CHAPTER XXV

HOW GORDON DIED

When the news of the Sirdar’s splendid victory reached England, the British nation may be said to have breathed again, and when the great rush was made for the cheap edition of “Ten Years’ Captivity,” which was extensively advertised with my portrait to catch attention, the few known details of Gordon’s death became as fresh again in people’s minds as they had been years before. I was constantly asked to relate all I had heard concerning Gordon. When I had done so I was invariably met with quotations and readings from “Mahdism,” “Ten Years’ Captivity,” “Fire and Sword,” and other works; for what I had been told of Gordon’s death by eye-witnesses was an entirely different history to those published.

The first to relate the story of Gordon’s death was a man whose tongue Gordon had threatened to cut out as the only cure for his inveterate lying, and when he escaped and reached Cairo, in telling his tale he sustained his reputation. All accounts of Gordon’s death have apparently been based upon this first one received. Gordon, the world has been |301| made to believe, died as a coward, for what other construction may be placed on the assertion that he turned his back upon his assailants, and in his back received his mortal wound? It is an infamous lie; but, then, what was to be expected from a man whom Gordon knew so well, and who, maybe, had good reason to invent the tale he did? I quote, side by side, what may be called the three official accounts of Gordon’s death:―

MAHDISM.

“He (Gordon) made a gesture of scorn with his right hand, and turned his back, where he received another spear wound which caused him to fall forward and was most likely his mortal wound. . . . He made no resistance, and did not fire a shot from his revolver.”

“. . . One of them rushing up, stabbed him with his spear, and others then followed, and soon he was killed. . . . He (Nejoumi) ordered the body to be dragged downstairs into the garden, where his head was cut off.”

OHRWALDER.

“_The first_ Arab _plunged his huge spear into his body_. _He fell forward on his face_, was _dragged down_ the stairs, many stabbed him with their spears, and _his head was cut off and sent to the Mahdi_.”

SLATIN.

“_The first_ man up the steps _plunged his huge spear into his body; he fell forward on his face_ without uttering a word. His murderers _dragged_ him _down_ the steps to the palace entrance, and here _his head was cut off and_ at once _sent_ over _to the Mahdi_.” |302|

It will be noticed that Father Ohrwalder’s account appears to be a condensation of the first given, while it is hard to believe that a coincidence only accounts for Slatin giving the history in almost the identical words used by Ohrwalder. It is still more extraordinary that the first account should ever have been believed and published, and still _more_ extraordinary that it was not corrected by Ohrwalder and Slatin, for when I arrived in Omdurman, in 1887, the real details of the death of Gordon were the theme of conversation whenever his name was mentioned, and there are many eye-witnesses to his death—or were until the battle of Omdurman, who could tell a very different tale.

Those who knew Charles George Gordon, will believe me when I aver that he died, as they must all have believed that he died—in spite of the official and semi-official accounts to the contrary—as the soldier and lion-hearted man he was. Gordon did not rest his hand on the hilt of his sword and turn his back to his enemies to receive his mortal wound. Gordon drew his sword, and used it. When Gordon fell, his sword was dripping with the blood of his assailants, for no less than sixteen or seventeen did he cut down with it. When Gordon fell, his left hand was blackened with the unburned powder from his at least thrice-emptied revolver. When Gordon fell, his life’s blood was pouring from a spear and pistol-shot wound in his right breast. When Gordon fell, his boots were slippery with the blood of the crowd of dervishes he shot and hacked his way through, in his heroic attempt |303| to cut his way out and place himself at the head of his troops. Gordon died as only Gordon could die. Let the world be misinformed and deceived about Soudan affairs with the tales of so-called guides and spies, but let it be told the truth of Gordon’s death.

A week before the fall of Khartoum, Gordon had given up hopes. Calling Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi, he ordered him to provision one of the steamers, get all the Europeans on board, and set off for the north. To their credit be it said, they refused to leave unless Gordon saved his own life with theirs. Finding him obdurate, a plot was made to seize him while asleep, carry him off, and save him in spite of himself; but he somehow heard of the plot, smiled, and said it was his duty to save their lives if he could, but it was also his duty to “stick to his post.” As the troops must be near, then sail north, he told them, and tell them to hurry up.

Each day at dawn, when he retired to rest, he bolted his door from the inside, and placed his faithful body-servant—Khaleel Agha Orphali—on guard outside it. On the fatal night, Gordon had as usual kept his vigil on the roof of the palace, sending and receiving telegraphic messages from the lines every few minutes, and as dawn crept into the skies, thinking that the long-threatened attack was not yet to be delivered, he lay down wearied out. The little firing heard a few minutes later attracted no more attention than the usual firing which had been going on continuously night and day for months, but when the palace guards were heard firing it was known that something serious |304| was happening. By the time Gordon had slipped into his old serge or dark tweed suit, and taken his sword and revolver, the advanced dervishes were already surrounding the palace. Overcoming the guards, a rush was made up the stairs, and Gordon was met leaving his room. A small spear was thrown which wounded him, but very slightly, on the left shoulder. Almost before the dervishes knew what was happening, three of them lay dead, and one wounded, at Gordon’s feet—the remainder fled. Quickly reloading his revolver, Gordon made for the head of the stairs, and again drove the reassembling dervishes off. Darting back to reload, he received a stab in his left shoulder-blade from a dervish concealed behind the corridor door, and on reaching the steps the third time, he received a pistol-shot and spear-wound in his right breast, and then, great soldier as he was, he rose almost above himself. With his life’s blood pouring from his breast—not his back, remember—he fought his way step by step, kicking from his path the wounded and dead dervishes—for Orphali too had not been idle—and as he was passing through the doorway leading into the courtyard, another concealed dervish almost severed his right leg with a single blow. Then Gordon fell. The steps he had _fought_ his way—not been dragged—down, were encumbered with the bodies of dead and dying dervishes. No dervish spear pierced the live and quivering flesh of a prostrate but still conscious Gordon, for he breathed his last as he turned to face his last assailant, half raised his sword to strike, and fell dead with his face to heaven. |305|

Even had I not been specially requested, as the last of the Soudan captives, to relate in my narrative all that I had heard and learned concerning Gordon, I should have done so to a certain extent at all events, for he was no more the hero of the British people than he was mine, and the belief that he was still alive had no little to do with my ill-starred journey in 1887. The truth about his death, which is now published for the first time, is ample justification for what follows concerning him while still alive. It is true, as I have been told, that all I can have to say will be from “hearsay;” but then all the reports published concerning Gordon’s last days are from hearsay. I have the advantage over all others in this—that I was maybe the one man, captive or not, in Omdurman whom Mahdist and “Government” man alike could trust implicitly and confide in, for there was no questioning what my attitude was towards Abdullahi and Mahdieh. The consequence was that old “Government” people and the powerful men who from time to time became my fellow-prisoners, and, as a consequence, enemies of Abdullahi, gave me confidences which, if given in other quarters, might have resulted in the loss of a head.

Again, almost all the tales told about the Soudan may be classed in one of two categories; the first, tales like mine, related by people interested in putting their own version upon events and incidents with which they were personally connected, and the second, tales told by people with versions for which they believed their questioners were hankering, so that what |306| was white to “A” became black to “B,” if it was considered that this colour pleased “B” best. The system scarcely puts a premium on accuracy.

But before proceeding to my comments on the criticisms, a few introductory remarks are called for to prevent misconceptions and misunderstandings arising in the minds of my readers. As an evidence that the following is not intended—far from it—to lacerate the feelings of any of those who suffered with me, I might mention that I have read over the notes of this chapter to many of my fellow-captives, and have, at their suggestion, cut out a series of incidents well known to Gordon, which influenced him in the stand he took towards certain people, and other incidents which prove how clear and long-sighted he was, and how events justified his taking up the stand which he did. One incident ought to be written, to punish on this earth, if possible, the man whose escape has not been recorded, and whose deserted and broken-hearted wife lies by the side of their unshriven baby-boy in the sands of the Soudan. However, maybe Gordon, had he come back alive to meet all the calumnies directed against him, would have hesitated to help his “clearance” by stabbing the living with a dead hand, and out of respect to his memory this incident, with a number of others, has been expunged.

