Part 1

Transcribed from the 1850 William Pickering edition by David Price, email [email protected]

A Second Letter TO THE REV. WILLIAM MASKELL, M.A. BY THE REV. MAYOW WYNELL MAYOW, M.A.

VICAR OF MARKET LAVINGTON, WILTS, RURAL DEAN, AND LATE STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, AS TO HER DOGMATIC TEACHING.

[Picture: Decorative graphic]

LONDON: WILLIAM PICKERING. 1850.

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“Is, then, the Church of England so isolated from the Universal, that the faith of the Church Universal has no influence into its theology?”—_A Letter to the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Chichester_, _by_ HENRY EDWARD MANNING, M.A. _Archdeacon of Chichester_, p. 41.

ADVERTISEMENT.

I NEED hardly express my sorrow that the publication of this letter has been delayed so far beyond the time I had calculated upon. But I hope I may be allowed to say, the delay has been occasioned not so much by idleness as by business; and that, chiefly upon subjects akin to those treated of in the letter itself. Still I cannot but be grieved at the delay, both on general grounds, and because during this time, Mr. Maskell has taken the step which would seem to make the letter wholly useless as regards himself. Still my grief would be of a very different and of a deeper character, did I imagine that what I have written would have influenced him to any other conclusion than that to which he has come. Though I fully believe him to have been honest in his seeking an answer to his difficulties, I have not the presumption to suppose that such answer as I have here attempted, would by him have been deemed sufficient. For others who may read this letter, I would only say in justification of even now publishing it, that certainly the subject has lost none of its interest, nor is the necessity for some reply, that I can see, diminished. Therefore, perhaps, I need take up no more time in apologizing for the publication, even though so late.

It may be useful to observe that far the greater part of the manuscript has been written many weeks, though I have not found time earlier to digest it, and correct the proofs, which fact, if borne in mind, may perhaps explain many expressions, not recognizing the altered position in which Mr. Maskell now stands, which certainly I do not think it worth while to correct.

The reader will perceive that I have availed myself largely of portions of Mr. Badeley’s speech before the Committee of Council, as well as of other assistance, wherever I found any thing already collected or condensed, which appeared to me useful in the statement of my argument:—my object being, (as I am certain it will be allowed it ought to be) to set this forth in the most intelligible manner I was able to do, without being careful as to any charge of want of originality or research.

Market Lavington, August 10th, 1850.

LETTER.

MY DEAR MASKELL,

ONE who has known you so long and loved you so well as I have, cannot fail to experience much sorrow of heart in now addressing you. But private sorrows, and private feelings have little place in the great crisis in which we live. I do not mean that we are required to be stoically indifferent; but that our duties to God and God’s truth, are so paramount over any regard to earthly ties, or private griefs, that we must needs put them by—so far at least as that they be no hindrance or impediment to the doing His will. Truly, in our time does the cycle of the world’s course seem to have come round, and never perhaps since the early days of persecution has there been so much need to remember and apply the warning, “He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me.” Believe me, I acknowledge fully, and am glad to acknowledge thus openly, that I am as much persuaded you are acting under the constraint of this great law, as that I am desirous to be guided by it myself. I acknowledge your trial (and have good cause to know how severely you have felt it), and I as much believe in your sincerity as I do in my own. I trust, therefore, that never by me at any rate shall your anticipation be realized, when you say, “I am prepared to be judged harshly, and the more harshly by oldest friends.” {6} Though I do not come to the same conclusions with you, and am about to controvert the general argument of your “Second Letter,” I know you will be the first and readiest to do me justice as to the temper in which I write.

