CHAPTER XXI

Chapter 247,189 wordsPublic domain

AN IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME

To the practical man who wants to know what to do and when and how to do it, general principles seem unreal and valueless. He is interested in the decisions of the next few months, not in a vague general direction of events for the coming century. And so in international politics he would like to decide what the nation shall do _now_ about the British blacklist, the German submarines, the Mexican revolution, the California-Japanese situation, and he is not keenly interested in the formulation of a policy which seems to hang high above the difficult concrete problems that must be solved immediately. He may languidly agree with proposals to create a community of interest among colonising nations and to establish the freedom of the sea, but he wishes to know whether in the meanwhile we are to back up Carranza in Mexico and what we are to do if the revolutionists "shoot up" an American town. While we work for these ideals, are we to allow Germany to sink our liners and Japan to swallow up China, or are we to fight?

This attitude is not unreasonable. A general policy is of little value unless we can make successive decisions conform to it. But it is not easy or always possible to predict these decisions. We can tell approximately how many people in the United States will die next year, but not how many will die in any particular family. We can {289} advise a man who is walking from New York to San Francisco to take a generally westward course, but for any given mile of the road the direction may be north or south or east. A trend of policy is made up of innumerable deflections, small or large; it is an irregular chain of successive actions, which do not all tend in one direction. Even if we narrow our field of vision and seek to elaborate a more immediate policy, we do not escape from the vagueness which inheres in all such general conclusions.

In the main our problem consists in using the influence of the United States to create such an economic harmony among the nations, and to give each nation such a measure of security as to permit them to agree upon an international policy, which will be in the interest of all. The chief elements of this programme are two in number: to create conditions within the United States which will permit us to exert a real influence; and to use this influence in the creation of an international organisation, which will give each nation a measure of economic and military security, and prevent any nation from wantonly breaking the peace.

How far we can progress towards such an organisation will depend upon the course and uncertain issue of the present war. The war may end with the Central Allies crushed, with Germany reduced in size and Austria and Turkey dismembered. It may end with a lesser defeat for the Central Powers and with lesser penalties. There may be an inconclusive peace, which may either be a mere truce or a new basis of agreement between nations disillusioned by the conflict. Finally the war may end with the partial or even complete victory of the Central Powers, either through their overcoming the united opposition of their enemies or by detaching one or more from their alliances.

{290}

What the United States can effect at the conclusion of the war will inevitably depend upon which of these developments takes place. Assuming that we ourselves are not drawn into the conflict, it is probable that our influence will be larger if neither of the great coalitions wins an overwhelming victory. If the Western and Eastern Allies completely crush the resistance of the Central Powers, it is hardly likely that they will concede to us, who have not borne a share of the danger and toil, a large discretion in proposing the terms of peace. Such an unconditional victory by either side would probably lead to an onerous and vindictive settlement, for each coalition is bound together by promises to its constituent nations, and these promises cannot be fulfilled without wholesale spoliation. Moreover, each coalition will wish to weaken the future power of its opponents. A request by the United States that the victorious alliance deal generously with the defeated nations in order to create the conditions of a permanent peace would therefore probably meet with a more or less courteous denial. On the other hand, a drawn battle, or one in which the defeated party asking for peace still retained a considerable power of resistance, might lead to conditions in which the influence of the neutral nations, led by the United States, would be all-decisive. A situation might be created out of which no further fighting could bring a tolerable peace, and the nations might agree to some form of incipient international organisation, to which the United States could contribute.

The problem of Constantinople illustrates this possibility. That city, with the command of the straits, is likely to go to Russia if the Allies win, and to fall under a disguised German-Austrian domination if the Central Powers are victorious. Either situation would be vicious; {291} either would leave the commerce of the defeated nations at the mercy of the great power that held the Bosphorus. If on the other hand, the two opposed alliances were almost equally formidable at the end of the war, or if England and France became unwilling to fight longer in order to give Russia a strategic position at Constantinople, a true solution of the problem might be obtained by neutralising the straits. A union of all the powers might guarantee the free passage of these waters at all times, and an American commissioner in command of a small American army might carry out the wishes of an international council. It would not be a pleasant or in any sense a profitable adventure for the United States, and we should accept the task most unwillingly. Our sole motive would be the belief that our acceptance of this responsibility would remove one of the greatest causes of future war.

Such an assumption of obligations at Constantinople would constitute for us a new and dangerous international policy. While Constantinople is easily defended and while ample assistance would be forthcoming if defence were necessary, it can hardly be doubted that a rupture of such an international agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the straits would bring on a war in which we should be obliged to take our part. Yet the danger which we thus incur by entering upon an agreement looking to international peace is perhaps less than the danger of not entering since if Constantinople causes another world war, as it may if not neutralised, it is by no means unlikely that sooner or later we may be forced into the struggle. It is better to risk our peace in seeking to avert a world disaster than to permit the great war to come.

