Part 9

The conditions of the Khalifate at this time show a close parallel with those prevailing in Europe under the later Karlings, when “the governor,—count, abbot, or bishop—tightened his grasp, turned a delegated into an independent, a personal into a territorial authority, and hardly owned a distant and feeble suzerain” (Bryce: _Holy Rom. Empire_, p. 79). So each governor appointed by the Khalif became the founder of an independent dynasty, barely conceding the mention of the suzerain’s name in the _khutba_ and on the coinage. Such were the Tahirids who ruled in Khurasan from 205 to 259, the Saffarids in Persia from 254 to 290, the Samanids in Transoxiana and Persia from 288 to about 400, the Hamdanids who established themselves at Mosul in 292, at Aleppo in 333, and ruled there until 394, and the Aghlabids whom we have seen in Kairawan.

The Ikhshids claimed to be descended from the ancient kings of Ferghana on the Jaxartes, a district inhabited by fighting races, from whom the Khalif al-Muʿtasim (218-227) drew many mercenaries. The first of the Ikhshids to serve the Khalifs was a mercenary named Juff, and he continued in the Khalif’s employ until his death in 247. One of his sons named Tughj was in the service of Luʿluʿ, who acted as squire to Ibn Tulun in Egypt, and, when his master died, in that of Ishaq b. Kundaj, and afterwards in that of Ibn Tulun’s son, Abu l-Jaysh Khumasawaih, who regarded him with great favour and formed a very high opinion of his military abilities, in consequence of which he procured for him the governorship of Damascus and Tiberias. At his patron’s death Tughj offered himself to the Khalif al-Muktafi, who considered this an act of marked loyalty, and was greatly pleased with him, and made him one of his confidential officers. These favours provoked the jealousy of the wazir al-ʿAbbas, and he succeeded in getting Tughj cast into prison where he died. He left two sons, Muhammad and ʿAbdullah, who burned to avenge their father’s death, and their resentment was gratified when they saw al-ʿAbbas executed by the Hamdanid al-Husayn.

After this the elder son, Muhammad, went to Syria and joined himself to Takin, who was governor of Syria as well as of Egypt. In this service he prospered and was made governor of Amman. Then in 316 he was appointed to Ramla, in 318 he was transferred to Damascus, which led the way to his appointment as Emir of Egypt. This last charge was given him in 321, but the state of Syria did not allow his immediate departure, and Egypt was left for a while in the hands of Ahmad b. Kayghalagh, who returned to office temporarily. By 324 Syria had been reduced to order, and Muhammad the Ikhshid went over to Egypt to assume his governorship in person, leaving his brother ʿAbdullah in Syria.

There were some in Egypt who did not like the prospect of this new governor, and amongst these was the Treasurer Madaraʿi, who induced the acting governor, Ibn Kayghalagh, to take up arms to resist his entry. The Egyptian army marched to the frontier and engaged the Syrians and Turks under the Ikhshid at Farama, the ancient Pelusiun, now more generally known as Tineh (Arabic _tîn_ = Greek πηλός “mud”), near the Egyptian end of the “short desert route,” _via_ al-Arish from Syria. The result was a complete defeat of the Egyptians, and so Muhammad the Ikhshid continued on his way to the capital Fustat (“Old Cairo”) without further opposition. Meanwhile the Syrian fleet had sailed up the Nile and anchored off Giza, thus commanding the city until the Ikhshid marched up his forces and took possession. The arrival of the new governor and his army, largely Turkish in composition, established a firm and efficient government in Egypt again until his death in 335. At their first arrival indeed the Turkish troops began plundering the city, but they were soon called to order and then, although the new governor was severe and exacted heavy contributions, this stern rule was welcomed as it recalled the peace and prosperity of the golden days of Ibn Tulun. The resultant peace very soon opened up the way to literary activity and scholarship, and Egypt began to follow, though at a distance, the culture of ʿIraq. This literary development, as well as theological discussion and debates on jurisprudence, centered in the “Old Mosque,” which was also the scene of the most important state functions.

