CHAPTER VI

CONSCIENCE

The gradual character of the evolution of Altruism--Paul Friedmann on the genesis of benevolence--The observable growth of Altruism from Egoism in the individual--Human society as necessitated by increase of the species--Criticism of Darwin's form of statement on this point--The mixed character of the motives which lead to advancement--The necessity of evolution, primal organisms once having come into existence--General features of the moral evolution in the human race--Personal and Social Virtues--Racial evolution as subordinate to the evolution of the species--Criticism of Stephen--The theory of the connection of Intelligence and Morality--Testimony of Maudsley, Lombroso, Dugdale--The advantages of conformity to social standards--Definition of "advantage"--Arguments from the general direction of social advancement--The direction of evolution in the race as a whole and in the individual not always the same--Conclusion: the connection of Intelligence with Morality not invariable--Definition of Morality--Identification of Morality with Justice--Special rules of morality--Morality as inward--The virtue of Truthfulness--Necessity of individual sacrifice--Dependence of Justice on certain general features of particular circumstances---Definition of Conscience--The mixed character of remorse--The theory of Conscience as a special sense--Criticism of Utilitarianism--Criticism of some forms of reaction against Utilitarianism--The terms "higher" and "lower" as applied to pleasures and "ends"--The idea of a "return to Nature"--The objection to Evolutional Ethics on the ground of degradation--Struggle as an element of virtue--The evolution of social rewards and punishments--Criticism of the objection to state-punishment on the ground of Determinism--Morality and the question of the Transcendental--Conscience in other species--The contempt for "mere habit"--The concepts of Cause and Effect as applied to the moral evolution 423-465