Chapter VI.: “Dongola to Omdurman.

Kandeel tells me that, on the arrival of our party at Dongola, Nejoumi called a meeting of emirs, and asked what should be done with us. All voted for instant execution, but this Nejoumi would not sanction. Among the emirs was a Taaishi wakil (spy or agent of Abdullahi)—a similar wakil being appointed to each army not actually led by one of the Khaleefa’s relatives. This wakil’s name was Messaad Geydoom-el-Taaishi. When Nejoumi insisted upon saving |347| my life, and, as an alternative, sending me to the Khaleefa, leaving him to decide what should be done with me, he instructed Kandeel to write a letter saying that, as I was a “hakeem” (doctor), I might be useful to him (Nejoumi) and also to the army. Geydoom, having his suspicions about Nejoumi’s loyalty to Mahdieh, used his sparing of my life as a proof of his sympathies with the Government, and Nejoumi was ordered to Omdurman, and kept a prisoner in his house for some months.

Geydoom’s treatment of the army during Nejoumi’s absence caused so much discontent that Abdullahi determined to send Nejoumi back to Dongola, but with strict instructions to at once commence the march for the conquest of Egypt. He was given a hundred and twenty rifles only, and very little ammunition.

When General Grenfell sent the letter to Nejoumi, calling upon him to surrender, Nejoumi called a council of emirs, said that the army could not possibly fight, as they were tired, hungry, and thirsty, and suggested surrender, for they must either be killed upon the field or die in the desert on the way back. The emirs, being of the Taaishi family, first accused Nejoumi of cowardice and then of treachery. They threatened to report him to the Khaleefa when the fight was _won_, and to ask that one of themselves should be given the command when the further advance into Egypt was ordered. There appears to be but little doubt that, had it not been for the Taaishi emirs, the army would have followed Nejoumi unarmed to the lines of the Government troops. The emirs dictated the reply which Nejoumi was to send to General Grenfell, and when Nejoumi dashed down into the plain as the dervish army was in retreat, it was doubtless with the object of reaching the Government lines, but under pretence of rallying the few remaining troops, so that they should not shoot him down if they thought he was deserting them—or follow him if they thought he was charging, for this would have drawn the fire of the brigades upon them. After the death of Nejoumi, spies reported to the Khaleefa that he had |348| attempted to open up negotiations with the Government troops, and Kandeel, being suspected as Nejoumi’s “katib,” was loaded with chains and sent to Omdurman, where he was imprisoned for fourteen months, and then released to become the clerk of Yacoub, the brother of Abdullahi.

|349|

APPENDIX VI

THE SOUDAN: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

To the present generation the history of the Soudan may be said to commence with the date of its partial conquest by Mohammad Ali Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt. To go further back than this is to compile from various sources, all more or less inaccurate, a mass of information which, where not misleading, would be next to useless to the would-be correct historian. Even the recent history of the benighted country has from force of circumstances been compiled from sources not the most reliable, and it is extremely difficult for the moment to sift the facts from the legends. The Soudan is still an unknown and unconquered land. Small tribes have been magnified into nations, and petty chiefs and sheikhs into kings and sultans who evidenced their exalted position in the possession of a few more sheep, goats, donkeys, and slaves, than their neighbours. No single tribe or sheikh ever held general supremacy over the others; Zubeir was within an ace of making himself the Sultan of the Soudan, when he accepted an invitation to visit Cairo; that was twenty-five years ago, and he is still here. The Soudan was nothing more nor less than a collection of little commonwealths; occasionally a number of these would acknowledge allegiance to one particular headman, and, in such instances, the “nation” might have boasted almost as great a population as some small and obscure provincial town. But that such instances were rare |350| is proved by the facility with which Mohammad Ahmed and Abdullahi set the various sections of tribes fighting among themselves.

When Mohammad Ali established his government, and when later Ismail Pasha attempted to extend his empire, they each took advantage of the chronic anarchy reigning in the Soudan to further their schemes, but the tribes soon found that they had but stepped from the frying-pan into the fire, and waited patiently for the strong man who was to rid them of the thraldom of the now hated and detested Turks, from whom they had hoped so much. From the time when, what the Soudanese call the “Turk” rule, was established, until the rebellion of 1882, nothing whatever was done to develop the natural resources of the country—indeed, the reverse. The only trade the officials fostered was that of slaves, and these were invariably drawn from peaceful and agricultural districts; the adult male population of whole districts was swept away in those raids organized to supply the hareems of Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey, with eunuchs and concubines. The mineral wealth of Sennar, Darfur and Kordofan was neglected, as when the soldiers reached the gold, silver and copper mines, they discovered that the precious metals did not exist in the pure blocks they had expected to find, and that to extract the metals meant work.