Although the establishment of the Ikhshid rule in Egypt gives the appearance of supreme power to the Khalif at Baghdad, who seems thus able to dispose of provinces and appoint governors at discretion, his position at the time was really very precarious. The Buwayhid dynasty of governors had established itself in ʿIraq in 320 (= A.D. 932), but Baghdad itself remained under the Khalif until 334, though generally he was only a tool in the hands of the commander of the garrison. These Buwayhids claimed descent from Buwayh, a prince in the hill country of Daylam, and so ultimately from the ancient kings of Persia. They appeared as rivals of other Daylamites led by Bajukin, who was _Emir al-Umara_ or “Supreme Prince,” and had control of the government under the Khalifs ar-Razi and al-Muttaqi. Alarmed at the progress of the Buwayhids, Bajukin took up arms against them in 327, but was compelled to abandon his efforts by the report of disorders in Baghdad. Soon afterwards Bajukin was killed by a band of Kurdish marauders, and the capital was left in a state of anarchy. Then Baridi became Chief Emir, but was expelled a few weeks later: then the Daylamite Kurtakin, who turned out to be a tyrant. At this the Khalif appealed to Ibn Raiq, the Emir of Syria, and he expelled Kurtakin. Not long afterwards Baridi attacked Baghdad and Ibn Raiq had to flee, taking the Khalif with him to Mosul, which was in the hands of the Hamdanids. As champions of the Khalifate the Hamdanids marched against Baghdad, took it, and ruled there for a short time, until the Turk Tuzun drove them out and made himself _Emir al-Umara_ in 331. Then another revolt drove him out, and the Khalif appealed again to the Hamdanids and escaped to Mosul; but when peace was concluded between Tuzun and the Hamdanids the Khalif remained in their hands. At this time, indeed, the Khalifate was very far from showing the character of an absolute monarchy. All over the Muslim world the Sunni, or orthodox party, recognised the Khalif as the Commander of the Faithful, except of course in Spain where the Umayyads of Cordova assumed the title of Khalif in 317. Enjoying great dignity and prestige in an office which combined many of the characteristics of the Pope and Emperor in the West, he was in fact no more than a puppet, a valuable asset in the hands of any one of the warring dynasties of Asia, but possessing no real authority. Yet his formal recognition was eagerly sought as a precious endorsement of _de facto_ rights by Muslim rulers, and even princes in far-off India humbly begged his approval of their titles. It seems indeed as though the office of Khalif gained in spiritual influence as it lost in political authority.

Whilst in exile and in Hamdanid’s hands, the Khalif appealed to the Ikhshid whom he had set over Egypt, and Muhammad visited him at Riqqa and invited him to take refuge in Egypt; but al-Muttaqi, though anxious for help to recover the external symbols of authority at Baghdad, was not willing to put himself so entirely in the Ikhshid’s hands; he knew that Ikhshid and Hamdanid alike only desired to possess his person as a kind of imperial regalia, and so he preferred to entrust himself to the Turk Tuzun, who at least could establish him in the capital. He reigned in Baghdad in name only until 333, when Tuzun deposed him, put out his eyes, and enthroned al-Mustakfi in his place. But this was followed by a period of anarchy in Baghdad, until in 334 the Buwayhid prince took the city. A few months later al-Mustakfi was deposed and replaced by al-Muʿti, whose position under the Buwayhid princes was parallel to that of the Frankish kings under the “Mayors of the Palace,” with the aggravated condition that the Khalifs were spiritual pontiffs and the Buwayhids were, like the Hamdanids, Shiʿite heretics of the “Twelvers” sect. Buwayhid’s rule over Baghdad lasted from 384 to 447, when the Emir was displaced by the Saljuk Turks under Tughril Beg. Throughout this period the Buwayhids were content with the title of _Emir al-Umara_; they never assumed that of Sultan.