There are other international policies which in favouring circumstances might be urged by the United States at {292} the close of the war. We might append our signature to international conventions defining and guaranteeing a freedom of the seas, to agreements looking towards a co-operative exploitation of backward countries, to laws regulating the settlement of arbitrable international disputes, and to such special conventions as might be made for the re-neutralisation of Belgium. Upon the basis of such agreements, even though they were but tentative and partial, we might enter with the other nations upon some form of a League of Peace and International Polity, which would secure these new conventions from being rudely disturbed by the aggression of one or two powers.

Whether we help to carry out these policies at the close of this war, will depend upon the balance of power then existing in Europe and upon the mood of the nations. If Russia wants Constantinople, if Britain insists upon the right of capture at sea, if France, Italy, Servia, Roumania and the British colonies demand territorial gains without compensation, and these powers are able to enforce their will, our delegates to the Peace Conference may make representations and suggestions, but will not be able to carry them through. Nor if the Central Powers are victorious and unyielding, shall we be able to make our advice count. No one power or group of powers could carry out such a policy against the will of a majority or even of a strong minority of powers. Unless the conditions at the end of the war are such as to convince the victors (if there are victors) that it is wiser to readjust the world than to get all they can, unless great nations like Britain, France and Germany can agree that a groundwork for future peace is more valuable than territorial gains and punitive damages, the opportunity for a peaceful reconstruction will pass. New coalitions will be formed; new wars will be fought.

It is of course possible that such an international {293} reconstruction will be entered upon only with hesitation by several of the nations, including some of the victors. It is even conceivable that the movement might be furthered by certain of the belligerents on both sides, as for example Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy (aided by the United States and other neutrals) and be opposed to some extent by, let us say, Russia and Turkey. It is not assumed that this particular division among the nations will actually occur, but merely that upon the conclusion of the war the moral integrity of the alliances may be shattered and with the prospect of new cleavages and disagreements, an effort be made, aided by the neutrals, to create conditions doing away with the present balance of power. A war disintegrates the elements making for success in war; enemies become allies and allies enemies. At the final council board each nation tends to return to its allegiance to itself, and with the passing of the old alliances a new league based upon totally different principles becomes possible.

It is, however, with a tempered optimism that we should approach the international conference that is to end this war. Even if America is represented and wisely represented, even if the powers are willing to listen to proposals looking toward international reconstruction, the probability that there will be an inclination to make concessions is not overwhelming. Hatred, distrust, the injection of petty interests, the tenacity of diplomatic conservatism will all work against a wise forbearance and a far-seeing policy, and the errors of the Vienna Conference of 1815 and of the Berlin Conference of 1878 may be duplicated or worse. There is at least an even chance that the international situation will be quite as unsatisfactory and perilous in 1920 as it was in 1900. Progress towards international reconstruction is a possible but by no means {294} certain part of the agenda of the diplomatic conference, which will meet when enough millions of the youth of Europe have been slaughtered and maimed.

But those who desire peace and the international relations which will alone make peace possible have learned to be patient, and if the problem advances only slowly to a solution it will be sufficient satisfaction to know that it advances at all. After this war there will be many long years during which the nations may study at their leisure the clumsiness of the arrangements which make for international conflict. There will be years in which America, if she is worthy and strong, will be able to make her influence for peace felt.

The problem, however, is not how rapidly we shall move but whether we shall move at all and in what direction. That direction seems to be clearly indicated by the recent trend of world events. With the passing of our isolation we are given the opportunity to use our immense influence directly, continuously and intelligently for the strengthening of the economic bonds which make for a world peace. Time and the economic trend work on our side. We can hasten, though we cannot and need not create, the vast unifying movement which comes with the further integration of industry. What we can contribute to this consummation is an ability to see the world as it is and a willingness to work and if necessary to fight for the changes without which international peace is impossible. We must avoid a cautious yet dangerous clinging to a philosophy of national irresponsibility, as we must likewise avoid the excesses of a nationalistic imperialism. We must take our part manfully, side by side with the other nations, in the great reorganisation of the world, which even to-day is foreshadowed by an economic internationalism, now in its beginnings.

{295}

In the last century and a half the United States has made three great contributions to the political advancement of the world. The first was the adoption of the constitution, an experiment in federalism on a scale larger than ever before known in history. The second was the adoption of a policy, by which the vast territories of all the states were held in common, and these new territories admitted to statehood upon exactly the same terms as the original commonwealths, which formed the Union. Our third contribution was the Monroe Doctrine, which removed two continents from the field of foreign conquest and guaranteed to each American nation the freedom to determine its own form of government and its own sovereignty.

To-day the nation is again in a position to contribute to the political progress of the world. It stands before a fourth decision. Either it can cling hopelessly to the last vestiges of its policy of isolation or can launch out into imperialistic ventures, or finally it can promote, as can no other nation, a policy of internationalism, which will bind together the nations in a union of mutual interest, and will hasten the peaceful progress of the economic and political integration of the world.

