Part 7
7. Wherefore the Tythes now should be twelve times as good as they were four hundred years ago; which the rates of Benefices in the Kings books do pretty well shew, by comparing of times; something of this should be abated because the proportion between the proceed of Lands and Labour do vary as the hands of Labourers vary: Wherefore we shall rather say, that the Tythes are but six times as good now as four hundred years ago, that is, that the Tythes now would pay six times as many Labourers, or feed six times as many mouthes, as the Tythes four hundred years ago would have done.
8. Now if there were not onely as many Parishes then as now, more Priests in every Parish, and also more Religious Men who were also Priests, and the Religion of those times being more operose, and fuller of work then now, by reason of Confessions, Holydayes, Offices, &c. more in those dayes then now, (the great work in these dayes being a compendious teaching above a thousand at once without much particular Confession and Catechising, or trouble about the Dead), it seems clear, that the Clergy now is far richer then heretofore; and that to be a Clergy-man then was a kinde of a Mortification, whereas now (praised be God) ’tis matter of splendour and magnificence; unless any will say, that there were golden Priests when the Chalices were wood, and but wooden Priests when the Chalices were gold; or that Religion best flourisheth when the Priests are most mortified, as was before said of the Law, which best flourisheth when Lawyers have least to do.
9. But what ever the increase of the Churches Goods are, I grudge it them not; onely wish, that they would take a course to enjoy it with safety and peace to themselves; whereof one is, not to breed more Churchmen then the Benefices as they now stand shared out, will receive; that is to say, if there be places but for about twelve thousand in _England_ and _Wales_, it will not be safe to breed up 24000. Ministers, upon a view or conceipt that the Church means otherwise distributed might suffice them all; for then the twelve thousand which are unprovided for, will seek wayes how to get themselves a livelihood; which they cannot do more easily then by perswading the people, that the twelve thousand Incumbents do poison or starve their souls, and misguide them in their way to Heaven: Which needy men upon a strong temptation will do effectually; we having observed, that Lecturers being such a sort of Supernumeraries, have preached more times in a week, more hours in the day, and with greater vehemence every time then the Incumbents could afford to do; for _Graculus esuriens in Cælum, jusseris, ibit._ Now this vehemence, this pains, this zeal, and this living upon particular donations, makes the people think, that those who act them are withall more Orthodox, nay better assisted from God then the others. Now let any man judge, whether men reputed to be inspired will not get help to lift themselves into Church-livings, &c. But these things are too plain from the latest experiences.
10. Now you will ask, how shall that be done, or how may we know how to adjust our Nursery to our Orchard? To which I answer, that if there be twelve thousand Church-livings in _England_, Dignitaries included, then that about four hundred being sent forth _per ann._ into the Vineyard, may keep it well served, without luxuriency; for according to the Mortality-Bill-observation, about that number will dye yearly out of twelve thousand Adult-persons, such as Ministers are as to age, and ought to be as well as to speculative knowledge, as practical experience, both of themselves and others.
11. But I have digressed, my main scope being to explain the nature of the Tax of Tythes; nevertheless since the end of such explanation is but to perswade men to bear quietly so much Tax as is necessary, and not to kick against the pricks; and since the end of that again, and the end of all else we are to do, is but to preserve the publick Peace, I think I have not been impertinent in inserting this little Advertisement, making so much for the Peace of our _Jerusalem_.
12. But to return to Tythes as a Tax or Levy, I say that in _England_ it is none, whatsoever it might be or seem to be in the first Age of its Institution; nor will the Kings Quit-rents in _Ireland_ as they are properly none now, seem any in the next Age, when every man will proportion his Expence to the remainder of his own Rent after the King is paid his; for ’tis surprize and the suddenness of the Charge, which a Tax supervenient to a mans other expences and issues makes, that renders it a burthen, and that intolerable to such as will not understand it, making men even to take up Arms to withstand it; that is, leap out of the Frying-pan upon earth into the fire even of hell, which is War and the consequences thereof.