The population of the half-conquered provinces was robbed in every conceivable manner by tax-collectors, who were seldom or never paid their salaries of from twenty-five to thirty shillings a month, and they were assisted in the duties of tax collecting by companies of irregular soldiers whose salaries also were never paid. Where money was not forthcoming, the taxes were collected in kind, and it may be imagined what the result of tax collecting was. The people were driven farther and farther away from the cultivated lands and watercourses. The “Sudd,” that rank growth of weeds which obstruct the navigation of the Nile and its tributaries, was left to accumulate year after year, the little clearances which the inhabitants themselves made formerly, |351| being abandoned as they but aided the passage of boats conveying soldiers on tax collecting or conquest of territory expeditions.

Admitting, for the sake of argument, that some of the Soudan tribes may have risen to the dignity of independent kingdoms, their history may be written with one word—“anarchy,” and when the “Turk” government was established, general rebellion was rife from the beginning until it culminated in the rising of Mohammad Ahmed.

The population of the Soudan was, and still is, divided into three great classes, (1) the pure Arab to whom manual labour has been unknown since the day his ancestor Ishmael mixed the mortar with which to cement the stones of the Kaaba or House of God, which Abraham built at Mecca; (2) the Negroid, who will perform a few light duties, but who has absorbed all the worst to the exclusion of the few better qualities of his progenitors,—and, (3) the Black—naturally indolent and too lazy to work,—without ambition, and whose presumed avarice only extends to the possession of a little more than he can eat. For centuries the Black has been the slave of the Arab, and performed all the manual labour, such as the collection of gum and senna leaves, indiarubber, ivory, the cultivation of cereals, and the navigation of the rivers; but taking it all in all, the lot of the black slave might be envied by millions of workers in other parts of the world. With the introduction of the “Turk” government, all three classes were considered as “prey”; the slave proper had to work harder so that his master might be able to satisfy the rapacity of _his_ master—the official, and the slave knew this; the negroid, who believed in cultivating only so much dourra as was requisite for his needs, found that he had to cultivate enough to feed the soldiers quartered in his province, and to pay taxes not only on what he grew for himself, but on what he grew for nothing for the soldiers. It is no wonder, then, that the three waited the coming of some strong man to rid them of the common enemy.

Although a religious element was introduced into |352| Mohammad Ahmed’s movement, many fail to grasp the fact that religion here takes the place of politics in Europe, and when the Arabs rise against the powers that be, they are backed up by some “religious” question, for their laws are based entirely upon the Quoran. Mohammad Ahmed had for years been preaching against the extortions of the Turk officials, and had it not been suggested to him, it is unlikely that he would ever have assumed the _rôle_ of Mahdi, though as a holy man only, it is almost certain that his crusade would have succeeded equally as well as it did. The country was ripe for rebellion, and when the followers of Mohammad Ahmed overcame the first “Turk” sent against him, and against whom he had been preaching for years, success was assured, and thousands flocked to him. His crusade, therefore, in the beginning, was not a religious movement pure and simple as we understand such; it was the rising of an oppressed people against a government that had but lately tried to establish its authority over them. It is true that once having had the _rôle_ of Mahdi forced upon him, Mohammad Ahmed did his best to act up to it; his miracles—in the way of annihilating successive armies sent against him were very real indeed, and if thousands flocked to his banner in consequence of them, they should not be too severely criticized and charged with fanaticism and unreasoning superstition, for while they flocked to see the worker of these very real miracles, just as many thousands of people in more enlightened climes were making pilgrimages to caves, grottoes and shrines in the belief that the miracles they were praying for would be performed. Nor, considering that the faith in dreams and visions is almost as strong in the east as it was when Pharaoh had his dreams interpreted by Joseph, should Mohammad Ahmed and his successor be blamed for taking advantage of the credulity of the most credulous people on earth in the relating of visions, when but a little time since thousands of people in a highly civilized country were flocking to the doors of one who pretended to be the mouthpiece on earth of the angel Gabriel—a much more mythical being than either the prophet Mohammad or the Mahdi. |353|

