Part 2

After the turn to the north, in the running fight in pursuit of Vice Admiral Beatty’s force, the German fleet was approaching the British Grand Fleet, which drew near in the increasing mist. To understand the course of the action at this critical stage, the reader should realize that the Germans possessed a fleet manœuvre which had been carefully rehearsed for such a contingency, in sudden contact with a superior enemy force. This was a simultaneous “swing-around” (S) of all the ships of the fleet, to turn the line and bring it into an opposite course. Admiral Scheer emphasizes the pains that had been taken to develop the ability to carry out this manœuvre, which had before been considered impracticable for a fleet in action. “At our peace manœuvres great importance was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to ensure the working of the signals.” (S) He is certainly justified in adding the statement that “the trouble spent was now well repaid,” as the German Admiral was by this means enabled to carry out an unexpected and very effective manœuvre on two occasions when his fleet would have been in cramped positions without this recourse. Admiral Scheer was also able to use this identical manœuvre in an attack.

The British did not have any idea that the German Command would be able to carry out this change of direction of the German line. Consequently, in the smoke and mist, these thrice-executed movements were not suspected by the British. With such an important part of the German tactics unnoticed, and not taken into account in relation to the British movements, the reasons are evident that make necessary a new story of these phases of the action.

At this stage of the running fight, the British battle cruisers, on a northwesterly course, had drawn ahead. The four _Queen Elizabeth_ battleships of Evan-Thomas’s Fifth Battle Squadron were following them and “thereby played the part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers.” (S) The fight had “developed into a stern chase,” (S) with Hipper’s battle cruisers engaging the British battle cruisers, and the German Main Fleet pressing on in chase of the Fifth Battle Squadron. The German fleet was disposed in this order: Squadron III, Squadron I, Squadron II, (predreadnoughts).[16]

[16] See Table II.

Squadrons III and I had opened fire at 4.45, but although they showed “speed much in excess of that for which they were designed,” (J) the German battleships were gradually falling behind the fast British ships. Admiral Beatty’s cruisers had drawn clear and shortly after 5.00 were free from the fire of Hipper’s battle cruisers. His increase to full speed enabled Vice Admiral Beatty to draw ahead. He again opened up a gap between his battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, taking a course that curved to the north and northeast, in search of Admiral Jellicoe’s battle fleet, which was hastening to his assistance.

The ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron were also drawing away from the German battleships and were soon only under fire from the German battle cruisers and the leading division of Squadron III. As the British battleships continued to distance their pursuers, and the fire even of this leading German division grew ineffective, Admiral Scheer at 5.20 signaled to Vice Admiral Hipper “to give chase.” Hipper had already been outdistanced by the British battle cruisers. He was “forced, in order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner circle and adopt the enemy’s course.” (S) As Beatty swung by the north to a northeasterly direction, Hipper conformed to his course. At this stage the weather grew hazy. The wind changed from northwest to southwest, and smoke hung over the water.

The German advance was soon in a position where it could not engage to any advantage in the mist “with the sun so low on the horizon.” (S) Hipper was also in danger from torpedo attacks, and at 5.40 the German Vice Admiral was compelled to turn his battle cruisers to starboard, “and finally bring the unit round to S. W.” (S), to close up with the German battleships. This manœuvre was observed in the mist by the British, but not until some time after it was being carried out, as Lord Jellicoe placed it “between 6 and 6.16.” (J) At the same time the leading German battleships had also begun to veer around to starboard, to conform with the course of the British advance, which was swinging from northeast to an easterly direction. Observing this, Admiral Scheer states that at 5.45 the order “Leaders in Front” was signaled, “and the speed temporarily reduced to fifteen knots to make it possible for the divisions ahead, which had pushed on at high pressure, to get into position again.” (S) By this means, and through the early closing up of Hipper’s battle cruisers, as described, Admiral Scheer’s whole command was more in hand than had been believed. The intervals were closed and the German fleet in better readiness for its rehearsed manœuvre, to change direction of the line. These alterations of speed and direction also probably increased the difficulties of the British in locating the German fleet at this time, of which Lord Jellicoe writes in describing this stage of the action.

Still thinking that the German fleet would be encountered more to the eastward, Lord Jellicoe had altered the course of the Grand Fleet to south and then to southeast. (6.02 and 6.08.) The _Lion_ had been sighted, and at 6.06 had signaled that “the enemy’s battle cruisers bore southeast.” (J) At 6.14 the _Lion_ signaled, “Have sighted the enemy’s battle fleet bearing south-southwest.” (J) Lord Jellicoe writes: “This report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment.” At 6.16 Lord Jellicoe made signal to the Grand Fleet to form line of battle on the port wing column on a course southeast by east.