{297}

INDEX

Abbott, J. F., "Japanese Expansion and American Policies," quoted, 215 n.

Africa, slavery under imperialistic system in, 95.

Agricultural nations, how war was a necessity to early, 22-23; effect of conversion of, into industrial nations, 79-81.

Agricultural progress, as one of the causes of war, 17.

Agriculture, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, 174; how America's economic mutuality with Europe may depend upon, 175; a secure base for a policy of non-aggression in development of, 176; amount of land available for, in America, 176-177; growth in products of, compared with growth in population, 177-178; opportunities for further development of American, 178-179; probable increase in efficiency in, 181-182.

Alaska, attitude of America in purchase of, 46.

Algeria, preferential treatment of, as to tariffs, by France, 104; volume of trade of, with France compared with that with other countries, 105.

America, effect of Great War upon, 1; choice of foreign policies open to, 2; influences which will determine national trend, 2-3; attitude of pacifist idealists, 3; attitude of self-seeking individualists, 4; origin and character of demand in, for preparedness, 5-6; the ideal of a united, 7-8; interest of financial groups in preparedness and "united America" ideal, 8-9; question as to what purpose armament in, is to be used, 10; the group for defence and the group for establishment of proper international relations, 10-11; factors which will determine foreign policy of, 11-12; goal of internationalism to be aspired for by, 12; causes of failure of, to realise ideal of internationalism, 13; imperialistic ideas in, 13-14; steadfastness necessary in whatever course decided on, 14-15; not exempt from economic forces which cause war, 30-31; attitude of, toward peace and war, 32-43; period of clipper ships in, 39; character of diplomacy of, 43-44; plunge taken by, in 1898; into imperialism, 45; strategic and industrial motives behind change in foreign policy of, 46-50; "congestion of capital" argument proved futile, 51-53; effect upon thought in, of imperialistic venture, 55; relations of, with Europe, as affected by Monroe Doctrine, and international responsibilities thrust upon, 55-57; lessons derived by, from European War, 57-58; a positive policy to be substituted for a negative, 58-59; comparative intensity of competition with Great Britain, Germany and France for foreign trade, 61-62; development in field of investment, 67-70; obvious entrance of, upon economic competition, 70-71; isolation evidently no longer possible to, 71; decision to be made by, as to nature of expansion policy to be adopted, 151-153; choice lies between Nationalistic Imperialism and Internationalism, 153; arguments of imperialists as to course to be taken by, 153-154; dangers of imperialistic policy to, 154-156; secure road to imperialism for, in Anglo-American union, 156-160; arguments for ideal of internationalism, 160-166; capability of, for leading in promotion of international peace, dependent on economic development, 169 ff.; tendency to imperialistic policy from unequal distribution of wealth, 186 ff.; danger of present favourable conditions as to incomes and wages not continuing, 190-191; foreign policy must accord with international ideals, 199-200; course to be followed by, in foreign policy, in choosing between immediate and ultimate interest, 203-212; question of future relations with Canada, 212-213; policy toward China, 213-216; three ways open to, of promoting international adjustments aimed to secure peace, 231; absurdity of method of "going it alone," 231-234; the method of forming an alliance with one or more selected nations, 234-236; third and most promising method, to constitute our nation a rallying-point for the formulation and enforcement of principles of international policy, 236-241; leading part taken by, in advocacy of freedom of the seas, 247; hostility of, to British domination of the seas, 253; an immediate programme for, 288-295.

Americanism, as an ideal, 7-8.

Anglo-American union, arguments favouring, 156-160; drawbacks to plan of, 160; further discussion of possible value of, and disadvantages of, 234-236.

Anti-imperialists, arguments of, 126-138; considerations which work against, 138-139.

Arbitration, defects of, as a plan for preserving peace, 225-226.

Aristocracy, benefits of imperialism confined to the, 132-135; evil effects of imperialistic system upon, 135.

Arndt, Paul, on handicapping of Germany because of meagreness of colonial possessions, 107.

Backward countries, root of imperialism in exploitation of, by imperialistic powers, 85-98; problem of governing, an argument for imperialism, 139; proposed joint development of, by all the great powers, 263-269.

Banks, German, in foreign countries, 118, 120-121.

Barker, Ernest, article "Crusades," quoted, 23.

Bauer, Otto, quoted on diversified interests of wage-earners in different countries, 143-144.

Belgium, monopoly of trade with her colonies secured by, 104; industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff.; truths illustrated by German invasion of, 256; position of, before 1914, as a neutralised state, 270.

Birth rate, decline in, the greatest of factors making for internationalism and peace, 287.

Bismarck, policy of, in encouraging France's colonial ambitions, 109-110.

Boycott, proposed for states violating principles of international league for peace, 242-244; discussion of, of Germany after the war, 273-274.

Brailsford, H. W., quoted on solution of colonial problem, 265-266.

