and are still, the victims of a universal delusion, from which they alone enjoy the privilege of exemption. Presumption, at all events, is against a man who asserts that everybody but himself sees wrongly. He may be the only person whose eyes have not deceived him, but we should require him to give the strongest proof of so extraordinary an assertion. And in all cases which are in the least degree similar, this condition is complied with without the smallest hesitation. There are, so far as I am aware, no instances of proved universal delusions, save those arising from the misleading suggestions of the senses. That the earth is a flat surface, that the sun moves round it, that the sun and moon are larger than the stars, that the blue sky begins at a fixed place, are inferences which the uninstructed observer cannot fail to draw from the most obvious appearances. But those who have combated these errors have not done so by merely telling the world at large that it was mistaken; they have pointed out the phenomena from which the erroneous inferences were drawn, and have shown at the same time that other phenomena, no less evident to the senses than these, were inconsistent with the explanation given. They have then substituted an explanation which accounted for all the phenomena alike, both the more obvious phenomena and the less so. Precisely similar is the method of procedure in history and philosophy, though the methods of proof in these sciences are not equally rigorous. Great historical delusions—such as the Popish plot—are put to rest by showing the misinterpreted facts out of which they have grown, exposing the misinterpretation, and substituting true interpretation. Imperfect psychological analysis, say of an emotion, is superseded by showing from what facts this analysis has been obtained, and what other facts it fails to account for.

Observe, then, that in all these cases the appeal is made from the first impressions of the mistaken person to his own impressions on further examination; not to those of another. Considerations are laid before him which it is supposed will cause him to change his mind, and in all that class of cases where strict demonstration is possible actually do so. To a man who believes the earth to be a flat extended surface we point out the fact that the top of a ship's mast is the first part of it to appear, and that this and other kindred phenomena imply sphericity. Our appeal is from the senses to the senses better informed; not from another man's senses to our own. And we justly assume that were all the world in possession of the facts we have before us, all the world would be of our opinion.

What, then, is the conclusion from these analogies? It surely is, that those who would deny the reality of the object of religious emotion must show from what appearances, misunderstood, the belief in that object has arisen, and must point out other appearances leading to other emotions which are in conflict with it. As the astronomer appeals from sensible perception to sensible perception, so they must appeal from emotion to emotion. But it must not be their own emotions to which they go as forming a standard for ours. They can demand no hearing at all until they attempt to influence the emotions of those whom they address.

Generality of belief need not, for the purposes of this argument, be taken as even a presumption of truth. We can grant our adversaries this advantage which, in the parallel cases of the illusions of the senses, was neither asked nor given. But we must ask them in return to concede to us that, if the generality of a belief entitles it to no weight in philosophic estimation, the singularity of a belief entitles it to none either. All mankind may be deluded: well and good: _a fortiori_ a few individuals among mankind may be deluded too. Grant that the human faculties at large are subject to error and deception, it follows from this that the faculties of individuals lie under the same disability. No word can be said as to the general liability to false beliefs, which does not carry with it the liability to false beliefs of the very persons who are seeking to convince us.

By whom, in fact, are we asked to admit, in the interests of their peculiar theory, the prevalence of a universal deception, and a deception embracing in its grasp not only the ignorant multitude, but men of science, thinkers and philosophers of the very highest altitude of culture? By whom is it that the great mass of humankind is charged with baseless thoughts, illusory emotions, and untenable ideas? By those who, in thus denying the capacity of the whole human race to perceive the truth, nevertheless maintain their own capacity to see over the heads of their fellow men so far as to assert that they are all the victims of an error. By those who, while bidding us distrust the strongest feelings, nevertheless require us to trust them so far as to banish, at their bidding, those feelings from our hearts. Not from our reason to our more instructed reason do they appeal, only from our reason to their own. But I deny the competence of the tribunal; and I maintain that until not merely disbelief, but disproof, of the position of Religion can be offered, Religion must remain in possession of the field.

Yet there is one mistake which, as it may tend to obscure the issue, it will be desirable to clear away. It is often contended, oftener perhaps tacitly assumed, that the burden of proof must rest on those who in any case maintain the affirmative side of a belief, while the negative on its side requires no proof, but can simply claim reception until the affirmative is established. Now this principle is true, where the negative is simply a suspension of judgment; the mere non-acceptance of a fact asserted, without a counter-assertion of its opposite. To understand the true application of the rule we must distinguish between what I will term substantial affirmations or negations, and affirmations or negations in form. Thus, to assert that A. B. is six feet tall, is a substantial affirmation. Out of many possible alternatives it selects one, and postulates that one as true, while all the rest it discards as false. Since, however, there are numerous possibilities besides this one with regard to A. B.'s height—since he may be either taller or shorter by various degrees—the negative, in the absence of all knowledge on the subject, is inherently more probable, for it covers a larger ground. It is a substantial negation. That is, it affirms nothing at all, but simply questions the fact affirmed, leaving the field open to countless other substantial affirmations. So, in law, it is the prosecution which is required to prove its case; for the prosecution affirms that this man was at a given place at a given time and did the criminal action. The opposite hypothesis of this covers innumerable alternatives: not this man but another, may have been at that place, or he may have been there and not done the action charged, or some other man may have done it, or the crime may have not been committed at all, and so forth. These are cases of substantial affirmations; asserting one alone out of many conceivable possibilities, and therefore needing proof. And their opposites are substantial negations; questioning only the one fact affirmed, and even with reference to that merely maintaining that in the absence of proof there is an inherent probability in favor of the negative side.

Widely different is the case before us. Here the affirmation and negation are affirmative and negative in form alone. The assertions, "An Unknowable Being exists," and "An Unknowable Being does not exist," are not opposed to one another as the affirmative and the negative sides were opposed in the previous cases. The latter proposition does not cover a number of possible alternatives whereof the former selects and affirms a single one. Both propositions are true and substantial affirmations. Both assert a supposed actual fact. And the latter does not, as the previous negative propositions did, leave the judgment in simple suspense. It requires assent to a given doctrine. That the one cast is in a negative form is the mere accident of expression, and without in any way affecting their substance, their positions in this respect may be reversed. Thus, we may say for the first, "The universe cannot exist without an Unknowable Being;" and for the second, "The universe can exist without an Unknowable Being." There are not here a multitude of alternatives, but two only, and of these each side affirms one. Each proposition is equally the assertion of a positive belief. Thus, the reason which, in general, causes the greater antecedent probability of a denial as against a positive assertion, in no way applies to the denial of the fundamental postulate of Religion. The statement that there is nobody in a certain room is not in itself more probable than the statement that there is somebody. And the proposition: "all men are not mortal," though negative in form, is truly as affirmative as the counter-proposition: "all men are mortal."

But this argument, inasmuch as it places the denial of all truth in the religious emotion on a level with its affirmation, fails to do justice to the real strength of the case. There are not here two contending beliefs, of which the one is as probable as the other. In conceding so much to the skeptical party we have given them a far greater advantage than they are entitled to demand. Generality of belief is, in the absence of evidence or argument to the contrary, a presumption of truth; for, unless its origin from some kind of fallacy can be shown, its generality is in itself a proof that it persists in virtue of the general laws of mind which forbid the separation of its subject from its predicate. And it is not only that we have here a general belief, or, more correctly speaking, a general emotion, but we have categories in the human mind which are not filled up or capable of being filled up by the objective element in the religious idea. There is, for example, the category of Cause; Nature presents us not with Cause, but with causes; and these causes are mere antecedents, physical causation in general being nothing whatever but invariable antecedents and invariable sequence. But this analysis of the facts of nature by no means satisfies the conception of causation which is rooted in the human mind. That conception imperiously demands a cause which is not a mere antecedent, but a Power. Without that, the idea would remain as a blank form, having no reality to fill it. And how do we come to be in the firm possession of this idea if there be nothing in nature corresponding to it? From what phenomena could it be derived? Akin to our notion of Cause is our notion of Force. When the scientific man speaks of a Force, he merely means an unknown something which effects certain movements. And Science cannot possibly dispense with the metaphysical idea of Force. Yet Force is not only unknowable; but it is _the_ Unknowable manifested in certain modes. Again, therefore, I ask, whence do we derive ineradicable feeling of the manifestation of Force, if that feeling be a mere illusion? Similar remarks apply to other categories which, like these, have no objects in actual existence in the conformity of the religious sentiment to truth be denied. Such is the category of Reality. Imagination cannot picture the world save as containing, though in its essence unknown to us, some real and permanent being. We know it only as a compound of phenomena, all of them fleeting, variable, and unsubstantial. There is nothing in the phenomena which can satisfy our mental demand for absolute being. As being transient, and as being relative, the phenomena in fact are nothing. But our intellectual, our emotional, and our moral natures demand the τό ὃντως ὄν—that which really is, as the necessary completion of τὰ φαινόμεα—that which only appears. And it is precisely the unshakeable belief in an unchangeable, though unknowable Reality; an everlasting Truth amid shifting forms, a Substance among shadows, which forms the universal foundation of religious faith.

A ship that has been driven from her intended course is drifting, with a crew who have no clear knowledge of her whereabouts, upon an unexplored ocean. Suddenly her captain exclaims that he sees land in the distance. The mate, however, summoned to verify the captain's observation, fancies that the black speck on the horizon is not land, but a large vessel. The sailors and passengers take part, some with the one, some with the other; while many of them form opinions of their own not agreeing with that of either, one maintaining it to be a whale, another a dark cloud, a third something else, and so forth. Minor differences abound. Those who take it to be land are at issue as to its being a plain or a mountain, those who think it a vessel cannot agree as to the description of the craft. One solitary passenger sees nothing at all. Instead of drawing what would appear to be the most obvious conclusion, that he is either more shortsighted or less apt to discover distant objects than the rest, he infers that his vision alone is right, and that of all the others, captain, passengers, and crew, defective and misleading. Oblivious of the fact that the mere failure to perceive an object is no proof of its non-existence, he persists in asserting not only that the speck seen in the distance, being so variously described, probably does not resemble any of the ideas formed of it on board the ship, but that there is no speck at all. Even the fact that the crews of many other ships, passing in this direction, perceive the same dim outline on the horizon, does not shake his conviction that it is a mere "idol of the tribe." Such is the procedure of those who deny the reality of the object of the religious idea. Instead of drawing from the diversity of creeds the legitimate inference that the Being of whom they severally speak is of unknown nature, they conclude, from the mere absence of the idea of that Being in their individual consciousness, that its very existence is a dream.

