Chapter 8

On the first point I still think I was right. He mentions some ideas of Russia ordering Diebitch across the Balkan, and even the Danube, of her giving up the Principalities, &c. In short he says all we know is that there is a peace--we do not know what it is--and it would be ridiculous to remonstrate against we know not what.

My draft was written before these reports were spread; and I only, from anxiety to have the despatch well written and soon, sketched what I thought would do.

As to the reports, I have told Aberdeen I cannot believe Russia has on a sudden ceased to be ambitious, or to use perfidy as a mode of accomplishing ambitious ends. She may give out she will make these changes--she may make some--but her object is to prevent all combination on the part of Austria, France, and England. If we do not remonstrate against what is signed, we shall lose all credit, if that which is executed should be comparatively favourable, and we shall incur great blame if no relaxation takes place. A remonstrance might be so worded as to do no harm to Turkey or to Europe, and to do good to us.

The Duke's other letter was on the Batta question, upon which he does not like contradiction, yet I think his course would lead to continued demands on the part of all the armies. I have told him I shall be in town to see the Chairs on Saturday, and will try to see him on Friday, and, if he wishes, bring the Chairs to him on Saturday.

_October 21._

Received a long confused letter from Fitzgerald upon my project of a draft to Lord Heytesbury. He was at Sudborn, [Footnote: Seat of Lord Hertford, in Suffolk] where the Duke was. The Duke was not so much inclined to think the Russians would make any considerable concessions as Aberdeen, but he thought, and had made Fitzgerald think, it would be premature to remonstrate. I have written to Fitzgerald and told him my opinion more at length than I told Aberdeen yesterday.

_October 23._

Cabinet room. Read the despatches from Petersburg and Paris. All the hints of the Emperor of Russia's intention of not retaining his army in Turkey come through Paris, Nesselrode having on September 29 spoken thus specifically to the Duke de Mortemart, and merely talked about taking less money and making some change in the guarantees to Lord Heytesbury. I did not see Aberdeen, who was engaged with the Spanish Minister.

I do not depart from my original idea that Russia does all this to gain time, and with as much perfidy as she has shown throughout.

Polignac would take a loyal view if he durst.

I cannot see the Duke till Monday, as he does not return to London till Sunday evening.

I saw Hardinge and had a long talk with him about Batta, &c.

_October 24._

Chairs at 11.

The Chairs say the Court have the matter entirely in their hands as to Batta. They wish to have the opinion of the Cabinet, and to be governed by that. I have written to the Duke to tell him so.

I am glad there is to be a Cabinet, because I think a Cabinet will take a more popular view of the question than the Duke, and, as I think, a juster view. I am for standing firm.

The Duke's letter on Persian affairs arrived while I was with the Chairs. I read it to them. The Duke suggests that McDonald should raise his escort in Persia--an excellent idea. He objects to Major Hart having an assignment of land. He thinks Willock may be recalled. The officers not; but if the prince will pay them, so much the better. I think the Duke may be right as to the assignments of land. Upon all the other points I entirely agree with him. Read last night a letter of Lushington's, or rather a minute, which shows he is determined to remain.

Cabinet room. Cunningham came in and showed me a draft of Aberdeen's to our Minister in Spain on the recognition by Spain of Don Miguel--finding excuses for Spain, and saying we cannot do it. What I saw was the _brouillon_ which had been sent to the Duke. It had his observations in pencil, and it seems Aberdeen sends all his proposed despatches to him and alters them at his suggestion. Certainly Aberdeen, left to himself, would be a very incautious writer.

_October 26._

Office early. Saw Captain Hanchett on the subject of the navigation of the Red Sea. He was there two years and a half. He says in going in you should make Aden and wait there for a wind. Water can be had there. Avoid Mocha, where the anchorage is dangerous and the water bad, and go to the Island of Cameran, then straight up in mid channel. All the dangers are visible, and in the mid channel there are none. Cosseir a good little harbour, the danger is going up to Suez; but that easy for a steamer. He worked with topgallant sails against the north-west monsoon. There is a breeze along shore at all times. The danger has been occasioned by the timid sailing of the Arabs, who always hug the shore, and anchor at night.