It has been necessary for us to turn aside to note the position of the Khalifate at the time, for otherwise we should have some difficulty in understanding the course of events in Egypt, which now takes the foremost place in the policy of the African Shiʿites. It is often possible to ignore the contemporary history of Spain and of North Africa when following the course of events in Egypt, but Egypt forms so integral a part of the world of Islam that it is never possible to treat its history, even during the comparative isolation of the Fatimid period, without some passing note of the contemporary history of the Baghdad Khalifate.

Whilst these changes were taking place in Asia and the Ikhshid was consolidating his power in Egypt, the Mahdi continued ruling at Kairawan, and, though North Africa was one of the most turbulent and the least civilized parts of the Islamic world, his rule was stable and orderly. In 312 he added a suburb to the city which he called al-Muhammadiya, and which served as a kind of royal cantonments closed against the ordinary citizens, and used only as an official settlement of those engaged in the public administration and as the site of the various public offices. Such official suburbs were very frequent in oriental capitals, and become a regular feature of the great Muslim royal cities. The Mahdi’s later years were somewhat clouded by his relations with the Qarmatians, who were still active in Asia, and who caused the whole Ismaʿilian movement to be regarded with grave suspicion by the Muslim world at large.

Since 311, as we have seen, the Qarmatians had occupied Basra. In 317 they had spread down into the Hijaz, and on the 8th of the month of the pilgrimage in that year the pilgrims who had come up to Mecca were attacked by them. The Sherif of Mecca, many of his attendants, and many of the pilgrims, were killed: the sacred spring of Zamzam was choked up with the bodies of the slain which were tumbled in: the door of the “House of God” was broken open, the veil which covered the House was torn down, and the sacred black stone was removed from the Kaʿaba and carried away to the Qarmatian headquarters at Hajar. Never in the history of Islam has there been sacrilege at all comparable to this, and never before had the Qarmatians advertised so boldly their contempt for the Muslim religion. Begkem, the Emir of Baghdad, offered them a reward of 50,000 dinars to restore the sacred stone, but the offer was refused.

According to Ibn Athir, quoted by Ibn Khallikan (i. 427, etc.) the Mahdi then wrote to them from Kairawan: “By what you have done you have justified the charge of infidelity brought against our sect, and the title of ‘impious’ given to the missionaries acting for our dynasty; if you restore not what you have taken from the people of Mecca, the pilgrims and others, if you replace not the Black Stone and the veil of the Kaʿaba, we shall renounce you in this world and the next.” This letter was more effectual than Begkem’s proffered reward, and the Qarmatians restored the Black Stone with the statement, “We took it by order, and by order we return it.” It was restored either in Dhu l-Kaada or Dhu l-Hijja of 339. Of the year there seems no question, and Ibn Khallikan points out that the Mahdi died in 322. He suggests, therefore, that the letter and the Qarmatian reply were fabrications, presumably for the purpose of throwing the odium of sacrilege on the Mahdi. But it is not necessary to suppose that the Black Stone was returned immediately in response to the Mahdi’s request. A more likely interpretation is given by Macdonald, who accepts the letter as genuine and comments: “When an enormous ransom was offered for the stone they (_i.e._, the Qarmatians) declined—they had orders not to send it back. Everyone understood that the orders were from Africa. So ʿUbayd Allah found it advisable to address them in a public letter, exhorting them to be better Muslims. The writing and reading of this letter must have been accompanied by mirth, at any rate no attention was paid to it by the Qarmatians. It was not till the time of the third Fatimid Khalifa that they were permitted to do business with that stone” (Macdonald: _Muslim Theology_, pp. 46-47). This suggests a plausible explanation, that the letter was sent by the Mahdi, but was only intended to disclaim any responsibility for the taking of the stone on his part; that it was not intended to be heeded, and was not taken seriously, the stone being detained until long after the Mahdi’s death. This theory would fit in with the policy of the Fatimids at Kairawan, which carefully avoided anything likely to offend the orthodox, and would dispose of Ibn Khallikan’s objection, which is based on the supposition that the date of the return of the stone was shortly after the writing of the latter. The letter assumes that the Qarmatians and the Fatimids were members of the same sect. Undoubtedly they had been so originally, but later on they definitely separated, and we are not clear as to the time of this division. It seems probable that the external quasi-orthodoxy of the Fatimids in Africa was the cause of its separation from the Qarmatians, who had made more open profession of the destructive elements of their religion.