Lastly, a few words, and a few only, must be said in reply to those who will think that the cenception of the Unknowable resulting from our analysis is too vague and shadowy to form the fitting foundation for religious feeling. They will probably object that the Being whom that feeling requires is not an inconceivable Cause or Substance of the Universe, but a Personal God; not an undefined something which we can barely imagine, but a definite Some one whom we can adore and love. There is nothing, they will say, in such a conception as this either to satisfy the affections or to impress the moral sentiments. And both purposes were fulfilled by the Christian ideal of a loving Father and a righteous Judge.

To these objections I would reply, first of all, that I have simply attempted to analyze religion as I found it, neither omitting what was of the essence of the religious idea, nor inserting what was not. If this analysis is in any respect defective, that is a matter for criticism and discussion. But if it has been correctly performed—of which I frankly admit there is abundant room for doubt—then I am not responsible for not finding in the universal elements of religion that which is not contained within them. The expression found for the ultimate truths must embrace within it, if possible, the crude notions of deity formed by the savage, and the highly abstract ideal formed by the most eminent thinkers of modern times. Even then, if I myself held the doctrines of the personality and the fatherhood of God, I could not have required from others any admission of these views of mine as universal ingredients in religious faith. The utmost I could have done would have been to tack them on as supplementary developments of the idea of the ultimate Being. And thus it is still open to any one who wishes it to do. Difficult as it is to reconcile the ideas of Love and Justice with unlimited Power and absolute Existence, yet if there are some who find it possible to accomplish the reconciliation, it may be well for them so to do.[104] Undoubtedly, however, all such efforts do appear to me mere hankerings after an incarnation of that idea which, by its very nature, does not admit of representation by incarnate forms, even though those forms be moral perfections. And I would reply, secondly, to the above objection, that, while we lose something by giving up the definite personality of God, we gain something also. If we part with the image of a loving Father, we part also with that of a stern monarch and an implacable judge. If we can no longer indulge in the contemplation of perfect virtue, embodied in an actual Person, we are free from the problem that has perplexed theologians of every age: how to reconcile the undoubted evil in the world with the omnipotence of that Person. I know that there are some who think it possible to retain the gentler features in the popular conception of deity, while dropping all that is harsh and repulsive. To them the idea of God is as free from terror as the idea of the Unknowable, and the first of these gains is therefore no gain to them. But the problem of the existence of evil presses perhaps with greater severity upon them than upon any other class of theologians. To suppose that God could not prevent the presence of wickedness, or could not prevent it without some greater calamity, is to deny his omnipotence; to suppose that he could, and did not, is to question his benevolence. But even admitting the improvement made by purging from the character of God all its severity, its vindictiveness, and its tendency to excessive punishment, the fact remains that the conception thus attained is not that of the popular creed at all, but that of a few enlightened thinkers. And it is with the former, not with the latter, that the doctrine of the Unknowable must be compared, in order fairly to estimate its advantages or disadvantages in relation to the current belief in a personal God.

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the dim figure we have shadowed out of an inconceivable and all-embracing ultimate Existence, if widely different from the more ordinary theological embodiments of the religious idea, is altogether in harmony with many of its expressions by the most devoutly religious minds. If religion has always had a tendency to run to seed in dogma, it has also always had a tendency to revert to its fundamental mysticism. The very best and highest minds have continually evinced this tendency to mysticism, and it has mixed itself up with the logical definitions of others who did not rise to so exalted a level. So that the examination of the writings of religious men will continually disclose that profound impression of the utterly incomprehensible and mysterious nature of the Supreme Being which is now, in its complete development in the form of Agnosticism, stigmatized as incompatible with genuine religious faith.

That tendency to be deeply sensible of the impossibility of conceiving the Absolute which Religion has thus evinced, it is the result of Science to strengthen and to increase. Science shows the imperfection of all the concrete expressions which have been found for the Unknowable. It proves that we cannot think of the Unknowable as entering in any peculiar sense into special objects in nature, dwelling in special places, or speaking through special channels. Miraculous phenomena, which were supposed to constitute the peculiar sphere of its manifestations, are thrown by Science completely out of the account. But all phenomena whatsoever are shown to manifest the Unknowable. Thus, while scientific inquiry tends to diminish the intensity of religious ideas, it tends to widen their extension. They do not any longer cling to partial symbols. They do not attach themselves with the same fervor to individual embodiments. But, in becoming more abstract, they become also more pervading. Religion is found everywhere and in everything. All nature is the utterance of the idea. And, as it gains in extension while losing in intensity in reference to the external world, it goes through a similar process in relation to human life. No longer a force seizing on given moments of our existence, at one moment inspiring devotional observances, at the next forgotten in the pleasures or the business of the day; at one time filling men with the zeal of martyrs or crusaders, at another leaving them to the unrestrained indulgence of gross injustice or revolting cruelty, it becomes a calm, all-pervading sentiment, shown (if it be shown at all) in the general beauty and spirituality of the character, not in the stated exercises of a rigorous piety, or in the passionate outbursts of an enthusiastic fervor.

But these considerations would lead me on to a subject which I had once hoped to treat within the boundaries of the present volume, but which I am now compelled, owing to the enlargement of the scheme, to postpone to a future time. That subject is the relation of religion to ethics. It may have struck some readers as an omission that I have said nothing of religion as a force inspiring moral conduct, which is the principal aspect under which it is regarded by some competent authorities. But the omission has been altogether intentional. It would take me a long time to explain what in my judgment has been the actual influence of religion upon morals in the past, and what is likely to be its influence in the future. Meanwhile I merely note the fact that this analysis professes to be complete in its own kind; that I have endeavored to probe the religious sentiment to the bottom, and to discover all that it contains. Thus, if religion be not only an emotion, but a moral force, it must acquire this character in virtue of the relation of its emotional elements to human character, not in virtue of the presence of ethical elements actually belonging to the religious emotion, and comprehended under it by the same indefeasible title as the sense of the Unknowable itself.

At present, however, I can attempt no answer to the objection which will no doubt be urged, that so abstract and cold a faith as that expounded here can afford no satisfaction to the moral sentiments. Indeed I must to a certain extent admit the reality of the loss which the adoption of this faith entails. There is consolation no doubt in the thought of a Heavenly Father who loves us; there is strength in the idea that he sees and helps us in our continual combat against evil without and evil within; there is happiness in the hope that he will assign us in another life an infinite reward for all the endurances of this. Above all, there is comfort in the reflection that when we are parted by death we are not parted for ever; that our love for those whom we have cherished on earth is no temporary bond, to be broken ere long in bitterness and despair, but a possession never to be lost again, a union of souls interrupted for a little while by the separation of the body, only to be again renewed in far greater perfection and carried on into far higher joys than can be even imagined here. All this is beautiful and full of fascination: why should we deny it? Candor compels us to admit that in giving it up with the other illusions of our younger days we are resigning a balm for the wounded spirit for which it would be hard to find an equivalent in all the repertories in Science, and in all the treasures of philosophy. Yet it must be borne in mind that every step from a lower to a higher creed involves a precisely similar loss. How much more beautiful was nature (as Schiller has shown us in his poem on the gods of Greece) when every fountain, tree and river had its presiding genius, when the Sun was driven by a divine charioteer, when the deities of Olympus intervened in the affairs of men to prevent injustice and to maintain the right. How cold and lifeless, nay, how profoundly irreligious, would our modern conception of the earth and the solar system have appeared to the worshiper of Poseidon and Apollon. And if the loss of the Christian as compared to the Pagan is thus great, how great also is the loss of the enlightened Protestant as compared to the ignorant Catholic peasant. What comfort must be found in the immediate intervention of the Virgin in answer to prayer, what security afforded by the protection of the local saint. Or again, how great the pleasure of contributing by our piety to the release of a friend from purgatorial torment, and of knowing that our friends will do us the same kindly service.

Even without contrasting such broad and conspicuous divisions of Christianity as these, we shall find enough of the same kind of difference within the limits of Protestantism itself. What mere intellectual conviction of a future state can vie with the consoling certainty offered by the Spiritualistic belief, that those whom we have lost on earth still hover around us in our daily course; sometimes even appear to us in bodily form, and converse with us in human speech. No mere hope of meeting them again can for a moment equal the delight of seeing their well-known shapes and hearing their familiar tones. Hence the Spiritualist has undoubtedly a source of comfort in his faith which more rational creeds can offer nothing to supply. But who that does not share it can envy them so baseless a conviction, so illusory a joy?

It is, in fact, the very condition of progress that, as we advance in knowledge and in culture, we give up something on the road. But it is also a condition that we do not feel the need of that which we have lost. Not only as we become men do we put away childish things, but we can no longer realize in thought the enjoyment which those childish things brought with them. Other interests, new occupations, deeper affections take the place of the interests, the occupations, and the affections of our early years. So too should it be in religion. Men have dwelt upon the love of God because they could not satisfy the craving of nature for the love of their fellow men. They have looked forward to eternal happiness in a future life because they could not find temporary happiness in this. It is these reflections which point out the way in which the void left by the removal of the religious affections should hereafter be supplied. The effort of those who cannot turn for consolation to a friend in heaven should be to strengthen the bonds of friendship on earth, to widen the range of human sympathy and to increase its depth. We should seek that love in one another which we have hitherto been required to seek in God. Above all, we should sweep away those barriers of convention and fancied propriety which continually hinder the free expression of affection, and force us to turn from the restrictions of the world to One towards whom there need be no irksome conformity to artificial regulation, and in speaking to whom we are under no shadow of reserve.