Brazil, tropical imperialism and the atrocities in, 87.

Bulnes, F., quoted on future relations of United States and Latin America, 209.

Burgess, "Homeland," cited, 136.

Burgess, J. W., "The European War of 1914," quoted, 253-254.

Business, international evolution of, 279-283.

Canada, trade of, with United States compared with that with Great Britain, 102; present and future relations of United States with, 212-213.

Capital, internationalism of, 279-283.

Caraballo Sotolongo, F., work by, cited, 208 n.

Cartels, description of German, 121-122.

Carver, T. N., quoted on small-scale farming, 179 n.

Children, dangers of neglect of, in United States, 191-192.

China, views of official of, quoted, 75-76; question of America's policy regarding, 213-216; possibilities of the impending industrial progress of, 216 n.

Class, increasing internationalism of, 280.

Class policy, imperialism viewed as a, 138.

Coercion, preserving peace by, 226-228.

Colonies, how germs of war are carried in nationalistic competition for, 99 ff.; tendency of, to trade with home country, 101-103; preference given to, by tariff legislation, 104; the open and the closed door policy in treatment of, by home countries, 104; future advantages resulting from possession of, 107-108; problem of, in plans for a higher imperialism, 246, 258 ff.; internationalisation of, under proposed higher imperialism, 263-269.

Colonisation, failure of argument for imperialism based on, 129-131.

Coloured labour and the root of imperialism, 85-98.

Commerce, development of, and the economic motive for war, 23-24.

Conant, C. A., arguments of, for American imperialism, 48-49.

Constantinople, problem of, after the war, and part America might play, 290-291.

Coolidge, A. C., "United States as a World Power," quoted, 45 n.

Cramb, J. A., war mystic, quoted, 20, 21; book, "England and Germany," quoted, 221.

Crusades, economic motives behind, 23.

Dardanelles, internationalisation of, 254, 279.

Democracy, the American tradition of, 12-13; failure to achieve ideal purpose of, 13.

Diepenhorst, Fritz, quoted on German cartels, 121.

Diplomacy, character of American, 43-44.

Disarmament, defects in proposal for universal, 225.

Distribution of wealth, incentive to war found in unequal, 17.

Dodsworth, W., arguments of, in favour of imperialism, 50.

"Dumping" of surplus goods by Germany, 62; as one of Germany's methods of industrial invasion, 117, 119-120.

Economic forces, determination of national policies by, 2-3; one of chief causes of wars, 14, 17-19, 21-28; hope of directing toward peace rather than war, 28-29.

Economic gains to imperialistic nation from tropical agriculture, 92.

Economic invasion, of other countries by Germany, 116-125; relative success or failure of system of, 124-125.

Educational system in America, imperfections of, 191-192.

Emigration, as one of the causes of war, 17.

England, relations between America and, 35-36, 40; economic competition between Germany and, 99-101; strength of imperialism in, 140. _See_ Great Britain.

Enoch, C. R., on boycotting Germany after the war, 274 n.

Europe, importance to, of American foreign policy, 2; attitude of pacifist idealists and of individualistic realists concerning America's relations with, 4-5; attitude of America toward, 35-42; economic competition of United States with, 55 ff.; significance to, of American competition for Latin-American trade, 59-60; renewed competition of, for foreign trade after the war, 66; financial relations of America and, 67-70; foreign investment by, in new countries, 81-84; lack of firm basis for union of peoples of, 111-114; problems presented by Canada's relation to controversies in, 213 n.

Extractive industries, pacific tendency of, 174.

Farms, possibilities for future development of, in America, 178-179. _See_ Agriculture.

Fear of war, value to certain interests of, 137-138.

Federation of nations, defect of plan for, to preserve peace, 224-225.

Finance, internationalism of, 279-283.

Financial relations of America and Europe, 67-70.

Financiers, interest of, in preparedness and spirited foreign policy, 8-9.

Foreign investment and the internationalism of capital, 280-281. _See_ Investment.

Foreign policy of America, effect of European war upon, 1 ff., 58-59; special factors which will figure in future, 11-12; change in, after the Spanish War, 45; in part due to military considerations, 46; part played by economic motives in, 46-50; must accord with international ideals which we aim to promote, 199-200; the choice between immediate and ultimate interest, 203-204; concerning Latin America, 207-212; concerning Canada, 212-213; concerning China, 213-216.

Foreign trade, effect on America's, of opening of Panama Canal, 62-63; America's gain in, since outbreak of European war, 63-64; European competition for, after the war, 66; question of value of, resulting from imperialism, 131-136.

France, relations between America and, 36; American competition with, for foreign trade, less keen than with Germany, 62; preferential tariffs given to colonies of, 104; industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff.; appeal of imperialism in, 140.

