Part 3

Admiral Jellicoe himself is explicit upon this point, and states that “at 9 P.M.” he ordered his fleet “to alter course by divisions to _south_, informing the Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding destroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that they should conform.” (J) Nothing could be more definitely established than the fact that this broke off the action of fleets in every real sense of the word. The British light craft were to conform to the movements of the Battle Fleet, and there was no hint of maintaining a screen or contact that would develop the position of the enemy fleet.

This situation should be kept clearly in mind. There were many encounters throughout the night between British and German war-craft of various types, but these fought on their own initiative, and there was no concerted touch maintained with the German fleet--nothing that could be called a part of a battle of fleets. The Germans simply ploughed their way home through the stragglers left in the wake of the British fleet, and Lord Jellicoe frankly states that he was out of touch with his cruisers and destroyers. Consequently Lord Jellicoe’s decision, and move to the south, ended the Battle of Jutland.

This should be recognized as the final decision of the battle, and the British Commander-in-Chief makes it plain that he so considered it, as he states the situation at the time and the reasons which influenced him.

At 9 o’clock the German fleet was to the westward. The British fleet was between it and all its bases. The British fleet was superior in speed, and had such an overwhelming superiority in ships and guns that it could afford to discard its damaged ships without impairing this superiority. The British Admiral had light cruisers and destroyers, to throw out a screen and to maintain touch with the German fleet. There was a proportion of damaged ships in the German fleet; and this, with its original inferior fleet speed, would have made it a hard task for the German fleet to ease around the British fleet and reach the German bases. These conditions were in favor of keeping in touch with the German fleet.

On the other hand, for Admiral Jellicoe to have kept his fleet in touch with the German fleet through the dark hours, even by the most efficient use of his screen of destroyers and cruisers, would have meant taking the risk of a night action, which would have involved his capital ships, as Admiral Scheer intended to fight his way through that night. Above all things there was the ominous threat of torpedo attacks in the night, with possibilities of disaster to the Battle Fleet upon which depended the established British control of the seas.

Lord Jellicoe’s arguments show that he followed a line of conduct well considered in advance,[18] and he writes with a sincere conviction that his act in breaking off the battle was justified by the results. In explaining the many advantages possessed by the weaker German fleet Admiral Jellicoe also reveals disappointing conditions in backwardness of methods on the part of the British Navy. There was not alone the lack of modern methods in range-finding and director fire-control, but also in torpedo attack and defense, and in preparation for action “under night conditions.” (J)[19] It is something of a shock to read that the stronger British fleet went into the Jutland battle with a handicap in these essentials that became a factor to prevent a decisive action.[20] Lord Jellicoe makes a very strong plea for his contention that, under the existing conditions of smoke, mist and darkness, with the German fleet skilfully taking advantage of these conditions, and with the handicaps of the Grand Fleet in construction, equipment, and methods to contend with these tactics and conditions, there was no opportunity to force a decision without prohibitive risks of losing the existing supremacy of the British Navy on the seas.[21]

[18] Lord Jellicoe had sent to the Admiralty a formal dispatch (October 30, 1914) stating his conviction that the Germans would “rely to a great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes,” (J) and defining his own “tactical methods in relation to these forms of attack.” (J) On November 7, 1914, the Admiralty approved the “views stated therein.” Lord Jellicoe in his book cites this Admiralty approval of 1914 as applying to the Battle of Jutland.

[19] “The German organization at night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours are practically nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours, and they use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results. I am reluctantly of the opinion that under night conditions we have a good deal to learn from them.” (J)

[20] “The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German fleet was. Consequently to fight them at night would only have been to court disaster. Lord Jellicoe’s business was to preserve the Grand Fleet, the main defense of the Empire as well as of the Allied cause, not to risk its existence.” Sir Percy Scott, _Fifty Years in the Royal Navy_.

[21] See _A Guide to the Military History of The World War_, pp. 320-22.

Accordingly, at 9 o’clock Admiral Jellicoe disposed the British battleships for the night in columns of divisions abeam one mile apart, to insure the columns not losing sight of one another through the dark hours. The destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern. In this order the British fleet steamed through the night at seventeen knots “some 85 miles” (J) on a southerly course. The only British ship that is mentioned as having been given another mission was the small minelayer _Abdiel_ which was sent to strew mines in an area off the Vyl Lightship “over which it was expected the High Seas Fleet would pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during the night via the Horn Reef.” (J) No other craft was assigned to observe or harass the German fleet. The Sixth Division of the Grand Fleet had fallen behind, as the _Marlborough_, which had been damaged by a torpedo, could not maintain fleet speed. (This ship had to be sent back after 2 A.M., and Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag to the _Revenge_.) The British light craft also became widely scattered in the dark hours.

