Part 23

Why say "in any State or Territory of the United States," instead of "in any one of the original States," as in the ordinance of 1787, unless the Congress of 1820 understood the latter to limit the right of recovering fugitive slaves to the original States, and meant by the Missouri bill to extend it to all the States and Territories? They did extend it, but in palpable violation of the "spirit of the compact of the fathers," and of the "policy of 1787."

Originally the Southern States committed themselves to the policy of slavery restriction, by a compact in the nature of a contract for a consideration. By their own votes, they relinquished all pretence of right to any slaves beyond the jurisdiction of the original States. Slaveholders, as such, voluntarily shut themselves out of the new States, in consideration of the right of recovering their fugitive slaves in whatever part of America they might take refuge. The object, as I have clearly shown, was to secure to slavery in the original States the right of recovering fugitives, whether their escape should be from one of those States to another, or to the Territories and new States; but to make that the limit, both of the right of recovery on one side, and of the obligation to permit or allow it, on the other.

It follows, then:

_First_: That as between the new States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, no right of reclamation exists, or can exist, there being no power in Congress, as the South admit, to alter the compact in the ordinance of 1787, which denies this right.

_Second_: That no person, escaping from those States into any other State or Territory, can be reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because no person can be held as a slave under their laws.

_Third_: That no slave escaping from the slave States of Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, or Florida, into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, or Missouri, can be lawfully reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida are not _original_ States.

_Fourth_: If slaves escape from any State or Territory other than the original States, into the States of the northwestern territory, no lawful power can touch them. The moment they reach those States they become free, because labor or service cannot lawfully be claimed of them in an original State.

_Fifth_: After the Missouri Compromise of 1820, slaves escaping from Arkansas and Missouri, for example to Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota, could be reclaimed, but escaping to Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio, they could not be. And the Congress of 1820 so understood it. The particular in which the Missouri proviso was altered in copying from the ordinance of 1787, is proof enough of this.

But did the framers of the Government intend to distinguish in this manner between new and original slave States? Certainly not; and the reason is, they did not mean to have any new slave States. Otherwise they certainly did mean to make this distinction, for nothing can be clearer than that Louisiana and Missouri cannot go to Ohio to recover fugitive slaves within the meaning of this "compact of the fathers;" while Georgia can. Manifestly we have departed from the system devised by the fathers in allowing Missouri, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Florida to be admitted with slavery, which explains, and nothing else can, this anomalous condition of things.

There can be no escape from these conclusions, but to deny that the ordinance has ever had any validity under the Constitution; which would be scarcely less than to deny that the Constitution itself had ever been a valid instrument. Having the like unequivocal sanction of national authority, and expressing alike in the words of Mr. Toombs, "the collective will of the whole," they must stand or fall together.

Originally the territory was not divided by the line of 36° 30´, or by any other line giving part to freedom and part to slavery. It was all secured, and by consent of the South, to freedom. There is nothing, therefore, in the original compromise, to justify the remark of the Editor of the Boston _Courier_ in a recent number of that paper, that "below the line of 36° 30´, the South have the right of prescription." Freedom has an older prescriptive right to all the Territories. The line established by the compromise, between slavery permitted and slavery prohibited, was the boundary line between the then existing States and the Territory of the United States; or the line between exclusive national jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the States. It is an erroneous assumption, therefore, that the free States, by the introduction of slavery south of 36° 30´, as well as north of it, would receive more than a fair share or moiety of rights and privileges, as between States or parties entitled to equal privileges. The idea that the extension of slavery under the Federal Government can be claimed by anybody south or north as a right, is wholly inadmissible. The _Courier_ will hold the following declarations from Mr. WEBSTER to be good authority, if others do not:

"Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from becoming slave territory, I am ready to assert the principle of excluding slavery." "We are to use the first and last, and every occasion which offers, to oppose the extension of slave power."

"I have to say, that while I hold with as much integrity, I trust, and faithfulness, as any citizen of this country, to all the original amendments and compromises in which the Constitution under which we now live was adopted, I never could, and never can persuade myself to be in favor of the admission of other States into this Union as slave States with the inequalities which were allowed and accorded to the slaveholding States then in existence by the Constitution. I do not think that the free States ever expected, or could expect, that they would be called upon to admit further slave States.... I think they have the clearest right to require that the State coming into the Union, shall come in upon an equality; and if the existence of slavery be an impediment to coming in on an equality, then the State proposing to come in should be required to remove that inequality by abolishing slavery or take the alternative of being excluded. I put my opposition on the political ground that it deranges the balance of the Constitution."

Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from slavery! Every occasion to be used to oppose the extension of the slave power! New States to abolish the inequality of slavery, or be excluded! I suppose Northern conservatives of the class referred to have endorsed those doctrines and declarations of Mr. WEBSTER a thousand times, as sound, national, conservative, and constitutional. But no Republican, so far as I know, has ever proposed to go an inch beyond the line of policy they indicated. The Chicago, or Republican Platform, certainly does not. And yet that same line of policy, when advocated by Republicans, is denounced as unsound, sectional, radical, and unconstitutional.

We have a great deal said about the equality of the States; of the new with the original States. This is said to be a fundamental doctrine of the Constitution.

It is claimed that citizens of the slaveholding States have an equal right in the Territories with the citizens of the non-slaveholding States; and I admit they have. But it is also claimed that they have the same right to the protection of property in slaves as property in cotton. This I deny. There is no such doctrine of State equality in the Constitution, nor was any thing like it contemplated by its framers. On the contrary, the Constitution denied this doctrine by clear implication, certainly for the first twenty years. It withheld from Congress the power to prohibit the importation of slaves into the "existing" States till 1808, while their importation into the Territories and new States might be prohibited at once. Ohio was admitted in 1802. Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State from that time, and did do it in effect by the very terms and conditions of her admission, which required that her Constitution and Government should not be repugnant to the ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, which interdicted slavery. But Congress had no power to prohibit the importation of slaves into Georgia till after 1808. Georgia and Ohio, therefore, in this respect, were not political equals from 1802 to 1808.

Nor have the States been all political equals in the sense claimed, since 1808. It will surprise many to be told that there is nothing in the Constitution about State equality, and especially nothing that affirms the equality of the new with the original States, even after 1808. And yet this is true. The only passages which refer to the new States, except impliedly in the importation clause, are these: "New States may be admitted by Congress into the Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State." There is nothing, certainly, in this language to show that the new States were to be admitted on an equality, or an equal footing with the original States.

And yet provision was made, when the Constitution was framed, for the admission of all the new States to be formed in United States Territory then possessed, "on an equal footing with the original States." But it was a footing of equality which was in nowise inconsistent with an absolute denial of the right to establish the inequality of slavery. And this is proved by the only compact in the English language contemporaneous with the Constitution which touches the subject, namely, that part of the fifth article of compact in the ordinance of 1787 which I have already quoted. There can be no shadow of claim that any thing else secured, or pretended to secure, the right of new States to admission into the Union on an equal footing with the original States. That, I admit, did. It is, to repeat it, in these words:

"Whenever any of said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent Constitution and State Government; _provided_ the Constitution and Government so to be formed, shall be republican in conformity to the principles of these articles," the 6th, which prohibited slavery, included.

And this is all there is, contemporaneous with the Constitution, on the subject of the equality of the States. The very instrument, then, which secured the admission of new States, on an equal footing with the original States, itself provided that they were never to tolerate slavery.

The new States, then, neither were to have, nor have they, any political equality which the prohibition violates, as Southern gentlemen contend. Certainly those formed and admitted under the plan of Government devised by the fathers, have not. In this sense they are not political equals. The original States were, from the beginning, and have ever been, political equals in this and every sense. Not, however, because the Constitution says they are, for it says nothing on the subject; but because they were independent sovereignties, and as such, made a compact which united them under one Federal Government, with discriminating restrictions upon the subject of slavery, or upon any other subject. But the fact that the evil and inequality of slavery existed in the original States, and was tolerated from necessity, was no reason why it should be allowed in the Territories and new States, where it did not and need never exist. So the power of the Territories and new States was sufficiently restricted to secure equality in personal rights and freedom to all the "inhabitants." Of course it cannot be pretended that the mere fact that one or more States had established, and had power to perpetuate slavery, secured to new States the right to establish and perpetuate the same enormity, as a necessary result of State equality. That would make the right or power of one State, resulting from State equality, necessarily coextensive with tolerated evil in another. Manifestly "the fathers" had no such idea as this. Theirs was the common sense and rational idea that a moral and political evil which existed in the old States, and could not be removed, need not for that reason be tolerated in new States.

