Part 1

Absurdities of Immaterialism,

Or,

A Reply to T. W. P. Taylder's Pamphlet,

Entitled,

"The Materialism of the Mormons or Latter-day Saints, Examined and Exposed."

By Orson Pratt,

One of the Twelve Apostles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

"What is truth?" This is a question which has been asked by many. It is a question supposed to be of difficult solution. Mr. Taylder in his tract against materialism, says, "It is a question which all the philosophers of the Grecian and Roman schools could not answer." He seems to think the question was unanswerable until the introduction of the gospel; since which time he considers that the veil is taken away, and that "we now enjoy the full blaze of truth." He further confidently asserts, that "with the materials afforded us in that sacred book, (meaning the New Testament,) we are enabled satisfactorily to answer the question, What is truth?"

What does this author mean by the foregoing assertions? Does he mean, that no truth was understood by the Grecian and Roman schools? That no truth was discerned by the nations, during the first four thousand years after the creation? Or, does he mean, that the gospel truths were not understood until they were revealed? He certainly must mean the latter and not the former. Both the Romans and Grecians could, without the least difficulty, answer the question. "What is truth?" Nothing is more simple than an answer to this question. It is a truth, _that something exists in space,_ and this truth was just as well perceived by all nations before the book called the New Testament existed as afterwards. It is a truth that, "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles." This was not learned from that sacred book--the Bible. We admit that the question, what is _gospel_ truth, could not be answered by any one to whom the gospel had never been revealed. Dr. Good, in his "Book of Nature," says, "general truth may be defined, the connexion and agreement, or repugnancy and disagreement, of our ideas." This definition we consider erroneous; for it makes general truth depend on the existence of ideas. Now truth is independent of all ideas. It is a necessary truth that, _space is boundless,_ and that _duration is endless,_ abstract from all connexion and agreement of our ideas, or even of our existence, or the existence of any other being. If neither the universe nor its Creator existed, these eternal unchangeable, and necessary truths would exist, unperceived and unknown. Truth is the relation which things bear to each other. Knowledge is the perception of truth. Truth may exist without knowledge, but knowledge cannot exist without truth.

The New Testament unfolds, not all the truths which exist, but some few truths of infinite importance. The vast majority of truths of less importance were discovered independently of that book.

"The followers of Joseph Smith," says this author, "hold the doctrine of the materiality of all existence in common with the ancient academics." This, sir, we admit. Our belief, however, in this doctrine, is founded, not on any modern supernatural revelation, unfolding this doctrine, as this author insinuates, but on reason and common sense. The doctrine of immaterialism, in our estimation, is false, and in the highest degree absurd, and unworthy the belief of any true Christian philosopher.

The author of the treatise against materialism has stated his first proposition as follows:--

"_The Philosophy of the Mormons is_ IRRATIONAL."

What the author means by this proposition is, that it is "irrational" to believe _all substance material._ To substantiate this proposition he sets out in quest of proof. An _immaterial substance_ is the thing wanted. No other proof will answer. If he can prove the existence of an immaterial substance his point is gained,--his proposition established, and the irrationality of the material theory will be demonstrated.

As we are about to launch forth into the wide field of existence in search of an "immaterial substance," it may be well to have the _term_ correctly defined, so as to be able to distinguish such a substance from _matter. _It is of the utmost importance that every reasoner should clearly define the terms he employs. Two contending parties may use the same word in altogether different meanings; and each draw correct conclusions from the meaning which he attaches to the same word; hence arise endless disputes. As we have no confidence in the immaterial theory, we shall let the immaterialist define his own terms. We shall give,

Taylder's Definition.--"What is meant by an _immaterial substance_ is merely this, that something exists which is _not matter_ and is evidently _distinct_ from matter, which is _not dependent_ on matter for its existence, and which possesses properties and qualities _entirely different_ from those possessed by matter." (Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 14.)