Had Mohammad Ahmed lived, there is no doubt but that he would have succeeded in establishing some form of government which, if not better, would certainly have been no worse than the one he had overturned. With the Mahdi’s death, Abdullahi found himself with a trust which, as he saw immediately, only a powerful military despotism could enable him to keep. Threatened with attack from all points of the compass, he had also internal dissensions to combat, and met them unflinchingly. While his atrocities have been made much of, he invariably went through the farce of trying people for disobedience during his reign of martial law before carrying out the capital sentence; perhaps, if Abdullahi’s atrocities were placed side by side with those associated with revolutions in other countries, his list would be found not the longest. Oppression doubtless was great, but it was concentrated in one place, and being more seen, was as a consequence more felt. Still opinions may be said to be equally divided as to whether oppression was any greater during the worst days of the reign of Abdullahi than it had been under the old government. The foregoing is not written in defence of Mohammad Ahmed or Abdullahi—and I have little reason to say a single good word for the latter, but it is time that the Soudan should be seen through clear glasses. Jealousy of power was Abdullahi’s besetting sin, and to this must be attributed the swift punishment meted out to those who in the slightest degree exhibited disobedience of orders. To this jealousy must be added vanity of his power also. I have heard since my release, from people of the Muslimanieh quarter, some of the reasons for Abdullahi’s sparing of my life. I had forgotten the incident, but am reminded that when on my arrival at Omdurman I was taken to the gallows in chains to be hanged, I turned to the Emirs and shouted “Has your Mahdi (I used this name at the time) no other way of exhibiting his power but by hanging a bound man before all his soldiers? Take off my chains, and I will fight you, or else get on with your work.” Abdullahi was told this while I was still being played with, and said, “A man who will |354| talk like that when he is going to be hanged is a man! He is a big man; I will not hang him; a man who is not afraid of me is not to be hanged; I will keep him.” This was said to the Muslimanieh and others. Abdullahi had not made up his mind whether I was a merchant, spy, medicine man or general. Then, again, he kept me alive in order to prove that he was more powerful than my Malek (the Emperor of Germany). I am told that he very often said to people, “You have heard of Abdalla Nufell; he is not afraid of me; his Malek has millions of soldiers like him, but he dare not bring his armies to release him; he is afraid to meet my ansar.”

There are other stories of Abdullahi’s many references to me, but, as they are of a complimentary nature, I must leave others to relate them; the above are only given for the purpose of affording a slight insight into the man’s complex character, and to give an idea of the small actions which could influence him.

The Past of the Soudan may be said to close with the battle of Omdurman; the Present may be given in one word—Transition. Its Future is still in the future; but from what I have written, those intending to make a rush to the Soudan as soon as it is declared open for trade, will understand that a settled government has yet to be established. The Soudan has had but one government, and I have given an idea of what that government was to the inhabitants; the next government established will, as a matter of course, be looked askance at. Although the Khaleefa’s army was smashed up at Omdurman, his influence still remains with great numbers, and time must be given for the Soudanese to learn that there are governments _and_ governments. All they are conscious of now is, that the Government they turned out has come back again, and they expect from it no better treatment than they received formerly, if they do not expect worse as a punishment for their rebellion. The possession of slaves will be forbidden, and this will give umbrage to the Arabs, while the slaves will no more appreciate or enjoy their freedom than would so many cage-bred birds theirs. There is a |355| considerable amount of ignorance in Europe on the subject of slavery in Mohammedan countries, but I must confine myself to the Soudan on this question. Slave raiding should of course be put down with a strong hand, and there should be, when a raider is captured, no other formality than that of loading the rifles or affixing the rope; the trial might take place at some future date, so that the fact of his execution might be recorded. I wish to speak now only of those who are already _called_ “slaves,” for, in the majority of cases, it is but a name.

I have remarked that the Black is naturally lazy, and will do no more work than he is compelled to; if liberated unconditionally, he will, unless drafted into regiments, loaf about, and occasionally do a little work for the sake of a meal; but he will refuse to keep to any work long unless some sort of pressure is brought to bear, and he will be only too glad if it is. As a slave, his master must keep him in food and clothes, and also support his wife and children in return for his services, and, being “property,” he is well looked after; he is, as I have said, a slave but in name, but the name has an ugly sound to Europeans. The new Government might open a slave register, have a few inspectors to go round and “ask for complaints,” and either give an age, or name a date, when all holding of slaves would be a breach of a law yet to be made. Treaties are all very well when dealing with countries boasting a civilized Government, but it is not an easy matter to compel petty chieftains in the heart of Africa to agree to laws which upset the whole political economy of their domains—and this only to please people who know nothing of the existing conditions. However the whole question bristles with difficulties and with arguments for and against leaving matters as they are—only suppressing raiding as I have said already—but as those difficulties do exist, it would be well not to be rash, or to burden the still unconquered and unsettled country with revolutionary laws. Far better to make haste slowly, for laws are of little use unless a breach of them is quickly punished, and the Soudan Arabs have yet to be taught to respect laws emanating from a “Government.” |356|