In the meantime the light German forces had become involved in a fight between the lines and were withdrawing under cover of smoke screens and torpedo attacks. The cruiser _Wiesbaden_ was reported disabled at 6.02, and Scheer turned his fleet two points to port “to render assistance to the _Wiesbaden_” (S)--a strange reason for such a move at such a time! This brought on what Admiral Scheer called “heavy fighting round the damaged _Wiesbaden_,” from 6.20. Yet this eccentric thrust of the German fleet actually resulted in heavy damage to the British.

At this time the Grand Fleet was deploying as described, but not yet seriously engaged. Lord Jellicoe reports the _Marlborough_ as opening fire at 6.17, the _Iron Duke_ firing a few salvos at 6.20. But Vice Admiral Beatty’s four remaining battle cruisers were in closer action, as Beatty was crossing the German van on a course turning from east to southeast. The speed of the deploying Grand Fleet had been reduced to 14 knots to allow Beatty’s cruisers to pass ahead, “as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them.” (J) The Fifth Battle Squadron had been left behind Beatty’s battle cruisers by a long interval, and was making a turn to port (at 6.19) to form astern of the Grand Fleet.

Rear Admiral Hood’s Third Squadron of three battle cruisers which had been ordered to reinforce Beatty’s advance, was far ahead of the Grand Fleet, and had overrun to the southeast in the error as to location. On realizing this mistake, Hood had turned back in the direction of the British advance. Hood’s squadron was signaled by Vice Admiral Beatty “to form single line ahead and take station” (J) ahead of Admiral Beatty’s four remaining battle cruisers, which were turned to a southeast and southerly course across the van of the German fleet. In obedience to this signal, Rear Admiral Hood turned to take station ahead (6.21), closing to a range of 8,000 yards (6.25). “At about 6.34” (J) his flagship, the _Invincible_, was sunk by gunfire.

Almost at the same time three of Rear Admiral Arbuthnot’s armored cruisers, _Black Prince_, _Warrior_, and _Defence_, “not aware of the approach of the enemy’s heavy ships,” (J) were put out of action. (_Defence_ was sunk; _Warrior_ sank while attempt was being made to tow her home; _Black Prince_ was sunk later.) In the turn of the Fifth Battle Squadron to take position astern of the Grand Fleet the _Warspite_ had jammed her helm and was out of control for a while. She was a good deal damaged by gunfire, but was extricated from her predicament and taken back to the British base.

By this time the German Commander-in-Chief had received information from his torpedo flotillas of the presence of “more than twenty enemy battleships following a southerly course.” (S) His van was under heavy fire. “Following the movements of the enemy they had made a bend which hindered free action” (S) of his torpedo flotilla, and his cruisers were also cramped between the fire of both lines. In this awkward situation Admiral Scheer resolved to make use of his prepared manœuvre, to change the direction of his line. Accordingly at 6.35 “the swing-around was carried out in excellent style,” (S) the ships turning simultaneously to starboard, putting the whole German fleet on a westerly course.

This manœuvre was covered by the use of dense smoke screens, and the pressure on the German fleet was relieved at once. Admiral Scheer states that “the enemy did not follow our veer around,” and he strongly insists that the British should have held firmly to his line by executing a similar manœuvre. But he really gives the true state of the case when he writes: “It may be that the leader did not grasp the situation.” In fact none of the British commanders realized what had taken place under cover of that smoke screen.

After the sinking of the _Invincible_, although Vice Admiral Beatty was reported as turning to starboard, there was no further aggressive action on his part--and, in the next fifteen minutes (6.50), he signaled the two remaining battle cruisers of the Third Squadron to take station astern of the last ship of his line, the _New Zealand_.

At the same time (6.50) the Grand Fleet, which had completed deployment at 6.38, altered course to south by divisions to close.