13. Now Tythes being no Tax, I speak of it but as the _modus_ or pattern of a Tax, affirming it to be next to one, the most equal and indifferent which can be appointed in order to defray the publick Charge of the whole Nation as well as that of the Church; for hereby is collected a proportion of all the Corn, Cattle, Fish, Fowl, Fruit, Wool, Honey, Wax, Oyl, Hemp, and Flax of the Nation, as a result of the Lands, Art, Labour, and Stock which produced them; onely it is scarce regular in respect of Housing, Cloth, Drinks, Leather, Feathers, and the several Manufactures of them; insomuch, as if the difference of Tythes which the Countrey payes in proportion to the City, were now _de novo_ to be established, I do not see what in likelihood would sooner cause a grand sedition about it.
14. The payment of an _aliquot_ part to the King out of the same things as now pay Tythes, _in specie_, would have an inconvenience, because the Kings Rents would be like the Dividend in Colledges, _viz._ higher or lower according to the prices of those Commodities, unless the said inequality in Colledges happen by reason of the fewness of particulars, according to the market rates whereof, their Rents are paid in money; whereas the whole of all the particulars might well enough ballance each other, a dear or plentiful year being but an appellation _secundum quid_, _viz._ with reference as to Corn onely, as the chief food of the multitude; whereas ’tis likely, that the same causes which makes Corn scarce may make other things in plenty of no less use to the King; as repairing in one thing what he wants in another.
15. Another inconvenience would be that which was observed in _Ireland_, when the Ministery were paid by Sallary, and the Tythes in kinde paid to the State; who because they could not actually receive them _in specie_, let them at farm to the most bidder; in the Transaction whereof was much juggling, combination, and collusion, which perhaps might have been remedied, had not that course been used but as a sudden temporary shift, without intention of continuing it.
16. The third inconvenience is, that abovementioned, _viz._ the necessity of another way of Tax, to take in the Manufactures of those Commodities which pay the Tax of Tythes; whereas possibly there is a way of Tax equal in its own nature, and which needs not to be pieced up by any other; so as the Officers about that may have a full employment, and none others wanted, whose wide intervals of leasure shall make them seem Drones, as they are also the Caterpillers of any State.
CHAP. XIII.
_Of several smaller wayes of levying Money._
When the people are weary of any one sort of Tax, presently some Projector propounds another, and gets himself audience, by affirming he can propound a way how all the publick charge may be born without the way that is. As for example, if a Land-tax be the present distasted way, and the people weary of it, then he offers to do the business without such a Land-tax, and propound either a Poll-money, Excize, or the institution of some new Office or Monopoly, and hereby draws some or other to hearken to him; which is readily enough done by those who are not in the places of profit relating to the way of Levies in use, but hope to make themselves Offices in the new Institution.
2. I shall enumerate a few of the smaller wayes which I have observed in several places of _Europe_, _viz._
First, in some places the State is common Cashier for all or most moneys, as where Banks are, thereby gaining the interest of as much money as is deposited in their hands.
Secondly, Sometimes the State is the common Usurer, as where Loan Banks, and _montes pietatis_ are in use, and might be more copiously and effectually where Registers of Lands are kept.
Thirdly, Sometimes the State is or may be Common Ensurer, either upon the danger onely of Enemies at sea, according to the supposed primitive end of our Customs in _England_, or else of the casualties of the Enemy, Weather, Sea, and Vessel taken together.
Fourthly, Sometimes the State hath the whole sale and benefit of certain Commodities, as of Amber in the Duke of _Brandenburghs_ Countrey, Tobacco formerly in _Ireland_, Salt in _France_, &c.
Fifthly, Sometimes the State is common Beggar, as ’tis almost in _Holland_, where particular Charity seems only to serve for the relief of concealed wants, and to save these wanting from the shame of discovering their poverty, and not so much to relieve any wants that are declared, and already publickly known.