Were we thus permitted to find in our fellow creatures that sympathy which so many mourners, so many sufferers, so many lonely hearts, have been compelled to find only in the idea of their heavenly Father, I hesitate not to say that the consolations of the new religion would far surpass in their strength and their perfection all those that were offered by the old. Towards such increasing and such deepening of the sympathies of humanity I believe that we are continually tending even now. Meantime, while we are still far from the promised land, the adherents of the universal religion are not without a happiness of their own. Their faith is at least a faith of perfect peace. Untroubled by the storms of controversy, in which so many others are tossed about, they can welcome all men as brothers in faith, for all of them, even the most hostile, contribute to supply the stones of the broad foundation upon which their philosophy is built. Those therefore who contend against them, be it even with vehemence and passion, yield, them involuntary help in bringing the materials upon which their judgment is formed. No man can truly oppose their religion, for he who seems to be hostile to it is himself but one of the notes struck by the Unknowable Cause, which so plays upon the vast instrument of humanity as to bring harmony out of jangling sounds, and to produce the universal chords of truth from the individual discords of error. Scientific discoveries and philosophic inquiries, so fatal to other creeds, touch not the universal religion. They who accept it can but desire the increase of knowledge, for even though new facts and deeper reasoning should overthrow something of what they have hitherto believed and taught, they will rejoice that their mistakes should be corrected, and their imperfections brought to light. They desire but the Truth, and the Truth has made them free. And as in their thoughts they can wish nothing so much as to know and to believe that which is true, so in their lives they will express the serenity which that desire will inevitably bring. They are not pained or troubled because other men see not as they see. They have no vain hope of a unity of thought which the very conditions of our being do not permit. They aim not at conquering the minds of men; far rather would they stimulate and help them to discover a higher Truth than they themselves have been permitted to know. And as their action will thus be inspired with hope of contributing their mite to the treasury of human knowledge, well-being, and moral good, so their death will be the expression of that, peaceful faith which has sustained their lives. Even though torn away when, in their own judgment, they have still much to do, they will not repine at the necessity of leaving it undone, even though they are well aware that their names, which might have been illustrious in the annals of our race, will now be buried in oblivion. For the disappearance of a single life is but a ripple on the ocean of humanity, and humanity feels it not. Hence they will meet their end "sustained and soothed by an unfaltering trust,"

"Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."

But the opposite fate, sometimes still more terrible, that of continuing to live when the joys of life are gone, and its purest happiness is turned into the bitterest pain, will be accepted too. Thus they will be willing, it need be, to remain in a world where their labor is not yet ended, even though that labor be wrought through suffering, despondency, and sorrow; willing also, if need be, to meet the universal lot—even though it strike them in the midst of prosperity, happiness, and hope; bowing in either case to the verdict of fate with unmurmuring resignation and fearless calm.

THE END.

INDEX.

Abhidharma-Pitaka, its metaphysics, 473-476

Abiogenesis, the theory of, 690; its destined functions, 702

Abraham, a Hanyf, 195; story of, 545-546

Acts, the book of, its value, 604; review of, 604-617

Aditi, the godess, 437

Africa, burial rites in, 430; divination in, 114; ordeals in, 119

Africans, western, sacrifice among, 42; drink-offerings among, 47

Agag hewn in pieces, 598

Age, a golden, traditions of, 538, 539

Agni, the god, 430

Agnosticism allied to mysticism, ii. 489

Ahab, his troubles, 598

Ahuna-Vairya, the, 503, 504

Ahura-Mazda, and Zarathustra, 182, 183; the god of the Parsees, 185; ancient worship of, 486, 487; praise of, 487, 488; rank and character, 489; address to, 489, 490; worship of, 490-492; fire and water given by, 493; questioned by Zarathustra, 497-504; things which please and things which displease, 497, 498; prescribes for medical training, 499; the same as Ormazd, 505; throughout the god of the Parsees, 508; creates the world, 535

Aischylos, his conception of the commercial relation between gods and men, 38

Akaba, the vow of the first and second, 188

Ali, sign at his birth, 226

Amatongo, sacrifice to the, 40

Amuzulus, sacrifice among the, 47 sneezing as an omen among, 111

Amos, his prophecy and history, 61; conduct towards Amaziah, 573

Anâgâmin, the, 478, 479 (note)

Analysis, ultimate metaphysical, 464

Ananda and the Matangi girl, 285; and Buddha, 134, 136

Ananias and his wife, story of, 607

Ancestors, worship of, in Fiji and among the Kafirs, 650, 651; in Peru, 651.

Angekoks, the, consecration of, 100, 101

Apocalypse, the, its author, 634; its style, 634; compared with the "Pilgrim's Progress," 634; its visions, 635, 636

Apollo, worship of, 38; his sense of gratitude appealed to, 38; oracle of the Clarian, 127

Âranyakas, the, 127

Arhats, the, rank of, 444, 445, 457, 458

Asceticism, various degrees of, 89; in Mexico and Peru, 90-92; rules of Chinese, 461

Ashem-Vohû, the, 503, 504

Asiti, the Rishi, the child and Buddha, 231

Asoka, the Buddhist king, 450, 451

Astrology, 118

Astrologers in Thibet, 144

Asvagosha, a Buddhist preacher, 122

Atharva-Veda-Sanhitâ, the, 426, 427

Atman, 661

Atmospheric currents, an illustration, 471

Automatism, apparent puzzle of, resolved, 464-466

Australia, burial rites in, 77

Babel, confusion at, 597

Balaam, treatment of, 597

Balaki, the Brahman, 446

Banshee, the Irish, 114

Baptism, a general religious rite, 58; in Fantee, 59; among the Cherokees, Aztecs, &c., 59; in Mexico, 59; in Mongolia and Thibet, 61; among the Parsees, 61; in the Christian Church, 61, 62; meaning of the rite, 62, 63

Barabbas, 215, 216

Barnabas, and Paul in Antioch, 611; taken for Zeus, 611; separation, 613

Beatitudes, the, 350, 351

Beauty and Bands, allegory of, 573

Beliefs, necessary, vindication of, 678-680; conditions of, 680; example, 695, 696

Benfey, translation of the Sâma-Veda Sanhitâ, 425

Bhikshu, a defined, 95

Bhikshus and Bhikshunîs, the, 479

Bible, the, though above, yet among the sacred books of the world, 369, 370; forced interpretations of 379, 380; mostly anonymous, 386; style of, 389, 390

Birth, religious rites at, among savage nations, 57, 58; in Mexico, 59, 60; in Mongolia and Thibet, 61

Bodhisattva, 175-180; in the womb, 225; the nature of, 477, 478; their sacrifice of Nirvâna, 478

Bogda, thaumaturgic powers of, 122

Books, sacred, all civilized nations nearly have, 370, 371; Greeks and Romans without, 370; list of, 370; their external marks—recognized inspiration, 371, 372; supposed merit of reading or repeating them, 372-375; subjection to forced interpretations, 375-383; internal marks—transcendental-subject-matter, 382-384; authoritativeness, 384, 385; general anonymity, 23-26; formlessness, 385-389; of the Chinese, 390-424; seldom written by the authors of the religion, 413; of India, 425-448; of the Buddhists, 449-482; necessity for, 449; of the Parsees, 482-509; of the Moslems, 500-520; of the Jews, 518-603; of Christianity, 604-641

Bo-tree, sanctity of, in Ceylon, 127 Buddha, under, 180, 181

Brahma, his incest, 600; not worshiped, 405, 406; and Brahm, 406, 407

Brahman, the caste, 183; the supreme, 405

Brâhmanas, the, 379, 425, 426; their character, 444, 445; ritualistic appendages to the Vedas, 444, 445; teaching of apologue, 445; on a universal soul, 445, 446; on the future of the soul, 447; on patience, 447; references to moral conduct, 448

Bread and wine in the Eucharist, virtue of, 135

Buddha, Gautama, a thaumaturgist, 122; the tooth of, 124, 125; preparation for his last manifestation, 170; uncertain data to go upon for his life, 171; when he lived, 172; early asceticism, 172, 173; abolishes caste, his theoretic, 217; his four truths, 173; the interpretation of these, 173; his death, 274; his chief disciples, 274; spread of his religion, 274; essential principles, 174, 175; his blamelessness, 175; the mythical twelve periods of his life, i. 176; resolution to be born, 176; choice of parents, 176; his birth, 177; various names of, 177; adoration by an old Rishi, 178; qualifies himself for marriage, 178; enjoyment of domestic life, 179; departure from home and assumption of the monastic character, 178; temptations, 178; his horse Kantaka, 178; his penances, 180; his triumph over the devil, 180; becomes perfect Buddha, 180, 181; turns the Wheel of the Law, 180; his reception by kings, 180; his first conversions, 180; founds monastic institutions, 180; enters Nirvâna, 449; funeral rites, 181; relics, 181; aristocratic descent, 221; gestation of, 224, 225; signs at his birth, 226; infant, recognized Simeon-wise by the Rishi Asita, 231; his temptations in the wilderness, 231; and the Matangi girl, 285; compared with Christ, 242-344; and the widow's mite, 342, 343; and the cup of cold water, 344; as a fisher of men, 344; exalts humility and poverty, 345; on divorce, 345, 346; and Christ, 362-365; his sayings collected, 343; sects in the Church of 449; extravagant adoration 458; painting the picture of, 458, 459; and the two condemned felons, 136-139; central figure of Buddhism, 146; successive manifestations, 476; worship of, 477; training of, 476, 478, 481; disciples of, 480

Buddha Sakymuni, leaps into the fire, 58

Buddhas, the, Pratyeka, 478.

Buddhism, ascetic nature and rules of, 93-95; fathers of, miracle workers, 121, 122; goal of, 120; its sacred canon, 449-451; ten commandments of, 467; boundless charity of, 468; regard for personal purity, 469-471; its four truths, 473; Buddha its central figure, 476; gods of, 476; grades in, 478, 479; morality of, 480-483; five commandments of, 550; not without a god, ii. 655-657.

Buddhists, 93-95; antecedent to Buddhism, 95; in India, 96, 97; of Visvamitra, 96, 97

Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress" compared with the Apocalypse, 366, 367

Caaba, the, 188-190.

Carlyle, Thomas, forestalled by Confucius, 167; his "Everlasting No." 186; on Mahomet, 192

Cause, the notion of, 484; the known. See POWER.