The Constitution guarantees to each State a republican form of Government merely; but the ordinance of 1787 provides that the "Constitution and Government of each new State shall be republican." Why this difference? In the original States slavery existed, or in most of them; and so far they were anti-republican in fact and practice, though republican in form. The framers of the Constitution, having no power to abolish this anti-republican institution of slavery in those States, did nothing more than guarantee them Governments republican in form. But having the power to exclude it from the new States, they did exclude it, and provided that their constitutions and governments should be republican. That this was the reason for the difference may be inferred from the remark of LUTHER MARTIN, a distinguished member of the Federal Convention, that "slavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism," and of General HEATH in the Massachusetts Convention, that "Congress has declared that the new States shall be republican and have no slavery." No other reason can be given. Thus republicanism in fact, and not in form merely, was made a condition of admitting new States. This is part of the unalterable compact to which validity was given by the Constitution. The Constitution, therefore, while it guarantees a republican form of government, does in fact, by giving validity to the ordinance, guarantee republican governments to the new States. This is another very significant fact harmonizing perfectly with all the other facts in the original plan for extending the Union by admitting States from Territories.

The States are all equals, or not, according to the terms of their admission. The original States became members of the Union upon the single condition of ratifying the Constitution, which left them at liberty to tolerate slavery or not. But the States formed in the only Territory which belonged to the United States at the time the Constitution was framed, were admitted on condition that slavery should be perpetually interdicted within their limits, and as parties to an unalterable compact to that effect.

Slavery was regarded, South as well as North, when the Constitution was adopted, as a moral and political evil. This had been the general sentiment of the country many years before, and continued to be long after that period. The representatives of the extensive district of Darien in Georgia, on the 12th of January, 1775, spoke of slavery as "founded in injustice and cruelty, and highly dangerous to our liberties." JEFFERSON pronounced it "an injustice and enormity." The present Chief Justice of the United States, Mr. TANEY, who acted many years ago as counsel of Rev. Mr. GRUBER, who was indicted in the State of Maryland for preaching a sermon on the evils of slavery, spoke as follows in his defence:

"Mr. GRUBER did quote the language of our great act of National Independence, and insisted on the principles contained in that venerated instrument. He did rebuke those masters who, in the exercise of power, are deaf to the call of humanity, and he warned them of the evils they might bring upon themselves. He did speak in abhorrence of those who live by trading in human flesh, and enrich themselves by tearing the husband from the wife, the infant from the bosom of the mother, and this was the head and front of his offending. So far is he from being the object of punishment in any form of proceeding, that we are prepared to maintain the same principles, and to use, if necessary, the same language here in the Temple of Justice, and in the presence of those who are the ministers of the law."

"A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evils of slavery for a time. While it continues it is a blot on our national character; and every real lover of freedom confidently hopes that it will be effectually, though it must be gradually, wiped away, and earnestly looks for the means by which the necessary object may be best obtained. And until it shall be accomplished, until the time shall come when we can point, without a blush, to the language held in the Declaration of Independence, every part of humanity will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery, and better, to the utmost of his power, the wretched condition of the slave."

Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:--Where did you get that?

Mr. GOODRICH:--I got it from a printed sermon recently preached by Dr. ORVILLE DEWEY, of Boston.

And Mr. CALHOUN, in the United States Senate, in 1838, said that "many in the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political evil;" and Mr. BUTLER, late a United States Senator from South Carolina, said in the Senate in 1850, that he "remembered the time when slavery was regarded as a moral evil, even in South Carolina."