I have already told Father Ohrwalder that, in commenting upon what he says in “Ten Years’ Captivity,” when speaking of Gordon’s actions, the remarks I may feel called upon to make are not intended for him personally, and although I foresee |307| that I must in the main have to speak as to the second person, I think Father Ohrwalder quite understands that the second person in this instance is his book, not himself. I do not, as I have told him, consider that he is directly responsible for the opinions he is credited with in “Ten Years’ Captivity,” and this notwithstanding the remark, “The reader is reminded that all opinions expressed are those of Father Ohrwalder.” Considering that Father Ohrwalder is a priest and missionary, and has ventured upon thin ice in attacking Gordon’s memory, such a statement is hardly fair to him, as in the preface to the book it is stated, that “Father Ohrwalder’s manuscript, which was in the first instance written in German, was roughly translated into English by Yusef Effendi Cudzi, a Syrian; this I entirely rewrote in narrative form; the work therefore does not profess to be a literal translation of the original manuscript. . . .”

I should have thought that when Gordon was being attacked the original manuscript might have been treated a little differently. Of course it is easily understandable that when a Syrian, with Arabic for his mother tongue, translates from one difficult language which he has picked up into another equally difficult, and translates roughly too, when moreover this rough translation is handled in the manner admitted, errors may have crept in or been passed unnoticed, whilst salient points were lost sight of. It is also quite possible that the peculiar idioms of the Arabic, German, and English languages |308| got into a hopeless tangle, and were left so. Whatever the cause, there is no gainsaying the fact that Father Ohrwalder is credited with the expression of opinions which he, as a priest and missionary, ought to be one of the last on this earth to give utterance to. That he did not appreciate to the full the real import of the opinions he is credited with, I feel certain of after my long interview with him, when, with the Bible in one hand and a copy of “Ten Years’ Captivity” in the other, we compared the opinions expressed in the latter with the teachings of Christ in the former.

Father Ohrwalder may or may not have been ill-advised in omitting or suppressing the relation of well-known incidents, which accounted for Gordon’s attitude in certain cases. It was only by omitting to mention these incidents that the criticisms on Gordon were rendered possible, or I should say that, had those incidents been included, the criticisms would not have lived a day. It would have been far better to tell everything to the generous and sympathetic world which he and Slatin met when they escaped, and to leave it to condone, if any condoning was called for, and to sympathize with them in the parts force of circumstances compelled them to act, which must have been so repugnant to them; for to omit, when criticizing Gordon, the relation of the very acts which compelled him also by force of circumstances to act as he did, was, to say the least of it, very unwise.

In “Ten Years’ Captivity” the reader is led into a maze of opinions, and left there. Once inside, you |309| discover that you can neither gain the centre of the maze or return to the starting-point; you must either wander round for an eternity, or do as I shall do, cut your way through the hedges planted to bewilder you, and thank Heaven when on the outside that you are clear of the tortuous passages. Compare, for instance―

“He (Cudzi) added that Gordon should have no anxiety about Berber as long as Hussein Pasha Khaleefa was Mudir,”

with,

“Gordon himself committed a mistake by which he gave a deathblow to himself and his mission. On his way to Khartoum, he stopped at Berber, and interviewed the Mudir Hussein Pasha Khaleefa; he _imprudently_ told him that he had come up to remove the Egyptian garrisons, as Egypt had abandoned the Soudan.”

Gordon cannot be blamed for confirming, as Governor-General of the Soudan, the news telegraphed to his subordinate, the Mudir of Berber, _through whose hands the retiring garrisons must pass_, nor can he be blamed if, when his suspicions were aroused, he deferred to the opinion of the man who was acting British Consul, Government representative, and his own agent, when he wrote and telegraphed as he did, “Trust in Hussein Pasha.”

“The catastrophe which had overtaken Hicks filled the inhabitants of Khartoum with indescribable dismay. Several of them returned to Egypt, and the members of the Austrian Mission, with their blacks, quitted Khartoum on the 11th December, 1883.”

I therefore take it for granted that Father Ohrwalder’s fellow-workers saw that all was hopeless |310| _two months before Gordon’s name had been suggested to the Egyptian Government_, yet, in the face of this, we are first asked―

“What could Gordon do alone against the now universally worshipped Mahdi?”

and then told―

“General Gordon’s arrival in Khartoum gave fresh life and hope to the inhabitants.”

Then,

“As it appeared to us in Kordofan, and to the Mahdi himself, Gordon’s undertaking was very strange; it was just as if a man were attempting to put out an enormous fire with a drop of water,”

and,

“I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that had the Egyptian Government not sent Gordon, then undoubtedly the evacuation originally ordered could have been carried out without difficulty.”

One is simply staggered by such an assertion. When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, the whole of the western Soudan had fallen. The town was overrun with the mourning women and children—the widows and orphans, I should say—of the troops who, under Hicks Pasha, had been annihilated a few months before on their way to extricate the garrisons. Slatin had surrendered Dara to Zoghal. Said Bey Gumaa, the last man to fight for the Government in the western Soudan, was compelled to capitulate very shortly before Gordon’s arrival, and this only after a second siege when his men were dying with thirst. |311| Bahr-el-Ghazal fell before Gordon had had time to turn round, and, for all that he or the Mahdi knew, the Equatorial province had fallen also. The town was hemmed in by the Mahdists, and the commanders of the garrisons which Gordon was expected to extricate were holding various commands in the dervish army, while Slatin had taken part already as a Mahdist in the subjugation of his subordinate, Said Bey Gumaa of El Fasher, who had refused to surrender. Am I not justified in saying that only the suppression of such facts made possible such attacks upon Gordon?

We are next told―

“Those who escaped massacre in Khartoum have often told me that they were perfectly ready to leave, and it was only Gordon’s arrival that kept them back, but Gordon’s arrival without troops had rather disappointed them. Had he been accompanied by five hundred British bayonets, his reputation in the Soudan might have been maintained, and probably the Mahdi would never have left Kordofan.”

Why did not those perfectly ready to leave leave with the members of the Austrian mission, or leave between the date of their departure, December 11, and the early days of February, when the news of Gordon’s mission first reached Khartoum? Who prevented their leaving during that interval of at least two months from the moment when they were all thrown into “indescribable dismay” until they heard of Gordon’s appointment? And if, when he did arrive, they were so bitterly disappointed at his not being accompanied with five hundred British |312| bayonets—much good these would have been against the “universally worshipped Mahdi” in extricating those who had surrendered to him—why did they stay on? Did not Gordon beg them to leave? did he not try and compel them to do so? did he not put boats at their disposal to sail north or south as best suited them? And has not Gordon himself given the real reason for their staying on?—though to this should be added their unbounded faith and confidence in Gordon.

Gordon, I venture to believe, sustained his reputation in the Soudan up to the end—up to the moment when, with the hand of Death on him, he fell facing his last assailant. True, he lost his reputation for telling the truth, but there are few men in this world whose telling of an untruth would startle and astonish a community. The people of Khartoum, their eyes dry and wearied with looking for a sign of the returning steamers which Gordon had sent off three months before to bring up the troops expected to arrive at the beginning of November, turned to each other, and, in an amazed whisper, said, “Gordon has told a lie,” and were startled and afraid at their own words.

Having dealt as tersely as possible with this curious collection of contradictions, I proceed to the quotation of and replies to the criticisms passed upon Gordon in the book I have already quoted from.

1. “Looking back on the events of the siege of Khartoum, I cannot refrain from saying I consider Gordon carried his humanitarian views too far, and this excessive forbearance on his part added to his difficulties.”

2. “It was Gordon’s first and paramount duty to rescue the |313| Europeans, Christians, and Egyptians, from the fanatical fury of the Mahdi, which was especially directed against them. This was Gordon’s clear duty, but unfortunately he allowed his kindness of heart to be made use of to his enemy’s advantage.”

3. “Thus, in his kindness of heart, did Gordon feed and support the families of his enemies. It was quite sufficient for a number of women to appeal to Gordon, with tears in their eyes, that they were starving for him to order that rations of corn should be at once issued to them, and thus it was that the supplies in the hands of the Government were enormously reduced.”

4. “Gordon should have recognized that the laws of humanity differ in war from peace time, more especially when the war he was waging was especially directed against wild fanatical savages, who were enemies to all peace.”