This definition of an "immaterial substance" is ambiguous. It needs another definition to inform us what he means. Does he mean that ALL of "the properties and qualities" of an immaterial substance are "entirely different from those possessed by matter;" and that it possesses NO properties in common with matter? Or does he mean that while it "possesses SOME properties and qualities entirely different" from matter it inherits OTHERS in common with matter? If the latter be his meaning, we see no reason for calling _any_ substance "immaterial." Iron possesses SOME properties and qualities "entirely different" from all other kinds of matter, and other properties it inherits in common with every other kind. Shall we therefore say that iron is not matter? Among the various kind of matter, each has its _distinct_ properties, and its _common_ properties; and notwithstanding each possesses "entirely different" properties and qualities from all other kinds, yet each is called matter because it possesses some properties in common with all other kinds. Hence the term _matter_ should be given to all substances which possess _any_ properties in common, however wide they may differ in other respects. A substance to be _immaterial_ must possess NO properties or qualities in common with matter. All its qualities must be entirely _distinct_ and _different_. It is to be regretted that our opponent has not defined an _immaterial substance_ more clearly. As he is ambiguous in his definition, we shall presume that he entertains the same views as the modern advocates of immaterialism generally entertain.

That celebrated writer, Isaac Taylor, says,--"a disembodied spirit, or we should rather say, an unembodied spirit, or sheer mind, is NOWHERE. Place is a relation belonging to extension; and extension is a property of matter; but that which is wholly abstracted from matter, and in speaking of which we deny that it has _any property_ in common therewith, can in itself be subjected to none of its conditions; and we might as well say of a pure spirit that it is hard, heavy, or red, or that it is a cubic foot in dimensions, as say that it is _here_ or _there._ It is only in a popular and improper sense that any such affirmation is made concerning the Infinite Spirit, or that we speak of God as _everywhere_ present." * * * "Using the term as we use them of ourselves, God is not _here_ or _there_." * * * "When we talk of an absolute immateriality," continues this author, "and wish to withdraw mind altogether from matter, we must no longer allow ourselves to imagine that it is, or can be, in any place, or that it has any kind of relationship to the visible and extended universe." (Taylor's "Physical Theory of Another Life." Chapter II.) Dr. Good says, "The metaphysical immaterialists of modern times freely admit that the mind has NO PLACE of existence, that it does exist NOWHERE; while at the same time they are compelled to allow that the immaterial Creator or universal spirit exists EVERYWHERE, substantially as well as virtually." (Good's "Book of Nature," Series III., Lecture I.)

Dr. Abercrombie, in speaking upon _matter_ and _mind,_ says, that "in as far as our utmost conception of them extends, we have no grounds for believing that they have _anything_ in common." (Abercrombie on the "Intellectual Powers." Part I. Sec. I.)

With these definitions, we shall follow our opponent in his researches after an "immaterial substance." After taking a minute survey of man, he believes he has found in his composition, and in connexion with his bodily organization, something _immaterial._ He says, "the spirit is the purely immaterial part, which is capable of separation from the body, and can exist independently of the body."

"The _body_ is that _material_ part, 'formed out of the dust of the ground,' and is the medium through which the mind is manifested." (Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 8.)

That the mind or _spirit_, "is capable of separation from the body, and can exist independently of the body," we most assuredly believe; but that it is "immaterial" we deny; and it remains for Mr. Taylder to _prove_ its _immateriality_. His first proof is founded on his own assertion, that "mind is simple, not compounded." If this assertion be admitted as true, it affords not the least evidence for the _immateriality_ of _mind._ Every material atom is simple, not compounded. Is it, therefore, not matter? Must each simple, uncompounded elementary atom be _immaterial?_

Mr. Taylder next says, "Mind is not perceivable to corporeal organs, matter is so perceivable." This assertion is altogether unfounded. "Corporeal organs" can perceive neither _matter_ nor _mind_. The mind alone can perceive: corporeal organs are only the instruments of perception. Bishop Butler, in his Analogy, expressly says, that "our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like matter as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive." (Butler's Analogy. Part I. Chap. I.) The mind clearly perceives its own existence as well as the existence of other matter. _Perception_, then, is a quality peculiar to that kind of matter called mind. Mr. Taylder further remarks, that "All the qualities of matter are not comparable with the more excellent qualities of mind, such as power and intelligence." We willing to admit that _power_ and _intelligence,_ and some other qualities of mind, are far superior to the qualities of other matter; but we do not admit that the superiority of some of the qualities of a substance prove its _immateriality_. The superiority of some qualities has nothing to do with the _immateriality_ of the _substance_. OXYGEN possesses some qualities, not only distinct from, but superior to, those qualities possessed by BARIUM, STRONTIUM, SILICIUM, GLUCINIUM, ZIRCONIUM, and many other metals and material substances; yet no one from this will draw the conclusion, that _oxygen_ is _immaterial_. Oxygen is material though it possesses some distinct and superior qualities to other matter; so mind or spirit is material, though it differs in the superiority of some of its qualities from other matter.