These few remarks on the unsettled state of the country are intended for those who may be going out as entire strangers to the Soudan. They must be prepared to meet with difficulties great and small, disappointments, much discomfort, and many annoyances big and little; but it is to be hoped that they will endure these for a time, and not pester the little and still half-formed new administration with big complaints about petty quarrels or troubles. Any reprisals asked for in case of small annoyances or unpleasantnesses, can but bring in their train much bigger ones; you want but to earn the respect of both Arab and Soudanese to earn his devotion, and you may have both by at least treating him as a man and not as a beast. When speaking of my having borrowed money from the guides whom I entrusted with the arrangements I made for my escape, I drew attention to the strange fact of my borrowing money from them. This was putting the principle I have pointed out into practice; I required their aid. I went further, and gave evidence that I was entirely in their hands—a weakling, but they understood that if they helped me in my weakness, I would help or protect them in my strength; above all, they valued my trust and confidence. There are limits, I know, to both, but you must learn those limits.

The great want of the Soudan at the present time is means of communication; there are enormous tracts of land on which cereals can be raised with the minimum of cost and labour, but without means of transport they might as well not exist. Some talk has been made of a line of rail connecting Khartoum with the Red Sea, and this, certainly, would provide the means of transport and enable the Soudan to compete with almost any other country in cereals, but it is a question whether it would be worth while to construct a railway for the sake of the grain trade, if the trucks which take it to the seaboard have to be hauled back empty, and, maybe, left idle for the greater part of the year. It is possible that during the last fifteen years Nature has to a great extent repaired the enormous damage done to indiarubber and gum trees, |357| when the plants and trees were destroyed in order to obtain a big enough crop to satisfy the rapacity of the “Turk” officials. The forests abound in ebony and other hard woods, but power to saw them into beams or planks of suitable dimensions for transit is requisite before this valuable industry can be developed. From what prisoners from the south told me, in places an almost pure iron is found on or near the surface; this the Shilluks and Dinkas smelt in mud furnaces about six to eight feet high and three to four feet in diameter. The spear heads of the Shilluks and Dinkas, beside their shape being different from all others, are readily distinguishable from their peculiarly deep black shade, while the spear heads made from imported iron are many shades lighter, and in comparison, when polished, have a tinny appearance. If coal is found, and I believe it will be, if the description I was given of “black stones” which took fire is correct, then one might say that there is no limit to the development of the country. Should the Nile and its tributaries be cleared of the “sudd,” considerable development would be immediately possible, but the whole country must first be studied, and its present condition with its existing means of transport thoroughly grasped, before people will be justified in subscribing for big ventures, for the failure of one means the failure of others, and a retarding, for want of new capital, of present possibilities in the way of development.

It is quite impossible to compile any statistics of the former import and export trade of the Soudan, that is to say reliable statistics, and as the whole trade of the country was governed by the slave trade—now abolished—a new condition of things has been introduced but not yet established. Barter must, for some time to come, be the medium of trade and exchange, and, here again, new conditions are certain to be met with. Formerly the principal imports were cheap cotton goods, earthenware, ironware, dried and preserved provisions, sugar, perfumes, and such like, which generally came in the category of things which are “cheap and nasty.” There are two great reasons why all this must now be changed; with almost |358| 20,000 regularly paid troops in the country, and troops, too, who have, in a measure, been living in the lap of luxury, since 1882, their demands must be met. The sight of well-fed, well-housed, and well-clothed troops, will excite the admiration and cupidity of the Soudanese for similar luxuries, and a demand for articles formerly unknown to them will at once be created. I hesitate to specify some of the goods which I know there will be a demand for, not that I am in any way interested in the subject for the moment, but only to guard against numbers of people exporting large quantities of merchandise of the same class far in excess of the actual demand. I cannot too strongly advise manufacturers to study on the spot the requirements of the people, and to comply with their requirements, whatever the article might be. Disappointment and loss can only ensue if articles they do not want, or which do not meet with their requirements, are attempted to be forced upon them, for while engaged upon this suicidal policy, some one else will certainly be studying the question with the intention of meeting the wishes of his prospective customers. I would strongly deprecate the formation of big syndicates and companies for the exploitation of the Soudan; the country, granted certain facilities for transport, has a great future, but it would be very unwise to lock up large capitals, the greater part of which would be lying unused. Small companies, with all the capital employed, will pay best for the time being, and the pioneers of such companies might be accompanied by a mineralogist, to examine the gold, silver, copper, lead, and other mineral deposits. That gold exists is well known, but the richness of the quartz I cannot speak of; one thing, though, is certain, gold can be obtained with little or no difficulty and labour, otherwise the small bags of gold I saw at Khartoum and Omdurman would not have been brought in. Lead and copper will be found to the west and south-west of Darfur—and possibly silver also, but whether it would pay to work the mines can only be ascertained after an examination of the districts. |359|