The Mahdi died in 322 (A.D. 933), and was succeeded by his son Abu l-Kasim, who assumed the name of al-Qaʾim.

VI

THE SECOND FATIMID KHALIF, AL-QAʾIM

(A.H. 322-335 = A.D. 933-946)

The new Khalif, al-Qaʾim, had already shown himself an efficient leader in the two expeditions against Egypt, and in the vigour with which he repressed the simmering revolts in Africa. His accession was marked by two expeditions; a naval attack on the south of France, the coast of Genoa and Calabria, which resulted in the bringing home of many slaves and plunder: and another attempt on Egypt, which, however, was promptly checked by the Ikhshid’s brother, ʿUbayd Allah.

At the moment Egypt was too well administered to allow opportunity for invasion such as had taken place in 307-8. The Ikhshid was doing his best to hold Syria and to bolster up the tottering throne of the Khalifs, but had forces to spare for the protection of Egypt. It is true that he was defeated shortly afterwards by Ibn Raiq, who had seized Damascus and was compelled to pay tribute, but after two years’ payment Ibn Raiq died (A.H. 326), and then the Ikhshid was able, not only to recover all that he had temporarily been compelled to yield, but was in a position to extend his dominions, and brought Syria under his control. Not long afterwards the Khalif entrusted him with the guardianship of Mecca and Madina. At that time the Ikhshid was the only loyal supporter on whom the Khalif could rely, chiefly, of course, because of his jealousy towards those who threatened the throne of Baghdad.

Unable to divert his subjects by the long hoped for conquest of Egypt, al-Qaʾim had to meet more serious rebellions in the west than his father had experienced. The principal revolt took place amongst the Zenata tribe of Aures and Zab, south of the Katama territory, nearly all members of the Kharijite sect, led by a darwish named Abu Yazid, who assumed the title of “Sheikh of the true believers,” but was better known as “the man with an ass.” This movement was mainly of a nationalist character, and aimed at establishing a purely Berber state in which Arabs should have no place. The Berbers had won Spain, and had done most to place the Fatimids on the throne of Kairawan, but in both cases they seemed to have been cheated out of the fruits of their labours by wily Asiatics, and so the motive in this revolt was the assertion of their racial rights.

In 332 Abu Yazid marched northwards at the head of most of the Zenata tribe of the south, hereditary rivals of the Katama, and many other Berbers. In rapid succession he took Baghai, Tabassa, Mermajenna, and Laribus. The Fatimid forces tried to prevent his advance upon Baja, but were repulsed. It was the story of Abu ʿAbdullah over again, but this time it was a Berber at the head of Berber tribes, and the religious motive assigned was the restoration of the primitive ideals of Islam, the democratic election of the Khalif, and all the reactionary programme of the Kharijites which was, and is, the most congenial to the nomadic tribes of Africa and Arabia. We have seen very much the same programme in the history of the Sanusi in recent times. The successful repulse of the Fatimid army made a great impression, and all the Zanata tribes of Zab, the Hwaras of the Aures, and many others, rallied round Abu Yazid. At the head of a large, but undisciplined force, he marched towards Kairawan: on the way he met a Fatimid army, but this time suffered defeat. It was, however, no more than a temporary check; he soon rallied, took Raqada, and then pressed on to Kairawan, defeated the forces of the Fatimid Khalif, and captured the city. Al-Qaʾim was obliged to take refuge in al-Mahadiya, which Abu Yazid forthwith besieged. At this juncture the Katama and Sanhaja tribes came in mass to relieve the city, and Abu Yazid’s followers, demoralised by the steady resistance of the defenders, were obliged to retire. As they retreated al-Qaʾim followed, and was soon able to recover the whole of Tunisia, but after an interval Abu Yazid rallied and laid siege to the town of Susa.