5. “He was entirely deceived if he believed that by the exercise of kindness and humanity he was likely to win over these people to his side; on the contrary, they ridiculed his generosity, and only thought it a sign of weakness. The Soudanese respect and regard only those whom they fear, and surely those cruel and hypocritical Mahdists should have received very different treatment to civilized Europeans.”

6. “I also think that Gordon brought harm on himself and his cause by another action, which I am convinced led to a great extent to his final overthrow. Such men as Slatin, Lupton, Wad-el-Mek, and others, had offered, at the risk of their lives, to come and serve him. . . . Gordon would not, however, vouchsafe an answer to the letters of appeal these men wrote to him.”

In the first five extracts, Father Ohrwalder, from an initial mistake in forgetting or being unaware of the presence in Khartoum of the thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers of Hicks’ army, flounders on until, as I have said, he is credited with opinions which he should be the last to give utterance to. It is passing strange that any missionary should place limits to the humanitarian views and forbearance of a military commander in time of war, who may invariably be |314| depended upon to err on the wrong side from the biblical point of view. Gordon, in keeping in mind the Sermon on the Mount, and acting up to its precepts as far as the exigencies of a state of war permitted, performed no act derogatory to him as a military commander. Gordon was no worse a Christian than he was a soldier—and the world never saw a better soldier. And whatever Gordon’s paramount duty may have been, it certainly was _not_ his paramount duty to weaken his little garrison by sending an expedition into Kordofan to rescue, say, a dozen people who, as far as Gordon and every one else in Khartoum knew, had disavowed the Christian religion and adopted that of the Mahdi.

There is another aspect to the case. Gordon’s troops were Muslims. The “Christians” had adopted the “true faith” and become Muslims also. Why, then, should Muslim lives be sacrificed to “rescue” them from Islam and bring them back to Christianity? And it must not be forgotten that Slatin, so far from denying his conversion, excused himself on the ground that his religious education had been neglected at home. Gordon is not to be blamed for having believed that the “Christians” had sincerely adopted Islam, for apart from the mere adoption of the religion, people sworn to celibacy and chastity had entered the matrimonial state, which was considered a further evidence of their conversion. While the gardener of the Khartoum Mission was bewailing the money he had sent to the “apostates,” Consul Hansal wrote, asking that the matter be kept secret, to the Austrian |315| Consul-General in Cairo, informing him of what had occurred. Had there been any “Christians” to rescue from the Mahdi, doubtless Gordon’s paramount duty would have exhibited itself in some action. Nor is there any evidence that the Mahdi’s “fanatical fury” was in any single instance especially directed against the “Christians,” but there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. With the exception of putting Slatin in chains, when he believed that he was playing him false, I know of no case of wanton cruelty practised by the Mahdi towards the “Christians,” and I am not sure whether “clemency” would not be the proper word to use in Slatin’s case, when it is remembered what happens to prisoners of war who break their parole, for Slatin and the others had sworn the oath of allegiance.

Extract No. 3, apart from the extraordinary censure on Gordon for feeding the families of his enemies, and being moved to pity at the sight of the tears of starving women, calls for a more detailed reply to the criticism. Gordon, according to “Ten Years’ Captivity,” ought to have turned these women out of the town to be at the tender mercies of the “wild fanatical savages” and been responsible for the rehearsal under his own eyes of the hunt for lust which followed on the fall of Khartoum. Father Ohrwalder can never have heard of England’s proud roll of heroes who on land and sea have given their lives to save those of helpless women and children. In feeding these women—even had all been the wives of his enemies, which they were not—Gordon committed |316| no graver military crime than did the commander of the troops on board the _Birkenhead_, when, instead of seeing first to the safety of the soldiers for whose lives he was responsible, he placed the women and children in the boats which could have saved the troops, and called upon his men to present arms as the boats left the side of the ship—and to stand to attention as the vessel sank under them. So much for British principle, apart from Christ’s teachings, in peace and war; now for the facts in Gordon’s case.

When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, he found wandering—hungry and helpless—the thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers who a few months before constituted Hicks Pasha’s army. Throughout his journals you will discover constant reference to the food question, with accounts of his successful search for the _stolen_ biscuits, which had “enormously reduced” the supplies in the hands of the Government. Gordon had calculated that the relieving army would reach him at the beginning of November, so that we find him writing on the 2nd of that month that he has six weeks’ food supplies. In making this estimate he was allowing for full rations to the troops (who were also in receipt of the money with which to buy those rations), and the wants of the poor. On the 11th of that month he discovers nearly a million pounds of stolen biscuits. On the 21st he writes, “I do not believe one person has died of hunger during the months we have been shut up.” On December 14—that is a month after the latest date he had estimated for the arrival of the relief expedition, he |317| says that unless the troops come in ten days the town may fall, and this because he had on November 12 written, “Omdurman fort has one and a half months’ supply of food and water.” With the fall of this fort, he knew that the end would soon come.

But up to this date the soldiers, who were not entitled to rations since they received money for their purchase, were given full rations, and there is every reason to believe that the pinch only came when Omdurman fort fell on January 14 or 15, and the town was completely hemmed in. Food was short, no doubt, but, eight days before the fall of the town, Gordon could spare from the stores fifteen hundred pounds of biscuits to provision a boat for the Europeans. One should only be filled with amazement that Gordon held out so long after the date when he had expected relief, and it is not only ridiculous but monstrous to attack him, because he did not calculate that the expedition would only arrive _seventy-eight_ instead of seventy-six days late, when we know for certain that his troops were receiving full rations which they were not entitled to for at least a month after the date of the expected arrival of the expedition.

It is true that Gordon, seeing the food supplies giving out, recommended people to leave him and join the Mahdi, but this was only after more days had slipped away after the “ten days from December 14.” He had then abandoned all hope, and saw that his prophecy was to come true—the expedition would arrive just “too late.” In comparison with the number of widows whom Gordon had had to support |318| for ten months, without the slightest assistance or aid from outside, the number of wives of his “enemies” in the Mahdi’s camp was so insignificant as to be unworthy of notice. But even supposing that all the starving women who went to Gordon crying for the bread which Father Ohrwalder suggests should have been represented by a stone, were the wives of his enemies, his own writing justifies Gordon’s feeding of them, for he says, “These crafty people thus assured themselves that, should the Mahdi be victorious, their loyalty to him would ensure the safety of their families and property in Khartoum, while, on the other hand, should Gordon be victorious, then their wives and families would be able to mediate for them with the conquerors.”

It is quite evident, then, that these people who went over to the Mahdi’s camp did so, not from conviction of his divine mission, but to save the lives of their wives and families, whom by preference they entrusted to Gordon even at the last hour, and nearly a year after the date when his arrival without five hundred British bayonets is supposed to have ruined his reputation in the Soudan. I am inclined to think that the “craftiness” displayed by some in trying to secure their wives and daughters against violation and death, was no less justifiable than the “craftiness” displayed by others for an entirely different purpose. What a tribute these “crafty” people paid to Gordon! I mean the crafty people who left Khartoum in January, 1885, and trusted Gordon with the lives of their wives and children. |319| In discussing this food question with Khartoum survivors, I laid particular stress upon the feeding of the women and children, and I can do no better than give the summing-up of it in the words of a native survivor, after I had translated to him the criticisms I am replying to—“What! Would Gordon Pasha send away the hungry women and children of soldiers who had been killed fighting for the Government?”

I pass over extract No. 5 for the moment to refer to No. 6. The use of my portrait in advertising the book I am quoting from led most to believe that I approved of the criticisms it contained, and I have taken this opportunity of showing how thoroughly I disagree with them. To say that Slatin and others had offered, at the risk of their lives, to join Gordon is hardly correct, and if Gordon did not vouchsafe a written answer to the letters he received, he probably had good reason for not doing so, especially as it appears likely that some of Said Bey Gumaa’s letters addressed to the Governor-General before Gordon’s appointment had succeeded in getting through to Khartoum, and from these and deserters from the Mahdi, Gordon must have learned all.