To sum up. The Soudan is a country which for nearly a century has been fighting against the establishment of any foreign government; its experience of a “benevolent” administration is of the very worst; the inhabitants sank all or nearly all differences between them when they rose to turn out the hated Turks; their experience of Christians has evidently not been of the best, else why the saying concerning Gordon? Large numbers are still loyal to the Khaleefa Abdullahi, and it will require but a very little mistake to make the inhabitants flock to his banner, or, what is worse, they will retire to the west and leave the country denuded of the population it stands in so much need of. Strangers are not wanted—they will be looked upon with suspicion until they have given evidence of their honest intentions towards the villagers; traders, before they may look for success, must overcome the prejudice of the people against European traders, a prejudice based upon experience of them formerly. And it is necessary for me to say that, after recent experience, it will take some time before the Muslim will believe that the Christian religion is anything but what he believes it to be, and he will be convinced that the boasted superiority of the European over the Arab does not hold good in the Soudan at all events. If those going to the Soudan will bear these points in mind, they will save themselves and others an infinity of trouble, and all barriers will be surmounted, if they keep in mind always the reputation Gordon made for himself for “Goodness and Justice,” and make Goodness and Justice their motto.

|361|

INDEX

A

Abbas, 246

_Abbas, The_, 325–328

Abdalla Rouchdi, 232, 333–336

Abdallah Sulieman, 236, 331

Abd el Kader Bey, 161, 189

Abd es Semmieh, 181, 209, 234

Abou-el-Gassim, 276

Abou Hamad, 232, 248

Abyssinian embassy, 246

Abyssinian expedition, 155, 221

Adultery, punishment of, 136, 137

Ahmed Abdel Maajid, 86, 121

Ahmed Youssef Kandeel, 346–348

Aid to wounded, 286–288

Ajjab Abou Jinn, 84, 102, 121

Ali Khaater, 180–182, 209

Alti, 182

Ansar, the, 42, 60, 97, 100–102, 130, 354

Arab tribes― Ababdeh, 9, 153 Alighat, 10, 23, 30, 31, 50, 60 Baggara, 212, 217, 230, 264–269, 276, 277, 281–283 Bedawi, 40, 55 Dabaanieh, 83 Danagli, 48 Dar Hamad, 8, 13, 54, 55 Digheem, 276 Dinkas, 357 Fellati, 171, 176, 209 Gawaamah, 98, 139, 188 Habbanieh, 276 Hadendowas, 88, 89 Hammadah, 84 Jaalin, 37, 59, 231, 244, 260, 266 Kabbabish, 2, 5, 8, 11, 22, 53, 54, 105, 167 Rhizaghat, 276 Shilluks, 357 Shukrieh, 84 Taaishi, 264, 267, 276, 346

Ardagh, Colonel, 5

Arsenal, 89, 178, 212, 226, 237–239

Assouan, 4–8, 52, 65, 77, 160–162

Atbara, battle of, 248, 249, 271

Austrian Consulate-general, 164, 168, 314

Austrian mission, 164, 233, 309

Awad el Kerim, 84; his three sons, 85

Awwad el Mardi, 226–239, 242, 244

B

Bakah Wells, 53

Bakhita, 240

Beit-el-Amana, 264, 273

Beit-el-Mal (Treasury), 13, 33, 34, 36, 51, 85, 87, 100, 125, 155, 157, 171, 174, 179, 206, 210, 214, 241, 276; Amin or Director of, 46, 49, 64, 145, 147, 175, 210, 226, 234

Berber, 86, 155, 165, 193, 198, 237, 309

Blackmail (_see_ Nebbi Khiddr)

