Philosophy

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)

This book makes no pretence of giving to the world a new theory of the intellectual operations. Its claim to attention, if it possess any, is grounded on the fact that it is an attempt not to supersede, but to embody and systematize, the best ideas which have been either promu...

Chapters

31. Chapter 31

§ 1. Some of the most remarkable instances which have occurred since the great Newtonian generalization, of the explanation of laws of causation subsisting among complex phenome...

23. Chapter 23

§ 1. The phenomena of nature exist in two distinct relations to one another; that of simultaneity, and that of succession. Every phenomenon is related, in an uniform manner, to...

6. Chapter 6

§ 1. Looking back now to the commencement of our inquiry, let us attempt to measure how far it has advanced. Logic, we found, is the Theory of Proof. But proof supposes somethin...

14. Chapter 14

§ 1. We have shown what is the real nature of the truths with which the Syllogism is conversant, in contradistinction to the more superficial manner in which their import is con...

5. Chapter 5

§ 1. “A name,” says Hobbes,(4) “is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronou...

11. Chapter 11

§ 1. One necessary part of the theory of Names and of Propositions remains to be treated of in this place: the theory of Definitions. As being the most important of the class of...

26. Chapter 26

§ 1. The simplest and most obvious modes of singling out from among the circumstances which precede or follow a phenomenon, those with which it is really connected by an invaria...

28. Chapter 28

§ 1. In the preceding exposition of the four methods of observation and experiment, by which we contrive to distinguish among a mass of coexistent phenomena the particular effec...

8. Chapter 8

§ 1. An inquiry into the nature of propositions must have one of two objects: to analyse the state of mind called Belief, or to analyse what is believed. All language recognises...

16. Chapter 16

§ 1. If, as laid down in the two preceding chapters, the foundation of all sciences, even deductive or demonstrative sciences, is Induction; if every step in the ratiocinations...

27. Chapter 27

§ 1. I shall select, as a first example, an interesting speculation of one of the most eminent of theoretical chemists, Professor Liebig. The object in view, is to ascertain the...

10. Chapter 10

§ 1. In examining into the nature of general propositions, we have adverted much less than is usual with Logicians, to the ideas of a Class, and Classification; ideas which, sin...

2. Chapter 2

This book makes no pretence of giving to the world a new theory of the intellectual operations. Its claim to attention, if it possess any, is grounded on the fact that it is an...

20. Chapter 20

§ 1. Induction, then, is that operation of the mind, by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the f...

15. Chapter 15

§ 1. In our analysis of the syllogism it appeared that the minor premiss always affirms a resemblance between a new case, and some cases previously known; while the major premis...

13. Chapter 13

§ 1. The analysis of the Syllogism has been so accurately and fully performed in the common manuals of Logic, that in the present work, which is not designed as a manual, it is...

17. Chapter 17

§ 1. In the examination which formed the subject of the last chapter, into the nature of the evidence of those deductive sciences which are commonly represented to be systems of...

30. Chapter 30

§ 1. The deductive operation by which we derive the law of an effect from the laws of the causes, of which the concurrence gives rise to it, may be undertaken either for the pur...

29. Chapter 29

§ 1. The mode of investigation which, from the proved inapplicability of direct methods of observation and experiment, remains to us as the main source of the knowledge we posse...

9. Chapter 9

§ 1. As a preparation for the inquiry which is the proper object of Logic, namely, in what manner propositions are to be proved, we have found it necessary to inquire what they...

25. Chapter 25

§ 1. It results from the preceding exposition, that the process of ascertaining what consequents, in nature, are invariably connected with what antecedents, or in other words wh...

7. Chapter 7

§ 1. In treating of Propositions, as already in treating of Names, some considerations of a comparatively elementary nature respecting their form and varieties must be premised,...

24. Chapter 24

§ 1. To complete the general notion of causation on which the rules of experimental inquiry into the laws of nature must be founded, one distinction still remains to be pointed...

21. Chapter 21

§ 1. Induction properly so called, as distinguished from those mental operations, sometimes though improperly designated by the name, which I have attempted in the preceding cha...

12. Chapter 12

§ 1. In the preceding Book, we have been occupied not with the nature of Proof, but with the nature of Assertion: the import conveyed by a Proposition, whether that Proposition...

22. Chapter 22

§ 1. In the contemplation of that uniformity in the course of nature, which is assumed in every inference from experience, one of the first observations that present themselves...

4. Chapter 4

§ 1. It is so much the established practice of writers on logic to commence their treatises by a few general observations (in most cases, it is true, rather meagre) on Terms and...

19. Chapter 19

§ 1. The portion of the present inquiry upon which we are now about to enter, may be considered as the principal, both from its surpassing in intricacy all the other branches, a...

18. Chapter 18

“According to the doctrine now stated, the highest, or rather the only proper object of physics, is to ascertain those established conjunctions of successive events, which const...

3. Chapter 3

“La scolastique, qui produisit dans la logique, comme dans la morale, et dans une partie de la métaphysique, une subtilité, une précision d’idées, dont l’habitude inconnue aux a...

1. Chapter 1