Under pretence of intending to submit, Gumaa gained time, and tried to hurry up reinforcements, but this having been suspected, Zoghal ordered Slatin, Tandal, the President of the Civil Court, Aly Bey Ibrahim-el-Khabir, Slatin’s head-clerk Ahmad Riad, and a few others, to send in an ultimatum to Gumaa, |320| and await his reply. The reply travelled quickly; as soon as he read the letter, Gumaa opened fire upon the spot where Slatin and his companions were awaiting him. During the first siege of El Fasher, Gumaa must have accounted for at least fifteen thousand dervishes, and utterly defeated the army which retired to Walad Birra, from whence a party was sent off to Dara to bring up the ammunition which, as appears from Gordon’s Journal, was handed over to the Mahdists by Slatin when he surrendered the province. This occupied eleven days, and then the second siege was laid. The wells were filled up, thus depriving the garrison of water; but for seven or eight days they held out, dying of thirst, while the town was constantly bombarded with Government ammunition. Said Bey Gumaa has always protested that had it not been for the ammunition handed over by Slatin to the Mahdists he could have held out—and more.

The knowledge of these things must have influenced Gordon, especially when Slatin writes to him, through Consul Hansal, offering to place his services at his disposal, but only on condition that Gordon should guarantee never to surrender, for, if he did, Slatin would be maltreated by the Mahdists when they laid hands upon him. Gordon was the best judge as to the value of services offered under such conditions. For “moral and political reasons,” Gordon considered it unadvisable to have anything whatever to do with what he called “apostate” Europeans in the Mahdi’s camp, but appreciating the enormous responsibility |321| thrown upon his shoulders, he appealed to the Ulema for their advice, as these apostates were now their co-religionists, and they decided to have nothing whatever to do with their “proposals of treachery,” as no good could come of it. Matters were made still worse by Slatin writing to Gordon asking him to be a party to proceedings very foreign indeed to Gordon’s nature at all events. Slatin’s request to Gordon was to write to him personally one letter in French, and another letter in Arabic, “asking him to obtain permission from his Master to come to Omdurman and discuss with him the conditions of his (Gordon’s) surrender,” which letter he could use in order to obtain permission to come to Omdurman. If Gordon had written that Arabic letter. . . .

If all these facts were not known to Father Ohrwalder before 1892, six years is quite long enough time to have learned them, and now I have no hesitation in saying that to assert that Gordon brought about his downfall by refusing the services of people willing to risk their lives in reaching him is, to put it charitably, pure fiction.

Irrespective of the opinions expressed in the first four extracts given, extract No. 5 makes out a very good case for the Sirdar to write in large letters at the Soudan Frontier, “No Missionaries Admitted,” for Father Ohrwalder proves conclusively that they can do no good. Honestly I believe that for many years to come the only religious teachers allowed to penetrate into the Soudan should be enlightened exponents of the Quoran. Consider that for sixteen years the |322| Soudan has been in the throes—is still in the throes of one of the greatest religious upheavals known. While this revival of Islam has been in progress in the Soudan proper, the converts at Uganda and elsewhere have been snicking each other’s throats to evidence their zeal for the rival Christian creeds. In the Soudan, missionaries have openly avowed to thousands their acceptance of the “true faith”—Islam, the very religion from which they had gone out to convert the Blacks. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying myself that for some time to come religious revivalism in the Soudan will, if permitted to take place, very soon spell REBELLION. Time must be given for the bad (?) effect produced on the native mind by the conversion of the Soudan missionaries to die out, and goodness knows the poor country requires a rest. If missionaries must be sent, then let them be honest traders, the best missionaries for savage countries. When the Soudan has again been opened up, and the natives have become a little more civilized through their contact with trade, and so Europeanized that their simple faith, “There is one God, and He is God,” is not sufficient for them, but they must needs snarl and fight over creeds, then and only then remove the “No Admittance” signboard.

I trust that no religious body or society of earnest Christians will think from the foregoing that I am either sneering or scoffing at religion, or that their disinterested efforts to spread the gospel of peace to the remotest ends of the earth have not my sincerest sympathy. I have spoken plainly and to the point, |323| for I consider that the occasion calls for it. The missionaries required in the Soudan now are clean-minded, honest traders, who will do more for you by a few years’ preparing the ground for “talking” missionaries than the missionaries can do in a score of years of preaching. It is men like Gordon who, though not preaching religion, yet practise it in their every act, whom the Soudan requires. Ask any one in the Soudan what is his opinion about Gordon, and he will reply, “Gordon was not a Christian; he was a true Muslim; no Christian could be so good and just as he was,” and I believe that this saying, or estimate of him, emanated from the Mahdi himself. I draw your particular attention to the word “just,” which proves that, in the eyes of the Mahdists and Soudanese alike, his justice ranked with his goodness. If any Soudanese or Mahdist ridiculed to Father Ohrwalder Gordon’s generosity, and considered it a sign of weakness, it must have been done for a purpose. During my twelve years amongst all shades of people of the Soudan, I never heard a single word against Gordon, nor did I hear one until I came amongst his own flesh and blood. I cannot do better than relate another example of the esteem he was held in, and this example is from a Christian source.

My friend Nahoum Abbajee, when he reached Cairo, prepared a petition which he had intended forwarding to her Majesty the Queen, asking that the British Government should restore part of the fortune accumulated by him during his twenty-three years’ residence in the Soudan. His argument was that, trusting to |324| Gordon, he had delayed in Khartoum until Stewart’s departure was arranged for, when, acting on the advice of Gordon, he sold off his goods, realizing but half their value, accepted Gordon Bonds in payment, bought a boat, as no one then would hire one out, set off with Stewart, and was captured by the dervishes. This would not have happened, had not the commander of the gunboat disobeyed Gordon’s orders by steaming off to Khartoum, instead of bombarding Berber for three days, and Gordon was consequently responsible for the delinquencies of his subordinate.

On being asked what his personal impressions of Gordon were, he said that his thoughtfulness for every one, his goodness, justice, and innumerable virtues would take years to relate; and then when he was told that his claim could only be sustained on his proving that Gordon was to blame for the loss of Stewart’s party, ill as he was, he rose from his couch, tore up the petition, and, with his hand raised, prayed Heaven that if the bit of bread to save him from starvation should be purchased with money obtained through laying a fault upon Gordon, it might choke him. One had to witness the scene really to appreciate it. Ruined, broken down in health, too old to make a new start in life, his eyes lost their dulness and glistened as he breathed his prayer and fell back on his couch exhausted with the effort. Nahoum, I am afraid, will have joined Gordon by the time this appears in print.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

HASSAN BEY HASSANEIN

When Gordon heard of the murder of Colonel Stewart and his companions, he held a sort of court-martial on himself, and, after reviewing all the arrangements which he had made for their safety, he came to the conclusion that Stewart must have been invited on shore and murdered. Then, as if endowed with second sight, he almost exactly described what actually happened. The _Abbas_, drawing less than two feet of water, ought not to have stranded, as it was High Nile. Treachery on the part of the crew he had guarded against by sending a bodyguard of highly paid Greeks. The cutting adrift of their boats just after passing Berber contributed to the catastrophe, for had they been with the steamer at the time she struck, it is hardly likely that the inhabitants of the village would have planned the treachery they did. As interpreter to the party, Gordon gave them the man he could least spare, and one in whom he had every confidence—Hassan Bey Hassanein. Gordon himself writes, “thus the question of treachery was duly weighed by me and guarded against,” yet, in “Ten Years’ Captivity,” we find the contrary stated. “It is said that the interpreter, Hassan, arranged the betrayal.” Moreover, to clinch the matter, and to show that Gordon had selected a traitor in the very man whom the |326| lives of the party might depend upon, it is added, “And I was afterwards told that, when he got into difficulties later, he sent a petition to Mohammad-el-Kheir, in which he said that he was entitled to reward for having secured Colonel Stewart’s death. He is still living in Omdurman.”

Hassan Bey Hassanein has lived to come back to Egypt and bear witness to the goodness and virtues of the heroic defender of Khartoum. The only bit of treachery Hassan Bey acknowledges is that—with his fellow-clerk, Sirri—he cut the Khaleefa’s telegraph and telephone communications as the troops were advancing, to prevent communication between Omdurman and Khartoum and the outpost at Khor Shambat. It was Hassan Bey who ran out of the telegraph-hut as the gunboats advanced and attempted to get on board in order to warn them of the mines. He succeeded in attracting attention, and barely got off with his life, for his shouts in English were drowned by the report of the rifles as the men “potted” at his dervish dress.