It is strange, indeed, to see the inconsistencies of this learned author: he remarks, "Mind thinks, matter cannot think. It is the existence of this thinking principle which clearly proves the immateriality of the mind or spirit." This method of reasoning may be termed (_petitio principii_), begging the question. First, he assumes that "matter cannot think;" and, second, draws the conclusion that a _thinking substance_ is _immaterial._ This conclusion is a legitimate one if the premises are granted; but the premises are assumed, therefore the conclusion is false. Prove that _mind_ is _not_ matter before you assume that "matter cannot think." It would seem from the assertions of this author, that the quality of "thinking" is to be the touchstone--the infallible test--the grand distinguishing characteristic between _material_ and _immaterial_ substances. It matters not, in his estimation, how many qualities different substances inherit in common, if one can be found that thinks, it must be immaterial. There is no one substance out of the fifty or more substances discovered by chemists, but what possesses some qualities "entirely different" from any of the rest; therefore, each substance, when compared with others, has equal claims with that of mind to be placed in the _immaterial_ list. In proving that mind is immaterial, it is not enough to prove that it has _some_ properties entirely distinct from other substances; but it must be proved to have no properties in common with matter. Nothing short of this will agree with the modern notions of _immateriality._ It must be shown that mind or spirit has no relation to _duration_ or _space_--no _locality_--that it must exist "NOWHERE"--that it has no _extension_--that it exists not "Now" and "Then," neither "Here" nor "There"--that it cannot be moved from _place_ to _place_--that it has no _form_ or _figure_--no _boundaries_ or _limits_ of extension. These, according to the definitions of modern immaterialists, are the negative conditions or qualities absolutely necessary to the existence of all _immaterial substance_. While the opposite of these, or the positive qualities or conditions are absolutely necessary to the existence of all _material_ substance.

"How do you distinguish," inquires Mr. Taylder, "between any two given substances, such as, that a block of stone is not a log of wood?" He answers, "Because they possess different qualities." And then declares, "So also you distinguish between mind and matter." But the "different qualities" by which "a block of stone" is distinguished from "a log of wood," do not prove either the stone or the wood to be _immaterial_; neither do the different qualities by which the substance called mind is distinguished from other substances, prove either the mind or the other substances to be _immaterial_. So far as the different qualities are evidences, the mind has as good a claim to materiality as the stone or wood.

"The properties of body," continues our learned opponent, "are size, weight, solidity, resistance, &c.; those of the mind are joy, hope, fear, &c.; but weight is not joy, resistance is not hope, size is not fear; therefore, as a block of stone is not a log of wood, so mind is not matter." That a _stone_ possesses many _different qualities_ from _wood,_ and that mind possesses many different qualities from other substances, we by no means deny; but that these _different qualities_ prove stone, or wood, or mind, or any other substance to be _immaterial,_ we do deny. We care not how many different properties mind possesses over and above other substances; that is altogether foreign from the question. But is it destitute of any or of all the properties which other substances possess? is the question. Is it destitute of "size, weight, solidity, resistance, &c?" If not, then the mind possesses all the essential characteristics of matter, though its peculiar and distinct properties should be multiplied to infinity.

This author calls "weight" one of the properties of matter. What is _weight?_ It is nothing more nor less than force. Matter approaches to, or presses on, other matter with _weight,_ or _force,_ or _power_. Now matter either exerts this _force_ of itself, or else it is impelled either directly or indirectly by other substances, possessing intelligence, power, and other properties of mind. If matter exerts this power of itself, then it exhibits one of the properties of mind; but if the seat of this power is in that substance called mind, then it is mind that exhibits the power called weight, and not other substances. Mr. Taylder informs us that "it is mind, and _mind alone,_ which is the _seat of power_." (Taylder against Materialism. Page 12.) If this be true, (and we feel no disposition to deny it), then _weight_ is not the property of unintelligent matter, but a property of mind. And the same reasoning will apply to all other _powers or forces_ which are generally ascribed to unintelligent matter. They are only the powers or forces of mind, or else other substances exhibit powers or forces which are common to mind: in the latter case, mind could not be _immaterial_: in the former case, unintelligent matter (if such exist) is deprived of every force usually ascribed to it. It can have neither gravitation, attraction, repulsion, chemical affinity, nor any other conceivable force. Though deprived of all energy or force, unintelligent matter would still be possessed of those inert qualities (if, indeed, they may be called qualities) essential to its existence. These qualities, or rather conditions necessary to its existence, are duration, extension or place, solidity, figure, &c. An _immaterial substance_ must have none of those conditions or qualities.

