CHAPTER XXXI

YOUNG MEN IN PEKING, OLD MEN IN PARIS

A crowd of students appeared before the legation gate on the 5th of May clamouring to see me. I was absent, that day, on a trip to the temple above Men Tou-kou and so missed seeing them. Their demonstration, as it turned out afterward, was the first step in the widespread student movement which was to make history. Their patriotic fervour had, on that morning, been brought to the boiling point by the first inkling of the Paris decision on Shantung.

The first reaction of the Chinese people as a whole to this news was one of dumb dismay. It was a stunning, paralyzing blow. It seemed that all the brazen intrigue through which Japan had been seeking to strengthen her hold on Shantung, all the cunning by which she had prepared the basis of her claim to permanent possession of the German rights, had been endorsed by the Versailles Conference.

The Chinese people, discouraged in Peking, had centred their hopes on Paris. When hints of a possible acceptance of Japan's demands were received in Peking, the first impulse of the students was to see the American minister, to ask him whether this news was true, and to see what he had to say. I escaped a severe ordeal.

When they were told that I was absent there was at first a hum of voices, then came the cry: "To the house of the traitor!" They meant the house of Tsao Ju-lin, where the schemers had assembled to make the contracts which China hated. Tsao Ju-lin, the smooth little plotter whom most people regarded as the guiding spirit of the humiliating business, was the most despised; but they associated with him Chang Ching-hsiang, who had been Chinese minister at Tokyo when the secret treaties were drawn up. The students rushed over to the house and broke down the door and trooped inside. They found both men there. No time was lost, either on the part of the students or their prey. The students breaking up chairs and tables and using pieces of them for weapons went after the two diplomats. Tsao, still smooth and slippery, managed to escape through a window and into a narrow alley where he eluded his pursuers. Chang, however, was beaten into insensibility. Lu Tsung-yu, the other plotter whom the students would have "treated rough", was not to be found.

For four days we were without foreign news. The first brief telegraphic intimation of the Paris decision was followed by the cutting of the wires; Japanese agents, the people surmised, did this to prevent the universal Chinese protest from influencing the decision or causing its review.

Primarily the cause of the student violence lay in the proximity of the fourth anniversary of the Japanese ultimatum of 1915; but they were also anxious and stirred because of the reported action of the old men at Paris.

While other telegraphic communication was cut off I got information of what was actually done by wireless. I found it hard to believe that President Wilson would be compliant to the Japanese demands, in View of the complete and insistent information the American Government had had from me and all other American officials in China as to what would result from such action. The Shantung decision constituted a wrong of far-reaching effect; no general benefits bestowed by a league of nations could outweigh it. Indeed, as I stated to the Government, it destroyed all confidence in a league of nations which had such an ugly fact as its cornerstone.

To any one who had watched, day by day, month by month, the unconscionable plotting for these claims, the decision was a lamentable denial of every principle put forward during the war. President Wilson brushed aside the unanimous opinion of the American experts, it would seem, for two reasons: first, he believed that if only the League were established, all difficulties of detail could easily be resolved; and, second, he had not given enough attention to the Shantung question to realize that this was not a matter of detail, but a fundamental issue.

President Wilson tried to make himself and others believe that with the acceptance of the Treaty and Covenant, the Shantung question would be solved through fulfilment by Japan of its promise "to restore Shantung Peninsula to China with full sovereignty," reserving only economic rights. This was his primary misconception. The ownership by a foreign government of a trunk railway reaching from a first-class port to the heart of China could not be correctly termed an economic right. Political control of such "economic rights" was exactly what American policy had tried to prevent for decades. The President submitted, also, in the apparent fear that Japanese delegates might follow the lead of the Italians and leave the Conference. Colonel House, it appears, was frightened into this belief and communicated it to President Wilson; the two believed the League was endangered, and that every sacrifice must be made to save it.

The fear was quite unfounded. I had seen indications enough, of which I had told the Government, that the Japanese set enormous store upon their membership in the Conference and their position in Paris. As a military, naval, and financial power, Japan could certainly not be put in the first class, notwithstanding the tactical advantages which the war had brought her. She would never forego the first-class status bestowed by the arrangements of the Peace Conference. The Japanese had not the remotest idea of throwing these advantages to the wind. The impression they produced on Colonel House simply proved their capacity for bluffing. Had President Wilson taken the trouble to understand the situation, he could without difficulty, by the use of friendly firmness, have secured a very different solution. As a matter of fact, it is now well known that the Japanese were ready to agree to an arrangement whereby the German rights in China should accrue to the Allied and Associated Powers jointly with an early reversion to China.

Probably nowhere else in the world had expectations of America's leadership at Paris been raised so high as in China. The Chinese trusted America, they trusted the frequent declarations of principle uttered by President Wilson, whose words had reached China in its remotest parts. The more intense was their disappointment and disillusionment due to the decisions of the old men that controlled the Peace Conference. It sickened and disheartened me to think how the Chinese people would receive this blow which meant the blasting of their hopes and the destruction of their confidence in the equity of nations.