Freedom of the seas, one of the elements in a programme of peace, 246; growth in significance of problem of, 247; opposite sides taken by America and England concerning, 247; benefits and drawbacks of England's policy, 249-254; five things desirable in order to establish, 254-255; international organisation to enforce convention regarding, with Anglo-American agreement as a corner-stone, 255; value of proposed international arrangement, dependent upon belief of nations in its enforcement, 255-257.

Free trade, as an antidote to war, 29; error lurking in the doctrine, 29-30.

Garcia Calderon, F., quoted on course of United States in the future, 155-156; on North American influence in Latin America, 209.

Geographical location, effect of, on a nation's policy, 172-173.

Germany, defence of war offered by romanticists in, 20-21; possibility of future competition with, by America, in battle for world market, 61-62; economic competition between England and, 99-101; volume of trade of colonies with, compared with that with other countries, 105; handicapping of, through lack of colonial possessions, 107; dangers of colonial ambition of, 109; Bismarck's policy regarding colonies, 109-110; industrial invasion of competing countries by, 116; tactics of, in trade invasions, 117 ff.; limitations and obstacles to policy of invasion of, 124; appeal of imperialism in, 140; why imperialism appeals to wage-earners in, 145-146; frugality and efficiency characteristic of, 189; the proposal to boycott after the war, 273-274.

Gibraltar, Straits of, internationalisation of, 254, 279.

Great Britain, what loss of markets for manufactured goods would mean to, 60; American competition with, for foreign trade, less keen than that with Germany, 61-62; comparative volume of trade between colonies and, 102-103; arguments for alliance between America and, 156-160; how surplus capital seeking a vent may lead to an imperialistic policy shown by, 187; policy of obstruction followed by, regarding freedom of the seas, 247; necessity to, of navy and command of seas, illustrated by case of Germany, 248-249; discussion of advantages and disadvantages of attitude of, on naval supremacy, 249-254.

Hauser, Henri, work by, cited and quoted, 116, 121, 122.

Hawaii, acquisition of, by United States, 46; America's international liabilities increased by, 57.

Hobson, C. K., "The Export of Capital," cited, 68 n., 83.

Hobson, John A., "Imperialism," quoted, 51, 131; "Towards International Government," quoted and cited, 242, 245.

Holland, industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff.

Honour, the demands of national, 197-199.

Hunting tribes, war inevitable among, 22.

Hurley, Edwin W., address by, cited and quoted, 66 n.

Hutchinson, Lincoln, "Panama Canal and International Trade Competition," cited, 63.

Idealists, position of pacifists as, 3; mystic interpretation of war by, 20-21.

Immigration, effect of growth of America's population due to, on nation's economic development and foreign policy, 184.

Imperialism, American ideal of internationalism opposed to, 12-13; intricacy of problem of, 13; the present an age of, 13-14; America's plunge into, in 1898, 45; strategic and industrial arguments for American, 46-50; not warranted by real conditions in America, 51-53; significance of America's premature venture into, 54; root of, found in necessity of compelling subject peoples to labour for industrial nations, 85-98; arguments against, 126 ff.; results of, for investment purposes beneficial only to a few, 127; regarded by Socialists as immoral, brutal, anti-democratic, and uneconomic, 128; revolt against, led by people of imperialistic powers not benefited by policy, 128 ff.; outlet for redundant population not secured by, 129-131; questionable value of foreign trade resulting from, 131-132; danger of war resulting from, 136-137; a class policy, 137-138; difficulty in Europe of democratic leaders making headway against, 138-139; popular appeal of, 140; economic argument for, 141-147; patriotic appeal of, 147-150; decision to be made by America between internationalism and, 151-153; road open to America, through Anglo-American union, 156-160; lack of economic reserves as an impelling force toward, 170-171; relation between geographical location and, 172-173; relation of inequalities of wealth and income to, 186 ff.; a more equal distribution of wealth an antidote to, 186-188; in what the economic antidote to, really consists, 194-195; measures necessary to achievement of higher form of, 258-269.

Income, equable distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, 191.

India, British conquest of, due to desire for trade, 21; tendency of, to give bulk of trade to home country, 101, 102; small percentage of British born in, 129.

Industrial invasions of each other's territory by competing countries, 116-124; question of success or failure of policy of, 124-125.

Inequality of wealth and income, risk of imperialistic policy resulting from, 186-188.

Intensive cultivation, limitations of, 179.

Internationalisation of colonies, 263-269; of capital, 279-283.

Internationalism, ideal of, to be aspired for by America, 12; causes of failure of America to realise ideal of, 13; what is necessary if America decides on the course of, 14-15; decision to be made by America between nationalistic imperialism and, 151-153; meaning of ideal of, as opposed to ideal of imperialism, 160; steps necessary to achievement of, 161-166; to be secured only by further political and economic development, 270; forces making for, 270 ff.; actual profit of, 272; impossibility of independence for small subject nations, 277-279.

Intervention, objections to a policy of, for preserving peace, 231-234.

Investment, America's development in field of foreign, 67-70; value of new countries as a field for, 81-82; extent of foreign, by European countries, 83; internationalism of capital shown by foreign, 280-281.

