Part 2

It follows then that the will is always determined by that which _seems most pleasing or appears most agreeable_ to the mind.

This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the position with which Edwards set out: that will is always as the preponderating desire; indeed, that the will is the same in kind with desire, or with the affections; and an act of will or choice, nothing more than the strongest desire in reference to an immediate object, and a desire producing an effect in our mental or physical being. The determination of will is the strongest excitement of passion. That which determines will is the cause of passion. The strength of the cause lies in its perceived tendency to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As possessing this tendency, it is called _good_, or _pleasing_, or _agreeable_; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the condition of the affections.

The _"good"_ which forms the characteristic of a cause or motive is an immediate good, or a good "in the present view of the mind." (p. 21.) Thus a drunkard, before he drinks, may be supposed to weigh against each other the present pleasure of drinking and the remote painful consequences; and the painful consequences may appear to him to be greater than the present pleasure. But still the question truly in his mind, when he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only; and if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. "If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his will; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his will, and is most pleasing to him." The reasoning is, that when the drunkard drinks, we are not to conclude that he has chosen future misery over future good, but that the act of drinking, in itself, is the object of choice; so that, in the view he has taken of it, it is to him the greatest apparent good. In general we may say, in accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of choice takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in such a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind; it is at the moment, and in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent good. The man thus never chooses what is disagreeable, but always what is agreeable to him.

_Proper use of the term_ most agreeable, _in relation to the Will._

"I have chosen rather to express myself thus, _that the will always is as the greatest apparent good_, or _as what appears most agreeable_, than to say the will is _determined by_ the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the _voluntary action_, which is the immediate _consequence_ of the mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the choice itself." (p. 21, 22.) Here _the perception or sense of the most agreeable_ is identified in express terms with _volition_ or _choice_. "The will is as the most agreeable,"--that is, _the determination of will_, which means _its actual choice_, as a fact of the consciousness is embraced in the _sense of the most agreeable;_ and as the _voluntary action_, or the action, or change, or effect, following volition, in any part of our being,--as to walk, or talk, or read, or think,--has its cause in the volition, or the "mind's choice,"--so it is entirely proper to say, either that this voluntary action is determined by the volition or that it is determined by the sense of the most agreeable. Edwards's meaning plainly is, that the terms are convertible: volition may be called the cause of voluntary action, or the sense of the most agreeable may be called the cause. This is still a carrying out of the position, that _the will is as the desire_. "The greatest apparent good" being identical with "the most agreeable," and this again being identical with _the most desirable_, it must follow, that whenever, in relation to any object, the mind is affected with _the sense of the most agreeable_, it presents the phenomenon of "volition" or "choice;" and still farther, that which is chosen is the most agreeable object; and is known to be such by the simple fact that it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more than that it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,--and the most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than chosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more than that it is the object of the mind's choice or sense of the most agreeable. The object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive or willing power, are correlatives, and choice is the unition of both: so that if we regard choice as characterizing the object, then the object is affirmed to be the most agreeable; and if, on the other side, we regard choice as characterizing the mind, then the mind is affirmed to be affected with the sense of the most agreeable.

_Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most agreeable._

"Volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say _in or about the mind's view of the object;_ because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the _state and circumstances_ of the mind that views." (p. 22.)

Choice being the unition of the mind's sensitivity and the object,--that is, being an affection of the sensitivity, by reason of its perfect agreement and correlation with the object, and of course of the perfect agreement and correlation of the object with the sensitivity, in determining the cause of choice, we must necessarily look both to the mind and the object. Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in relation to each.

I. In relation to the object, the sense of the most agreeable, or choice, will depend upon,--

1. The beauty of the object, "viewing it as it is _in itself_," independently of circumstances.

2. "The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or _the consequence_ of it," or the object taken with its "concomitants" and consequences.

3. "The apparent _state_ of the pleasure or trouble that appears with respect to _distance of time_. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed." (p. 22.)

II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness will depend, first, upon the _manner_ of the mind's view; secondly, upon the state of mind. Edwards, under the first, speaks of the object as connected with future pleasure. Here the manner of the mind's view will have influence in two respects:

1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind judges to attach to the pleasure;

2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the imagination, which the mind has of it.

Now these may be in different degrees, compounded with different degrees of pleasure, considered in itself; and "the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgement, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good." (p. 23.)

Secondly: In reference to objects generally, whether connected with present or future pleasure, the sense of agreeableness will depend also upon "the _state of the mind_ which views a proposed object of choice." (p. 24.) Here we have to consider "the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced or established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion." (ibid.)

Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary to consider the _state of the mind_ as a ground of agreeableness distinct from the two already mentioned: viz.--the _nature and circumstances of the object_, and the _manner of the view_. "Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter," he remarks, "the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently; _beautiful_ or _deformed_, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the _manner_ of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively." (ibid.) In this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind and object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of the two, choice is. The _state of the mind_ is manifested only in relation to _the nature and circumstances of the object;_ and the sense of agreeableness being in the correlation of the two, _the sense of the most agreeable_ or _choice_ is such a perfect unition of the two, that, having described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation to _the most agreeable_, we have comprehended in this the _state of mind_. On the other hand, the nature and circumstances of the object, in relation to the most agreeable, can be known only by the state of mind produced by the presence of the object and its circumstances. To give an example,--let a rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and agreeableness of this object, I describe the _state of mind_ in relation to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in philosophical language, called the _secondary_ qualities of the object: and so, on the other hand, if I describe my sensations and emotions in the presence of the rose, I do in fact describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind and object are thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not have this sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object is presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they seem to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of the most agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. The only difference between the agreeable simply and the most agreeable is this: the agreeable refers merely to an emotion awakened on the immediate presentation of an object, without any comparison or competition. The most agreeable takes place where there is comparison and competition. Thus, to prefer or choose a rose above a violet is a sense of the most agreeable of the two. In some cases, however, that which is refused is positively disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every instance of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating the act of choosing itself in the contrast of positive and negative, the phrase _most agreeable_ or _greatest apparent good_ is convenient for general use, and sufficiently precise to express every case which comes up.

It may be well here to remark, that in the system we are thus endeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word _choice_ is properly used to express the action of will, when that action is viewed in relation to its immediate effects,--as when I say, I choose to walk. _The sense of the most agreeable_, is properly used to express the same action, when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice and volition are the words in common use, because men at large only think of choice and volition in reference to effects. But when the cause of choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, and is supposed to lie in the nature and circumstances of mind and object, then the _sense of the most agreeable_ becomes the most appropriate form of expression.

Edwards concludes his discussion of the cause of the most agreeable, by remarking: "However, I think so much is certain,--that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained." This is the great principle of his system; and, a few sentences after, he states it as an axiom, or a generally admitted truth: "There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than that when men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them." Indeed, Edwards cannot be considered as having attempted to prove this; he has only explained it, and therefore it is only the _explanation_ of a supposed axiom that we have been following out.

This supposed axiom is really announced in the first section: "Will and desire do not run counter at all: the thing which he wills, the very same he desires;" that is, a man wills as he desires, and of course wills what is most agreeable to him. It is to be noticed, also, that the title of part I. runs as follows: "Wherein are explained and stated various terms and things, &c." Receiving it, therefore, as a generally admitted truth, "that choice or volition is always as the most agreeable," and is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, what is the explanation given?

1. That will, or the faculty of choice, is not a faculty distinct from the affections or passions, or that part of our being which philosophers sometimes call the sensitivity.

2. That volition, or choice, or preference, being at any given moment and under any given circumstances the strongest inclination, or the strongest affection and desire with regard to an immediate object, appears in the constitution of our being as the antecedent of effects in the mind itself, or in the body; which effects are called voluntary actions,--as acts of attention, or of talking, or walking.

3. To say that volition is as the desire, is equivalent to saying that volition is as the "greatest apparent good," which again means only the most agreeable,--so that the volition becomes again the _sense or feeling of the greatest apparent good_. There is in all this only a variety of expressions for the same affection of the sensitivity.

4. Determination of will is actual choice, or the production in the mind of volition, or choice, or the strongest affection, or the sense of the most agreeable, or of the greatest apparent good. It is therefore an effect, and must have a determiner or cause.

5. This determiner or cause is called motive. In explaining what constitutes the motive, we must take into view both _mind_ and _object_. The object must be perceived by the mind as something existent. This perception, however, is only preliminary, or a mere introduction of the object to the mind. Now, in order that the sense of the most agreeable, or choice, may take place, the mind and object must be suited to each other; they must be correlatives. The object must possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. The mind must possess a susceptibility agreeable to the qualities of the object. But to say that the object possesses qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind, is in fact to affirm that the mind has the requisite susceptibility; for these qualities of the object have a being, and are what they are only in relation to mind. Choice, or the sense of agreeableness, may therefore be called the unition of the sensitivity and the object. Choice is thus, like any emotion or passion, a fact perpetually appearing in the consciousness; and, like emotion or passion; and, indeed, being a mere form of emotion and passion, must ultimately be accounted for by referring it to the constitution of our being. But inasmuch as the constitution of our being manifests itself in relation to objects and circumstances, we do commonly account for its manifestations by referring them to the objects and circumstances in connexion with which they take place, and without which they would not take place; and thus, as we say, the cause of passion is the object of passion: so we say also, in common parlance, the cause of choice is the object of choice; and assigning the affections of the mind springing up in the presence of the object, to the object, as descriptive of its qualities, we say that choice is always as the most beautiful and agreeable; that is, as the greatest apparent good. This greatest apparent good, thus _objectively_ described, is the motive, or determiner, or cause of volition.