Ceylon, religious observance in, 51; festivals in, 53; marriage in, 75, 76; burial rites in, 78; omens in, 112, 113; divination in, 117; the Bo-tree, 127.

Child, myth of the dangerous, 227-230

China, Emperor of, praying for rain, 36; sacrifice in, 42; divination in, 117, 118; in the days of Confucius, 159; official creed of, 391; sacred writings of, 39; authentic history of, remote, 403; fate of the early Emperors of, as good or bad, 403-406; its sages and kings, 405-407; the "religiones licitæ" of, 413

Chinese, the, sacred books once nearly destroyed, 391; their political doctrines, 394; their ethics, 395, 396; their loyalty to the heroes as heaven-appointed, 398, 399

Christ, Jesus, conceived necessity of his death, 47; his appeal to miracles, 123; divinity of, not found in the New Testament, 326, 327; Mahomet's view of, 513, 514; worship of, 665. See JESUS.

Christians, the early, communists, 607; first breach among, 608; severe discipline of, 614

Christianity, fundamental conception of, 48, 49; festivals of, 52; ascetic spirit of early, 97; ascetic development of, 98, 99; powerless over the Jews since the death of Christ, 314, 315; originally Judaic, 334; its worship of Christ, 308; its treatment of the Father and the Spirit, 309, 310

Christmas, a pagan festival, 53.

Church, the, necessary infallibility of, 152

Choo He, his criticism of preface to Chinese odes, 380, 381

Chow, the Duke of, on the favor of heaven, 406

Ch'un Ts'ëw, the, forced interpretation applied to, 376-378, 411; its subject matter and authorship, 411-413; opinions of Dr. Legge, 411-413, of Mang, 411, 412; extract, 412; topics, 412

Chung Yung, the, authorship of, 394; its doctrine of the "Mean," 394, 395; its doctrine of virtue and heaven, 395, 396

Cicero on immortality, 688.

Circumcision, wide-spread practice of, 63; among the Jews, 64; of women among the Suzees and Mandingoes, 73, 74

Clement, quotation from, on second coming, 338, 339

Clergy, secular and regular, 100

Cobbe, Frances Power, 641

Coming, the second, apostolic doctrine on, 334-339.

Confucius, neither an ascetic recluse nor a religious enthusiast, 158, 159; regard for ritual, 159-201; birth and early life, 159; as a teacher, 159; subject of his doctrines, 160; refuses state endowments, 160; chief magistrate of Loo, 160; resignation 160; death, 161; character, 162; wanting in the bold originality of the other reformers of religion, 162; charge of insincerity, 162; his purity, 163; his courteous manners, 164; formal deportment, 165; relations with his disciples, 165; four virtues of which he was master, 166; sense of a mission, 166, 167; pain at being misunderstood, 167; had no theological beliefs, 167; lays all stress upon terrestrial virtues, 168; had an esoteric doctrine, 169; subjects on which he did not talk, 170; minds not things too high for him, but is silent, 170; summary of moral duties, 171; moral perfection, 171; doctrine of reciprocity, 172; some of his sayings, 172, 173; Carlylean utterances, 173; Tsge-Kung's admiration for him, 173; interview with and opinion of Laò-tsé, 174, 175; ante-natal signs, 225; his teachings similar to Christ's, 342; doctrine of recompense, 354-357; idea of perfect virtue, 361; and Christ, 362-365; on unseen spiritual beings, 395, 396; left writings, 414

Confucianism the official creed in China, 391

Consciousness, its rise unaccounted for by material evolution, 705; necessarily of spiritual evolution, 706, 707; not by creation, nor from nothing, 707

Consecration, power of, among the Mongolians, 86; among the Catholics, 86; differs from sacrifice, 86; permanence of, 87

Consecrated objects in Sierra Leone, 84; among the Tartars, 84; in Ceylon, 86; value of, 86

Cornelius, conversion of, 328, 610

Creation of the universe, Hebrew account of 531-533; account, of the Quichés, 533, of the Mixtecs, 533, 534, of the Buddhists, 534, of the Parsees, 534, 535; of the Rig-Veda, 535, 536; of animals and man, Hebrew account, 536-538, Fijian account, 538; impossible, 707

Creeds, the error of, 709, 710

Cylinders, rotary, in Thibet, with sacred texts, 373, 374

Dakhmas, the, 79, 80

Daniel, the book of, 586, 587; the prophet, 587, 588, 590

Darwinism, an epoch, 705

Death, rites at, in New South Wales, 77; in Western Africa, 77, 78; in Polynesia, 77; in Mexico, 78; in Ceylon, 77; in Thibet, 88; among Christians, 89, 90

Death-watch, the, in Scotland, 114

Debt a disqualification in Buddhism, 460

Delphi, oracle at, 126

Deluge, the, Hebrew account of, 541, 542; other traditions, 243, 244; Indian tradition, 244, 245; the judgment by, 597

Demoniac possession in the days of Christ, 210, 211; in Judea, Abyssinia, Polynesia, and Ceylon, 245, 246

Design, argument from, 711, 712

Destruction, impossible, 706

Devadatta, 481

Devas, the worship of, renounced by the Parsees, 490

Didron, M., on the Scriptural proof of the Trinity, 379; on mediæval representations of the Father and the Son in the Trinity, 665, 666

Disciples, the, rebuked by Christ for not casting out a devil, 244; and Judaism, 328-341, 345

Disease, moral theory of, 141

Disease-makers in Tanna, 140

Divination a profession, 115; in South Africa, 115; from sticks and bones, 115, 116; by familiar spirits, 116, 117; among the American Indians, 117, 118; among the Ostiacks, 118; in China, 118, 119; in Ceylon, 119; by the stars, 120

Diviners, methods of, in Sierra Leone, 143; in Mexico, 143; among the Jews, 145

Divorce, Christ's doctrine of, 304; Paul's doctrine of, 632

Dogs, Parsee respect for, 409, 500

Drake, Sir Francis, and his men, divine honors paid to, 256, 257

Dreams, presumed supernatural origin of, 106; theory of, 107; interpretation of, 107; Jewish ceremony against bad, 107, 108; in Scripture, 108, 109; in Homer, 110; horn and ivory gates of, 110

Dreams, Joseph's, as a main proof of the incarnation, 108

Dress, Buddhist rule for nuns, 467

Duty, Chinese definition of, 395

Easter, 55

Ebionite, the, a sect apart, 333; their fate, 334

Ecclesiastes, the work of a cynic, 568; account of, 569

Eddas, the Norse, 388

Ego, consciousness of the, 700

Elisha, an Amazulu, 556

Elohim, the, 663, 664

Epistles, the, of the New Testament, general burden of, 618, 619

Equilibrium of soul, Chinese definition of, 395

Essenes, the, 96

Essence, the ultimate, of Brahminism, 661, 662

Evil, origin of, Hebrew account of; 537, 538; Buddhist account, 539, 540

Evolution theory, its dark spot, 705; its great triumph, 706

Existence the course of evil, 474, 475; at bottom, what? 702

Exorcism among the Jews, 212; among the disciples of Christ, 213

Experience as a test of truth, 678, 679

Ezekiel the prophet and his prophecies, 582, 584

Faith and belief distinguished, 23; and works, Scripture controversy on, 618, 619; and belief, relations of, 709-711

Fasting as a religious rite, 55

Festivals, idea of, 52; natural seasons of, 52; in Guinea, China, &c., 53; New Year's day in China, 53; Christmas, 54; among the Jews, 55; three kinds of, 54, 55; of Peruvians, 56

Fetish, idea of a, 132; power to charm, 133, priests as healers, 141

Fire a sacred symbol, 56; invocation of, 489; Parsee worship, 494, 495

Force, persistence of, 672-677; Herbert Spencer on, 677, 705; the notion of, 717

Frashaostra, 183, 184

Fravashis, the, 493

Gadarene demoniac, the, i. 243

Gâthâ, the fifth, i. 182; account of the first, ii. 487, 488; the second, ii. 485, 486; third, ii. 486, 487; fourth and fifth, ii. 487, 488

Gâthâs, the five, antiquity of, ii. 484; account of, ii. 485-490

Gentleness, Laò-tsé on, ii. 419

Ghost, the Holy, the Christian art, ii. 666, 667; generally unworshiped, 668

God, personality of, not an essential element in religious belief, 719; loss of personality of, a gain, 720

God of Israel, the, his imperious attitude, 590; arbitrary conduct towards man in Paradise, 591, 592; his command to Abraham, 592; a Bramanical contrast, 592; his favoritism for Abel, 593, for Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, 594; partizanship in delivering the Israelites from Egypt, 594, and giving them Canaan, 594; exacting and "jealous," 594; anger and the calf idolaters, 595; treatment of the Israelites in the wilderness, 594, 595; capriciousness, 595, 596, in the punishment by deluge, 596, towards the builders of Babel, 596; in regard to Balaam, ii. 596, Nadab and Abihu, ii. 597, the man that touched the ark, ii. 597, his rejection of Saul, ii. 598; preference for Samuel, 598; treatment of Ahab, ii. 598; his treatment of alien nations, 599; his legislation, 600, in regard to the Sabbath, 600, idolatry, 600, filial impiety, 600; anthropomorphic conceptions of, 602, 603; better elements in the ideal, 603, 604

God of Christendom, the, differs from the God of Israel, 636; his worst action, 637; the change accounted for, 637, 638; no longer the God of a race, 638; one blot on his character, makes punishment eternal, 638, 639; step toward a milder view, Purgatory, 640; recent still milder conceptions, 641

God the Father in mediæval art, 665, 666

God, belief in, as Father, 682; as Son, 682, 683; as Spirit, 683

God among the Fijians, 650, 651; the Negroes, 653, 654; the Greenlanders, 654; original Americans, 654, 655; the great religions of the world, 655; of Buddhism, and 653-657; interior superior, 657