Black population of Soudan, 351, 355

Burleigh, Bennet, 244, 279

Bussati Bey, 326

C

Cairo, start from, 2–7; return to, 1, 290

Caravan, constitution of, 4, 8, 11, 12; betrayal of, 2, 3, 21, 22, 60, 61, 68, 106, 167, 168

Catarina, 114, 116

Coinage, 171, 210–215, 223

Cromer, Lord, 247

D

Dara, 310

Darfur, 181, 203, 350, 358

Derawi, 7–10, 245, 329

Dervishes, horsemanship of, 41, 44, 49; treachery of, 285, 288

Desert routes, 12, 15–23

Divorce laws, 123, 180, 190–192

Dongola, 10, 39–43, 54, 59, 66, 67, 328, 329; capture of, 232, 248, 249, 346

E

Earle, General, 3

Egyptian War Office (Intelligence Department), 105, 167, 168, 197, 291, 295, 298

El Agia, 15, 16, 19–22

El Etroun, 15, 23

El Fasher, 203, 311

El Fun, 143, 144

El Kiyeh, 15, 22, 23

El Obeid, 10, 220

Elias, clerk to Neufeld, 8, 12, 14, 24–29, 35, 36, 43, 50, 66

Elias Pasha, 4

Emirs― Abd-el-Baagi, 257, 261, 264 Ahmed Fedeel, 176, 243 Ali Wad Saad, 91 Makin en Nur, 37, 59 Mohammed Hamad'na Allah, 176–179, 186 Mohammed Hamza, 27, 37–40, 43, 44, 59 Mohammed Taher, 88 Nur Angara, 70, 76 Wad Bessir, 59, 121 Wad en Nejoumi, 27–34, 39, 46–59, 64–67, 78, 118, 132, 139, 155, 337, 346–348 Wad Eysawee, 59 Wad Farag, 27–35, 44, 59–61, 173, 174 Wad Umma, 59 Yacoub, 148, 175, 176, 186, 216, 221, 235, 242, 249, 257, 263, 267, 271, 273, 348

F

Famine, 112, 116–119, 147

Fettering, method of, 72, 79, 80, 91, 93, 229, 235, 279

Fitton, Major, 261

Flogging, 41–43, 126, 127, 129–132

Forts, 239, 243, 244, 254, 266

G

Gebel Ain, 8, 15

Gebel Ragaf, 111, 220

Gebel Roiyan, 68

German Consulate, 154, 160, 162–165, 168, 291

Germany, Emperor of, 354

Gordon, 68, 89, 212, 218, 228, 300–324, 325–328, 332–337, 340–345; relief expedition, 3, 65, 132, 229, 247, 316–321

“Gordonizing,” 159

Grenfell, General, 347

Guides― Abdallah, 197–201, 214 Ali el Amin, 8, 12, 17–24, 31, 36, 49, 60, 67 Darb es Safai, 21–29, 49, 50 Hassan, 12–24, 30, 50, 60–62, 67 Hassib el Gabou, 8–16, 22, 48, 52–58, 64, 106, 107, 255 Hawanein, 196, 201, 207, 214 Ismail, 11–26, 57, 61 Mohammad Ali, 153, 154, 156, 163 Moussa Daoud Kanaga, 54, 154, 156, 163–166 Onoor Issa, 223, 226, 233, 239–244, 254 Zecki, 220

Gunboats, 240, 250–256, 257, 265, 270, 290, 326

Gunpowder manufacture, 175–182, 209, 224, 232–241, 289, 296

H

Halfeyeh, 176–178, 198, 261, 265, 270

Hamad Wad el Malek, 246

Hamaida, 234, 237

Hanafi, 110, 151

Hassan Bey Hassanein, 325–331

Hassan Hosny, 181, 209, 234

Hassan Zecki, 174, 177, 232

Hasseena, 4, 8–12, 25–29, 32–36, 40–46, 50–52, 68, 72, 81, 102, 103, 108, 109, 118, 135, 185–194, 195

Hassib Allah, 59, 60

Hicks Pasha, 88, 101, 178, 309, 310, 313, 326

Hogal Dufa'allah, 4–14, 54, 58, 62, 78, 245, 255

Hunter, General, 293

Hussein Pasha Khaleefa, 308, 309

I

Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi, 167, 208, 218, 224, 244, 260, 263, 266, 277, 303, 332, 340–345