Iron, "dumping" of, by Germany in foreign countries, 119-120.

Italy, industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff.; "dumping" of German products in, 119.

Jamaica, trade of, with United States compared with that with United Kingdom, 102.

James, William, "The Moral Equivalent of War," quoted, 195-196.

Japan, relations between America and, as influenced by Philippine Islands, 57; an example of a nation driven to imperialistic policy through lack of economic reserves, 170-171.

Jingoism, the irreducible minimum of, 196-197.

Joehlinger, Otto, on the open and the closed door in colonies, 104 n.

Kidd, Benjamin, "Control of the Tropics," cited, 91.

Kiel Canal, internationalisation of, 254, 279.

King, W. I., "Wealth and Income of People of United States," cited, 190 n.

Krehbiel, Edward, digest of history of pacifism by, 219 n.

Latin America, competition of America for trade of, 59-60; possibilities of, as a field for investment, 69-70; course to be followed by America toward, 207-208; fear of policy of aggression on part of United States by, 208-209; danger in our relations with, from its political instability and unripeness, 211.

League for peace, foundations of a true, 240-241; question of how to form, premature, 241; things essential to continued existence of, 241-242; methods of enforcing system, 242-244; creation of international machinery for working out modes of action, 245.

League to enforce peace, arguments for and against a, 226-228, 230.

Lippmann, Walter, quoted on solution of colonial problem, 265.

Loree, L. F., compilation by, cited, 68 n.

Lough, W. H., quoted on trade of United States with South America, 65 n.

McMaster, J. B., quotation from, 172 n.

Mahan, A. T., "Interest of America in Sea Power," etc., cited, 46; on the possibilities of an Anglo-American alliance, 156-157.

Marx, Karl, on the workingman's lack of a fatherland, 143.

Merles, Salvador R., work by, cited, 208 n.

Merritt, Eugene, on disadvantages of small-sized farms, 179.

Mexico, significance of revolution in, to United States, 55; inferences to be drawn from action of United States concerning, 56-57; laming of industry by frequent revolutions in, 88. _See_ Latin America.

Millard, T. F., "Our Eastern Question," quoted, 214 n.

Milloud, Maurice, "The Ruling Caste and Frenzied Finance in Germany," quoted, 116, 119, 120, 124.

Mining, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, 174.

Monroe Doctrine, the, 39; effect of, on America's relations with Europe, 55-57; stands for principle that Latin-American countries will develop naturally, 89; possibility of cloaking a policy of aggression under, 206-207; tolerance of, by Europe, conditioned upon America's acting as guardian and not conqueror, 207-208; peril in, both to United States and to Latin America, 209-210; question of future treatment of, 212.

Munition makers, value to, of constant fear of war, 137-138.

Mystic interpretation of war, 20-21.

Napoleonic Wars, economic factors in, 26.

National consciousness, development of, in Europe, 111-112.

Nationalism and Internationalism, discussion of use of terms, 153 n.

Nationalities, the struggle of subject, for independence, 274-276; impossibility of independence for all, 276-278.

Natural resources, lack of, a cause of militaristic and imperialistic policy, 170-171.

Naumann, Friedrich, on handicapping of Germany through meagreness of colonial possessions, 107.

Navies, arguments for reduction of, to secure freedom of the seas, 247-252.

Olivier, Sir Sidney, "White Capital and Coloured Labour," quoted, 85, 86-87.

Olney, Richard, on sovereignty of United States in Western hemisphere, 56.

Open door, America's policy of the, relative to China, 213; what America should mean by, 215; problem of, the essential one in solution of question of colonies, 267-268.

Orient, possibilities of, as a field for investment, 69-70.

Pacifism, history of, 218-221; must be either static or dynamic, 222; our hope in dynamic type of, 223; character of dynamic as opposed to static, 223-226. _See also_ Peace.

Pacifists in America, attitude of, toward national policies, 3; effect upon, of great war and the demand for preparedness, 6-7; mistaken ideas concerning war and its causes held by many, 16-17.

Panama Canal, international liabilities of United States increased by, 57; competition of United States for foreign trade increased by, 62-63; internationalisation of, 254, 279.

Pastoral nations, war a necessity to, 22.

Peace, direct and indirect interest of America in, 217-218; the classic ideal of, 218-219; change in character of movement for, before French Revolution, 219-220; proven inapplicability of rationalistic theories of, 220-221; cause of failures of pacifist efforts, 221-224; criticism of plans of static type for preserving, 224-230; the all-pervasive sentiment for, 237; decline in population rate a help toward, 287; proposed league for, _see_ League for peace.

Philippine Islands, acquisition of, by America, 46; change in feeling of Americans regarding ownership of, 53-54; increase of America's international responsibilities by, 57; small percentage of Europeans and Americans in, 130.