Whatever view the world may have taken of that letter, or however it may regard its author, I think few will deny it is well it should have some answer. It is a different thing to say, it were well it had not been written, or, not written by one in this or that circumstance, from saying that _being_ written, it does not demand a reply. Persons may and will judge differently, as to the propriety of your having published it, though I dare say, far the greater part of English Churchmen will be against you in that respect, and say they know not how to reconcile your having done so with either dutifulness or wisdom. For my own part, however, I must say (whatever may be thought of me for saying so) I do not condemn you for having published it; if only you will seek patience to weigh all circumstances indicating the line of duty, before you shall finally act upon the doubts and difficulties it discloses. I confess, to my mind, there is but one justification for any man in the communion of the Church of England, having written and published such a letter; viz.—that, feeling the oppression of the difficulties it sets forth, he is yet _no more than in doubt_, as to the matters debated in it, and the conclusion to be drawn from them. Perhaps in ordinary times even such a frame of mind would not be a sufficient excuse for the unsettling tendency of that which you have written; but certainly these are _not_ ordinary times; and, I agree with you in thinking, many ordinary rules do not apply. Enquiries therefore how far the Church of England may have sanctioned error, or failed to teach the whole Catholic truth, pressed even with painful nakedness and pertinacity, must, perchance, now of necessity be instituted, in order “to do her good at her latter end.” At any rate there is a show of reason on _his_ side, who says, “If her ‘grievous wound’ be not probed to its full depth, it will never be more than ‘slightly healed;’” and of this argument, I, at any rate, am disposed to allow you the full benefit. Moreover, when it cannot be denied that practically “the trumpet” _has_ given “an uncertain sound,” it seems far more “tolerable” to have enquiry pushed even to what some will call the verge of disloyalty, than would be the case if the cause of uncertainty were only in the writer’s mind, and might not, with any plausibility or truth be charged upon the Church herself. Still, after making all due allowance for these disturbing forces, there is, I think, no justification at all for such statements as those in your “Second Letter,” but in the one consideration that the writer is grievously pressed by the difficulties of the case; (“the archers have hit him, and he is sore wounded;”) yet, believing it would be _sin_ to let go his hold upon the Church in which his lot has been cast without the most direct and earnest endeavours to ascertain whether his doubts have not an answer, and his difficulties a solution somewhere, he lays them as a duty, and with great pain, though with all plainness, before his brethren of the same communion, that he may rejoice in such answer and such solution if they can be given. Take away this honest motive, and consider the writer’s mind as already made up, and I see no escape from the reproach of his having written as a traitor: but grant the supposition I have made (and I know, better, I believe, than most men, how safely it may be granted you), and there remains, to my mind, no ground for the invective and reproach with which in some quarters you have been met. {8}

You will not misunderstand me, if I say that I approach the task I have undertaken with a certain disquietude, arising from the responsibility I appear to take upon myself, and the consciousness how little qualified I am duly to discharge it. These thoughts have made me feel at times uncertain whether I do well to attempt it at all. Still, as I do not think at present there is any notice of another undertaking it; and as, if there be, my letter will be no hindrance to any one else more worthily occupying the same ground, and as I do seem (to myself at any rate) to have _something_ to answer as to the principle on which your difficulties rest, perhaps I better discharge my duty by writing what I _can_, than I should do in withholding my letter, from the knowledge my ability does not reach to the half that I could wish. I trust, however, you will remember, if I have not learning or skill to state the Church of England’s argument in the way it may best be stated, that _I_ only am responsible; and it is no fair mode of reasoning, to argue, the Church of England can say no more in defence of her position than I may be able to set down for her.

But I proceed to the subject before me.

The drift of your whole second letter appears to me to be summed up in this one sentence towards its close, “I have resigned my cure of souls, because I have no doctrines and no faith to teach, as certainly the faith and doctrines of the English Church.” {10} Plainly this involves the whole point at issue; for if _you_ have none, (I mean as a result not of your own mind, but from the Church’s defect,) then of course neither have I, nor has any one of her priests; and if so, we have all, (all, that is to say, who are enough imbued with the spirit of Catholic antiquity to know and feel that we _must_ teach as the Church in all ages has taught,) no other line before us but to follow your example in resignation of our cures. And this again is a sentence of deposition to the Church of England altogether; for that Church which drives from her all that is sound and Catholic, and can admit none but such as are more or less heretics to minister at her altars, is manifestly faithless to her trust, and has forfeited the “good deposit.” She can claim no longer to be a living branch of the true vine; nor can any man believe that she can bear and convey the grace of life-giving sacraments. To ascertain whether indeed this be so with us, is the point to which I purpose presently to direct my argument, endeavouring to show the contrary, inasmuch as I think it may be proved, that where the faith has been directly assailed, as on the subject of Baptism by the late decision of the Privy Council, our business is to clear and vindicate it; and that we have _time_, and I trust also, _means_ to do this; whilst upon all other essential subjects, not in like manner attacked, though the Church of England may possibly seem upon some of them more open to objection or assault than upon Baptism, we yet have a rule of Catholic teaching which _is_ dogmatic, and _ought_ to be received _as such_ by every one of us on the very face of the matter, until in any like mode it may be brought into question, when again, as such cause arises, the objection must be met, and the faith vindicated and cleared.