These movements of the British forces naturally did not succeed in bringing any pressure upon the Germans, as Admiral Scheer’s whole fleet was then safely on a westerly course, as a result of the simultaneous swing-around of his line--and the German fleet was concealed by dense smoke screens, which left the British in ignorance of Scheer’s manœuvre. Encouraged by this successful result of his move, and finding his ships all able to keep their places in the line, “fully prepared to fight,” (S) the German Admiral decided upon an unexpected course of action. His change of tactics was so remarkable that his reasons should be quoted at length:

“It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy followed us, our action in retaining the direction taken after turning the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving him to decide when he could elect to meet us the next morning. There was but one way of averting this--to force the enemy into a second battle by another determined advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo boats to attack. The success of the turning of the line while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and decided me to make still further use of the facility of movement. The manœuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night.” (S)

To carry out these ideas Admiral Scheer at 6.55 executed a second swing-around of his whole fleet turning ships-right-about to starboard as before. This put the German fleet again on an easterly course and launched its van in an attack against the deployed British line, “to deal a blow at the centre of the enemy’s line.” (S) Ahead of the fleet there was sent forward a determined attack by the German torpedo flotillas, all of which “had orders to attack.” (S) In the words of Admiral Scheer, “This led to the intended result, a full resumption of the firing at the van.”

The practical effect in action, so far as the German Battle Fleet was concerned, was to subject the van of the German fleet to heavy damage, without doing any compensating harm to the British ships. Admiral Scheer admits this damage to the German fleet, especially the battle cruisers, and it is established that the German fleet did not score upon the Grand Fleet. On the other hand, the accompanying sudden torpedo attacks, emerging from the smoke directed against the British battleships, did actually accomplish the result of making the Grand Fleet turn away and open the range. Admiral Scheer claims that putting the van of his fleet again into action “diverted the enemy fire and rendered it possible for the torpedo-boat flotillas to take so effective a share in the proceedings,” (S) but of course it is a question whether the same result might not have been obtained by the use of the torpedo flotillas alone.

In any case, it must be acknowledged that Admiral Scheer’s extraordinary manœuvres had accomplished a surprise effect upon his enemy as, besides forcing the Grand Fleet to turn away, the moral effect of this torpedo attack had a great influence upon the British conduct of the rest of the action. It is also evident that the British had not comprehended the tactics of the Germans.

One phase of the situation at this time has not been understood--but should be strongly emphasized. The fact is that the German Admiral, by his own act, had again placed his fleet in the same position from which he had once withdrawn--and this second creation of the same situation (6.55) was _after_ the Grand Fleet had deployed and was in line of battle. Consequently, in view of the way the battle was really fought, many of the long arguments as to the so-called crucial situation at the time of the British deployment are wasted words. Now that it is known that Admiral Scheer came back again to attack the fully deployed British fleet, the much-discussed method of deployment can no longer be considered all-important. Even if the deployment had not come to the Germans, the Germans had gone to the deployment--and the same situation existed. In their ignorance of the German Admiral’s smoke-screened manœuvres, both sides of the heated British controversy have missed the essential fact of this unusual duplication of a battle situation, which actually occurred at Jutland.

This lack of understanding of Scheer’s turn and return is plainly shown by Admiral Jellicoe, who writes, concerning the situation after 7.00: “Our alteration of course to the south had, meanwhile, brought the enemy’s line into view once more.” The British Command did not realize that his enemy had actually voluntarily come back into the former position, and this was the real reason the German ships had reappeared.

At 7.05 the whole British battle line had been turned together three more points to starboard. But at 7.10 the sudden attack of the German torpedo flotillas was sighted, and shortly afterwards the British fleet was turned away to port two points, and then two points more, to avoid the run of the torpedoes. Admiral Jellicoe states that this move enabled his battleships to avoid many torpedoes, and that the range was opened by about 1,750 yards. The German Admiral claims that “the action of the torpedo-boat flotillas had achieved its purpose.” (S)

After accomplishing this result of making his enemy turn away, Admiral Scheer at 7.17 for a third time successfully executed the same manœuvre of ships-right-about (in this third turn Scheer’s flagship, _Friedrich der Grosse_, was cramped and made the turn to port), and again his fleet was on a westerly course screened by dense smoke. This swing-around again had the same effect of freeing the German fleet from the gunfire of the British fleet. The British Command again did not grasp the full import of the German move. He writes of the difficulty of observation in the mist and smoke. Some of his subordinates reported that the Germans had turned away at this time, but none realized that a ships-right-about had been carried out. It was not until 7.41 that the British battle fleet was altered by divisions three points to starboard to close.

Shortly after (at 7.47), Vice Admiral Beatty made signal to Lord Jellicoe: “Urgent. Submit that the van of battleships follow the cruisers. We can then cut off the whole of the enemy’s battle fleet.” Much has been made of this signal by ill-advised critics. In fact it will be self-evident that, at the time Beatty’s signal was sent, the German fleet was not in the assumed position, but had long before been extricated from its dangerous contact by the third “swing-around” (S) at 7.17, and the Germans ships were again safely proceeding on their altered course.