In the universal despair I feared a revulsion of feeling against America; not because we were more to blame than others for the unjust decision, but because the Chinese had entertained a deeper belief in our power, influence, and loyalty to principle. They would hardly understand so abject and complete a surrender. Foreign papers, also, placed the chief responsibility on the United States. The British in China felt that their government had been forced into the unfortunate secret agreements with Japan when it could not help itself, because of the German danger and the difficulties Japan might raise by going over to the other side. The United States, whose hands were free, could have saved us all, they said, by insisting on the right solution. They had really hoped for this; their saying so now in their editorials and in private conversation was in no spirit of petty hostility, but they had to give vent to their feelings. I feared the Chinese might feel that they had been betrayed in the house of their friends, but they met the blow with sturdy spirit. They never wounded my feelings by anything approaching an upbraiding of the United States for the part that President Wilson played at Paris. They expressed to me their terrible dejection, but said merely that President Wilson must have encountered very great difficulties which they could know nothing about.

They all knew, of course, that the case of China had been weakened by the treaties made through the connivance of Tsao Ju-lin and his associates in the fall of 1918. Their resentment was turned toward Japan, which had thus taken advantage of the war and the weakness of China, and against the Chinese politicians who had become Japan's tools.

The Americans in China, as well as the British and the Chinese, were deeply dejected during these difficult weeks. From the moment America entered the war there had been a triumphant confidence that all this sacrifice and suffering would establish just principles of world action, under which mankind could live more happily and in greater security. That hope was now all but crushed.

In commemoration of the soldier dead, the American community gathered on May 30th, Decoration Day. It fell to me to make the address, in which I spoke of those recently stationed in Peking who had died during the war. Especially, I spoke of the fruitful career of Major Willard Straight. It was remarkable how many officers of the Marine Guard recently in Peking had gone through the brunt of the war and had been distinguished in their service. I spoke of General Neville, General Bowley, Commander Hutchins, Colonel Newell, and Colonel Holcombe, all of whom had been in the thick of it, and rejoiced in their record and the fact that though they passed through the valley of death they had been spared. My eyes often rested on the sad face of Mrs. Deering, transfigured with the mother's pride in that heroic son whose war letters, published by her, are one of the intimately human memorials of the great struggle.

I was impressed with how inadequately this wonderful country of China and the promise of its people were understood in America. I knew the difficulties and dangers to be overcome there, and I felt that Americans well-disposed toward China would take a hand in its development. But the "folks back home," especially the interests that controlled the economic life of America, remained blind and deaf, lavishing their money in Europe.

I had spent my energies freely, withholding assistance from none who deserved it, although I could easily have limited my official action within narrower and more convenient bounds. In developments that would mean a slow lift of this fine old civilization to a modern plane real American interests had come in. Foundations had been laid in the Canal Contract, the China Medical Board, the railway concessions, the creation of a Chino-American bank, and many other enterprises. America stood no longer with empty hands; she could not be confronted with the gibe so often used before: "It is easy for you to suggest generous action, for you have nothing to contribute."

With these as beginnings, I arrived at the conclusion that more, possibly, could be done by way of arousing American interests in Far Eastern affairs by going to the United States than by staying in China. I feared, also, that if I remained away from America too long, it would be difficult readily to get in touch again with affairs there.

For such reasons, I came to the decision that I should send my resignation to the President. I did not wish to run away from a difficult and disagreeable situation. Indeed, until the first effects of the Paris decision had been overcome, I would not leave. Beyond that time, I had no desire to remain. Like the Chinese, I at that time still believed that President Wilson had probably met tremendous difficulties of which I had no knowledge. At any rate, it was far from my purpose to embarrass him or the Government through my action. Therefore, the only motive I gave for my resignation was my desire to return to the United States. However, in my letter to the President I tried to express in moderate but serious terms my view of the situation and of the action which had been taken at Paris. This letter follows:

June 7, 1919.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to place in your hands my resignation as minister to China and to request that I may be relieved of the duties of this post as soon as convenient to yourself and to the Secretary of State. My reason for this action is that I am wearied after nearly six years of continuous strain, that I feel that the interests of my family demand my return to the United States, and that I should like to reënter affairs at home without making my absence so long as to break off all of the most important relationships.

I desire to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me, and it shall be my greatest desire to continue in the future to coöperate in helping to realize those great purposes of national and international policy which you have so clearly and strongly put before the American nation and the world.