_October 27._

I omitted yesterday to mention that at the Foreign Office I saw some despatches just received from Sir R. Gordon. I think the date of the first was October 2. He had the day before at last got the Turks to ratify the treaty, but it seems there was a hitch, and until the ratification the officers did not set off to stop hostilities in Asia. A Pasha had advanced on Philippopoli and General Geismar on Sophia. Diebitch threatened to advance on Constantinople. However, the day after he wrote his threatening letter he must have received the ratifications. The Sultan is very anxious to get the Egyptian fleet to Constantinople, probably as a pledge for the allegiance of the Pasha, and to show his greatest vassal obeys him. The Turks say it is the moral effect of the presence of the fleet on their own subjects that they want, that they have no idea of not acting faithfully. Sir R. Gordon assures me they mean to preserve the peace and must.

He has written the representation the Turkish ambassador is to present to the Emperor. It would be a good remonstrance for us, but it is not a good one for the Turks. It is very well written, but it is quite European in its style, and the Russians will at once know, as I did, the author.

The Turks intended to send a splendid embassy to Petersburg, and Halil Pasha, once the slave of the Seraskier, now the Sultan's son-in-law, was to have been the ambassador. He is their least officer. However, Diebitch tells them they must not send it till they have the Emperor's consent. The Turks have ready the first 100,000 ducats, to get the Russians out of Adrianople.

I should say from these despatches that things do not look peaceful.

_October 28._

Had a letter yesterday from Mr. Elphinstone on Nazarre. It appears to be a fine on descents, &c., of Jaghire lands. I think his opinion will be different from Sir J. Malcolm's--the latter wishing to make the Jaghires hereditary, or rather to give a fee simple interest to the actual proprietor. Mr. Elphinstone, on the contrary, thinking they should be resumed on death without heirs.

_October 29._

Read a work just published by Colonel de Lacy Evans, on the practicability of a Russian invasion of India. The route would be first to China, across a desert from the shores of the Caspian--from China by water up the Oxus, to within 550 miles of Attock. The great difficulty is between the end of the river, and the southern side of the Hindoo Koosh. This difficulty, however, has been often surmounted, and the road is constantly travelled by caravans.

I think it is clear that the invasion of India could not be attempted till the third year; but when should we begin to take precautions? A Government wholly Asiatic would not be still if the Russians took possession of China; but ours, chained by European politics, would hardly move if they entered Cabul.

We ought to have full information as to Cabul, Bokhara, and China.

My letter of last year directed the attaining of information; but I dare say nothing has been done.

_October 30._

Received a Memorial from Mr. Fullerton, asking some remuneration beyond his salary for past services. He has a claim _if we were rich_. I think he should have 10,000 dollars. I dare say he thinks 20,000. Thoughtless extravagance is the destruction of generosity and even of justice.

Upon the subject of the invasion of India my idea is that the thing is not only practicable, but easy, unless we determine to act as an Asiatic Power. On the acquisition of Khiva by the Russians we should occupy Lahore and Cabul.[Footnote: It may be remembered that Lord Ellenborough strongly disapproved of any occupation of Afghanistan, or interference with its internal affairs, in 1840-42. At that time Russia had not advanced to Khiva. It is clear that he would not have held the same opinion as to our policy towards Afghanistan after the events of 1873-74.] It is not on the Indus that an enemy is to be met. If we do not meet him in Cabul, at the foot of the Hindoo Koosh, or in its passes, we had better remain in the Sutlege. If the Russians once occupy Cabul they may remain there with the Indus in their front, till they have organised insurrection in our rear, and completely equipped their army. I fear there are passes from Balkh upon Peshawur. If these could be closed and the enemy poured upon Cabul we should know where to meet him. Now we, being at Cabul, might be cut off from its resources by the descent of the enemy upon Peshawur.