God, the highest, recognized amidst inferior, worshiped gods, in Guinea, 657; among the Kafirs, 657; in Sierra Leone, 658; in Dahomey, 658; among the Ashantees, 658, 659; in Mexico and Peru, 659; in Sabaeism, 659; among the Hindus, 659-664; in Judaism, 664, 665; in Christianity, 664-666; various explanations of the idea of, 669, of common realism, 670, 698, of metaphysical realism, 671, 672, 698; comparative estimate of these theories, 672, 673; of moderate idealism, 673, 676, 698; philosophical conclusion, 476, 477

Gods appealed to as men, 39, 40

Goethe, quotation, 415

Gopa, wife of Buddha, 177-179

Gospels, the, 199; criticism of the narratives, 199-204; discrepancies in regard to the genealogies, 218-220; accounts of Christ's birth, 221, 222; discrepancies regarding Christ's habitation, 239; regarding the calling of his first disciples, 230, 231; discrepancies about the sermon on the Mount, 243; hopelessness of chronology, 243; account of Christ's entry into Jerusalem, 253; account of the fig-tree, 254; accounts of Christ's annointing, 225; accounts of Christ's betrayal by Judas, 240, 241; accounts of Christ's last passover, 258, 259; account of Christ's passion, 260, 261; account of Christ's arrest, 261, 262, of Jesus before the Sanhedrim, 262, 263, of Jesus before Pilate, 263-265, of the crucifixion, 265-267, of the resurrection, 269-275; account of Christ's lineage and birthplace, 295-298

Greece, gods of, 386

Groves, sacred, Africa and the South seas, 127

Habakkuk, the prophet, 579

Haggai, his prophecy, 585

Hanyfites, 550

Haoma, the plant, 46, 47

Harischandra, legend of, 246-249

Harmony, Chinese spiritual, 395

Haug, Dr, on the ages of the Vedas, 428, 429; his translation of the Gâthâs, 482

Hea, decrees against the King of, 404, 405

Heaven and hell, Mahometan, 516, 517

Heaven, Chinese definition of, ii. 396

Hebrews, the, its teachings, as contrasted with that of James, 618-620

Hegira, the, 189

Here's conception of Hephaistos, 223

Hermits, Indian, 195

Herod and the birth of Christ, 227-229

Herod the Tetrarch, fate of, 611

Heu Hing, political economy of, 400

Hezekiah, and Isaiah, 550; divine favor to, 557; inglorious reign of, 558

Hilkiah, and his associates, and Josiah, 523-525

Hindus, ritual among the, 51; festivals among the, 52-54

Hodgson, his discovery in Nepaul, 451

Homa, the god, 506-508

Homa-Yasht, the, 506

Homer, poems of, 388, 389

Horace, quotation, 418

Hosea, the prophet, 573

How-tseih, miraculous birth of, 224

Huran, prayer of a, 33

Hymns, Vedic, of cursing, 565, 566

Hysteria in Judea in the days of Christ, 210, 211

Ibos, sacrifice among the, 42

Idealism, its forms, 673; moderate, as a solution, 677-676; extreme, 676

Idolatry, the crime of, among the Jews, 600

Immortality of the soul, not an article in either the Buddhist or Jewish creed, 687; the Greek and Roman philosophers on, 687, 688

Incas, the worship of, by images, 651

Indian, Nootka, prayer of, 32

Indra, his praises, 433; his soma-drinking, 433; the Indian Zeus, 433

Infallibility of the clergy, 153

Inspiration of sacred books, 311, 372; among the Chinese, 380, 381

Instruction, Chinese definition of, 305

Interpretation, forced, of sacred books, 375-383

Isaac, the sacrifice of, an Indian parallel to, 545-548

Isaiah quoted to prove Messiahship of Christ, 297-299; 53d as a prophecy of Christ, 299; his rank as a prophet, 517; dates of his prophecies, 518; earliest stratum of his prophecies, 518; contrast with Joel, 519; on the Jerusalem ladies, 519; second part, 519; accepts the divine call, 520; third part, 520; fourth part, 520, 521; fifth, sixth, and seventh parts, 521; vision of the future, 521

Jacob, his bargain with Jehovah, 39; his conduct to Esau, 594

Jahveh, the holy name, 664

James, the Epistle of, its teaching contrasted with that of the Hebrews, 619, 620

Jehovah, his praises in the Psalms, 38; and Adonia, 663, 664

Jeremiah, the prophet, 579; his call 579, 580; denunciatory prophecies, ii. 580, 581; and Pashur, 581; analysis of his prophecies, ii. 581, 582; lamentations of, 583

Jesus Christ, the historical (see CHRIST), difficulties in regard to materials for his life, 199; compared with the mythical, and the ideal, 200; his sayings credibly reported, 201; criticism of his doings, 202; further tests applied, 202-204; his parents and family, 204-206; his mother, 205; birth at Nazareth, 206; originally a carpenter, 207; influence of John the Baptist, 206, 207; comes forth a Messiah, 207; boldly asserts his claim, 207; his early disciples, the three most intimate, 207, 208; female followers, 209; his own family and neighbors unfriendly to his mission, 208, 209; his public teaching, 209; state of Judea at the time, 209, 210; casts out devils, 210, 211; his sermons and parables, 212; authority as a teacher, 212, 213; offends the Jews by forgiving sin, 213; disregard of Sabbatical customs, 213; claiming Messiahship, 213, 214; abusing his enemies, 214; violent conduct in the Temple, 214; his betrayal and apprehension, 214; accusation and trial, 215, 216; the witnesses and his defense, 215, 216; his condemnation, 216; before Pilate, 216; crucifixion, 216; interment, 216

Jesus, of the Gospels, indifference to alleged lineage and birthplace, 294; believed to be of Nazareth, 296; misapplies a prophecy to himself, 298, 299; and the Jewish Sabbath, 301, 302; offense taken at the company he kept and free living, 302; his neglect of the tradition of the elders, 303; views of divorce, 304; on paying tribute, 304, 305; and the Sadducees in regard to the future state, 305-307; two chief commandments, 307; on the denunciation of the Scribes, 408, 409; provokes opposition, 409; expulsion of the money-changers, 409, 410; defense of his conduct, 410, 411; gives offense to the Sanhedrim, 312; before the Sanhedrim, 312; before Pilate, 313; his faith in his Messiahship, 316; conscious of being son of God, 316, 317; comparative modesty of the claim, 317; asserted inferiority to the Father, 318; his relation to the law, 319, 320; his mission confined to the Jews, 320, 321; his idea of his mission his one thought, 321-326; his warning to his disciples to be ready, 321-323; his idea of his kingdom, 323; his one qualification for admission, 324; his kingdom to be on earth, 325; Peter's confession of, 327; doctrine of his divinity not found in the New Testament, 327; not thought to have a design of subverting the Mosaic law, 328; modern laudation of, 339; materials for criticism, 339, 340; his fondness for contrasts, 340, 341; his resemblance to Laò-tsé, 344; aversion to wealth and wealthy men, 446, 447; his doctrine in regard to invitations to feasts, 448; parable of the laborers in in the vineyard, 449; his assertion of eternal punishment, 350; his false estimate of the power of prayer, 349; his sermon on the Mount, 450-462; his doctrine of murder, adultery, and perjury, 451, 452; of resisting evil by doing good, 452, 453; his model prayer, 356, 358; on the superiority of heavenly to temporal interests, 358-461; founder of scientific ethics, 360; as a prophet, compared with Buddha and Confucius, 362-364; compared with Socrates, 464, 465; his transcendent moral grandeur, 366; as a man of sorrows, 366-368

Jesus Christ, Mahomet's view of, 513, 514

Jesus, the ideal, of St. John, peculiarities of the narrative, 277-288; improbabilities, 288; raising Lazarus, 288-291; at the marriage feast, 279, 280; heals by a word, 282; at the pool of Bethesda, 282; interviews with Nathaniel, &c., 280, 281, 283; symbolic teachings, 281-283; last discourse to his disciples, 283; as the Logos, 283, 284; Oneness with God, as his father, 284; last days and moments, 286, 287

Jesus, the mythical, the accounts of, 216, 217; variety of these, 217; the genealogies, 217-221; conception and nativity, 221-223; mythological parallels, 223-226; mediæval painting of, in the womb, 225; recognition by the shepherds, 226, 227; by the Magi, 227; and Herod, 227, 228; a dangerous child, 228-230; circumcision, 230; recognized by Simeon, 231; by Anna, 231; in the Temple, 232-233; called a Nazarene, 234; his baptism, 234, 236; message from John the Baptist, 236; temptation, 237; comes to Capernaum, 238; reasons for leaving Nazareth 238, 239; reception in Nazareth as a preacher, 239; has an abode, 239; no ascetic, 240; in comfortable circumstances, 240; collects followers, 240, 241; calls Peter, 241; calls Matthew, 241; appoints twelve, 241; his four select, 241, 242; works miracles, 242; sermon on the Mount, 242, 243; heals the Gadarene demoniac, 243; expels a devil, and rebukes his disciples for their want of faith, 244; heals the Syrophenician damsel, 244, 245; heals a leper, 246; a paralytic, 246; raises Jarius' daughter, 246, 248; heals a woman with an issue of blood, 248; the centurion's servant, 248, 249; heals a deaf mute, 250; heals a blind man, 250, ten lepers, 250; raises the widow's son, 250; miraculously feeds a multitude, 250; walks on the water, 251; stills the storm, 251; his transfiguration, 251, 252; foretells his crucifixion and resurrection, 253; triumphal entry into Jerusalem, 253, 254; blasts the fig-tree, 254; purges the temple, 254; last anointing, 254; betrayal by Judas, 257; keeps his last passover, 258; institutes the supper, 259; washes his disciples' feet, 260; in Gethsemane, 260; arrest, 261; before the Sanhedrim, 261, 262; before Pilate, 262-265; before Herod, 264; mockery, 265; crucifixion, 265-267; last words, 267; wonders accompanying his death, 267; his burial, 268, 269; resurrection, 269-273; ascension, 275

Jews, sacrifices among the, 42-44; prayers, 50; festivals of, 52, 53; passover among, 55; rite of circumcision among, 64; historical result of their rejection of Christ, 287, 288; unjust treatment, 289; consideration in extenuation, 289; their provocations, 290, 291; credulity of skepticism in regard to Messianic pretensions, 292; justification of their Messianic expectations, 293-294; excusable ignorance as to Christ's lineage, 295, 296; and their own prophecies, 296-299; treatment of Christ's miracles, 299; their esteem for the Sabbath law, 300, 301; their offense at Christ for his disregard of ceremonial observance, 300-303; their right to interrogate Christ, 303; question to Jesus about tribute, 304, 305; just offense, as monotheists, at Christ, 313; and Christianity, 314-316; justification of their rejection of Christ, 315; identified with their Bible, 162; settlement in Judea, 162, 163; under kings, 163; in captivity, 163; epoch in their history, 163; their national god, 164-166; early creed not monotheistic, 166; idolatry, 167; not Jehovistic, only the priests, 167, 169; effects of the captivity, 170-172; under the Maccabees, 173; their pride and intolerance, 133, 173; under the Asmoneans and the Herods, 173; under the Romans, 174; in Christendom, 175; their toughness, 175.