Popular appeal of imperialistic policy, 140; reason for, found in economic argument, 141-147; patriotic ideals and, 147-150.

Population, growth in, one incentive to war, 17; increase in, one of the chief forces driving Western nations outward, 76-77; imperialism not an outlet for superfluity of, 129-131; overtaking of extension of agriculture by, 182; statistics of, 183; diminishing rate of increase in, 183; increase of America's, by immigration, 184; distribution of wealth among, in United States, 190 n.; increase in, means increased inequality in distribution of wealth, 190-191; decline in rate of, the greatest of factors making for internationalism and peace, 287.

Preparedness, origin and character of demand for, 5-6; effect of, on pacifist ideals, 6-7; interest of financial groups in policy of, 8-9.

Preziosi, G., work by, cited, 117.

Punic Wars, economic motives behind, 21.

Railroad policy of Germany, impetus given to "dumping" by, 120.

Rationalistic pacifism, inapplicability of, to the facts of life, 220-221.

Reinsch, Paul, "World Politics," quoted, 54 n.; "Colonial Administration" by, cited and quoted, 95, 103.

Religion, a lesser cause of war than economic interests, 27-28; not a preventive of war, 165.

Ripley, W. Z., cited concerning American debt to Europe, 68 n.

Robinson, E. V. D., essay by, cited, 28 n.

Rohrbach, Paul, "German World Policies," quoted, 93 n.

Ruedorffer, J. J., quoted on future of Germany's world policy, 109.

Russia, relations between America and, 36.

_Saturday Review_ article on competition between England and Germany, 100.

Schulze-Gaevernitz, Dr., work by, cited and quoted, 133-134.

Scottish Border wars, viewed as cattle-stealing raids, 24-25.

Shipping, an economic activity that is not pacific in tendency, 174.

Sidebotham, H., "The Freedom of the Seas," quoted, 251, 253.

Six-Power Loan, in principle a right step, 216.

Slavery, modern forms of, under system of tropical imperialism, 95.

Slosson, E. E., article by, quoted, 90-91.

Social Democratic party in Germany, attitude of, toward imperialism, 146.

Socialists, anti-imperialistic philosophy of, 128-129; allegiance of, to their own countries, 143-144; reason for failure of, to prevent war, 239-240; agreement of, with theory that colonial problem can be solved only by concerted action of Great Powers, 264-266.

Solf, Wilhelm, quoted on Germany's colonial policy, 104, 106 n.

South American trade, competition of United States for, 63-65. _See_ Latin America.

Suez Canal, internationalisation of, 254.

Sumner, W. G., quoted on war, 196-197.

Supra-nationalism, the proximate economic development, 284.

Switzerland, industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff., 119.

Taxation, an underlying cause of war, 17.

Thompson, Warren S., "Population: A Study in Malthusianism," cited, 178.

Trade development, as one of the causes of war, 17.

Trojan War, a free-booting expedition, 24.

Tropical imperialism, conditions causing, 85; arguments for and against, 85-98.

Tropical products, growing significance of, 90-92.

Trusts, tendency to internationalism in process of formation of, 281-282.

Tunis, trade of, favoured by France, 104.

United States. _See_ America.

United States of Europe, fallacy in proposal to create a, 224-225.

Von der Goltz, Field-Marshal, quoted on necessity of imminence of war to maintenance of prestige of officer class, 138 n.

Wage-earners, imperialistic arguments that appeal to, 141-147; internationalism of, 280.

Wages, supposed beneficial reaction of imperialism upon, 144-146.

War, popular theories regarding, 16; the real motives, incentives and origins of, 17; reason for both ancient and modern, traced to economic forces, 17-19, 260-262; interpretation of, by school of romanticists, 20-21; question of permanence of, as an institution, 28; attitude of Americans toward, 32 ff.; cause of attitude of average American toward, 32-42; how system of imperialism tends to lead to, 99-115, 136-137; value of fear of, to certain political and industrial interests, 137-138; elements in America that foster spirit of, 164; antidotes to imperialistic policy and, 186-200. _See also_ Peace.

War after the war, the, 273.

War of 1914, effect of, upon America, 1-15; lessons derived by America from, 57-58; the part that America might play at close of, 290-294.

Wealth, equal distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, 186-188.

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, "History of Trade Unionism," quoted, 145 n.

West Indies, working of modern imperialistic methods in, 85-87.

Wilcox, E. V., "Tropical Agriculture," quoted, 91-92.

Willcox, W. F., birth and death rate statistics by, 183 n.

Willford, Isbell, "Wealth and Income of People of United States," quoted, 177 n.

Willis, J. C., arguments by, for tropical imperialism, 86 n.

Wilson, C. Usher, article on "The Native Question and Irrigation in South Africa," quoted, 95 n.

Printed in the United States of America.

Italy, France and Britain at War

BY H. G. WELLS

Author of "Mr. Britling Sees it Through," "What is Coming," etc.