There is some road from Roondorg through Cashmere, but I do not fear that. The road an enemy would choose would be that by the Valley of the Cachgu.

We know nothing of these passes, nothing of the country beyond them, nothing of the course of the Indus--but we should have full information so as to be able to crush an advancing enemy, by making the whole country hostile, which money would do.

To meet an invasion we must raise every regiment to 1,000 men.

168 Regiments 360 " ----- 1,008 504 ------ 60,480 Men, besides Artillery. 4,000 King's Inf. raised to 1,000 each Reg. 1,000 Do. four Regiments of Cavalry. 4,000 Four new Regiments. 2,000 Two new Cavalry. Besides King's Artillery. ------ 71,480

Besides the increase which would take place in the Irregular Corps, particularly in Skinner's.

A smaller increase than this would not be sufficient; for we should require 20,000 men at Delhi, 20,000 in Lahore, and 60,000 in Cabul. I speak of enrolled, not effectives--but with these augmentations the Regular Army would only be

148,000 N.I. 24,000 King's. ------- 172,000 20,000 Native Cavalry. 6,000 King's. ------- 198,000

The out provisional battalions, local corps, &c., of 198,000, I do not think above 100,000 could possibly be disposable, and there would not be 70,000 effectives. The Artillery must be very numerous. I omitted the Company's English Regiments, about 3,000 men.

Of all nations the Russians are the least adapted for an enterprise of this nature. They have neither medical staff nor commissariat, and the men are without resource. A French army would be the best. I doubt the possibility of Russia bringing more than 20,000 men to Cabul, and these could not descend the mountains till the third year, if Cabul was occupied. What I fear is an occupation of Khiva unknown to us. No preparation on our part-- no marching forward--so that in three or four months from leaving Khiva the enemy might be at Cabul. I am sure we can defeat the enterprise. We ought to defeat it before the enemy reaches the Indus. If 20,000 Russians should reach the Indus, it will be a sharp fight.

_November 1, 1829._

A letter from the Duke. He returned the papers I sent him. He has doubts as to the expediency of making the Commissary-General of Stores I proposed; but he seems to have supposed I wished to do away with the Military Board. I have explained what I meant.

He approves of my suggestions as to correspondence, but thinks every paper must be sent home, and the collections formed here. I have explained that I always intended every paper should be sent home, and I have told him that I had the opinion of the clerks I consulted that the collections might be framed in India, with a saving of time, and without diminishing the check on the local Governments.

_November 4._

Received from Aberdeen his draft of a remonstrance to Russia, which, it seems, must be sent at last. He has already shown it to the Duke and Peel.

There is no great substantive objection to it; but it is not very carefully written. I shall send it to him tomorrow with many proposed alterations. In the second box came Gaily [Footnote: H. Gaily Knight. Best known for his works on the Normans in Sicily, and Ecclesiastical Architecture in Italy.] Knight's letter to Aberdeen; which is a poor, flimsy production. A peacock's feather in the hilt of a Drawcansir's sword.

_November 5._

Altered, not only verbally, but substantially, Aberdeen's paper, and sent it to him.

Cabinet room. Read a Memorandum by Lord Heytesbury, of a conversation he has had with the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor expects the early downfall of the Porte--and a Revolution in France. Asks if another march to Paris would be possible? Lord Heytesbury saw Nesselrode afterwards and told him what the Emperor had said. Nesselrode said the Emperor always saw things _en noir_. He had a different opinion. He did not think the Porte in immediate danger, nor did he expect a French Revolution.

The other guarantees they talk of are further cessions in Asia, specifically Batoum, or the occupation of Varna, or Silistria, instead of the Principalities. The latter is worse, and the Turks will probably consent to neither. They do not value the Principalities, and they know Europe does.[Footnote: The Principalities, as commanding the lower course of the Danube, were all important to Austria especially. Thus, occupation by Russia, while it would have been felt as a menace to Central Europe, would have left Turkey a compact state beyond the Danube.]