It is a strange comment on the battle to realize that the thrice executed German manœuvre of ships-right-about was not observed by anyone on the British fleet. None of the British maps or charts of the action shows any sign of these movements. Chart No. 1 is a typical British diagram of this stage of the action. It will be noted that the times (6.15 to 7.41) in the indications of the course of the German fleet include the times of all three turns of ships-right-about. (6.35, 6.55, 7.17.) Yet there is no trace of these German manœuvres on the plan. Chart No. 2 shows the contrast between the supposed movements of the Germans and their actual manœuvres in the battle.

One reason for the failure of the British to understand these manœuvres of Admiral Scheer was the fixed conviction of the British that such a simultaneous turn of all the ships of a fleet was impracticable in action--consequently they did not expect it to be used by their enemies. This doctrine has been stated by Lord Jellicoe in explaining his own movements in the battle. “The objection to altering by turning all the ships together was the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as the result of such a manœuvre carried out with a very large fleet under action conditions in misty weather.” This positive statement was made by the British Commander-in-Chief in perfect unconsciousness that his antagonist had in fact successfully carried out such a turn three times under the identical conditions described!

After the turn to a westerly course, the German fleet was brought around to a southwesterly, southerly, and finally to a southeasterly course “to meet the enemy’s encircling movements and keep open a way for our return.” (S) From this time Admiral Scheer’s fleet was not in great danger, nor even seriously engaged. As the twilight advanced the German Command could prepare for the night. He found all his battleships in condition to do 16 knots “the speed requisite for night work, and thus keep their places in the line.” (S) Vice Admiral Hipper’s flagship the _Lützow_ had been so badly damaged that he had changed his flag to the _Moltke_ (7.00).[17] At 7.30 the _Lützow_ could do 15 knots, and her condition grew worse steadily, but she was the only ship that could not be relied upon to maintain fleet speed.

[17] It was nearly two hours before Vice Admiral Hipper could get on board the _Moltke_.

Consequently Admiral Scheer was not hard pressed at this stage, but only intermittently engaged. The order of the German fleet, after the last turn to westerly, had been Squadron II, Squadron I, Squadron III. Squadron II (the slower predreadnoughts) fell out to starboard, and was passed by Squadrons I and III, giving support to Hipper’s battle cruisers, which were engaged at 8.20. The Germans were all the time making use of smoke for concealment, in addition to the mist and the increasing darkness.

As a result of these tactics, the British Admiral was always groping for his enemy in mist and smoke, with only occasional glimpses of the German ships. Although he had not understood the German manœuvre, Lord Jellicoe had become convinced that the Germans had turned away, and at 7.59 he had altered course by divisions to west to close his enemy. It was again natural that he did not gain much actual contact. Lord Jellicoe writes of the fighting, already mentioned, at 8.20, in which the battle cruisers of both sides and the German predreadnoughts were engaged, and explains the puzzling conditions of the action at this stage. “At 8.30 P.M. the light was failing and the fleet was turned by divisions to a southwest course, thus reforming single line again.” (J) All this time his elusive enemy was screening his movements by the use of smoke, and the German ships would only occasionally be visible in the smoke and mist.

As the darkness came on, it is evident that these tactics on the part of the Germans, with increasing threats of torpedo attacks, became more and more baffling to the British Command, and then came the crucial decision which ended the battle. Admiral Jellicoe reports:

“At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedoboat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a view to its safety from such attacks, while providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same time be favorably situated for attacking the enemy’s heavy ships.”

Concerning this stage of the action Admiral Jellicoe in his report quotes Vice Admiral Beatty as follows: “In view of the gathering darkness and the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favorable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy battle-fleet during the dark hours.”

Here the British Admiral and his subordinate were in accord, but of course the responsibility for the movements of the British fleet rested with Admiral Jellicoe, as Commander-in-Chief. By his order the British fleet steamed through the dark hours on southerly courses “some eighty-five miles” (J) from the battlefield. Although the British fleet was thus placed in the general direction of Heligoland, this meant that Admiral Jellicoe relinquished contact, in a military sense, with the German fleet. At the time it was undoubtedly Lord Jellicoe’s intention to renew the action the next day, but it must be clearly understood that this was to be in every way a new naval battle--not a battle continued by keeping in touch with his enemy and reëxerting his force on the following day.