Hassan Bey Hassanein, speaking English, French, and Arabic, was sent to Khartoum in July, 1883, for telegraphic work. When Gordon arrived, in 1884, he wrote an official letter detailing him for his special service. Orders were given that he was to have access to him at all hours of the day and night. It was Hassan Bey who used to mark the words Gordon required to use at a forthcoming interview, in his Arabic dictionary. Before giving his version of the murder of Stewart’s party, a few words concerning him and his relations with Gordon will prove that, in selecting him as interpreter to the party, Gordon “well-guarded against treachery.”

One of Hassan Bey’s first missions after the arrival of Gordon was to seek out the widow of Bussati Bey; for, on arrival at Berber, he had telegraphed to Bussati Bey, not knowing that he had been killed with Hicks. Having found the widow and her children in dire straits, he returned with one of the children to Gordon, and then took the child back carrying a handkerchief containing a hundred pounds. “Bis |327| dat qui cito dat” was certainly Gordon’s motto in Khartoum, from the hundreds of tales which I have heard. On handing the money to the widow, she brought out her husband’s uniform and sword, and, handing them to Hassan Bey, said, “As you take the place of my husband at Gordon’s side, then take his sword and uniform.” Hassan Bey took it to Gordon, who asked what it was worth, and being told “perhaps ten pounds,” sent twenty pounds to the widow to make sure, and told Hassan Bey to keep the uniform, as it might yet come in useful.

Later on, when Hassan Bey, who was then but “effendi,” had had a particularly hard spell of night and day work, Gordon asked him which he would prefer—an increase of pay or a rank. Hassan Bey left the matter to Gordon, and he gave him both, writing the “firman” himself. On the Friday following, Hassan Bey presented himself to Gordon in Bussati’s uniform—for uniform was worn on Fridays and feast days. Gordon was evidently much amused at his interpreter and telegraph-clerk appearing in the uniform of a lieut.-colonel, although the rank he had bestowed upon him was nothing more nor less. Telling Hassan Bey that such a uniform did not look well without a decoration, he pinned on to his right breast one of the decorations he had had struck to commemorate the siege of Khartoum, and Hassanein walked off a proud man to delight the eyes of his wife, then nearing her confinement. Fifteen days before the departure of the _Abbas_, he presented himself to Gordon, and told him that he was the father of a boy. “No, I am the father,” replied Gordon, and, knowing Hassan Bey’s house, he hurried off at a quick walk, which Hassan Bey had to run to keep up with. Pushing his way through the women assembled in the outer room, he tapped gently on the door where mother and child were lying, and asked, “Mary, tyeeb-tyeeb?” (“Is all well?”) and then, as the child’s “father,” he insisted upon entering, took the child in his arms, crooned to it, kissed it, and then hurried off and wrote a note to the Finance Office to pay a hundred pounds _from his salary_ “to his boy.” Mother and child were to meet with a tragic death. |328|

Two days before the departure of the _Abbas_, Gordon told Hassan Bey that he had selected him to accompany Colonel Stewart as interpreter. He was to accompany the party as far as Dongola, at all events, but there was the possibility of Stewart requiring him as far as Cairo, therefore his wife collected a number of presents for her relatives in Cairo, which Hassan Bey was to present in uniform and decorations, so that all should understand how highly she had married. I must now, having given an idea of the relations existing between Gordon and the man who “betrayed” Colonel Stewart, and who had left with Gordon his wife and fifteen-day-old boy, give his account of what actually occurred. I purposely leave out all the incidents of the voyage until the boats reach the island opposite the village of El Salamanieh.

A discussion arose between the two Reises (pilots) as the island was neared, as to what course to take; the river was running strong, and between the island and mainland resembled a mill race. One reis contended for the left bank and the other for the right. Stewart, who spoke Turkish and Arabic, asked what was the matter, and decided that judgment was to rest with the oldest of the reises, and he selected the right bank. Instead of coming through the race stern first, it was decided to put on full steam and “shoot” what might be called the rapids. While the decision was being given, the steamer had come end on with the island, and when full steam ahead was signalled, she steamed ahead at an angle of about seventy-five degrees to the southern spit, and before reaching the race proper, struck—swung round, and struck again. Colonel Stewart took down his revolver, and threatened to shoot both reises, upon which they dived overboard and swam to the right bank of the Nile, but thirty or forty yards distant. Colonel Stewart did not fire at them as they swam off. This occurred about an hour before mid-day.

About an hour later, the two reises—Mohammad el Dongolawi and Ali el Bishtili—returned to the vessel, said they had spoken to the people of the village, who had declared they acknowledged the authority of Mustapha Pasha Yawer, the |329| Mudir of Dongola; they at the same time begged that Stewart would not molest them in any way, and they would provide camels to take the whole party to Dongola. Colonel Stewart spiked the cannon, and threw it overboard along with the ammunition. He then ordered Hassan Bey, with one of Gordon’s cavasses, and the clerk Mahmoud Ghorab, to go on shore and interview the people. At first they demurred, as, being Egyptians, they felt sure they would be murdered, and asked that the small boat should be sent as far as a village near Derawi, where it was certain “friends” would be met with. Colonel Stewart, after first threatening to throw them into the river, took his revolver again and threatened to shoot all three if they did not obey instantly. They obeyed, and went on shore to meet the men awaiting them—a blind man named Osman, and two men of the Wadi Kamr tribe. On reaching the reception-room of the Sheikh-el-Belad (headman of the village), a copy of the Quoran was produced, and upon this Osman and his companions swore loyalty to the Government. Osman remained behind while the other two accompanied Hassan Bey and the others to the island where Stewart’s party had then landed. Here again the oath of allegiance to the Government was taken, and the men left, promising to send for camels to be ready on the following morning.

At about ten o’clock the next day they returned, and suggested that all should come to the right bank and pack up their effects, to be ready for the camels when they arrived. About two hours after mid-day, while all were either seated on the bank or fastening up their effects, a man came, said that the Sheikh-el-Belad had arrived, and invited the “Pasha” and the Consuls to his house. Colonel Stewart ordered Hassan Bey to accompany him as interpreter. On reaching the reception-room, they found about forty or fifty people assembled to receive them. The Sheikh-el-Belad was seated in the centre of the room on the left. Two angareebs were placed at each side of the doorway: Stewart and Power seated themselves on the |330| angareeb on the right, and Hassan Bey and Herbin on the angareeb to the left. Some minutes were taken up in the usual salutations, and before they had time to speak about the journey, the natives rose, and, saying the camels were approaching, left the room, only to rush back a few minutes later shouting, “Salaamoo tisslaamoo ya kaffarah” (“Become Muslims, you infidels, and you will be spared”); but at the same moment Herbin had his head smashed in with an axe, and Hassan Bey was stabbed in the right arm with a crease knife, and, as he was falling, received a large spear wound in the left leg. He fell unconscious, and did not see how Stewart and Power were killed. While the bodies were being dragged out of the room, some time after sunset, Hassan Bey was found to be still alive; it was proposed to kill him, but the brother of the Sheikh-el-Belad, he heard afterwards, pleaded for him, as his “stomach felt sick.”

After the murder of Stewart and the others, the party made their way to the river, and a long fight ensued between them and the crew of the vessel, the latter being killed to a man. Hassan Bey was given some engine-oil from the steamer with which to dress his wounds, and, when he recovered, was sent to attend the flocks of the tribe. About fifty to sixty days later, he was sent to Berber on the orders of Mohammad-el-Kheir, and there imprisoned for four months, and, on the death of the Mahdi, was, with other prisoners, sent to Omdurman, to take the oath of allegiance to Khaleefa Abdullahi.