Here Mr. Wells discusses with an incisiveness and penetrativeness all his own, conditions as he has seen them in three of the great countries engaged in the European War. The book is divided into four main sections: I. The Passing of the Effigy, in which are reviewed certain changing sentiments as regards war; II. The War in Italy, taking up The Isonzo Front, The Mountain War and Behind the Front; III. The Western War, and IV. How People Think about the War, in which are found such topics as Do They Really Think at All, The Yielding Pacifist, The Religious Revival and The Social Changes in Progress.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

_BY THE SAME AUTHOR_

The New Democracy

An Essay on Certain Political and Economic Tendencies in the United States

BY WALTER E. WEYL, PH.D.

A chief issue in the Presidential Campaign is "Socialized Democracy." Dr. Weyl's new work gives a clear summary of its causes and aims.

_Crown 8vo, blue cloth, gilt top, $2.00_

_Standard Library edition .50_

SOME PRESS COMMENTS

"A masterly, scathing, and absolutely fearless arraignment of things that ought not to be in a republic, and of tendencies that no democracy ought to tolerate."--_Boston Herald_.

"A thoughtful volume ... a big synthesis of the whole social problem in this country. A keen survey."--_Chicago Evening Post_.

"A searching and suggestive study of American life.... A book to make people think.... Notable for its scholarship and brilliant in execution, it is not merely for the theorist, but for the citizen."--_Newark Evening News_.

"Dr. Weyl's book is a strong analysis of the whole subject. It will be read widely and will exercise a large influence."--_The Evening Mail_.

"Dr. Weyl has read the modern writing on the wall and interprets it to us more clearly than has yet been done."--_New York Globe_.

"A masterly interpretation of the industrial, political, social, and moral revolution that is going on in this country."--_Albany Argus_.

"A complete and circumstantial statement of the whole case ... our social and economic unrest is not to lead to a war of classes, but to a 'National Readjustment.'"--_New York Tribune_.

"The best and most comprehensive survey of the general social and political status and prospects that has been published of late years."--_The Pittsburg Post_.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

_OUR NATIONAL PROBLEMS_

_DECORATED BOARDS -------- EACH FIFTY CENTS_

THE PENTECOST OF CALAMITY

BY OWEN WISTER

"One of the most striking and moving utterances.... Let all Americans read it."--_The Congregationalist_.

"It is written with sustained charm and freshness of insight."--_N. Y. Times_.

THEIR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE

BY GUSTAVUS OHLINGER

"Hundreds of thousands of this book should be distributed as tracts for all honest, loyal, decent American citizens to read and digest."--_N. Y. Sun_.

THE FORKS OF THE ROAD

BY WASHINGTON GLADDEN

(This book won the first prize offered by the Church Peace Union for the best essay on war and peace.)

"Small as the book is, it is full of 'meat for strong men,' and its closely reasoned argument is likely to set many people thinking along unaccustomed lines."--_N. Y. Times_.

THE HERITAGE OF TYRE

BY WILLIAM BROWN MELONEY

"In terse, striking, forceful language the author of this most valuable little volume shows us the greatest weakness America has, and the most ominous danger such weakness involves."--_Boston Transcript_.

STRAIGHT AMERICA

BY FRANCES A. KELLOR

"Practical, candid, and most earnest. It gets down to the first principles of American needs and discusses them with honesty, ability, and a straight-from-the-shoulder forcefulness that ought to prove inspiring and infectious."--_New York Times_.

AMERICANIZATION

BY ROYAL DIXON

"No better beginning with the immigrant can be made than to teach him along the lines laid down in Mr. Dixon's sincere and ardent little manual of decency in democracy."--_New York Sun_.

WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH MEXICO

BY CASPAR WHITNEY

"A vital question answered intelligently, fully and without hesitation.... Should be read by every one whose sense of fair play has not been warped by a baneful sophistry."--_Philadelphia Public Ledger_.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

Brazil: Today and Tomorrow

BY LILLIAN ELWYN ELLIOTT, F. R. G. S.

Literary Editor of the Pan-American Magazine, New York.

This volume seeks to show how and to what extent Brazil "has been opened up" and developed, and by whom, and to outline some of the work that remains to be done. Miss Elliott first of all discusses present social conditions in Brazil, explaining who the Brazilian is, what political and social events have moulded him and what he has done to develop his territory; a territory 300,000 square miles larger than that of the United States. Later sections deal with finance, the monetary conditions of the country, the problem of exchange, and the source of income. Still others take up various means of transit, the railroads, the coast-wise and the ocean service, rivers and roads. Industries are treated in considerable detail--cattle, cotton raising, weaving, coffee growing and the rubber trade. An unusual feature comes under the heading of "The World's Horticultural and Medicinal Debt to Brazil" in which the reader is made to realize something of the immense forestal treasure house comprised in the huge, wild, half explored regions of north Brazil.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

End of Project Gutenberg's American World Policies, by Walter E. Weyl