Job, story of the book of, 563, 564

"Jocelyn," Lamartine's, 102, 103

Joel, his prophecy, 571; Isaiah, 575

John, Baptist, asceticism of, 96, 206, 207; baptizes Christ, 235; message from prison to Christ, 336; Christ's estimate of, 336

John, Gospel of, silence about miraculous conception, 221; account of Christ's baptism, 235; account of the crucifixion, 268; on Christ's Divinity, 327, 328; its value in evidence, 328

John, the apostle, the beloved disciple, 281; his Gospel, its fondness for symbolic speech, 281, 282; for obscure theological questions, 383, 384; doctrine of the Logos, 384, 385; his Gospel as regards Christ's birthplace and lineage, 294, 295

John, the three epistles of, 620, 621

Jonah, book and story of, 586, 587

Jongleurs, the, in New France, installation of, 601

Jordan, crossing the, an Indian parallel, 553

Joseph, the father of Jesus, 204, 218, 221, 229, 233

Josiah, Jehovistic _coup d'état_ under, 523, 525

Judas, his betrayal of Jesus, 214; slander against, 255; betrays Christ, 263; myth of his unhappy end, 257, 258; charged with his intended crime at the last supper, 258, 259; arrest of Christ, 261, 263

Judaism, antagonism to asceticism, 96; of John the Baptist, 97; tendency of Christianity to encourage, 97; idea of, 98; Protestant disregard of, 99; and Christianity, 328; and the apostle Paul, 330, 331; and the early Church, 334

Kafirs, prayer of, 34; sacrifice among the, 42, 43; sneezing an omen among, 110; other omens among, 112

Kama, burning of, 55; invoked to curse, 566

Kantaka, horse of Buddha, 179

Karma, the, of Buddhist ethics, 481

Kava-Vistaspa, 183, 184

Keightley, data from, on saint worship in England, 668

Khadija, the first wife of Mahomet, 187; her relations with the prophet, 187; her death, 180

Khorda-Avesta, the, 502-509; its use, 502; subject-matter and date, 503

King, the meaning of the term, 391; the five, 391, 392

Kingdom of heaven, Christ's idea of, 321-324; Paul's, 335; Peter's 336

Koran, style of, 194, 378-389; the staple of, 198; the single authorship and unity of, 510; apology for its style, 510; translations, 510; origin and formation of, 510; original copy, 511; arrangement, 511; themes, 511, 512; specimens, 512; its paradise, 517; its hell, 517

Korosi, his discovery, 451

Kosti, investure with the, 74

Kronos, his dread of his children, 229

Kunâla, legend of, 481

Kyros, a dangerous child, 230

Lady, a pious, 460

Laò-tsé, probable date of birth, 168; admonition to Confucius, 168; account of himself, 168; resembled Plato's philosopher, 169; his style similar to Christ's, 340; the Christianity of, 353; left writings, 413; description of Tao, 414; conception of goodness, 418; on gentleness, 419; against luxury, 419; has three cardinal virtues, 420; mysticism, 420; conception of God, 421, 422; his character and teaching, 422

Lazarus, story of, peculiar to John's Gospel, 255; his resurrection, 347, 348

Lazarus and Dives, 344, 347, 350

Legge, Dr. James, his Chinese classics, 390; his opinion of the authorship of Ch'un' Tsew, 59

Legislation, Hebrew, 600-603

Libations in sacrifice, 47; in Tartary, Samoa, Thibet, &c., 47

Life, vital forces, Indian apologue, 445, 446

Linga, the, worship of, 54

Lucretius on immortality, 688

Luke, his genealogy of Jesus, 218-221; account of miraculous conception and birth, 222, 223; account of the shepherds, 226, 227; account of Christ's infancy, 230; discrepancies with Matthew, 233-236; his free spirit, 232; account of the call of Peter, 241; version of the sermon on the Mount, 243; account of lunatic boy, 244; his partiality for angels, 252; accompanies Paul, 257

Lun Yu, the, date of, 392; subject matter, 392; its Boswellian minuteness of detail, 392

Luxury, Laò-tsé on, 419

Magi and the birth of Christ, 228-230

Mahomet, pretensions of, to the supernatural, 122; the last of the great prophets, 186; his religion self-derived, 187; his parents and birth, 187; his original social position, 187; marries Khadija, 187; his first revelation, 187; passes through the period of the "Everlasting No." 187; Gabriel his guardian angel, 187; first disciples, 187; his doctrines provoke persecution, 187; his momentary relapse into idolatry and repentance, 188; persecution of his family, 188; binds by a vow pilgrims from Medina, 188; his flight to Medina, 189; success there, 189; war with Mecca, 189; truce with the Meccans, 190; summons crowned heads to submit to his religion, 190; first pilgrimage to Mecca, 190; enters Mecca in triumph, 191; proclamation to the inhabitants, 192; final triumph and death, 191; his character an open question, 192; his sincerity, 193-195; sense of inspiration, 193; time-serving withal, 193; inspired poetic style, 193; his predecessors, 195; his sources of information, 195; takes to the sword, 195; conduct to the Jews, 195, 196; his weak point, 196, 197; his harem, 197; his marriages, 198; his jealousy, 198; triumph of his religion, 199, 200; aristocratic descent, 221; ante-natal intimations of his greatness, 226; the infant recognized by his grandfather, 231; his awe under the new revelation, 512; his stock-in-trade, 513; view of his prophetic function, 513; prophets acknowledged by, 514; views of Christ, 514, 515; of himself, 516, 517; address of God to, 516

Malachi on sacrifices to God, 44; prophecies of, 586, 587

Man, the wise and the fool, chapter from, 468

Mang, on high-mindedness, his teaching similar to Christ's, 341; a disciple of Confucius, 396; his works, 396, 397; late introduction to the canon, 397, 398; his democratic philosophy, 398; his view how heaven makes known its will, 399, 400; notions of good government, 399, 400; a political economist, 401; his regard for propriety, 401, 402; his faith in human nature, 402, 403; his moral tone, 403

Manu, code of, on legal and illegal forms of marriage, 76, 77; the typical ancestors of men, 447; and the deluge, 543, 544

Mark, Gospel of, its credibility, 203; omits miraculous conception, 221; account of Christ's baptism, 235; reference to Christ's temptation, 237

Marriage, rites at, peculiar to civilized nations, 75; in Ceylon, 75; in Thibet, 76; according to the code of Manu, 76; among Parsees, Jews, and Christians, 77; with strangers, among the Jews, 600

Marriage-tie, the, Christ on, 345

Maruts, the, prayer to, 35, 38; their nature, 434

Mary, the mother of Jesus, 204, 205, 218, 221-223, 233, 234; at the cross, 267

Masses for the dead, 80

Materialism, unphilosophic, 694

Matthew, his genealogy of Jesus, 218-221; account of miraculous conception, and birth, 221, 222; account of the Magi, 227; reticence about infancy of Christ, 230; discrepancies with Luke, 233-236; call of, 241; version of sermon on the Mount, 243; his misappropriation of prophecy, 297, 298

Maya Devi, her dream, 176; her pregnancy, 176; delivery of a son, 177; death thereafter, 177

Maya, her gestation-time, 225

Mean, the, Chinese doctrine of, 394, 395

Mencius. See MANG

Messiah, the, the term, 292, 293; Jewish ideas of, 292, 293; these ideas not responded to by Christ, 293; presumptuous Christian interpretations, 293, 294; predictions as to lineage and birth, 294-296; as son of David, 295; predictions of his birth from a virgin, 297, 298; in 53d of Isaiah, 279

Metaphysics, Buddhist, 473, 474

Mexico, human and other sacrifices in, 41, 42, 43; worship in, 51; burial rites in, 78; monasticism in, 91, 93

Mexican festival for rain, 35

Micah, the prophecy of, 578

Mill, J. S., a metaphysical realist, 676

Mind, not resolvable in matter, or physical cause, 689-692

Miracles as credentials of the divine, 120, 121; of Buddhism, 121; among the Mongols, 122; among the Moslems, 122; of Christianity, 123; in the early Church, 123, 124; of the Mormons, 124, 125; insufficiency of the evidence in the case of Christ, 299, 300

Mite, the widow's, 342, 343

Mithra, the god, 467, 471, 493

Mitra, 435

Moments, four sacred, 57

Monasticism in Mexico and Peru, 89, 92; among the Buddhists, 93-95; in Siam, 96; in Nepaul, 97; in Christianity, 104

Monk, Buddhist, condemned, to monkeyhood, 556

Monotheism, fate of, 312

Monteçuma and human sacrifice, 41

Mormons, the, claim to supernatural gifts, 124, 125

Moses, a dangerous Child, 229; address of God to, 515; the ten commandments of, 549, 550; commandments of the tables of stone given to, 595, 596; mercifulness, 239; divine manifestations to, 602

Moslems, prayer among the, 51

Muir, Dr., Sanskrit texts, 425

Müller, Max, translator of Rig-Veda-Sanhitâ, 425; account, of the Vedas, 427, 428; on the supreme god of the Hindus, 662, 663

Myths, three classes of, about Jesus, 217; instance of first order, 221, 222, 224; of the dangerous child, 227; Perseus's birth, 229; of Oidipous, 229; of Christ's baptism, 352; illustration of the growth of, 234