Ibrahim Wad Adlan, 121, 143, 145–159, 165, 166, 170, 216

Ibrahim Wad Hamza, 246, 260

Ismail Pasha Ayoub, 340, 350

J

Jinns (spirits), 170–174

Joseppi, 141, 156, 157, 179, 200

K

Kadis Hassein Wad Zarah, 222 Ahmed 221

Kassala, 181

Kerreri, 248, 258, 260, 274

Khaleefa, Abdullahi― His cruelty, 69, 73–75, 84, 85, 110, 353; his superstition, 99, 103, 120, 249, 257, 263, 267; respect for Neufeld, 132, 143, 204, 230, 353; objection to traders, 149, 155; encouragement of marriage, 123, 139, 186–189, 224; relations with Slatin, 204–208; his flight, 274–277; opposition to him among Mahdists, 66, 85, 146–148, 245–247, 254–256, 305, 345, 346 Ali Wad Helu, 44, 264, 273 Shereef, 146, 264, 273

Khaleel Agha Orphali, 303, 332–337

Khaleel Hassanein, 89, 98, 178, 182, 212, 216, 235, 242, 249, 252

Khartoum, 29, 47, 83, 89, 175, 178, 181, 212, 218, 228, 266, 284, 303, 309, 310

Khedive, 247

Kirbekan, battle of, 3, 89, 286

Kordofan, 2, 4, 7, 61, 146, 289, 310, 350

Korosko, 65

L

Lupton, 295, 313

M

Macdonald, Colonel, 271, 274

Mahdi, 3, 66, 69, 78, 86, 98, 103, 273, 309–318, 330, 341, 345, 351–353

Mahdieh, 70, 85, 88, 99, 101, 110, 145, 205, 257, 260, 262, 273

Mahdi’s Ratib, 94, 271

Mahdi’s Tomb, 44, 70, 151, 155–157, 267

“Mahdism,” 300

Makkieh, 141, 178, 185, 192

Mankarious Effendi, 77, 152–154, 160, 195

Marriage customs, 86, 121–123, 126, 135–138, 189

Maxwell, Colonel, 281

Mecklenburg, Duke of, 291

Mehkemmeh, the, 105, 110, 163

Metemmeh, 68, 247

Mihrab, 267

Mimbar, 267

Mohammad Ali Pasha, 349, 350

Mohammad Effendi Rafai, 167

Möller, 68, 153, 154, 160

Moxley, Hewett, 298

N

Nahoum Abbajee, 114, 186, 188–190, 209, 226–232, 323

Nebbi Khiddr, 101–104, 112, 113, 120, 128, 173, 216

Negroid population, 351

Neufeld― Official accounts, 1–4, 53, 61, 68, 167; newspaper accounts, 1, 79, 134, 166, 169, 291–299; as trader, 3, 9, 10, 46, 47, 76, 105, 149, 168; as Government spy, 37, 46, 47, 53, 145, 156, 239; letters to his manager and Mankarious, 77, 152–154, 160–165, 199; letter to General Stephenson, 294, 338, 339; named Abdallah, 77, 91, 102, 151, 269; interview with the Khaleefa, 76, 79, 90, 92; practises medicine, 106, 124, 130, 175, 197, 224, 240, 250, 272; plans to escape, 107, 143, 152–157, 160–169, 198–201, 227, 293; floggings, 127, 131; relations with Hasseena, 4, 10, 40, 108, 109, 118, 135–139, 185–194, 290; conversion, 132, 150, 167, 205, 224; not a German subject, 162, 293; native wives, 139, 167, 186–189; English wife, 4, 163, 166–169, 194, 289; furnishes information to Government, 239, 243–245, 254, 261, 289; employed under the Khaleefa (_see_ Coinage, Arsenal, and Gunpowder Manufacture); offers from publishers, 291, 299; reception in Cairo, 290–299; relations with Gordon, 3, 132, 228, 305; views on missionaries, 321–323; views on trade, 356–359

Newnes, Sir George, 299

Nubar Pasha, 342

O

Ohrwalder, 6, 114–116, 119, 182, 187, 223; his escape, 183, 280, 295; his book, “Ten Years’ Captivity,” 300, 306–323; criticisms of Gordon, 306–323, 325

Ombeyehs (war-trumpets), 72, 73, 76, 158, 257, 275, 277

Omdurman, 1–3, 54, 62–65, 67, 69, 71; battle of, 44, 258, 265–277, 281, 326, 354; looting of, 281