Within a few minutes of the time of Lord Jellicoe’s signal for the move to the south, Admiral Scheer gave his order for the night (9.06), “course S. S. E. ¼ E. speed 16 knots.” (S) The German Admiral fully expected to be attacked by the British fleet and to meet strong opposition, but he decided that the German “main fleet in close formation was to make for Horn Reef by the shortest route.” (S) The fleet was disposed in the same order, Squadrons I, III, II, with the battle cruisers covering the rear--“out of consideration for their damaged condition.” (S) The German Admiral placed these weaker ships in the rear, as he thought his van would encounter resistance and might be heavily engaged in the expected night action. His torpedo flotillas were disposed “in an E. N. E. to S. S. W. direction, which was where the enemy Main Fleet could be expected.” (S)

Thus disposed the German Battle Fleet moved through the dark hours, on a straight course for Horn Reef, without meeting the expected attacks, which the strong Squadron I in the van was prepared to ward off. There really was no chance of engaging the British battleships, as the Grand Fleet had moved to the south before the German fleet crossed Lord Jellicoe’s course. The _Nassau_ got out of station, when she struck a stray British destroyer in the darkness, and made for a morning rendezvous. The rest of the dreadnoughts of the High Seas Fleet met no delay nor mishap through the dark hours. Of the predreadnoughts, the battleship _Pommern_ was sunk by a mine or torpedo, with loss of all hands.

Many of the destroyers had fired all their torpedoes, and these craft were used for emergencies. They were very necessary, as the disabled cruisers _Rostock_ and _Elbing_ were abandoned and blown up, and these destroyers did good service in taking off the crews. They also rescued the crew of the disabled _Lützow_, which was towed through the darkness until she was so down by the head that her screws spun in the air. She was abandoned and destroyed by a torpedo at 1.45 A.M. Admiral Scheer cites the fact that these events could happen, without disturbance by the enemy, as “proving that the English Naval forces made no attempt to occupy the waters between the scene of battle and Horn Reef.” (S)

As a matter of fact this did not need any proof, because the British fleet held steadily on its southerly course, without regard to the direction taken by the Germans. In the wake of the Grand Fleet were left scattered cruisers and destroyers--and there were many clashes between these and the Germans, but all were isolated fights and adventures of lame ducks. Some of these encounters were reported to Lord Jellicoe and there was much shooting, with explosions and fire lighting up the darkness.

Admiral Scheer thought that all this must have indicated his position, and, even after not encountering the expected night attacks, the German Admiral expected the British to renew the battle promptly at dawn. But in consequence of the British Admiral’s dispositions for the night, it is evident that the position of the German fleet was not developed, as Admiral Jellicoe himself says, until “the information obtained from our wireless directional stations during the early morning.” (J)

As dawn was breaking, “at about 2.47 A.M.” (J) June 1, Admiral Jellicoe altered course of his fleet to the north to retrace his path of the night before. His Sixth Division of battleships had dropped astern, out of sight. His cruisers and destroyers were badly scattered, and the British Admiral abandoned his intention of seeking a new battle on the first of June.

The straggling of portions of his fleet during the move through the darkness is explained by Lord Jellicoe, and this caused him to delay his search for the German fleet until he could pick up the missing craft. His return to find these was the reason for retracing the course of the night manœuvre. The following is quoted from Lord Jellicoe’s book: “The difficulty experienced in collecting the fleet (particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night. It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By the time this concentration was effected it had become apparent that the High Seas Fleet, steering for the Horn Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German mine fields in the early morning on their way to their ports.”

Admiral Scheer’s fleet had arrived off Horn Reef at 3 A.M., where he waited for the disabled _Lützow_. At 3.30 he learned that she had been abandoned. Up to that time the German Admiral had expected a new battle of fleets, but he soon divined that he was to be free from pressure on the part of his enemy. This was confirmed when Admiral Scheer learned through a German aircraft scout of the straggling of Lord Jellicoe’s ships. (L 11 was the airship reported by the British “shortly after 3.30.”) Admiral Scheer’s comment is: “It is obvious that this scattering of the forces--which can only be explained by the fact that after the day-battle Admiral Jellicoe had lost the general command--induced the Admiral to avoid a fresh battle.” Both commanders are consequently on record in agreement as to the reason for no new battle of fleets.