In 1889–90 he was sent to Kassala, and, on the breaking out of the famine, he, with his wife and child, and many others, made up a party to return to Omdurman. Hassan Bey’s group consisted of his family, a man named Ismail, with his wife and daughter, and a man with two women. They ran short of water, and, leaving the others, who were worn out, to rest under some shrubs, Hassan Bey and Ismail set off in search of water. In about four hours’ time they reached some pools near the Atbara, and filling their water-skins, set off to rejoin |331| their families. On reaching the spot, they found that they had been devoured by lions; the heads of Hassan’s wife and boy—then between six and seven years of age—and the heads of Ismail’s wife and daughter were all that remained. No trace was left of the heads of the man and the other two women, and it is surmised that they must have escaped, for the lion never eats the head of its victim. Half mad, the two wandered on, living on roots and leaves, until, on reaching the village of El-Mughetta, on the banks of the Atbara, they were taken prisoners and made slaves. Ismail had to work at the ferry, but Hassan Bey, being weak and ill, was allowed to wander about until, meeting with a caravan bound for Geddaref, he joined it, and then made his way to Omdurman, being employed, first, as clerk under Abdallah Sulieman, the head of the cartridge-factory, and then transferred to the telegraph service.

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APPENDIX II

ORPHALI

The account which I have given of how Gordon died differs so very little in essentials from the account which I have since received from Khaleel Agha Orphali, and which has been read to Khartoum survivors with the idea of comparing the statements made with what was related at the time, that I think it advisable to allow my account to stand, and to append that of Orphali, giving a few details concerning Orphali himself. I might mention that Gordon was credited with having killed a much greater number of dervishes than I have given, but the error arose from his being credited with the killing of the dervishes on the “Gouvernorat” (E) staircase; but these were killed by the guards. The fact of his having killed so many as he did, is to be accounted for in two ways; first, the people who first assailed him on the private staircase were unaccustomed to the use of the small spears they carried—indeed, it is safe to say that they had only been dervishes outwardly for half an hour or so; and, secondly, as they were packed on a narrow staircase, every shot told on the mass. To assist the reader in following Orphali’s narrative, I have drawn from memory a rough plan of the palace as I remembered it while it stood intact, and, with the assistance of Fauzi Pasha and others, have been able to name each of the rooms.

Khaleel Agha Orphali joined the army for service in the Soudan in the Coptic year 1591 (1873–74). After taking part in a number of engagements, he was promoted to the rank of Bulok Bashi (commander of twenty-five men), and when |333| Gordon reached Kulkul, in 1878–79, Orphali and his men had been without pay for months. They presented themselves to Gordon and clamoured for their pay; he recommended them to go to Khartoum for it, upon which they became abusive, and Gordon drew his revolver. Orphali followed suit, but neither fired. Gordon quietly ordered the cavasses to remove their chief in custody, which they did. Shortly afterwards, Gordon sent for Orphali, told him he was a “man,” gave him a present of money, and offered him the post of cavass to himself, which Orphali at once accepted, accompanying Gordon to Khartoum, and remaining with him until he left.

On Gordon’s return, in 1884, he found Orphali then in Khartoum, and made him his chief cavass. Orphali is one of those men who know but one master, and believe that master to be the ruler of the universe. He, therefore, was no great favourite with some in the administration, as, during the siege, he was never away from Gordon’s side, and his cavasses were allowed to do nothing but keep their arms clean, and be ready to surround Gordon in case of trouble. They were strictly forbidden to leave their posts to carry coffee, bread, run messages, or perform all the other little services which they had been accustomed to perform for the katibs (clerks). Orphali’s ideas as to the duty of his cavasses were the cause of constant bickerings, which came to a climax about twenty days before the fall of Khartoum, when he espied one of them carrying an ink-bottle behind Geriagis Bey—the head-clerk, who succeeded Rouchdi Bey. This was too much for Orphali. Grasping the brass inkstand, he drove it with all his force against Geriagis’ chest, and this assault Gordon could not pass over. Orphali was in disgrace for eight days, and “confined to barracks,” that is to say, the palace precincts, but he slept at Gordon’s door as usual. Twelve days before the fall, he was re-instated in favour, and never again left Gordon’s side for a moment.

Orphali—as Gordon is not alive to speak for him, and as so many knew from Gordon himself of his threat to shoot him many years before—has been afraid, since his return, to talk |334| about his relations with Gordon, and was not a little surprised when I assured him that, if he appeared in “Londra,” he need have nothing to be afraid of from the English people. Having introduced the man, I now give his description of the night of the 25th January, keeping as much as possible to his own words, and only, to give a complete account, mentioning the incidents occurring in other parts of the palace while Gordon and he fought the upper floor:―

His excellency was not an early sleeper, and on the night the dervishes entered Khartoum he was in his room. At eight o’clock, Consul Hansall, Consul Leontides and the Doctor, Abou Naddara (he of the spectacles), came to see him, and remained until midnight. After their departure, he did not go to sleep, but sat reading and writing letters, and sometimes pacing the room. At one o’clock in the morning, he sent me to the telegraph-office to inquire about the enemy’s movements, as he had received confirmed news of the intended attack, and his excellency had issued general orders to the soldiers and employés to be on guard to attack and withstand the dervishes. Ali Effendi Riza, Mohammad Effendi Fauzi, and Youssef Effendi Esmatt were on duty, also the messenger Mohammad Omar. They reported all was quiet, and this news I gave his excellency. Half an hour later, perhaps, firing was heard from the land side (_i.e._ to the south); I was sent to seek information. Bakhit Bey, from Buri, telegraphed that a few dervishes had attacked, but had been driven off, and when I told his excellency, he prepared to sleep, and gave me the customary order to bolt his door, and this I did. Then I closed the door of the terrace (I, plan), then the door of the Gouvernorat (H), near Rouchdi Bey’s room, and returning along the corridor leading to the private apartments, closed the door in the middle (B), and then went down the private staircase (D), gave the usual orders to the guards, and returned to my sleeping place opposite the pasha’s room (K), after I had told the telegraph-clerks to bring information as soon as any news came from the lines. About three o’clock, Mohammad Omar, the messenger, with Cavass Ali |335| Agha Gadri, roused me and said that an attack was being made at Kabakat (boats) on the White Nile. I informed the Pasha, who told me to run to the telegraph-office for more news, and there I met Hassan Bey Bahnassawi, who was on duty, and we heard that an attack had been made, but had been repulsed.[13] On informing the Pasha, he told me to close the door of his room again, which I did, and sat down to make coffee. Then we heard more firing from the White Nile, and the cavasses, having run to the terrace, called to me that the dervishes were coming into the town. I ran down to Buluk Bashi Ibrahim El Nahass, who had twenty-four men; fifteen we placed at the windows (rooms on right ground-plan), and nine on the terrace overlooking the garden (G). There were also twenty-four cavasses and ferrashes; thirteen were placed at the windows (left of ground-plan) under my second, Niman Agha, eight on the terrace (F), and three at the door of the palace (B). Each man had ten dozen cartridges, besides which, each party had a spare case of ammunition. All these arrangements did not take five minutes, as each knew his place. I then ran up to the Governor-General’s room, and informed him of the arrangements. The day had now come (dawned). The dervishes who ran to the front of the palace were killed by the fire from the steamer. About seventy were killed in the garden by the soldiers firing on them from the terrace, and then we saw the dervishes coming over the rukooba (vine-trellis A), and they were met with the fire from the windows and terraces. They came in great numbers very quickly. Some ran to the entrance (B), killed the guards and opened the door; then they all ran to the Gouvernorat door and killed the telegraph-clerks, all except Esmatt, who hid among the sacks in the storeroom; they then went to the terrace (G) and killed the soldiers, and Nahass, seeing the massacre, jumped from the window. Four men were on guard at the private stairs, but when the |336| dervishes came back from the Gouvernorat door (E) they were soon killed, and some of the dervishes ran to the terrace (F), and killed the soldiers there; others came up the steps to the private apartment, and broke the door; Gordon Pasha met them with his sword in his right hand and his pistol (revolver) in his left, and killed of them two who fell at the door, and one who fell down the stairs,[14] and the others ran away. Then we heard the dervishes breaking the private door (B), while the Pasha was loading his revolver. I went forward and received a little wound in the face, and when the Pasha came, he received a wound in the left shoulder; the man who wounded him was a half-blood slave. We followed them to Rouchdi Bey’s room, killing three and wounding many, and the others ran away and fell down the stairs. We went back to the Pasha’s room and reloaded, but the dervishes came back, and I received a slight wound in my right leg from a sword, but I warded the blow, and the cut was nothing. We attacked the dervishes on the private stairs (D), and while we were passing the door a native of Khartoum, dressed as a dervish, stabbed the Pasha with a spear on the left shoulder; seeing this man’s hand coming from behind the door, I cut at it, and he ran and fell on a spear held by one of his companions on the steps, and was killed. At this time more dervishes were coming along the corridor (from H), and we returned to meet them; I received a thrust in the left hand, but the Pasha cut the man down with his sword, and kicked him on the head and he died; then the dervishes ran into the clerks’ offices (5, 6, 7, upper-floor plan), and while we were standing in the corridor, a tall negro fired a shot from the door (H) near Rouchdi Bey’s room, and the bullet struck the Pasha in the right breast, and the Pasha ran up and shot the man dead. The dervishes then came out of the offices, and we turned, and they ran to the private stairs, and we fired into them, but the Pasha was getting weak from loss of blood. We fought these dervishes down the stairs till we reached the last one, and a native of |337| Katimeh speared the Pasha in the right hip, but I shot him, and the Pasha fell down on the cavasses’ mat at the door, and he was dead, and as I turned to seek refuge in the finance-office (F plan), I was struck down and lost my senses, and I was lying down with the dead. In the afternoon, a man of El Katimeh—Abd-el-Rahman, whom I knew, helped me to go to the river for water, and I saw the body of the Pasha at the door (D), but the head was not there. I was helped to my house, and found my wife and children and property all missing. . . . I was taken by a friend and Abd-el-Rahman to El Dem-el-Darawish, and left on the plain all night, and in the morning I was taken before Wad en Nejoumi . . . and I was stripped to see if I had any money and papers, but I had not; and when I said that I was ignorant of any treasure, I was heavily beaten, though much wounded, and was very ill for seventeen days, and my wife found me.