_In what sense the Will follows the last dictate of the Understanding._

"It appears from these things, that in some sense _the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding_. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called _reason_ or _judgement_. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most _agreeable_, all things being put together which relates to the mind's present perceptions in any respect." (p. 25.) The "large sense" in which Edwards takes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual and sensitive being. In the production of choice, or the sense of the most agreeable, the suggestions of reason may have their influence, and may work in with other particulars to bring about the result; but then they are subject to the same condition with the other particulars,--they must appear, at the moment and in the immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is not enough that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must likewise _suit the state of the mind_,--for as choice is the sense of the most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to awaken this sense, which is properly and agreeably related to the feelings of the subject. Where the suggestions of reason are not agreeably related, "the act of the will is determined in opposition to it." (ibid.)

"Sec. III.--Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence."

After having settled his definition of choice or volition, and explained the cause of the same, Edwards takes up the nature of the connexion between this cause and effect: viz. motive and volition. Is this connexion a necessary connexion?

In order to determine this point, and to explain his view of it, he proceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms contained in the above title. This section is entirely occupied with this preliminary discussion.

Edwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity as understood in the common or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as understood in the philosophical or metaphysical use.

1. In common use, _necessity_ "is a relative term, and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. The word _impossible_ is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient for the effect. The word _unable_ is relative, and has relation to ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. The word _irresistible_ is relative, and has reference to resistance which is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power or hinder the effect. The common notion of necessity and impossibility implies _something that frustrates endeavour or desire_."

He then distinguishes this necessity into _general and particular_. "Things are necessary _in general_, which are or will be, notwithstanding any supposable opposition, from whatever quarter:" e. g. that God will judge the world.

"Things are necessary _to us_ which are or will be, notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case _from us_." This is _particular_ necessity: e. g. any event which I cannot hinder. In the discussions "about liberty and moral agency," the word is used especially in a particular sense, because we are concerned in these discussions _as individuals_.

According to this _common use_ of necessity in the _particular_ sense, "When we speak of any thing necessary _to us_, it is with relation to some supposable opposition _to our wills;_" and "a thing is said to be necessary" in this sense "when we cannot help it, do what _we will_." So also a thing is said to be _impossible to us_ when we cannot do it, although we make the attempt,--that is, put forth the volition; and _irresistible to us_, which, when we put forth a volition to hinder it, overcomes the opposition: and we are _unable_ to do a thing "when our supposable desires and endeavours are insufficient,"--are not followed by any effect. In the common or vulgar use of these terms, we are not considering volition in relation to its own cause; but we are considering volition as itself a cause in relation to its own effects: e. g. suppose a question be raised, whether a certain man can raise a certain weight,--if it be affirmed that it is _impossible_ for him to raise it, that he has not the _ability_ to raise it, and that the weight will _necessarily_ keep its position,--no reference whatever is made to the production of a volition or choice to raise it, but solely to the connexion between the _volition_ and the _raising of the weight_. Now Edwards remarks, that this common use of the term necessity and its cognates being habitual, is likely to enter into and confound our reasonings on subjects where it is inadmissible from the nature of the case. We must therefore be careful to discriminate. (p. 27.)

2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity is not a _relative_, but an _absolute term_. In this use necessity applies "in cases wherein no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed; but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or endeavour." (ibid.) Thus it is used "with respect to God's existence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being." "_Metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ necessity is nothing different from certainty,--not the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty of things in themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms them. Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true; and in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when I endeavour to prove _that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty_." (p. 27, 28, 29.)

"The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion, in several ways."

"1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion _in and of themselves_. So God's infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary, _in its own nature_, that two and two should be four."

2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, affirming the existence of something which is already come to pass, are fixed and certain.

3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain _consequentially_,--and so the existence of the things affirmed may be "consequentially necessary." "Things which are _perfectly connected_ with the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a necessity of consequence." This is logical necessity.