The Germans were thus enabled to proceed to their bases undisturbed. Admiral Scheer’s account of the return of the German fleet to its home ports, and of the condition of his ships, is convincing--and there is no longer any question as to the German losses. On the way home the _Ostfriesland_ struck a mine, but was not seriously injured, making port without difficulty. Outside of the destruction of the _Lützow_, the German battle cruiser squadron was badly battered. The _Seydlitz_ had great difficulty in making her berth, and the _Derfflinger_ was also seriously damaged. To sum up the damage done to the battle cruisers of both fleets makes a sorry showing for this type of warship, which had so great a vogue before The World War.

Admiral Scheer states that, with the exception of his two battle cruisers, the German fleet was repaired and ready to go to sea again by the middle of August, and the _Bayern_ (the first German warship to mount 38 c.m.-guns) had been added to the fleet. He also gives an account of another sortie (August 18 to 20, 1916). Later in the year the German fleet was reinforced by the _Baden_ (38 c.m.-guns) and the battle cruiser _Hindenburg_, but at the end of 1916 the function of the High Seas Fleet was to keep the gates for the U-boats in the great German submarine campaign.

In this rôle of covering the operations of the submarines the German Battle Fleet had a very important influence upon the ensuing stages of the War. It was altogether a delusion to think that the career of the German fleet had been ended at Jutland--and that it “never came out.” On the contrary, Admiral Scheer’s fleet kept a wide area cleared for the egress and entrance of the German U-boats in their destructive campaign. If the German fleet had been destroyed in the Jutland action, it would have been possible for the Allies to put in place and maintain mine barrages close to the German bases. There is no need to add anything to this statement to show the great results that would have been gained, if the British had been able to win a decision in the Battle of Jutland.

* * * * *

The losses in the battle were as follows:

BRITISH

Tons QUEEN MARY (_Battle Cruiser_) 26,350 INDEFATIGABLE (_Battle Cruiser_) 18,800 INVINCIBLE (_Battle Cruiser_) 17,250 DEFENCE (_Armored Cruiser_) 14,600 WARRIOR (_Armored Cruiser_) 13,550 BLACK PRINCE (_Armored Cruiser_) 13,350 TIPPERARY (_Destroyer_) 1,430 NESTOR (_Destroyer_) 890 NOMAD (_Destroyer_) 890 TURBULENT (_Destroyer_) 1,100 FORTUNE (_Destroyer_) 965 ARDENT (_Destroyer_) 935 SHARK (_Destroyer_) 935 SPARROWHAWK (_Destroyer_) 935 -------- Total tonnage 111,980

GERMAN

Tons LÜTZOW (_Battle Cruiser_) 26,180 POMMERN (_Predreadnought_) 13,200 WIESBADEN (_Cruiser_) 5,400 ELBING (_Cruiser_) 4,500 ROSTOCK (_Cruiser_) 4,900 FRAUENLOB (_Cruiser_) 2,700 V-4 (_Destroyer_) 570 V-48 (_Destroyer_) 750 V-27 (_Destroyer_) 640 V-29 (_Destroyer_) 640 S-33 (_Destroyer_) 700 -------- Total tonnage 60,180

Killed and wounded: British (approximately) 6,600 German 3,076

In the early British accounts of the battle there were fanciful tales of pursuit of the German ships, through the night, and even after Admiral Jellicoe’s Report the British public did not at first realize the situation at the end of the action. But after a time, when this was better understood, there arose one of the greatest naval controversies that have ever agitated Great Britain, centered around the alleged “defensive” naval policy for maintaining the supremacy of Great Britain on the seas,--the pros and cons as to closing the Germans while there was light, and keeping in touch through the dark hours.

This controversy as to the Battle of Jutland has been carried on with bitterness in Great Britain, and volumes of matter have been written that will be utterly useless, so far as a true story of the action is concerned. Partisans have made the mistake of putting on record arguments that have been founded on phases of the British operations--with imaginary corresponding situations of the enemy, which never existed in actual fact. The preceding account may be relied upon as tracing the main events of the battle--and the real course of the action shows that many briefs must be thrown out of court.

Putting aside these contentions, and seeking only to visualize the truth, one is forced to the conclusion that the chief cause of failure on the part of the British fleet was the obvious handicap that methods had not been devised in advance for decisive operations under the existing conditions.

The problem for the British was to unite two parts of a superior force, and to impose this united superior force with destructive effect upon the enemy. This problem was simplified by the fact that the weaker enemy voluntarily came into contact in a position where escape by flight was out of the question. On the other hand, the solution was made difficult by unusual conditions of mist and smoke.