Before, however, I proceed to these positions and the proofs of them, I am anxious to say something on one or two preliminary considerations. And first, I must make an observation on my own former letter, and on the notice taken of it by you, (in the kindest terms, but, as I think, with some little misapprehension of its argument,) in the appendix to your “second letter.” I refer to this, not merely to clear up the misapprehension, which might appear a personal matter hardly worth the time, but also because I think the point will be found to have a further and necessary bearing on my present subject as we proceed. After speaking of my letter as to its tone, you say, “But as it was not intended to be an answer to the facts stated in my first letter, so it seemed to me to fail in meeting the real difficulty of the case.” {12} It is quite true it was not intended to be an answer to the _facts_, viz. the positions advanced by you as to the powers of the regal supremacy, and the jurisdiction of the Committee of Privy Council, as a court of appeal. Rather, it admitted the facts, for argument’s sake at any rate, (I did not intend to commit myself, and, I think, did not commit myself to more than this in the way of concession,) in order to show that, even so, the conclusions you drew would not follow legitimately from them. Its aim, therefore was, that even granting the premises to be as you had stated them, as to the authority of the said court, and granting also the judgment (then about to be delivered) to be heretical, still the Church might not be thereby committed to heresy; and _would not be so_, unless it could be reasonably made manifest that she _intended_ such heresy to be permissible; that her _animus_ was to include the heresy in her teaching. “Its point was,” (you continue) “that even granting such an ambiguity to exist in our formularies, yet it might have been an inadvertence at the time when our Prayer Book and Articles were put forth, and that we must prove that the Church of England at the Reformation _intended_ that there should be such an ambiguity. But this is a line of argument which must admit that which has been so energetically denied to bear upon the question at issue, namely, the opinions of the reformers and divines of the sixteenth century; and it is to be remembered that if such are to be referred to as evidence of the animus of our Church on the subject of Baptism, so they must equally be appealed to upon the doctrines, for example, of the Eucharist and sacramental grace. In short, it is making use of an argument wisely and long repudiated by the High Church party.” {13}

