CHAPTER XI

THE WAR: JAPAN IN SHANTUNG

On August 8, 1914, Japanese war vessels appeared near Tsingtau. Japan suggested on August 10th that the British Government might call for the coöperation of Japan under the terms of the Alliance. In view of possible consequences the British Government hesitated to make the call; the British in China considered it important that independent action by Japan in that country should be precluded.

Acting on its own account on August 15th, the Japanese Government sent the Shantung ultimatum to Germany. The British Government was then informed of the action taken. The German representative at Peking had discussed informally with the Foreign Office the possibility of immediately returning Kiaochow directly to China; but the Chinese Government was now pointedly warned by the Japanese that no such action would be permitted.

The Chinese Government then also seriously considered the policy of declaring war on Germany. It would have been as easy for the Chinese, as for any one else, to take Kiaochow from the Germans, but Japan was ready and anticipated them. In fact, the Japanese minister stated to the Chinese Foreign Office on August 20th that the Kiaochow matter no longer concerned the Chinese Government, which, he trusted, would remain absolutely passive in regard to it. The ultimatum to Germany, limited to August 23rd, demanded the delivery, at a date not later than September 15th of the leased territory of Kiaochow to the Japanese Government, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China."

Basing its action upon the language of this ultimatum, the American Government on August 19th made a communication to the Japanese Foreign Office, noting with satisfaction that Japan demanded the surrender of Kiaochow with the purpose of restoring that tract to China, and that it was seeking no territorial aggrandizement in China.

On my return to Peking on September 30th, I found the Chinese in a state of natural excitement over the action taken by Japan. By this time the Japanese had invested Tsingtau; the British, who had also sent a contingent of troops, were kept by the Japanese in a very subsidiary position. The scope of Japan's plans was more fully revealed on September 29th, when the Chinese Government was informed that "military necessity" required the Japanese Government to place troops along the entire railway in Shantung Province. As this railway had never had German military guards, and as the portion near Tsingtau was already held by Japanese troops, the military necessity of such further occupation was by no means apparent.

Mr. Liang Tun-yen, Minister of Communications, called on me on October 1st, expressing deep concern over the action of the Japanese in Shantung. He stated his conviction that, in departing from the necessary military operations around Tsingtau, it was Japan's plan to stir up trouble in the interior of China with a view to more extensive occupation of Chinese territory. From Japanese sources he had information to the effect that the Japanese militarists were not satisfied with the reduction of Tsingtau, but wished to take advantage of this opportunity to secure a solid footing--political and military--within the interior of China. He was further informed that they were ready to let loose large numbers of bandits and other irresponsible persons to coöperate with revolutionary elements in an attempt to create widespread uprisings, in order to furnish a pretext for military interference. When I called attention to the declarations regarding Kiaochow in Japan's ultimatum to Germany, the minister shook his head and said: "Unfortunately, Japanese policy cannot be judged by such professions, but only by the acts of the last twenty years, which make up a series of broken pledges and attacks upon the rights of China."

President Yuan Shih-kai had wished to see me; so I called on him informally on October 2nd. In stronger terms than Minister Liang he set forth his apprehensions. "From information in my possession," he stated, "I am convinced that the Japanese have a definite and far-reaching plan for using the European crisis to further an attempt to lap the foundations of control over China. In this, the control of Shantung through the possession of the port and the railway is to be the foundation stone. Their policy was made quite apparent through the threatened occupation of the entire Shantung Railway, which goes far beyond anything the Germans ever attempted in Shantung Province. It will bring the Japanese military forces to the very heart of China."

Thereupon Yuan Shih-kai requested that I ask President Wilson to use his good offices in conferring with the British Government, in order to prevail upon Japan to restrict her action in Shantung to the military necessities involved in the capture of Tsingtau, according to the original assurances given the Chinese Government. I communicated this request to the President through the Department of State.

With great promptness, however, the Japanese executed the plan they had adopted. They informed the Chinese that, being judges of their own military necessities, they would occupy the railway by _force majeure_ immediately, but would leave its administration in Chinese hands--with the stipulation that Japanese conductors be placed on the trains. The Chinese found no means to resist this arrangement.