_November 6._

Saw Aberdeen. He is always gloomy about _divisions_. He is afraid of an attack on Foreign Policy. He thinks the two parties will unite in that. He hears there has been some approximation between Lord Grey [Footnote: Lord Grey had been separated from the bulk of the Whig party since their junction with Canning in 1827.] and Lord Holland. At the same time it is said there is a notion of bringing in Lord Grey. I suspect this report to have been fabricated by the Ultra-Tories to annoy the King.

He thinks the Duke is annoyed, more particularly at the King's not treating him well, and at his Government not being well supported.

In fact, however, it is a Government which will not fall, for the King hates the Whigs; the people do not regard them. He may like the Tories, but he knows they cannot make a Government, and the Duke's Administration has four-fifths of the country.

Received a letter from the Duke, telling me he had settled Colonel McDonald's knighthood, and asking me if I should be ready to talk about India on the 13th. I said about Batta certainly; about India I had rather talk first to Lord Melville and him.

Wrote to the Duchess of Kent telling her a Bengal cavalry cadetship was at her disposal for the son of Colonel Harvey.

There is a very interesting letter from an English officer at Adrianople with respect to the state of the Russian army. It has suffered and suffers most dreadfully.

I told Aberdeen if I had seen the account of the conversation between Lord Heytesbury and the Emperor Nicholas before I read his proposed letter, I should have suggested that much stress should have been laid upon the effect the downfall of Turkey would have upon affairs in France.

Polignac seems confident he can stand. He thinks he has the Chambers. The French behave ill in the settlement of the Greek business, and object altogether to our man, Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg. They equally object to Prince Frederick of Orange, and to Prince Leopold, whom Russia would have had willingly. I wonder Aberdeen did not laugh when he was proposed. They want to settle the thing without a Prince. I suppose they want a Frenchman.

Aberdeen is for settling Greece as a Power into whose lap the broken parts of Turkey may fall. He gives up Euboea. That is, the surrender of Euboea is to be proposed to the Porte, with a frontier limited in other respects, instead of the protocol of March 22.

The Turks who have left the Morea have no indemnity. The Turks who are in the other parts of the new Greece remain. It is altogether a wonderful business. These anti-revolutionary States combining to revolutionise a rebellious province of an unoffending ally!

_November 11._

It seems the French do not like the idea of giving to the Turks the option of an independent State with smaller limits, or of a State under Suzeraineté with extended limits, contrary to the treaty, and sending at the same time secret instructions to the Ambassadors to insist upon the _entire_ independence of the new Greek State. The French seem likewise to have been offended at the protocol having been settled between Russia and us, before they were called in to give their opinion. No wonder. Certainly our diplomacy has not succeeded. We have failed in all our objects.

_November 13._

Cabinet. I was first called upon to say my say upon the general Indian question. I observed that the present prospective deficiency was one million a year. That until we could ascertain whether that deficiency could be diminished or done away with we were really not ourselves prepared to come to a decision upon the future government of India; nor would Parliament endure that the China trade should be closed upon the country for twenty years more without first inquiring whether it was necessary. The first question was, 'Can we make such a reduction of expenditure, or effect such an increase in income as to enable the Government of India to go on without any assistance direct or indirect from England?' If it can, then we have the China trade in our hands. If it cannot, we have to decide whether the necessary assistance shall be found by means of a continuance of the monopoly or in some other manner.

I stated the increase of two millions in six years in the civil charges of Bengal; that the Court had issued the strongest instructions, and the local Government seemed to have a real intention to curtail expenditure. That I had done something, and should do all I could, investigating every item. Peel suggested a commission. I said that had occurred to me last year. The Duke, however, objected to a commission as really superseding the Governor- General and being the Government. Another objection certainly is the delay. Difficulties would be thrown in its way, and we should at last be obliged to decide without its final report, having thrown away our time here in waiting for it.