In such a state of public sentiment, it is certainly no marvel that slavery was not allowed to extend into the Territories and new States. It was not prohibited in the northwest territory, because it was supposed to be, or would become, an evil in that territory particularly, or a greater evil there than anywhere else; but because it was regarded as an evil everywhere, and therefore wrong to permit its extension anywhere, when there was power to prevent it. There can be no doubt it would have been prohibited in the Territories and new States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, if Georgia and North Carolina, previous to the Federal Convention, had ceded them to the United States upon the same conditions Virginia had ceded the northwest territory. Proof of this is found in the fact that the plan of territorial governments interdicting slavery forever after 1800, embraced all territory ceded, or to be ceded by individual States; and still further proof is in the fact, that the cessions by Georgia and North Carolina, after the adoption of the Constitution, were upon the express condition that slavery should not be prohibited; thereby showing that the policy of the Federal Government, as they understood it, was restrictive of slavery in the far southern latitudes as well as in the more northern, and that they expected the power to restrict would be exercised, if not withheld in the deeds of cession. A proposition was, in fact, made to apply the anti-slavery clause of 1787, to all the southern part of the Mississippi territory, now the southern parts of Alabama and Mississippi, by the act of April 7th, 1798, it being supposed at one time that it belonged to the United States; but the debate shows that the proposition was withdrawn because the jurisdiction was in Georgia, or because not five members of Congress, after the question was examined, believed otherwise. Georgia claimed absolute title and right of jurisdiction, and denied all right on the part of the United States to interfere with slavery. Congress did, however, prohibit the importation of slaves into the territory, and declare every slave so imported to be entitled to his freedom. This was probably wholly unauthorized, as it was six years before Georgia ceded it to the United States, and ten years before Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State. But these facts show a strong disposition on the part of "the fathers" to curtail and circumscribe slavery, even in the far south, and at the hazard, too, of exercising doubtful power.

Nothing can be clearer than that the original States had a right to form a Federal Government on such terms as to themselves as they could mutually agree upon, and to fix the terms upon which they would permit new members to be admitted. The Northern States were under no obligation to protect slavery at all, not even by permitting fugitives to be reclaimed within their limits. If, then, they were willing to concede that right to the original States, only upon condition that slavery should not be allowed to extend, who will say they had not a right to make that condition, or that, if agreed to, it would not be valid and binding? With their views of slavery, believing it to be a moral and political evil, it was certainly their first and highest duty to make effectual provision against its extension, before undertaking, for any reason, to give the least protection to it. Such provision they supposed they had made, and it was this that justified them, if any thing could, in conceding the right of reclamation.

The free, or northern States, in the exercise of their admitted right in deciding upon the terms of Union, insisted on making it a fundamental and ever-binding condition that no obligation to protect slavery in Illinois should ever exist; and this was done for reasons which render it morally certain that they would have insisted on the same condition in reference to Missouri, if Missouri had been part of the original territory. It would be preposterous to suppose that while they would not consent to guarantee slavery in any manner in Illinois, because they believed it to be a moral and political evil, they meant at the same time to make a Government that could obligate them to guarantee it in the adjoining Territory or State of Missouri, either by the return of fugitive slaves, or in any other manner. They meant no such thing, nor can an honest interpretation of the terms of union bind them to such guarantee now. The right to recapture fugitive slaves could not exist without the consent of the free States; and as that consent was given upon conditions and with limitations, by necessary implication and every sound principle of construction, they reserved the right to say whether it should exist upon other conditions and with other limitations, or without either condition or limitation.

Mr. WICKLIFFE:--No one from Kentucky or Virginia wishes to alter the ordinance of 1787. For GOD'S sake spare us the argument.

Mr. GOODRICH:--I understand no alteration is proposed in the ordinance; nor am I arguing against any such proposition. I am showing what the policy of 1787 was, and what the compact of the fathers was. And I am doing this because it is in the spirit of that policy and compact that Kentucky and Virginia tell us they wish to have this controversy adjusted. Massachusetts and the other Northern States meant to fix, and supposed they had fixed, a limit to their connection with, and responsibility for slavery. By consenting to the clause which secured the right of reclamation, they did become responsible for it to a certain extent. So far as it was supposed, when that clause was agreed to, that its effect would be the recapture of fugitive slaves, and their return to bondage, and so far as the purpose was to make such recapture and return lawful, so far the responsibility of adding to the security of slavery was voluntarily assumed. But this was limited to the existing States by excluding slavery from all United States territory. If any part of such territory had been left for slavery--enough for a single slave State--it might be said that its extension from a part was for reasons applicable only to a part, and so could not be considered as establishing the principle of non-extension. But now this cannot be said. Not a foot was left for slavery.