Mr. Eki Hioki, successor of Minister Yamaza, had arrived during the summer. He had for many years been minister in Chile, where I had met him in 1910; remembering his genial and sociable qualities, I was happy to renew this acquaintance. Mr. Hioki differed from his predecessor in his readiness to talk freely and abundantly. In our first conversation, when the relations between the United States and Japan came up, he adduced the customary argument that as the United States was preventing the Japanese from settling in America, we could not in fairness object if Japan tried to develop her activities and influence on the Asian continent. I could honestly assure him that American goodwill did go out in full measure to any legitimate development of Japanese enterprise and prosperity, but we also had duties toward our own citizens, who had been active in Chinese trade for more than 130 years, as well as toward China herself. We could not be expected to approve any action which would not respect the rights of these.

The Chinese people were becoming more and more alarmed about Japan in Shantung. The large number of petitions and manifestoes which came to me, as the representative of a friendly nation, from various parts of China, gave me an idea of how widespread was this anxiety. Some of these protests were written with the blood of the petitioner.

Count Okuma's declaration, that a large increase in the military forces of Japan was needed to preserve peace in the Far East, was interpreted as meaning that Japan would take the present opportunity to make good her actual domination throughout eastern Asia. The Chinese felt that any understanding with Japan would inevitably lead to the total subjection of China to the political dominance of her neighbour. They distrust all professions of Japanese friendship. Whenever I tried to argue that a frank understanding between China and Japan was desirable, I was told that China could not trust Japan; that Japan must not be judged by her professions, but by her past acts, all of which show a determined policy of political advance veiled by reassuring declarations.

Thus the Chinese feared Japanese intrigue at every point. They believed that revolutionary activities, as in the past, were getting encouragement from Japan. The Japanese were ready to take advantage of and to aggravate any weakness which might exist in Chinese social and political life. They would fasten like leeches upon any sore spot. The tendency toward rebellion and brigandage, the counterfeiting of banknotes, the corruption of officials, the undermining of the credit of important private and public enterprises, the furnishing of more dangerous drugs when opium was forbidden--in connection with such mischiefs individual Japanese had been active to the great damage of the Chinese. But though it would be unjust, of course, to charge up this meddling to the Japanese nation as a whole the connivance of their militarist government was a fact.

The British looked upon the new adventure of Japan with a decided lack of enthusiasm. While welcoming the losses inflicted on their enemy in war, they were evidently fearful of the results which might come from Shantung.

It was plain that the Russians, too, while allied with Japan, were quite aware of the dangers inherent in the Chinese situation. Taken with recent Japanese advances in Inner Mongolia, a situation was created in northern China which would be regarded as dangerous by the Russians. Discussing the unrest in China, the Russian minister said to me significantly: "The situation itself does not impress me as serious; the only serious thing about it is that the Japanese say it is serious."

In fine, the general temper and direction of Japanese action was not relished by the allies of Japan. Japan had taken advantage of a conflict which was primarily European, into the rigour of which she did not enter, for the purpose of gathering up the possessions of Germany in the Far East and the Pacific at a time when they could be but weakly defended.

This policy of Japan deeply affected American prospects and enterprise in China, as, also, that of the other leading nations. Since the American attitude of goodwill toward China had in the past been understood by the Chinese to imply a readiness to give them a certain support in times of need, large hopes were entertained as to what the United States would do. Rich and powerful beyond measure, she would, in the minds of the Chinese, help China to maintain her integrity, independence, and sovereignty. Other nations, not a little jealous of the past goodwill of the Chinese toward us, were not slow to point out that American friendship was a bubble which vanished before such concrete difficulties as the violation of China's neutrality. But the Chinese, after all, saw that it did not lie within the sphere of its action for the United States to come to the rescue with direct political and military support. True, the Chinese had encouraged American activities in China. They had looked upon them as a safeguard to their own national life. Since they were conducted in a fair spirit and without political afterthought, the Chinese did hope and expect as a minimum that Americans would stand by their guns and not let themselves be excluded by political intrigue or other means from their share in the development and activities of China.