It is amusing to trace this author's process of reasoning. He first assumes premises entirely false, argues from the same, shows the deductions to be absurd and triumphantly exclaims, "Mind then is not matter." We will quote the following specimen: "If the mind," says this author, "be material and the brain nothing but a large gland, secreting the various affections of thought, hope, joy, memory, &c, then all these _affections_ or _qualities_ are _material,_ and must be also little particles of matter, of different forms and dimensions, and perhaps of various colours, Then we might, with the utmost propriety, without the shadow of an absurdity, logically say, 'the twentieth part of our belief, the half of a hope, the top of memory, the corner of a fear, the north side of a doubt,' &c. Mind then is not matter." (Taylder against Materialism. Page 15.) It will be perceived that this logical author, in the foregoing quotation, confounds _affections_ or _qualities_ with _mind;_ that is, he supposes "thought, hope, joy, memory," &c. all to be material as well as the mind; he then introduces a material brain that secretes the material affections; but what becomes of the material mind he does not tell us; probably the material mind is stowed away in some extremity of the body--in the foot or big toe, so as not to interfere with its material affections, which are secreted in the material brain at the other extremity. After imagining up such an unheard of being, no wonder that he should discover some absurdities in its composition. No wonder that in such a creature of his own invention, there should be, not only "the corner of a fear," and "the north side of a doubt," but a cubical imagination with horns to it. No wonder that such frightful absurdities should cause as great a man as Taylder to exclaim with the upper part of a five-cornered assurance, that "Mind then is not matter." It would be a logical conclusion from his logical absurdities, founded on his _material affections_ of a material mind.

But who does not know that "thought, hope, joy, memory," and all other _affections_ or _qualities_ are not substances of any kind, but merely different operations or states of the mind? A material mind, possessing the power to think, to feel, to reason, to remember, is not the brain, nor secretions of the brain, nor any other part of the fleshy tabernacle; but it is the being that inhabits it, that preserves its own identity, whether in the body or out of it, and remains unchangeable in its substance whatever changes may happen to the body. This material spirit or mind existed before it entered the body, exists in the body, will exist after it leaves the body, and will be reunited again with the body in the resurrection.

As another specimen of monstrous absurdities logically deduced from absurd premises, we quote the following:--"Materialism" he remarks, "is not only relatively but absolutely absurd. If mind be matter, or matter mind, then we may have the square or cube of joy or grief, of pain or pleasure. We may divide a great joy into a number of little joys, or we may accumulate a great joy by heaping together the solid parts of several little joys. We shall then have the color and shape of a thought. It will be either white, grey, brown, crimson, purple, or it may be a mixture of two or more colors. Then we shall have a dark grey hope, a bright yellow sorrow, a round brown tall pain, and an octagonal green belief; an inch of thought, a mile of joy." We do most cordially agree with Mr. Taylder that these results would be "not only relatively but absolutely absurd;" and only equalled by the absurdity of the premises from which they were deduced. He has assumed that the several STATES or CONDITIONS of the mind, such as joy, grief, pain, pleasure, thought, &c., are material as well as the mind. With the same propriety he might have assumed that MOTION is material as well as the matter moved. Joy is no more a _substance_ than _motion,_ both are merely the _states_ or _conditions_ of substance. As great absurdities could be deduced from assuming that _motion_ is material, as there can be from Mr. Taylder's assumption that _joy_ is material. As an illustration, let us take this author's own words, with the exception of substituting _iron_ for _mind, motion_ for the _affections_ of the mind; it will then read thus:--"If" _iron_ "be matter, or matter" _iron,_ "then we may have the square or cube of" a _solid motion._ "We may divide a great" _solid motion_ "into a number of little" _solid motions,_ "or we may accumulate a great" _solid motion_ "by heaping together the solid parts of several little" _solid motions._ "We shall then have a color and shape of a" _motion._ "It will be either white, grey, brown, crimson, purple, or it may be a mixture of two or more colors. Then we shall have a dark grey" _motion_ "a round, brown, tall" _motion_; "an inch" or "a mile of" _solid motion_, &c. It is strange that Mr. Taylder did not close his train of reasoning, by saying, "Mind, therefore, is not matter;" and then we could have completed the parallel by saying, _iron, therefore, is not matter._ If such reasoning proves mind _immaterial,_ similar reasoning will prove any other substance immaterial.