Sixthly, In some places the State is the sole Guardian of Minors, Lunaticks, and Idiots.
Seventhly, In some other Countreys the State sets up and maintains Play-houses, and publick Entertainments, giving Sallaries to the Actors, but receiving the bulk of the profit to themselves.
Eighthly, In some places, Houses are ensured from fire by the State at a small Rent _per annum_ upon each.
Ninthly, In some places Tolls are taken upon passage over Bridges, Causeys, and Ferries built and maintained at the Publick Charge.
Tenthly, In some places men that dye are obliged to leave a certain pittance to the publick, the same is practised in other places upon Marriages, and may be in others upon Births.
Eleventhly, In some places strangers especially Jews, are particularly taxed; which may be good in over-peopled Countreys, though bad in the contrary case.
3. As for Jews, they may well bear somewhat extraordinary, because they seldom eat and drink with Christians, hold it no disparagement to live frugally, and even sordidly among themselves, by which way alone they become able to under-sell any other Traders, to elude the Excize, which bears but according to mens Expences; as also other Duties, by dealing so much in Bills of Exchange, Jewels, and Money, and by practising of several frauds with more impunity then others; for by their being at home every where, and yet no where they become responsible almost for nothing.
4. Twelfthly, There have been in our times, wayes of levying an _aliquot_ part of mens Estates, as a Fifth, and Twentieth, _viz._ of their Estates real and personal, yea of their Offices, Faculties, and imaginary Estates also, in and about which way may be so much fraud, collusion, oppression, and trouble, some purposely getting themselves taxed to gain more trust: Others bribing to be taxed low, and it being impossible to check or examine, or trace these Collections by the print of any footsteps they leave, (such as the Harths of Chimneys are) that I have not patience to speak more against it; daring rather conclude without more ado, in the words of our Comick to be naught, yea exceeding naught, very abominable, and not good.
CHAP. XIV.
_Of raising, depressing, or embasing of Money._
Sometimes it hath happened, that States (I know not by what raw advice) have raised or embased their money, hoping thereby, as it were, to multiply it, and make it pass for more then it did before; that is, to purchase more commodity or labour with it: All which indeed and in truth, amounts to no more then a Tax, upon such People unto whom the State is indebted, or a defalkation of what is due; as also the like burthen upon all that live upon Pensions, established Rents, Annuities, Fees, Gratuities, &c.
2. To explain this fully, one might lanch out into the deep Ocean of all the Mysteries concerning Money, which is done for other ends elsewhere; nevertheless I shall do it the best I can, by expounding the reasons _pro & contrà_ for embasing and raising of Money: and first of embasing.
3. Copper or Tin Money made _ad valorem_ in its matter, is no embasing; the same being onely cumbersom and baser then silver money, onely because less convenient and portable.
And Copper money _ad valorem_ in workmanship and matter both together; (such as on which the Effigies and Scutcheon are so curiously graven and impressed, as the moneys seem rather Medalls) is not embasing, unless the numbers of such pieces be excessive, (the measures whereof I shall not set down, until I shall hereafter propound the fittest Sections of the abstracted pound into which I would have money coyned, and determine how many pieces of each Section should be in an hundred pound) for in case of such excess, the workmanship being of no other use but to look upon, becomes base by its being too common.
4. Nor are such Tokens base as are coyned for Exchange in retailing by particular men, (if such men be responsible and able to take them back, and give Silver for them.)
5. But that Gold I count to be embased, which hath more allay either of Copper or Silver in it, then serves to correct its too great natural softness and flexibility, whereby it wears too fast in Money: And that Silver I reckon also embased, wherein is commixed more Copper then will sufficiently toughen it, and save it from cracking under the Hammer, Press, or Mill that must coin it, or the like.
6. Base Money is therefore such as Dutch Shillings, Stivers, French Soulz, Irish Bon-galls, &c. and for the most part consisting of great pieces, though of small value. To answer the first reason or pretence of making them, which is, that the said Pieces might be more bulky, handleable, and the silver in them less apt to be lost or worn away.