The decision was missed through the lack of rehearsed methods, not only for effectively joining the British forces, but for bringing into contact the superior British strength, against an enemy who actually possessed the great advantage of rehearsed methods adapted to the existing conditions. These conditions must be realized in order to arrive at a fair verdict.

When considering the Battle of Jutland, we must not think in the old terms of small dimensions, but we must picture the long miles of battle lines wreathed in mist and smoke, the great areas of manœuvre--and the complicated difficulties that must beset anyone who was called to command in this first great battle of dreadnoughts. These widely extended manœuvres of ships, only intermittently visible, must not be thought of as merely positions on a chart or game-board.

Reviewing the course of the action, the conclusion cannot be avoided that, on the day of the battle and under its conditions, the Germans were better prepared in advance for a battle of fleets. In his book Lord Jellicoe states many advantages possessed by the German fleet in construction, armament, and equipment--but, as has been said, his revelation of the British lack of methods is more significant.

All these deficiencies cannot be charged against Admiral Jellicoe, and the persistent efforts to give him all the blame are unjust. Is there any real evidence that another man would have done better under the circumstances? The tendency of certain writers to laud Vice Admiral Beatty at the expense of Admiral Jellicoe does not seem justified. As has been noted, when contact was established with the German advance force, Beatty failed to bring his full strength into action against this isolated weaker enemy force. In the ensuing stages it cannot be denied that haphazard methods were in evidence.

The idea must be put aside that the German ships were a huddled, helpless prey “delivered” to the British Commander-in-Chief. On the contrary, as stated, the German battle cruisers had already closed up with the German battleships and the High Seas Fleet had been slowed down to correct its formations. Consequently at this stage the German fleet was in hand and ready to sheer off, by use of their well rehearsed elusive manœuvre of ships-right-about, with baffling concealment in smoke screens. It has been shown that _after_ the Grand Fleet had completed deployment, the unsuspected situation existed in which Admiral Scheer’s fleet was again in close contact with the British fleet. It has also been explained that Vice Admiral Beatty made his much discussed signal, to “cut off” the German fleet, long after Admiral Scheer had put his fleet into safety by his third swing-around of the German ships. With these situations totally uncomprehended, it cannot be said that Vice Admiral Beatty had a firmer grasp upon the actual conditions than anyone else. The simple truth is, the British Command was always compelled to grope for the German ships, while his enemies were executing carefully rehearsed elusive manœuvres concealed in smoke--and the British were not prepared in advance to counter these tactics.

In the matter of signaling, the Germans were far ahead--in that they had their manœuvres carefully prepared in advance, to be executed with the minimum number of signals. The result was that, while the British Commander-in-Chief was obliged to keep up a constant succession of instructions by signals, the German Admiral was able to perform his surprising manœuvres with comparatively few master signals.[22] Lord Jellicoe also emphasizes the great advantage possessed by the Germans in their recognition signals at night.

[22] “Jellicoe was sending out radio instructions at the rate of two a minute--while von Scheer made only _nine_ such signals during the whole battle. This I learn on credible testimony.” Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U.S.N.

Sir Percy Scott, as already quoted, bluntly states: “The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German Fleet was.” To this should be added the statement that the British fleet was not prepared in methods in advance to cope with the conditions of the afternoon of May 31. The German fleet was. Herein lay the chief cause for failure to gain a decision, when the one great opportunity of the war was offered to the British fleet.

In the three decades before The World War great strides had been made in naval development, with only the unequal fighting in the American War with Spain and in the East to give the tests of warfare. In this period it is probable that at different times first one navy would be in the lead and then another. It was the misfortune of the British in the Battle of Jutland that the Germans, at that time, were better prepared in equipment and rehearsed methods for an action under the existing conditions. This should be recognized as an important factor--and the failure to win a decision should not be wholly charged against the men who fought the battle.

The destroyer came to its own in the Battle of Jutland as an auxiliary of the battle fleet, both for offense and defense. The whole course of the action proved that a screen of destroyers was absolutely necessary. For offense, it might be argued truthfully that, of the great number of torpedoes used, very few hit anything. The _Marlborough_ was the only capital ship reported struck in the real action,[23] and she was able afterward to take some part in the battle, and then get back to her base. But above all things stands out the fact that it was the threat of night torpedo attacks by German destroyers, and the desire to safeguard the British capital ships from these torpedo attacks, which made the British fleet withdraw from the battlefield, and break off touch with the German fleet. Lord Jellicoe states that he “rejected at once the idea of a night action” on account of “first the presence of torpedo craft in such large numbers.” (J)

[23] The _Pommern_ was sunk in the night after the action of fleets had been broken off.