At this juncture al-Qaʾim died, and was succeeded by his son, who took the name al-Mansur (the protected).

Al-Qaʾim had accompanied his father, the Mahdi, in his flight from Syria, and had proved himself a trusty and competent general before his accession to the throne. He figures in history solely as a fighting man: we hear nothing of any development either in the Ismaʿilian sect or in the organization of the Fatimid state.

VII

THE THIRD FATIMID KHALIF, AL-MANSUR

(A.H. 335-342 = A.D. 946-953)

The stability of the Fatimid Khalifate was problematical when al-Qaʾim died at the height of Abu Yazid’s rebellion. The first task of the new Khalif al-Mansur was to relieve Susa, and he was fortunate enough to inflict a severe defeat on Abu Yazid, and to drive him back to the mountains of Kiana in the extreme west of Ifrikiya. There a stubborn struggle followed which lasted a whole year, but was terminated by the final defeat and complete rout of the insurgent Berbers, Abu Yazid himself being mortally wounded in the final engagement and dying soon after.

This revolt, however, begins the decay of Fatimid authority in the west. The Zanata tribes of Maghrawa and B. Ifrene were able to form a separate state in the neighbourhood of Tlemsen, whilst the Umayyads of Spain established a colony at Fez, where they placed the descendants of Musa ibn Abi l-Afia and his followers, Syrian Arabs who had been invited to Spain but had become obnoxious, and whom it was advisable to segregate from the earlier settlers in Spain. Central Maghrab, roughly corresponding to the greater part of Algeria, was held by the Sanhaja tribe, steady allies and supporters of the Fatimid Khalifate, under the government of Ziri b. Menad, who built the town of Achir as his capital.

Such was the position when al-Mansur died in 342 and was succeeded by his son Maʿad, who took the name of al-Moʿizz. Al-Mansur’s reign had been occupied entirely in dealing with Abu Yazid’s rebellion, and in the consolidation of the country after this rebellion had been put down. It cannot be said that he left the Fatimid state in a strengthened position when compared with conditions under the Mahdi, for already independent states had begun to be formed in the West, but he had dealt successfully with the emergency existing at the time of his accession.

The Fatimid state was essentially an hereditary one, for the Shiʿite theory implied the legitimate descent of the Imam. The recognition of Ismaʿil, the son of Jaʿfar, clearly showed that the father’s claimed right of disposing of the succession was invalid in the eyes of the sect of Seveners. From that time the succession had been strictly hereditary. But the Fatimids, seated in power, borrowed the constitutional usage of the Khalifs of Baghdad, and secured the succession by obtaining formal recognition of the heir during their lifetime. Thus Maʿad was formally recognised as next in succession on Monday, the 7th of Dhu l-Hijja 341, and came to the throne in the following year. In the ʿAbbasid Khalifate this recognition was a relic of the earlier election, and meant that the next Khalif was formally elected by the princes during his predecessor’s lifetime, the orthodox Khalifate not being professedly hereditary. The case was otherwise with the Fatimids who were legitimist, and could only have as Imam the one chosen by God, and to whom alone the Divine Spirit could pass at the preceding Imam’s death. No doubt the formal recognition during the father’s life was adopted as a measure of precaution; theoretically it might be defended by the supposition that its point was the father’s public recognition of his son and heir, but the real case seems to be that it was simply borrowed from the usages of the court of Baghdad, and marks a relaxation of the theocratic and sectarian character of the Fatimid state which is gradually inclining towards becoming a purely secular one, differing from the Baghdad Khalifate in little more than in that it professed Shiʿism as the established religion.

VIII

THE FOURTH FATIMID KHALIF, AL-MOʿIZZ

(A.H. 342-365 = A.D. 953-975)

The new Fatimid Khalif was of a type somewhat different from his predecessors. Like them, indeed, he proved an able and efficient ruler, but unlike them he was a man of cultured tastes and of considerable literary ability. His heart was set on the conquest of Egypt, the great dream ever present before his father and grandfather, which seemed now coming within the bounds of possibility.