In making this communication to you I cannot but refer to recent developments with respect China. The general outlook is indeed most discouraging, and it seems impossible to accomplish anything here at present or until the home governments are willing to face the situation and to act. It is not difficulties that deter me, and I should stay at my post if it were necessary and if I did not think that I could be of more use in the United States than in China at the present time. But in fact, the situation requires that the American people should be made to realize what is at stake here for us in order that they may give the necessary backing to the Government for support in any action which the developments here may Inquire. Unless the American people realize this and the Government feels strong enough to take adequate action, the fruits of one hundred and forty years of American work in China will inevitably be lost. Our people will be permitted to exist here only on the sufferance of others, and the great opportunity which has been held out to us by the Chinese people to assist in the development of education and free institutions will be gone beyond recall. In its stead there will come a sinister situation dominated by the unscrupulous methods of the reactionary military régime centred in Tokyo, absolutist in tendency, cynical of the principles of free government and human progress. If this force, with all the methods it is accustomed to apply, remains unopposed there will be created in the Far East the greatest engine of military oppression and dominance that the world has yet seen. Nor can we avoid the conclusion that the brunt of evil results will fall on the United States, as is already foreshadowed by the bitter hostility and abnormal vituperativeness of the Japanese press with regard to America.

The United States and Great Britain will have to stand together in this matter; I do not think this is realized as fully by Britishers at home as by those out here. If Russia can become an independent representative government its interests would parallel ours. The forces of public opinion and strength which can thus be mobilized are entirely sufficient to control the situation here and to keep it from assuming the menacing character which is threatened at present; but this can only be done if the situation is clearly seen and if it is realized that the military party of Japan will continue its present methods and purposes which have proved so successful until it becomes a dead wall of firm, quiet opposition. There will be a great deal of talk of friendship for China, of restoration of Shantung, of loyalty to the League of Nations, but it will be dangerous to accept this and to stop questioning what are the methods actually applied; as long as they exist the menace is growing all the time. We cannot rest secure on treaties nor even on the League of Nations without this checking up of the facts. Otherwise these instruments would only make the game a little more complicated but not change its essential character. The menace can be avoided only if it is made plain to Japan that her purposes are unmistakable and that the methods utilized to effect them will by no means be tolerated. Such purposes are the stirring up of trouble and revolution, encouragement of bandits and pirates, morphia, financial corruption, misleading of the press, refusal of just satisfaction when Americans are injured in order to gain prestige for absolute power, and chief of all official duplicity, such as the disavowal of knowledge when loans are being made to the Chinese Government by leading Japanese banks and the subsequent statement by the Japanese minister that these loans were private arrangements by "merchants."

If continuous support could be given not only to the activities of American merchants but to the constructive forces in Chinese national life itself these purposes and methods would not have the chance to flourish and succeed which they now enjoy.

During the war our action in the support of constructive forces in China necessarily could not be effective, as our energies were required elsewhere. Yet I believe that a great opportunity was missed when China had broken of relations with Germany. The very least recognition of her sentiments, support and efforts, on our part, would have changed the entire situation. But while millions upon millions were paid to the least important of the countries of Europe not a cent was forthcoming for China. This lack of support drove Tuan and his followers into the arms of the pro-Japanese agents. Instead of support we gave China the Lansing-Ishii Note.

Throughout this period the Japanese game has still been in the stage of bluff; while Germany seemed at her strongest in the war, indeed the Japanese were perhaps making their veiled threats with a feeling that if they should ally themselves with a strong Germany the two would be invincible; but even at that time a portion of the American navy detached could have checkmated Japan. Since the complete breakdown of Germany the case of Japan has been carried through solely on bluff though perhaps it may be that the Japanese militarists have succeeded in convincing themselves that their establishment is formidable. But it is plain that they would be absolutely powerless in the face of a stoppage of commerce and a navy demonstration on the part of any one of the great powers. No one desires to think of this contingency, but it is plain that after the breakdown of Germany it was not feasible for Japan to use force nor could she have suffered a greater damage than to exclude herself from the Peace Conference where she had everything to gain and nothing to lose. In ten years there may be a very different situation. Then also our people, having grown wise, will be sure to shout: "Why was not this stopped while there was yet time?" It seems to me necessary that someone in the Government ought to give attention primarily to China and the Far Eastern situation. It is very difficult to get any attention for China. I mean any continuous attention that results in getting something actually done. Everything else seems to come first because Europe seems so much nearer; and yet the destinies of Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, and Greece are infinitesimal in their importance to the future of America compared With those of China.

During my service here I have constantly suffered from this lack of continuous attention at home to the Far Eastern situation. It has reacted on the consular service; the interpreter service which is absolutely necessary to make our consular corps in China effective has been starved, as no new appointments have been made. In my own case promises of assistance which had been given repeatedly went unfulfilled. In this matter I have not the least personal feeling. I know the result is not due to the personal neglect or ill-will of any man or group of men, only it seems to me to indicate a general sentiment of the unimportance of Far Eastern affairs, which ought to be remedied. I repeat that these statements are not made in a spirit of complaint; all individual members of the Department of State have shown nothing but consideration and readiness to assist, but there has been lacking a concentrated interest in China, which ought to be represented in some one of the high officials, designated to follow up Far Eastern affairs and accorded influence commensurate with responsibilities in this matter.