7. The other reason (besides that of allay which we must allow in the Measures abovementioned) is to save it from being melted down by Goldsmiths and Bullioners, or exported by strangers; neither of which can happen but to their loss: for suppose a Stiver of two pence, had a penny of pure silver, if the Bullioner melts it for the sake of the silver onely, in the separation he shall lose the Copper and charge of refining the Silver; nor will strangers export it into places where the local value of the Piece perisheth, the intrinsick leaving him to loss.
7. Now the reasons against this kinde of Money are, first the greater danger of falsification, because the colour, sound, and weight by which men (without the test) guess at the goodness of the material of Money is too much confounded, for the vulgar (whom it concerns) to make use of them for their marks and guides in the business.
8. Secondly, In case small pieces of this Money, _viz._ pieces of two pence should happen to be raised or depressed twelve, fifteen, or sixteen _per cent._ then there will be a certain loss by reason of the fractions, which the vulgar cannot reckon: As for example, if such Money were depressed but ten, eleven, or twelve _per cent._ then the two pence piece would be worth but three half pence, which is twenty five _per cent._ and so of other proportions.
9. Thirdly, In case the Inconvenience of this Money should be so great as to necessitate a new Coinage of it, then will happen all the losses we mentioned before in melting it down by Bullioners.
10. Fourthly, If the two pence piece contained but 1./5.^{th.} part of the Silver usually in a shilling, then Dealers would have fifteen pence paid in this money for the same Commodity, for which they would take a shilling in Standard Silver.
11. Raising of Money is either the cutting the pound _Troy_ of Standard Silver into more pieces then formerly, as into above sixty, whereas heretofore the same was made but into twenty, and yet both sorts called shillings, or else calling the money already made by higher names: The reasons or pretences given for such raising are these, _viz._ That the raising of Money will bring it in, and the material thereof more plentifully; for trial whereof suppose one shilling were proclaimed to be worth two, what other effect could this have, then the raising of all Commodities unto a double price? Now if it were proclaimed, That Labourers Wages, &c. should not rise at all upon this raising of Money, then would this Act be as onely a Tax upon the said Labourers, as forcing them to lose half their wages, which would not be onely unjust but impossible, unless they could live with the said half, (which is not to be supposed) for then the Law that appoints such Wages were ill made, which should allow the Labourer but just wherewithall to live; for if you allow double, then he works but half so much as he could have done, and otherwise would; which is a loss to the Publick of the fruit of so much labour.
12. But suppose the _Quart d’ Ecus_ of _France_ commonly esteemed worth eighteen pence were raised to three shillings, then ’tis true, that all the Moneys of _England_ would be indeed _Quart d’ Ecus_ pieces; but as true, that all the English Money would be carried away, and that our _Quart d’ Ecus_ would contain but half so much Bullion as our own money did; so that raising of Money may indeed change the _species_, but with so much loss as the Forreign Pieces were raised unto, above their intrinsick value.
13. But for remedy of this, suppose we raised the _Quart d’ Ecus_ double, and prohibited the Exportation of our own money in Exchange thereof. I answer, that such a Prohibition is nugatory, and impossible to be executed; and if it were not, yet the raising of the said _species_ would but make us sell the Commodities bought with raised _Quart d’ Ecus_, in effect but at half the usual rate, which unto them that want such commodities will as well yield the full; so that abating our prices, will as well allure strangers to buy extraordinary proportions of our Commodities, as raising their money will do: But neither that, nor abating the price will make strangers use more of our Commodities then they want; for although the first year they should carry away an unuseful and superfluous proportion, yet afterwards they would take so much the less.
14. If this be true, as in substance it is, why then have so many wise States in several ancient, as well as modern times frequently practised this Artifice, as a means to draw in money into their respective Dominions?