I mentioned that the character of the local Government was 'disrespect and disobedience.' That nothing but a long continuance of strict rule could bring India into real subjection. It was this disobedience which was the chief source of increased expenditure. It arose in a great measure from the unequal hand which had been held over them--the indulgence of the Court of Directors--and the great delays in the communication with India arising out of the system of correspondence. I had endeavoured to remedy that, and hoped to get an answer to letters within the year. It was now two years and a half. I had likewise endeavoured to make arrangements for steam communication by the Red Sea. I hoped to be able to send a letter to Bombay in sixty days.

The Cabinet seemed generally to acquiesce in the expediency of only having a Committee this year.

At first they all seemed to think the continuance of the government in the Company a matter of course. I told them that even with the China trade the Government could not now go on without great reductions of expenditure, and that I hoped the Cabinet would not come to a hasty decision upon a question involving so many important political and financial considerations. The present system was not one of great expense, but it was one involving great delay--and delay was expense, and not only expense but abandonment of authority. It was in this point of view that I hoped the Cabinet would look at the question when it came before them.

I mean to go quietly to work; but I mean, if I can, to substitute the King's government for that of the Company. [Footnote: This was not carried out till 1858, after the great mutiny.] I am sure that in doing so I shall confer a great benefit upon India and effect the measure which is most likely to retain for England the possession of India.

We afterwards spoke of the Batta question. I read Lord Wellesley's letter, and stated the opinions of Sir J. Malcolm, Sir Archibald Campbell, and Sir J. Nicholls.

I stated that it seemed the feeling in the army was excited more by the apprehension of further reductions than by the establishment of the half- Batta stations; that if concessions were made to the Bengal army, the other armies would be discontented and further demands would be made.

The Duke said, as a soldier, and having been in India at the time, he must say he thought the orders of 1828 [Footnote: Orders issued by Lord William Bentinck, abolishing full batta or the larger scale of allowances to the military at stations where half-batta only had been recognised, before the Act of the Bengal Government allowing full batta in consideration of officers providing themselves with quarters.--See Thornton's _British India_, pp. 221-25.] a breach of faith--but these having been issued, he thought we must stand to them. The general opinion was that as nothing could be said or done till the arrival of despatches, there could be no necessity for deciding.

I mentioned my Supreme Court Bill, which will be ready immediately.

I hope to save--ultimately 60,000 pounds a year in the Supreme Courts.

£ £1,000 on each Judge..... 9,000 1 Judge at Calcutta...... 5,000 1 Judge at M. and B...... 8,000 Recorder's Court......... 8,000 Fees at Calcutta........ 30,000 ------ £60,000

Ireland is put off till Monday, that we may all read the papers. We dine with the Duke to-morrow.

The French oppose all the people we name for the Greek coronet. They have named Prince Charles of Bavaria, and the second son of the King of Bavaria with a regency till he is of age! However, this folly they did not press.

We first named Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg, whom the French would not hear of. Then Leopold! They did not like him. Prince Emilius of Hesse Darmstadt was thought of. The French have suggested Prince John of Saxony, second son of the King, a fine young man, about 28, but unknown. His elder brother too may soon succeed to the throne, and he has no children. Otherwise there is no objection to this Prince.

It seems to me they are running after trifles. Russia adheres to us as to the Prince, or rather remains neutral, thinking I have no doubt that France and England will quarrel about the feather.

The secret instruction which it was proposed to give to the Ambassadors is now abandoned, France having objected. They were to have been ordered to _insist_ upon Turkey taking one of two things of which she was to have ostensibly the pure option. Now they are only clearly to intimate their _wish_. However, it seems Russia will take a million of ducats less if Turkey will make Greece independent. That is, she will give up a claim to what she cannot get in order to effect that she has no right to ask.

The French Government have, by giving new rates of pension, got 1,600 old officers out of the army, and filled important stations with friends of their own. They think they shall stand.