An Account of the Abipones, an Equestrian people of Paraguay, (3 of 3)
CHAPTER X.
OF THE FRUITLESS EXCURSIONS OF THE CORDOBANS AGAINST THE ABIPONES.
What! you exclaim, did the minds of the Cordobans at last grow callous to so much slaughter?—Were they so tame as never to think of revenge?—Did Cordoba want men, or arms, or strength? In neither of these requisites was that flourishing city deficient. The Cordobans have always in readiness twelve thousand men fit to bear arms. Cordoba abounds in swift and strong horses. The bodies of the inhabitants are strong and vigorous, and their minds filled with the desire of military glory; they might not only put the Abipones to flight, but reduce the whole province of Chaco: in short, they might do every thing against the savages, did not the vain fear with which they are possessed make them despair of doing any thing. Whilst depressed by the recollection of the slaughters they had suffered, they thought victory must always attend the Abipones; they dared attempt nothing against them, and were thus forsaken by fortune, which usually favours the brave. I will here describe some expeditions of the Cordobans, the issue of which was always either unfortunate or ridiculous.
The Abipones laid waste the territories of Rio Segundo, and some Cordoban forces were sent out to repress them. The enemy was overtaken in the open plain. On one side stood the Spaniards, on the other the Abipones, in battle-array. They threatened one another for a long time, but no one had courage to begin the attack, till at last an Abipon leapt from his horse, approached the ranks of the Spaniards, and challenged one of them to single combat. Many of the soldiers would have been willing enough to engage with this bold one, but the leader of the expedition forbade them to stir hand or foot, under pain of death; perceiving which, the Abipones slowly departed, each his own way, leaving the Spaniards to themselves. The Cordoban captains acted in the same way on other occasions, and by thus betraying their own fear, rendered the savages still bolder in their projects. To pacify the minds of the people, endless expeditions were undertaken against Chaco, but all unsuccessful. There were many causes for this. These delicate warriors always drove before them a vast number of horses and oxen, consequently the journey was retarded by the multitude of beasts. The number of captains was too great in proportion to that of soldiers; there were too many to give commands and too few to execute them. Besides laden mules, they carried a good many waggons for conveying provisions, which are always sure to impede a journey. Moreover, the Commander-in-chief made use of a chariot for show. I myself saw a place in Chaco where that chariot and all the waggons were burnt by the Cordobans, when, surrounded by pools and marshes, they could neither go back nor forwards. Doubtless the ways which led to the retreats of the savages in Chaco, were dangerous to the Indians themselves. The nature of the soil is such, that after a long cessation of rain, it grows as dry as a flint, and denies even the little birds wherewith to drink; but if the showers be frequent, you will not find an inch of dry ground to walk or lie down upon. As the plain is varied neither by fountains, hills, nor stones, but runs out into a vast extent of even ground, covered with turf, when deluged with rain it presents the appearance of a lake. At other times the road is intercepted by marshes and overflowing rivers, which occasion delay, even if the soldiers can overcome them by swimming; but if this be not the case, they are entirely prevented from proceeding, being unprovided with bridges or skiffs. The place of these is supplied, as I have said, by the pelota; but, as those vessels are capable of holding but one man at once, much time will be consumed whilst four hundred soldiers are transported, in this manner, to the opposite shore; and likewise so much noise must necessarily be made during the process, that the enemy, apprized of their arrival, will either take to speedy flight, or rush on the Spaniards whilst unprepared and separated from one another by the river. If, therefore, you would know the chief reason why the Spaniards so often returned ingloriously home from Chaco, without even obtaining a sight of the savages, it was that they could not swim.