Nagardjuna, thaumaturgic powers of, 122

Nahum, the prophet, and his prophecy, 578

Nathaniel, 280-285

Nature, Chinese definition of, 395

Nausikaa, a Chinese, 409

Nazareth, Christ's reputed birthplace, 296

Nazarites, the, 96

Neander on the Judaism of the early Church, 333, 334

Newman, Francis W., 640

Nicodemus, 267, 280, 282, 283, 285

Nidânas, the twelve, 473-475

Nirvâna, theory of, 474, 475; sacrifice of, 478

Obadiah, prophecy of, 577

Objects, holy, in Peru, 133; trees as, 134; animals as, 134; serpents as, 134; images as, 135

Odes, Chinese, traditional interpretation of, 379-381

Offerings, religious, in Sierra Leone, 84; in Tartary, 85

Oidipous, 229

Omar, his conversion to Mahometanism, 188

Omens, divine, 106; in dreams, 106; in sneezing, 109-110; interpretation of, 111; from flight of eagles, 111; from a horse turning back, 111; from bleating of a sheep, 111; among the Kafirs and Chinese, 112; in Ceylon, 112, 113; in the heavens, 113; in Tacitus, 113, 114; in Ireland and Scotland, 114; at birth of great men, 114, 115

Ophites, the, their worship, 134

Ordeals, as a moral test, 119; in Western Africa, 119; among the Hebrews, 120; among the Negroes, 120; among the Ostiacks, 121

Orders, holy, in the Church of England, 102, 103; Buddhist monastic rules, 104-106

Ormazd. See AHURA-MAZDA

Pachacamac, or the universal soul, 658

Palestine, state of, in days of Christ, 209, 210

Parker, Theodore, 641

Parsees, sacrifices among the, 44; prayers, 50; festivals of, 53; baptism among, 61, 62; burial rites, 78, 80

Parseeism, rise of, 484; reformers' hymn, 483; religious zeal of, 486; objects of worship, 489; fire-worship, 490, 491; confession of faith, 490, 491; new divinities, 491, 493; respect for dogs, 499, 500; later respect for purity, 500, 501; times of, 507, 508; eight commandments of, 550, 551

Passover, the Jewish, 55

Patets, the Parsees, 506, 507

Patria Potestas, the, in Judea and Rome, 600, 601

Paul, his independence and concession to Jewish prejudices, 330, 331; his views of the Mosaic law, 332, 333; idea of the coming of Christ, 334, 335; as a persecutor, 608; accounts of his conversion, 608-610; his consecration, 611; at Paphos, 611; in Antioch, 611; at Lystra, taken for Hermes, 611; for a god, 611; parallel in the case of Sir Francis Drake, 612, 613; stoned, 614; parts with Barnabas, 614; chooses Silas, 614; at Phillippi, 614; at Athens, 614; at Corinth, 614; at Ephesus, 614, 615; at Troas, 616; at Jerusalem, 616, 617; appeal to Cæsar, 616; in Rome, 617; his equal apostleship, 621, 622; his epistles, their style and spirit, 623; his reasoning powers, 623, 624; his exclusive regard for essential principles, 623, 624; denunciation of cohabitation with a stepmother, 626; against prostitution, 626; views on matrimony, 628, 629, 630, 632; rules affecting widows, 629; preference for celibacy, 630; allows bishops and deacons to marry, 630; on divorce, 632; on the resurrection of the dead, 632-634; on brotherly love, 634; other maxims, 634

Perseus, myth of his birth, 229

Persia, power of, 482

Peru, monasticism in, 91, 92

Peruvians, festivals of, 55; baptism among, 58

Peter, call of, 240; his denial of Christ, 262; his confession, 327; his vision, 328; and Judaism, 329, 330; idea of kingdom of heaven, 335, 336; conduct towards Ananias and Sapphira, 606, 607; deliverance by an angel, 608; scandal caused by, 610; his epistles, 619

Pharisee, the, and publican, 344

Pharisees, and Christ, 300, 305; denounced by Christ, 308, 309

Phinehas and the Midianitish woman, 597

Pilate, as governor of Judea, 262, 263; treatment of Christ, 263, 265; Christ before, 313

"Pilgrim's Progress," 635, 636. See BUNYAN

Places, holy, 82, 83; special haunts of the divine, 126, 127; in Africa and South Seas, 127; in Ceylon, (the Bo-tree), 127; graves as, 127, 128; in history, 128; oracles, 128; by consecration—the temple, 128, 129; holy of holies, 130

Plato, his description of a philosopher in his "Theætetus," 170

Polynesia, burial rites in, 78

Positivism, weak point in, 157

Pourutschista, St., 183, 184

Power, the Unknown, not a suggestion of sense, 696, or of reason, 696, 697, but of religious sentiment, 697, 698; idea of, unaccounted for by Realism, common and metaphysical, 698; moderate and extreme Idealism, 698; neither one nor many, but all, 699, 700; sense of, an intuition, 700, 701; of kin to mind, as in man, 701, 702; includes consciousness, 702; includes our nature, 702; the universal solvent, 703, 704; fountain of all reservoirs of force, 705; allows nothing to be a law to itself, 705; our knowledge of, no riddle, 707; illustrations, 708-712; the denial of, an affirmation, 717; faith in, the foundation of religious faith, 718; answer to charge of vagueness, 719, 720; not a father, not a judge, 720; harmony of the idea of, with deep religious feeling, 721

Praise conjoined with prayer, 32-37; part of worship, 37, 38; Christian and heathen compared, 38

Prajapati, 535

Prayer, its influence, 32; its concomitant, praise, 32; its primitive form and purpose, 33; specimens of primitive, 33; of Indians, preparing for war, 33; of a Huron, 33; of Kafirs, 34; of Caribbean Islanders, 34; of the Samoans, 34; Polynesian, 34; Vedic, 35-37; Solomon's, 35; special, 35; efficacy, 35; for rain and other physical benefits, 36; for Thebes, 38; specimens of, 38-40; and sacrifice, 39; forms of, 50; Christ's doctrine of, 350; the Lord's, 356-358

Pre-Adamites, Buddhist, 460

Priests, special function of, 99; in relation to the monastic order, 99, 100; consecration of, in Greenland, 100; among the American tribes, 100; among certain Negroes, 100; in Mexico, 101; among the Jews, 101, 102; in the Christian Church, 102, 103; sanctity of, 136; authority of, 136-138; grades of, 137; prophets _versus_, 138; privileges of, 138; primitive, 138; formation as a separate class, as medical practitioners, 139, 140; disease-making, 140; as doctors in Australia, Africa, &c., 141; as healers among the Negroes, 140, 141; as mediators for the sick, 142; irregular, 142; miscellaneous functions, 142; in North America as soothsayers, 144; as fortune-tellers, &c., in Thibet, 145; claim to inspiration, 145; Jewish high, claims and powers of, 146; protected by heaven, 146; repute of Brahminical, 147; functions of, 147; as rain makers, &c., 148; power and sanctity of, 148, 149; in Ceylon and Siam, 149; reward of, 149; tithes to, 149; the duty and privilege of offering, 152; privileges of, 150; hereditary, 151; internally called, 152; a demand for, 152; infallibility, 153

Priestesses in Guinea, 148, 149

Prophet, anonymous, 574; another, 578; _the_ anonymous, his rank among the prophets, 583; his prophecies, 584; the prophet of consolation, 584, 585

Prophets of the world, the, 154; their ultimate authority, 155; mystically invested with superhuman endowment, 155; their absolute consciousness, 155, 156; their conservative spirit, 156; the Hebrew, civil standing, 554, 555; Elijah and Elisha, 555; the most powerful, 570

Prophecy, Hebrew, originally oral, then written, 570; constant theme of, 570, 571; minor topics, 571

Prosperity, national or royal, Jewish, Chinese, and Thibetan theories of, 558, 559

Protestantism and asceticism, 98

Proverbs, the, a criticism, 568

Psalms, the, their character, 564, 565; of cursing (cx. and cix.), 565; Vedic parallels, 565, 566

Psalmists, the, their praises of Jehovah, 38

Puberty, rites of, cruel and mysterious, 64, 65; meaning of the rites, 65, 66; Catlin's account of the rite among the Mandans, 66, 67; Schoolcraft's account, 68; rite in New South Wales, 68-70; and in other parts of Australia, 70, 71; of a Phallic nature in Africa, 71-73; in South Seas, 73; among the Hindus, 72, 73; among the Parsees, 74; among Jews and Christians, 74

Punishment, eternal, doctrine of, 350; in the Christian system, 638-640

Purgatory, a merciful suggestion, 640

Pûrna, the Christianity of, 354; the legend of, 452-458

Purusha Sûkta, the, a universal essence, 438, 439

Rain, prayer for, 35, 36

Rays of Buddha, 113

Realism, common, in relation to God, 670, 671; metaphysical, do., 671, 672; comparative estimate, 672, 673; and Idealism, unable to solve the religious problem, 698, 699

Reality, the one, 701

Reason, the process of, 696

Relations, the, of time and space to mind and matter, 691, 692

Religion, interest and importance of the subject, 19, 20; fallacious evidences, 20, 21; method of inquiry, 22, 23; universality and varied phases, 22, 23; substance and form, 22; its root principle, 27; craving after, 28; twofold aspect and function, 29; analysis of treatment of the subject in these volumes, 28-30; two distinct questions regarding, 645, 646; these resolved into three, 646; essential assumption, 647; three fundamental postulates, 648; two kinds of proof, 649; universal, 649, 650; meagre among the Australians, 650; in Kamtschatka, 650; the permanent in, 668, 669; question suggested by, as regards God, 669; conclusion of science, 677, 678; tendency to limit itself in theology, 679, 680; historical progress of, 681, 682; the great truth in, offered to philosophy, 683; involves a faith in the soul, 684-694; final postulate, 695; conclusion of, neither from sense nor reason, but sentiment, 696; conclusion of, necessary, 696; a pervading error and a general truth in, 709; real difficulty about, 711; denial of its truth emotional as well as the affirmation, 712; objections met, 710, 725; the one universal foundation of, 718