I answer, that something is to be attributed to the stupidity and ignorance of the people, who cannot of a sudden understand this matter: for I finde many men wise enough, who though they be well informed that raising of money signifies little, yet cannot suddenly digest it. As for example, an unengaged person who had money in his purse in _England_, and should hear that a shilling was made fourteen pence in _Ireland_, would more readily run thither to buy Land then before; not suddenly apprehending, that for the same Land which he might have bought before for six years Purchase, he shall now pay seven. Nor will Sellers in _Ireland_ of a sudden apprehend cause to raise their Land proportionally, but will at least be contented to compound the business, _viz._ to sell at six and an half; and if the difference be a more ragged fraction, men under a long time will not apprehend it, nor ever be able exactly to govern their practice according to it.
15. Secondly, Although I apprehend little real difference between raising Forreign Money to double, and abating half in the price of our own Commodities, yet to sell them on a tacite condition to be paid in Forreign present Money, shall increase our money; forasmuch as between raising the money, and abasing the price, is the same difference as between selling for money and in barter, which latter is the dearer; or between selling for present money, and for time; barter resolving into the nature of uncertain time.
16. I say, suppose English Cloth were sold at six shillings a Yard, and French Canvas at eighteen pence the Ell, the question is, whether it were all one in order to increase Money in _England_ to raise the French Money double, or to abate half of the price of our Cloth? I think the former better, because that former way or proposition carries with it a condition of having Forreign Money in _specie_, and not Canvas in barter, between which two wayes the world generally agrees there is a difference. Wherefore if we can afford to abate half our price, but will not do it but for our neighbours money, then we gain so much as the said difference between Money and Barter amounts unto, by such raising of our Neighbours Money.
17. But the fundamental solution of this Question depends upon a real and not an imaginary way of computing the prices of Commodities; in order to which real way I premise these suppositions: First then, suppose there be in a Territory a thousand people, let these people be supposed sufficient to Till this whole Territory as to the Husbandry of Corn, which we will suppose to contain all necessaries for life, as in the Lords Prayer we suppose the word Bread doth; and let the production of a Bushel of this Corn be supposed of equal labour to that of producing an ounce of Silver. Suppose again that a tenth part of this Land, and tenth of the people, viz. an hundred of them, can produce Corn enough for the whole; suppose that the Rent of Land (found out as abovementioned) be a fourth part of the whole product, (about which proportion it really is, as we may perceive by paying a fourth Sheaf instead of Rent in some places) suppose also that whereas but an hundred are necessary for this Husbandry, yet that two hundred have taken up the Trade; and suppose that where a Bushel of Corn would suffice, yet men out of delicacy will use two, making use of the Flower onely of both. Now the Inferences from hence are;
First, That the goodness or badness, or the value of Land depends upon the greater or lesser share of the product given for it in proportion to the simple labour bestowed to raise the said Product.
Secondly, That the proportions between Corn and Silver signifie onely an artificial value, not a natural; because the comparison is between a thing naturally useful, and a thing in it self unnecessary, which (by the way) is part of the reason why there are not so great changes and leaps in the prices of Silver as of other Commodities.
Thirdly, That natural dearness and cheapness depends upon the few or more hands requisite to necessaries of Nature: As Corn is cheaper where one man produces Corn for ten, then where he can do the like but for six; and withall, according as the Climate disposes men to a necessity of spending more or less. But Political Cheapness depends upon the paucity of Supernumerary Interlopers into any Trade over and above all that are necessary, _viz._ Corn will be twice as dear where are two hundred Husbandmen to do the same work which an hundred could perform: the proportion thereof being compounded with the proportion of superfluous Expence, (_viz._ if to the cause of dearness abovementioned be added to the double Expence to what is necessary) then the natural price will appear quadrupled; and this quadruple Price is the true Political Price computed upon naturall grounds.
And this again proportioned to the common artificiall Standard Silver gives what was sought; that is, the true Price Currant.