Of this I had a most creditable witness in Landriel, who sometimes acted as guide to the Cordobans in their expeditions into Chaco; and under whose conduct they arrived, after many days' journey, at the eastern shore of the river Malabrigo, on the opposite side of which the Abipones Riikahes were accustomed to pitch their tents. It was a difficult matter to discover their lurking-holes, to attack which was the object of the expedition; the whole plain being deluged with water to such a degree that no traces of either man or beast could be found there. The only things that appeared above the surface of the water were some large ant-hills, from one of which Landriel perceived that a honeycomb had been lately taken. This circumstance led him to conjecture that the Abipones must be somewhere near, and after much search he discovered a large horde of them, which might have been attacked, conquered, plundered, and destroyed on the same day, had Landriel brought soldiers of St. Iago, Corrientes, or Sta. Fè, all excellent swimmers, instead of Cordobans who are ignorant of that art; for as they drew nigh to the hostile horde, it was necessary to cross the river Malabrigo, which, being at that time greatly overflowed, would neither suffer a bridge, nor allow of being forded. The soldiers might all have been transported to the opposite shore on a hide, but they foresaw that a passage of this kind could not be effected in less than a day, whatever haste were employed. Meantime the Abipones, roused by the noise of the Spaniards, or by the neighing of their horses alone, would have placed their families in safety, and undoubtedly attacked and routed the Cordobans, who were never formidable to them, and would be still less so at that time, when their forces were divided by the river. After discussing these matters, they concluded that it was most advisable to hasten their return, which they did, falling, rather than marching; for the way had been rendered slippery from the inundation, and dangerous on account of the deep holes underneath the water. Numberless multitudes of wild oxen had formerly filled the plain, and the bulls by tearing the ground with their horns, as is usual with them when enraged, had occasioned those numerous holes: which are the more dangerous to horsemen because when covered with water they cannot be seen: many of them are one cubit deep, and equally wide. If any of the Cordobans slipped into one of these holes, his comrades all followed him, and fell in too, and when Landriel advised them to turn their horses a little to the right or the left, for the sake of avoiding the ditch where their companion had fallen, they seldom attended to his admonitions, saying, "It is true we saw our fellow-soldier fall in there, but we also saw him get safely out again. If we go another way we shall perhaps fall into a deeper ditch, whence we may not rise without injury." These holes are properly called by the Spaniards _pozzos_, or wells, because they receive the rain water, and preserve it a long time for the use of travellers, when the plains and woods are parched by a dry season. From what I have related you may collect, that the expeditions of the Cordobans into Chaco, so far from subduing and overawing the savages, served only to confirm them in their disposition to plunder; indeed they became more unrestrained in their attacks upon the colonists of Cordoba, in proportion as they became more fully convinced of the imbecility of the Cordoban soldiers, whom they believed incapable of returning injury for injury, slaughter for slaughter, and deterred from venturing into Chaco by the difficulties of the journey thither. To ensure the safety of the merchants, soldiers were at last hired to keep guard continually over those places. The tax laid on the herb of Paraguay, which is conveyed in waggons into Peru, was the chief source of the money for paying the soldiers. But this provision, though it thoroughly drained the purses of the merchants, did not much lessen the boldness or frequency of these robberies, the savages sometimes craftily deceiving this little band of soldiers, sometimes intimidating it with superior numbers. It is true that when most part of the Mocobios and Abipones were settled by us in the colonies, the province, delivered from so many enemies, began to breathe once more. The remainder of both nations, who still wandered without these colonies, though they disturbed and laid waste the country of Sta. Fè and Asumpcion, hardly ever attempted any hostilities against the territories of Cordoba; which tranquillity they owed to Alvarez, captain at Rio Segundo, and to Benavides commander at Rio Seco. As soon as those brave men took upon themselves the direction of military affairs the Cordobans became bolder, and the Abipones more timid in their attacks, especially after one of them had been taken in the plain by a Cordoban soldier, and the formidable Pachiekè, son of the Cacique Alaykin, slain. When we returned to Europe, almost all the Abipones deserted the colonies we had founded and taken care of. Weary of the peace and friendship which had been established between them and the Spaniards, they resumed their arms, with what success is best known to those who had to contend with the savages, enraged and distracted at our departure. I have shown how formidable and destructive the savage tribe of Abipones was to the whole province, and how little the arms of the Spaniards availed to check and restrain them. What fruit we had of our endeavours in subduing and reclaiming them is yet to be related.