[13] This is a literal translation. What Orphali intends to convey is, that on telegraphing to the lines, Bahnassawi Bey, who was on duty, was at his post, and replied to the inquiries sent by telegraph. The distance between the palace and Bahnassawi’s post was about two and a half miles.

[14] That is to say, fell dead or wounded.

* * * * *

All who were taken to see the steps where Gordon fell remarked upon the number and extent of the blood stains, for they could not believe that all had come from one body. These stains were shown to me in 1887. It has been stated on good authority that “Stains of blood marked the spot where this atrocity took place, and the steps from top to bottom for weeks bore the same sad traces.” Here is what I choose to consider not only a confirmation of Gordon having died fighting, but a confirmation of Orphali’s narrative, for there were only two people on the upper floor—Gordon and Orphali, and all the fighting must have been done by them. It is quite impossible that the steps “from top to bottom”—four flights-could have been stained as they were stained with large patches of blood left by a body which had been dragged downstairs some time after death. The steps _were_ stained with the blood of the dervishes through whom I have said Gordon shot and hacked his way in his heroic attempt to reach his troops.

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APPENDIX III

Translation of the letter which the Khaleefa dictated in reply to the letter given me by General Stephenson, in Cairo, before leaving for Kordofan.

“In the name of God the Most Merciful, and thanks to God the Omnipotent and Generous, with prayers on Mohammad our Lord and his descendants; Greeting.

“From the servant of his Lord Abdallah-el-Muslimani-el-Brussi (the Prussian), formerly named Karl Neufeld, to Stephenson the Englishman, at Cairo.

“We have to inform you that, in conformity with your letter, dated March 1, 1887, addressed to us, and recommending us to Sheikh Saleh Fadlallah-el-Kabashi with regard to your projects,

“We started from Halfa, with his men bearing the arms and ammunition and other things sent him by the Government.

“We proceeded on our course, and were constantly on guard on ourselves and our property, until we arrived at a well called Selima, from where we took the water supply, and continued our way to our destination.

“It was our fate to be met in the desert by six fakirs, followers of the Mahdi, who attacked us, so that we and Saleh’s men had to defend ourselves, our number being fifty-five men.

“The six fakirs were later reinforced by others, all of them being men of Abd-el-Rahman en Nejoumi. Thus there remained for us no way of escape, and in the space of half an hour we were defeated, many being killed, and the rest taken prisoners. The rifles, ammunition, and things destined for Saleh were seized, and I, my servant Elias, and my slave-girl, Hasseena, were among the prisoners, and |339| we were thus conducted to Abd-el-Rahman en Nejoumi, to Ordeh or Dongola.

“From this place we were sent to the Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, at Omdurman, to whom we were presented. We were certain that we were to be killed, taking into consideration our great crime against him.

“The Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, however, pitied our condition, and proposed to us to avow the Mohammedan faith. We accepted, and became Muslims by pronouncing the two declarations in his presence, and by publicly professing that there is no God but God, and that Mohammad is the Prophet of God, and I then added that I believed in God and his Prophet Mohammad, and in the Khaleefa of the Mahdi. We then asked him for his clemency and pardon, which was granted. He thereupon embraced me, and named me Abdallah. I was then accepted of the Mohammedan religion.

“It was on these conditions that the Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, pardoned me and spared my life, which was already forfeited.

“This was done to the honour and glory of the Mohammedan religion.

“We further inform you that although Dufa'Allah Hogal deceived us, notwithstanding his perfidy, we cannot sufficiently thank and reward him, as his treachery turned to our great benefit, and he has allowed us to enjoy great prosperity.

“Finally, we inform you confidentially that Saleh Fadlallah Salem has lost all his power and influence, and has taken refuge in the desert. This is the truth. I write this for your advice.

“The 17th Shaaban, 1304.”

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APPENDIX IV

IBRAHIM PASHA FAUZI-GORDON’S FAVOURITE OFFICER

When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, in 1874, Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi was then a second-lieutenant. Gordon had applied to the then Governor-General of the Soudan, Ismail Pasha Ayoub, for four companies of soldiers to accompany him to the Equatorial Provinces. Ayoub was not at all pleased at Gordon’s mission, as he took it as a slight upon his administration, so that when Gordon’s application for troops was received, Ayoub selected for the purpose his most worthless men, with the double object of getting rid of them, and making Gordon’s mission a failure. Fauzi, anxious to see some service, had volunteered to accompany Gordon, and, for doing so, Ayoub placed him under arrest. Gordon, hearing of the matter, sent to Ayoub demanding that the officer who had volunteered his services should be sent to him immediately. Fauzi was sent to Gordon’s head-quarters, when Gordon first asked him, “Are you the officer who volunteered your services?” following up the question, when Fauzi in reply said, “Yes, sir,” the only two words he then knew of English, by asking why he had done so. On learning that Fauzi wished to see service, he promised that his wish should be gratified. “But,” added Gordon, “I wish you to answer me as an officer—why did the Governor place you under arrest?” Fauzi gave the reason—Ayoub was afraid that |341| Gordon would discover, before departure, that he had been sent the worst troops. Sending back the four companies, he requisitioned four companies indicated by Fauzi, and, Fauzi being too young for a command, he appointed him commandant of his body-guard, and a sort of adjutant-major to the little force.

Fauzi accompanied Gordon to the Albert Nyanza, returned with him to Khartoum, was gazetted major in consideration of his services, and appointed Mudir (Governor) of Bohr, but given two months’ leave of absence before taking up his post. Gordon left for England, and Fauzi came to Cairo for his leave, on the expiration of which he set out for the Soudan, but, on reaching Berber, he found a telegram awaiting him from Gordon telling him not to go further than Khartoum, as he (Gordon) was returning as Governor-General. When Gordon reached Khartoum, it was to hear that Darfur was in revolt, and that the Bahr-el-Ghazal province was joining the rebels. A council of war was held, when Gordon asked the officers present to select one of themselves to head an expedition to the Bahr-el-Ghazal province, while he took another into Darfur; he had expected all of them to volunteer for the command, but they believed that such an expedition had more the elements of defeat and death in it than of glory and distinction. Told that they must name an officer, they named Fauzi, who was not present, and Gordon at once accepted him, sending him off with 4000 troops and the clerks for the civil administration. Fauzi succeeded in setting the province to rights without fighting, and while travelling about setting the administration right in the districts, he often met, and assisted with food and money, a holy man then living as a sort of hermit at Abba and the neighbourhood. The man’s name was Mohammed Ahmed—whom the world was to hear of six years later as the Mahdi.