This statement, as I conceive, does not represent the argument of my former letter at all, and therefore is no answer to it. And for this reason it does not represent it; that it confounds together and then unconsciously interchanges, two somewhat similar, but by no means identical propositions, making me answerable for both, whereas to one only of them am I really committed. Observe, it is one thing to say, “It is necessary to take into account the animus of those who sanctioned them, in order to ascertain _the true sense of the documents_:” it is another to say, “It is necessary to do this, in order to determine _the guilt of the Church_.” The first of these propositions I have never maintained at all. The second was the very essence of my argument. I never maintained we were to go to the intentions of the compilers in order to arrive at the meaning of the formularies; but I did say, (and I must venture still to think the argument sound, at any rate not refuted by your remarks,) that we could not condemn our Church of heresy, without considering whether she had ever _intended_ to sanction heresy. For (let me say it once more) I was speaking of the animus, not to show the sense of the documents, but to show the guilt or innocency of the Church. The first, as I understand the matter, is the ground “so wisely and long repudiated by the High Church party,” (and which I quite agree in repudiating;) the second, I think is, when fully stated, almost a self-evident truth wheresoever a moral delinquency is to be affirmed. The first view too, would not really have agreed with my argument; for, I said, “The only postulate I ask is, that the Church shall not, and cannot stand committed to heresy, without proof that her _crime_ is something not accidental but wilful and deliberate; something more than a mistake which she is ready and willing to clear up the moment opportunity is given her to do so. In short, that as a man is not a liar without the intention to deceive, so a Church is not heretical, unless the animus of heresy be proved against her.” {14a} Neither would this representation of the drift of my argument agree with the particular illustration, of the factory act, by which I tried at some length to make my meaning plain: for certainly I never said, the judges were to have recourse to the animus of the framers of that measure in order to ascertain _its legal sense_, though I did (as I think justly) argue, they who framed or passed it were not to be _convicted of cruelty or double-dealing_ because an inadvertent ambiguity might for a time defeat their object. {14b} Neither should it be forgotten that ecclesiastical history itself furnishes plain instances of the difference of those two propositions, and I think of the justness of that one which alone I supported. There was a time when the Apostles’ Creed was found insufficient to protect the one Faith, even on the most sacred subject of the true divinity of the Son of God. Arianism crept in, in spite of its wording: and had there been a Judicial Committee of Privy Council to hear the case of Arius, no doubt we should have heard there too, of “charitable interpretations,” and “qualified senses,” and the impropriety of “fixing one meaning upon doubtful words,” and the liberal intention to include as many as possible under an “hypothetical construction.” It might not have been deemed even then, cogent or sufficient merely to appeal to the known sentiments of the framers to arrive at the sense of the document in question: at any rate to have done so, might have been the introduction of a dangerous principle for another day: but surely then, and in all times, it would be a maxim among the faithful, that the Church could not be condemned as guilty of the heresy, (whether of Arius or any other,) even if there were an ambiguity or want of strict definition in her holy words, without considering also whether her animus in her sanction of them had been heretical. The absence of any such suspicion, even had the East and West been then divided, would have prevented any from withdrawing from the communion of the Church at Constantinople at that time, even though she might fail for a brief space to enforce the truth. And this very consideration, as it seems to me, was sufficient to clear the Church’s faithfulness, during the rise of Arianism, and until the great Council of Nicea could be held. It gave her time to pass what we may call a declaratory act of the true meaning of the Creed, without in the mean time forfeiting her trust. {15} There can be no doubt the Nicene Creed was such an act; and I have asked for ourselves only the patience that we may try to procure such a vindication of ourselves and of our faith, now in our day, as to baptism, in our somewhat parallel circumstances. I have endeavoured to enforce only the similar claim so far as this parallel will hold good: viz. not at all the claim to have our formularies interpreted by the known or suspected intentions of their compilers; but merely, not to have our branch of the Church Catholic hastily adjudged guilty of heresy, or of forfeiting her name and place in Christendom, without consideration had of her real guilt or innocence: without weighing the point, whether, even granting it were true (though _I_ cannot see it) that her formularies on Baptism are ambiguous, she has ever had the guilty intention of permitting heresy within her. The only claim therefore which I have made, is that she has the right to _time_ to throw off the ambiguity, and re-affirm her faith. If she will neither do, nor try to do this, I have all along admitted she will “become bound by the said sentence,” forfeit her claim on our allegiance, and blot out her name from the kingdom of Christ: but she does not appear to me to have done this already, and _our duty_ is now to see that she do not. As I have said, I think we have the _time_, and I trust we have the _means_, effectually, though it may be gradually, to vindicate her.

I must cite a few lines more from the next paragraph of your appendix, in order the more directly to mark what I feel called upon to do in this letter more than I attempted in the last. You say (App. p. 86), “I cannot refrain from citing one passage more from Mr. Mayow’s letter. He says: ‘Let me be well understood. If such ambiguity of language can be shown to be intentional on the part of the Church; if she can be proved to have _desired_ in drawing up her articles and services to have admitted two interpretations on baptismal regeneration; if her view and plan be to include two such opposite parties within her as those represented by Mr. Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter, by such ambiguous and therefore comprehensive language; I most fully admit she stands convicted of unpalliated heresy both in form and matter.’” On which your observation is, “Instead of _baptismal regeneration_ in the above sentence, put _the Eucharist_ or _justification_!” This opens new ground, and I own involves very weighty considerations, most fairly calling for a reply. It is the application of the whole principle of your second letter, the want of dogmatic teaching, to an extension of the subject of my first. You say in fact, “If the Church’s animus be sound on baptism, consider whether it is so likewise, on justification and the Eucharist, and then answer as to her condition.” Of course in all these cases I conceive you exaggerate the grounds against me, rather, I should say, against the Catholic character of the formularies of our Church, by having imagined I appealed to the opinions of the compilers of our services, in order to ascertain their meaning; but, as I have allowed, nay claimed, that in one respect, i.e. in order to ascertain the Church’s _guilt_, such reference to her animus is necessary, I do not think it is a sufficient answer merely to have pointed out the above distinction. A further examination and reply I think is needful, which I propose presently to give.