Osman Digna, 243, 248, 254, 264

Osta Abdallah, 224, 235–239, 242, 249, 252

P

Perdikaki, 177–181

Pink, Colonel, 274

Prison (Saier)― Horrors of, 2, 81, 93–96, 116–119, 218; Idris es Saier, 82, 91, 98–105, 112, 121, 127, 130, 135, 138, 158, 171–174, 216, 262, 266, 272, 277, 278; the Umm Hagar, 94, 95, 106, 113, 128, 218, 262, 266, 269; the Bint Umm Hagar, 221; escape from, 96, 107, 120–123; food, 112, 113, 116–119, 143; subordinate gaolers, 123, 127–129, 173, 174, 262; women’s prison, 125, 126

R

Rossignoli, 132, 134, 197–201, 205

S

Sabalooka, 243, 249, 257

Said Abdel Wohatt, 175, 178–182, 209

Said Gumaa, 91, 203

Selima Wells, 11–15, 19–23, 59, 78

Sennar, 84, 350

Shayba (yoke), 38, 219

Sheiks― Ahmed Nur ed Din, 54, 105–109, 111, 127 Ed Din, 130, 233, 264, 271, 273, 274 Hamad El Nil, 85, 102, 103 Mahmoud Wad Said, 83, 90, 118, 121, 247 Saleh Bey Wad Salem, 2–6, 11–22, 28, 31, 46–49, 55–57, 61, 68, 77, 105

Shereef Hamadan, 201, 216, 231–233

Shwybo, 171–174, 228

Sirdar, 225, 228, 262, 271, 276–279, 290, 321, 345; rumours concerning, 97, 155, 232, 233, 259; advance of, 240, 245, 247; charges against, 284, 286

Sirri, 230, 233, 251, 326

Slatin, 6, 70, 71, 76, 79, 91, 110, 280; his escape, 87, 201–207, 214, 220, 223, 295, 315, 345; kindness to Neufeld, 119; Austrian Consul’s letter, 164; his letter to the Khaleefa, 202, 295; position with the Khaleefa, 204; conversion, 205; his wives, 206; reception at Cairo, 295, 308; his book, “Fire and Sword,” 300; relations with Said Bey Gumaa, 203, 310

Slave Trade, 350, 354

Soudan, future of, 322, 323, 349–359

Spies― Government, 62, 106, 150, 158, 244, 250, 255, 256, 261, 305 Mahdist, 62, 65, 66, 82, 97, 150, 244, 259, 305, 346

Stanley, Emin, expedition of, 139

Stephenson, General, 2–6, 47, 48, 56, 76, 145, 261, 294, 338

Stewart, Colonel, 324, 325–330, 343

Sulieman Haroun, 153

Surghani hill, 273

T

Toki, battle of, 139, 156

Torpedoes, 243, 249, 251–256, 280

Tuti island, 228, 243, 265

Typhus fever, 108

U

Umm es Shole, 188–190, 193, 198, 217, 222, 224, 239, 242

W

Wadi El Kab, 8, 15, 19, 22, 23, 33, 56–60, 67

Wadi Halfa, 5–13, 30, 31, 42, 48–51, 57, 61, 65, 71, 77, 89, 141, 280

Wakih Idris, 3, 135

Wass, Count, 164

Wilson, Sir Charles, 69

Wingate, Major, 223

Wood, Sir Evelyn, 342

Worrak, 245, 261

Y

Youssef Jebaalee, 114, 116

Youssef Mansour, 205, 220, 244, 250, 252, 256

Yunis, 264, 274

Z

Zecki Tummal, 221

Zobheir Pasha, 176, 202

Zoghal, 203, 310

Zubeir, 349

THE END

PRINTED BY

WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,

LONDON AND BECCLES.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

This transcription is based on the first edition of this book, page scans of which are available from archive.net; search for _prisonerofkhalee00neuf_, for example. Original spelling and grammar are generally retained, with a few exceptions noted below. Original italics _looks like this_. The original page numbers are shown like this: |97|. Illustrations have been moved from within paragraphs to between. Blank pages, numbered or not, have been removed. Footnotes have been renumbered 1–15, and moved from within paragraphs to between paragraphs. Ditto marks have been removed, with associated text rearranged as necessary to retain the same meaning.

Page 78. In “is his prophet; and then, ‘I believe”, a right single quotation mark was added after _prophet_, to match the earlier left mark.

Page 165 note. The double quotation marks do not seem to be balanced, but have been retained as printed.

Page 294. The author refers to a translation of a letter appearing on “p. 336”. This seems to be an error, and has been corrected to point to page 338, Appendix III.

Page 352. In original “to the doors of one who pretented to be the mouthpiece”, _pretented_ is changed to _pretended_.