Breaking down in health, Gordon ordered Fauzi to Khartoum, for rest, promoted him to the rank of full colonel, and named him Governor of Equatoria, in which province he spent about a year carrying out Gordon’s instructions to the |342| letter, and making a host of enemies amongst the officials whose peculations and interest in the slave-trade he put a stop to. He accompanied Gordon to Cairo in 1879, and when Gordon decided upon resigning, he asked Fauzi whether he would prefer to remain in Cairo or return to the Soudan. Fauzi saw that, without Gordon to back him up, his tenure of office would be but of short duration, unless he engaged himself in the maladministration of the provinces; he elected to remain in Cairo, where, at Gordon’s request, he was gazetted Colonel commanding the 1st Regiment of the 3rd Brigade. Gordon made it a point to be present at Fauzi’s first parade, congratulated him on the handling of his men, and bidding him farewell, gave him three hundred pounds as a souvenir of their days together in the Soudan. At the outbreak of the Arabist rebellion, Fauzi’s regiment, with others under the command of Kourschid Pasha, was ordered to Rosetta, and after the defeat of Arabi, at Tel-el-Kebir, he was, with other colonels, ordered to surrender to Sir Evelyn Wood at Kafr Dawar. Sent to Alexandria, he was tried, degraded, and then dismissed in disgrace.

Some days before the arrival of Gordon, in 1884, H. E. Nubar Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood sent for Fauzi, and told him to be in readiness to proceed to the Soudan, as Gordon had asked for his services. When Fauzi said that he had been dismissed, and was no longer on the army-list, Nubar Pasha replied, “General Gordon will see to the matter.” It had not been Gordon’s intention to call at Cairo, and Fauzi was to have gone to Suez or viâ the Nile, as Gordon might decide. However, Gordon was stopped at Port Said, and asked to come through Cairo; Fauzi went to the station to meet him, and Gordon, on alighting, went up to his old Soudan lieutenant, and asked how it was that he was not in uniform. Fauzi detailed his dismissal, upon which Gordon turned to Sir Evelyn Wood, and asked him how it was. It appears that when Gordon saw Fauzi’s name amongst the names of the colonels to be tried, he wired, or wrote—or both—to Sir Evelyn Wood, asking him to look after Colonel |343| Ibrahim Fauzi. General Wood did do so, but there was another Colonel Ibrahim Fauzi; and while Gordon’s Fauzi was dismissed in disgrace, the other Fauzi retired in glory and with a pension.

Gordon had some difficulty in seeing Fauzi reinstated, for his enemies were powerful; but, not to be thwarted, he took Fauzi direct to His Highness the Khedive, and carried his point. Two days later, Fauzi took his seat in the carriage with Gordon and Stewart, and left Bulac Dacroor station on that journey from which he only was to return alive, and that fourteen years later.

On the way to Khartoum, Gordon named Stewart sub-Governor-General of the Soudan, and Fauzi Director of Military and Marine, and, in communicating these appointments to Cairo, he wrote of Fauzi, “I especially recognize in Fauzi Bey the desired activity which he has displayed with me while previously in the Soudan; he has already given proof of his abilities, and I am more than ever satisfied with him.”

Soon after his arrival at Khartoum, Fauzi was entrusted with the clearing out of the rebels from Khor Shambat and Halfeyeh, and the restoring of the telegraphic communications which they had cut. Fauzi won his dual victory, and restored the line, but, in leading his men, he was hit in the right leg with a bullet fired from an elephant-gun, which split and shattered the bone. Owing to want of skill on the part of the Greek doctor, the broken bone was allowed to overlap, and a suppurating wound set in from the unextracted fragments, which kept Fauzi confined to his official residence for about six months, although he was able to transact the executive part of his duties. On the departure of Stewart, Gordon named Fauzi Governor of Khartoum and Commandant of Troops, calling a special parade for the occasion. Fauzi Pasha must be left to relate, at some future date, the incidents of the siege of Khartoum; I pass on to January 25, 1885.

About three o’clock in the afternoon, Gordon called Fauzi to the roof of the palace, to see the activity taking place in |344| the dervish camp. He had a large tripod telescope fixed on the roof immediately over his room.[15]

[15] It has been repeatedly stated that Gordon had a gun on the roof of the palace, with which he used to shell the dervish camp. In one account of the fall of Khartoum, it is averred that Gordon, in his sleeping suit, served this gun for an hour until it was rendered useless, as it could not be depressed sufficiently to bear upon the dervishes surrounding the palace. There never was a gun on the roof of the palace, for the roof would not have supported its dead weight, much less the shock of its recoil.

About 3.30, Fauzi, riding a donkey, accompanied Gordon on what proved to be his last visit to the lines. Most of the troops were lying down exhausted and hungry; as they saw Gordon approach, they wished to present arms, but he kept calling out to them, “Rest, rest; but keep your eyes open.” At sunset they regained the palace, and walked up and down for some time discussing the situation. As the dinner-hour approached, Gordon told Fauzi that he was sorry he could not invite him to dinner, as he had nothing to eat. Fauzi said he had, for himself and guards, the hearts of four date trees, and would send one to the palace, upon which Gordon ran in and brought out his dinner—also the heart of a date tree. This was the last Fauzi was to see of Gordon.

At midnight, Fauzi Pasha, as usual, went his rounds of the posts in the town, reaching his guards at about 2 a.m. While giving orders in the courtyard of his official residence, a sound as of shouts in the distance was heard. This was towards dawn. Fauzi went to the roof, and, through his binoculars, could faintly make out hand-to-hand fighting going on in the lines. Hurrying down, he drew up his men, and set off for the palace, being joined by ten Greeks who had been on duty. On coming in sight of the palace, they were met by two bands of dervishes, but succeeded in cutting their way through one, only to be met by a troop of dervish horse. The little party was forced back, fighting every step, and when close to his house all rushed inside, closed the doors, and commenced to fight through the windows, but for every shot they fired, a score came back in reply. The little garrison assembled in the courtyard for a last stand as the dervishes were then beating down the doors. Fortunately, the sight of other dervishes rushing past with loot drew the |345| besiegers off on a similar errand, and the party was able to hold its own against successive parties until the Mahdi sent word to stop the massacre. When Fauzi was taken before the Mahdi, he was asked, “Why is it that you, a good Muslim, have never written to me when every one else has done so, expressing their loyalty? Have you forgotten the days at Abba, and the instruction I gave you? If you have, I have not;” and, kissing him, the Mahdi told him to “go in peace.” The Mahdi was very wroth at the death of Gordon, for he really admired and respected him, and he had given strict orders that he was not to be harmed in any way.

As, during his captivity, Fauzi used to receive moneys from Cairo, he had, to explain his being able to live, to engage in some occupation, and took to lime-burning, a business which cost him more than he ever got out of it. As an Egyptian, he was under the surveillance of Youssef Mansour, who, after the escape of Slatin, refused to be responsible for Fauzi any longer. Failing to get him executed for having assisted in Slatin’s escape, he succeeded in getting him committed to the Saier, where he remained as a prisoner for four years, until released by the Sirdar.

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APPENDIX V

AHMED YOUSSEF KANDEEL

Ahmed Youssef Kandeel, though actually a civilian employé, held the rank in Khartoum, where he was born, of Lieutenant in the 3rd Soudan Artillery. He took part in many of the attacks on the dervishes during the siege, and fought with Bakhit Bey on the night the town was taken. He managed to fight his way to his house, and held out until the Mahdi’s orders came to stop the massacre of the inhabitants, when he gave himself up. His father, uncle, and brother had already been killed fighting. For some time he supported himself at Omdurman by cutting firewood, living in a state of semi-starvation. Being a good clerk, he offered his services to Wad Nejoumi, who, it appears, would employ no one but old Egyptian employés as “katibs” (clerks). He was with Wad Nejoumi when I was taken prisoner to Dongola, and throws an interesting light upon Nejoumi’s attitude towards Mahdieh, which more than confirms the impressions I had formed, and which I have given expression to in