Religions, founders of new, 154; their comparison, 645

Resurrection, of Christ, accounts of the, 269; the germ of these in Mark, 269, 270; Matthew's, 269, 270; Luke's, 270; John's, 271, 272; Paul's, 272, 273; summary of accounts, 272, 273; psychological explanation of the myth, 275, 277; of Lazarus, 278, 279

Reverend, the title of, 149

Review, general, 643-645

Rig Veda, the, 426, 427, 429

Rig-Veda, Sanhitâ, its contents, 430, 435; its praise of Agni, 431; of Indra and the Soma, 431-434; of the Maruts, 434; of Ushas, the dawn, 434; of Varuna, 435, 436; consciousness of one God, 437, 438; speculative element, 440; on the Purusha Sûkta, 438, 439; personification of abstractions, 439, 440; general estimate of, 440, 441; interest to the mythologist, 441; elementary religious ideas, 442, 443

Ritual, early, universal development of a fixed, 49, 50; in prayer, 50; in worship, 51; in Mexican and other worships, 51; Griggories, charms in Sierra Leone, 133

Rome, Church of, and Paganism, 56

Rudrayana, legend of his conversion to Buddhism, 458, 459

Sabaeism, god of, 659

Sabbath, the Jewish, Christ's treatment of, 309-302

Sacrament, the Christian, 46, 47

Sacrifice, idea and origin of, 39, 40, 42, 43, 48; motive to and duty of, 49, 50; to the Amatongo, 40; object of, 41, 44; in Kamtschatka, 42; human, 41; animal, among the Kafirs and in Western Africa, 42; among the American Indians, 42; in China, 42; among the Jews, 42, 46; the Ibos, 42; in South Sea Islands, 43; among the Mexicans, Peruvians, Incas, 43; among the Hindus, 43; among the Parsees, 44; Malachi on, 45; among the Buddhists, 45; a requirement of the religious sentiment, 45; part of, the priests' and worshipers', 46; among the Tembus, 46; by libation, 46; supposed effects on the deity, 47; theory of, among the Hindus, 47; idea of, fundamental to Christianity, 48, 49

Sadducees, the, and Christ, 305, 308

Saints, worship of, 310, 311

Sakyamuni. See BUDDHA

Saleh, the legend of the prophet, 512-514

Sâma Veda, the, 427, 429

Sâmaria, the woman of, 281-284

Samoans, prayer of the, 34; drink-offerings of, 47

Samson, the Jewish Hercules, 553

Samudra, the legend of, 588, 589

Samuel, government of, 553, 554

Sanhitâs, the, what? 425, 426

Satan in the book of Job, 563, 564

Saturday, holy, in the Catholic Church, 55

Scala Santa, the, 128

Sect, Johannine, trace of a, 616

Self-consecration common to all religions, 88; its nature, 89; its elements, 89

Sennacherib, legend of, 556, 557

Sermon on the Mount, 350, 351

Shakers, the, 98

She King, the, slight religious interest of, 407; popularity of its songs, 408; varied themes of these, 407; the widow's protest, 408; young lady's request to her lover, 408; ode of filial piety, 410; theory of kingly success, 560; ode similar to one of psalmist David's, 567

Ship adrift, a parallel, 718, 719

Shoo, the four, 391

Shoo King, the, its antiquity, 403; doctrine of imperial duties and rights, 403, 404; respect for the popular mind, 404; on the house of Hea, 404, 405; on the house of Yin, 406; counsels of the Duke of Chow, 406; of the Duke of Ts'in, 406

Shun, heaven's choice of, as king, 399, 400, 402, 406

Simeon, his recognition of the infant Christ, 231-235

Sin, supposed physical effects of, 36

Sincerity, a Chinese virtue, 395

Sneeze, a famous, in Xenophon, 111

Sneezing, an omen, 110; exclamations connected with, in Polynesia, Germany, Africa, &c., 110; as an omen in Germany, 111

Socrates, and Christ, his superior gift, 364, 366; a Chinese, 417

Solomon, prayer of, 35; dedication of Temple, 83; an Indian, 554

Soma, a god as well as a juice, 431

Son, the, in the Trinity, 682, 683

Song of Solomon, traditional interpretation of, 379; dramatic character of, 569, 570; brief account of, 570

Sophocles, prayer to Apollo, 39

Soul, Indian conception of a universal, 445, 446; Indian idea of the future of the, 446; the universal, of the Veda, 659, 661; faith in, involved in every religion, 684; in Kamtschatka, Tartary, America, 685; the Kafirs, the Ashantees, 686; immateriality of, 687; faith in its immortality not universal, 687, 688

Space and time as elements, 691

Spiegel, Dr., translation of the Zend-Avesta, 483

Spirit, the, in the Trinity, 683

Spirits, familiar, divination by, 108, 109

Spiritualism, 724

Sramana, a, defined, 94

Srotâpanna, the, 479 (note)

Suddhodana and his queen worthy to produce Buddha, 176

Sunday, Jewish notions of, 301

Serpent, worship of the, 133, 134

Suras, showing how Mahomet was possessed by his idea, 512; the opening of the Koran, 512; of the prophet's maturity, 513

Sûtras, the Buddhistic, the interpretation of, 378; tediousness, 389; the simple and developed, 450; diffuseness and supernatural gear, 472; the simple, 472

Sûtra, Prâtimoksha, the, monastic rules of, 94; its subject, 463; antiquity, 463; monastic rules of, 464-466

Sûtra-Pitaka, the, 467, 468; stories from, 467, 468; contents of, 468

Svetaketu, the ill-educated young Brahman, 446

Syrophœnicia, woman of, 244, 245

Swimming, mixed, 460

Tables of stone, commandments of, 551, 552

T'ae-k'ang, the Shoo King on, 403

Ta Hëo, the, its doctrinal character, 293; the original text, 393, 394; Tsang's commentary, 394; its politico-practical character, 394

Talapoins, the, 148, 149

Tantras, the, 476

Tao, description of, 414, 417; his character, 421

Taò-tĕ-Kīng, book of the Taò-sse, 413; European translations, 413; authenticity of, 414; meaning of the title, 414; its principal subjects, 414; on Tao, 416, 417; its ideal man, 417, 419; moral doctrines, 417, 418; most philosophical of sacred books, 414; a perplexing study, 414; its conception of God, 421, 422; extract in French and German, 423, 424

Tao-tsé, the sect, 413

Tartars, drink-offerings among the, 47

Tathâgata, the, 477

Temple, rudest form of, known, 83; Solomon's, its dedication, 83; usual splendor of such structures, 82; the Jewish, as a holy place, 129; Fijian, 129, 130; in Mexico and Peru, 130, 131

Testament, the Old, the sum of the literary activity of the Jews, 518; historical books, 530, 563; doctrine of creation of the universe, 531, 532; of animals and man, 535-538; account of the deluge, 542, 543; of Abraham, 545, 546; of the Jews in Egypt and their deliverance, 548, 549; of the law, 549; of the laws of the stone tablets, 552; of settlement in Palestine, 554; of the kings, 554, 555; of the schism, 555; of the captivity, 563

Testament, New, its contents, 604

Theologians, royal, 445-447

Theology and religion, 681

Theology, misconception of, 709

Therapeutæ, the, 95

Thibet, marriage in, 76; death rites in, 79

Thread, investiture with the, among the Hindus, 73, 74

Tombs, sacred, 127

Tongues, the gift of, at Pentecost, 605, 606; Paul's view of, 606, 607

Tree, the Ruminal, 113

Trees, holy, 127, 133, 134

Tribute, Christ on paying, 304-306

Trinity, Scripture proof of the doctrine, 379; rationally viewed, 681, 682

Tripitaka, the, translations of, 449; its origin, 450; its divisions and their authorship, 450; second and third editions called for, 450; real antiquity, 451; discoveries connected with, 451; theology and ethics of, 476

Tsang, commentary of, 393

Ts'in on the choice of rulers, 406

Tsze-Kung, hero-worship of, 168

Unkulunkulu, the Great-great of the Kafirs, 651, 652

Upagupta and the courtesan, 469, 470

Upanishad, the, 444, 445

Upâsakas, 479, 480

Ushas, the Indian aurora, 434

Utikxo, a greater than the Great-great, 653

Utilitarianism sanctioned by Christ, 360

Utshaka, his prayer for rain, 35

Varuna, his power and attributes, 435, 436

Veda, the, merit of studying, 373; forced interpretation of, 377, 378; its inspiration, 429

Vedas, the, meaning of the term, 425; subdivisions, literature, and versions, 425, 426; the Sanhitâ portion, 425; the Brâhmana, 425; origin of the four, 427; arrangement, 427, 428; antiquity, 427-429; four epochs of development, 427; theories of them, 428, 429; division into Sruti and Smriti, 429; the study of, 430

Vedic hymns, prayer and praise in, 37, 38; the style of, 39

Vendidad, the, a legislative code, 497, 502; on agriculture, 498, 499; on penalties, 499; on surgical training, 499

Vinaya-Pitaka, the date, 451, 452; specimen legend of Pûrna, 452, 458; immediate subject of, 460, 461; monastic rules, 461-463

Virgin, the term in Scripture, 297

Vishnu, the unknowable of Spencer, 659, 660

Visvamitra, his merits and trials as an ascetic, 95, 96; an Indian Joshua, 553

Vocabulary, Pentaglot Buddhist, rules, 461, 462

Voice, the still small, 603

Volsunga-Saga, 388, 399

Water, holy, 55; virtues of, 135

Wilson, H. H., translation of first five Ashtakas, 425; on the age of the Vedas, 428

Wisdom, Indian hymn to, 440; worship a universal necessity, 31; its elements, 31; its grades, 32; efficacy of, 32; often selfish, 37; considered as pleasing to deity, 37; matter of commerce, 38; of Zeus and Apollo, 39; ritual in, 122

Woo, King, legend of, 557, 558

Xenophon, encouraged by a sneeze, 111

Yaçna, the, of seven chapters, antiquity, 488; theme of, 488-490;