CHAPTER XVII.

ADMINISTRATION OF LINCOLN (CONTINUED), 1861-1865.

WAR FOR THE UNION (CONTINUED), 1863.

The Military Situation in the West--Siege and Capture of Vicksburg--The Mississippi Opened--Battle of Chickamauga--"The Rock of Chickamauga"--The Battle Above the Clouds--Siege of Knoxville--General Hooker Appointed to the Command of the Army of the Potomac--His Plan of Campaign Against Richmond--Stonewall Jackson's Stampede of the Eleventh Corps--Critical Situation of the Union Army--Death of Jackson--Battle of Chancellorsville--Defeat of Hooker--The Second Confederate Invasion--Battle of Gettysburg--The Decisive Struggle of the War--Lee's Retreat--Subsequent Movements of Lee and Meade--Confederate Privateering--Destruction of the _Nashville_--Failure of the Attacks on Charleston--The Military Raids--Stuart's Narrow Escape--Stoneman's Raid--Morgan's Raid in Indiana and Ohio.

There were now such immense armies in the field and military operations were conducted on so vast a scale that the reader must carefully study the situation in order to gain an intelligent idea of the progress of the momentous events. We will give our attention first to operations in the West.

THE SITUATION IN THE WEST.

There were four Union armies in that section. The first was the one under Rosecrans, which, on the opening days of the year, won the victory at Murfreesboro' or Stone River, an account of which is given in the preceding chapter. The second was near Holly Springs, under General Grant; a third was in New Orleans, under General Banks, who had succeeded General Butler; and the fourth was in Arkansas. The main object of all these armies was to open the Mississippi. When that should be accomplished, the Confederacy would be split in two. Hundreds of thousands of beeves were drawn from Texas and the country beyond the Mississippi, and to shut off this supply would be one of the most effective blows that could be struck against the rebellion.

GRANT BEFORE VICKSBURG.

General Sherman had failed to capture Vicksburg, and General Grant assumed command of the forces besieging it. He saw that the defenses facing the Mississippi and the lower part of the Yazoo were too powerful to be taken by storm. He decided as a consequence to turn the rear of the lines, and, securing an entrance into the upper part of the Yazoo, reach the rear of the batteries at Haines' Bluff.

In this important work he received valuable help from the ironclads of Admiral Porter. With one of them he opened communication with the squadron in the lower part of the Mississippi and disabled a Confederate steamer under the guns of Vicksburg. Two of the boats groped their way through the swamps and wooded creeks, where nothing more than canoes and dugouts had ventured before, obtained a great deal of cotton and burned much more, disregarded the torpedoes and fought the rebels along the banks, explored new routes, and in the end both were captured by the enemy.

Several ingenious plans were tried to capture these formidable fortifications. One was an attempt to force a passage into the Upper Yazoo. Another was to open a new channel for the Mississippi. Both were failures, but the levees along the Yazoo were cut and many acres in the rear of Vicksburg overflowed, while a great deal of Arkansas and Louisiana was flooded. The object of all this was to shut off the supplies of Vicksburg. Admiral Farragut now strove to pass from the lower Mississippi by the Port Hudson batteries to Vicksburg. The effort was made on the night of March 14th, which was of inky darkness. The approach was discovered by the enemy, who kindled large bonfires on the bank which revealed the passing vessels. The latter opened on the batteries with great effect, but only two, including the flagship, were able to get past, the thirteen being forced to turn back. The _Mississippi_ ran aground and was set on fire and abandoned. With the two vessels in hand, Farragut blockaded the mouth of the Red River and gave valuable help to General Grant, but the land forces advancing from Baton Rouge to aid in the attack on Vicksburg turned back upon learning of the failure of Farragut's fleet to run past the batteries.

General Grant had set out to capture Vicksburg and nothing could turn him from his purpose. His aim was to sever the Confederate communications with the east by turning the defenses of the Yazoo and the Mississippi. General McClernand was sent in the latter part of March to occupy New Carthage to the south, while General Banks, by advancing from New Orleans, threatened Port Hudson in conjunction with the fleet lying near.

Banks' force was so large that the most the enemy could do was to delay his advance by burning bridges and obstructing the river. In the latter part of April, he established himself at Simmsport, near the junction of the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi. Admiral Porter, who was lying with his fleet above Vicksburg, now made the attempt to join Farragut below, and it proved one of the most exciting experiences of the war.

RUNNING THE BATTERIES.

Naturally a dark night--April 16th--was selected, and eight gunboats, three transports, and several barges loaded with supplies silently dropped down the river in the impenetrable mist, while the thousands of Union troops intently watched the hulls as they melted from sight in the gloom. The hope was general that they would be able to float past undiscovered, and, when an hour of intense stillness went by, the watchers and listeners began to breathe more freely, though their anxiety was only partly lifted.

Suddenly two crimson lines of fire flamed along the river front, and the earth trembled under the stupendous explosion. The ships had been detected, and the river was swept by a tempest of shot and shell that it seemed must shatter to fragments every one of the craft. It should be remembered that these batteries extended for a long distance along the shore, and they opened one after the other, as the ships came opposite. Thus the fleet became the target of battery after battery, and had a continuous and extended gantlet to run before reaching safety.

The gunboats returned the fire as they swept by, and many of their shots were effective, but in such a duel the advantage is always with the land batteries. One of the transports was disabled, and another, directly behind her, had to stop to avoid running into the injured craft. The crew of the former, finding themselves the centre of a terrific fire, launched the yawl, and, leaping into it, pulled for the shore. They had scarcely left their vessel when it was fired by a shell, and, aflame from stem to stern, it drifted down stream. Meanwhile, the transport that had grounded was towed out of danger. With this exception, the whole fleet got safely past, the loss being only one man killed and two wounded on Porter's flagship.

General Grant was greatly pleased with this success. A few nights later a second attempt was successful. He was thus enabled to send supplies to the army, with which he intended to attack Vicksburg on the south. Gradually shifting his own position, he reached a point opposite Grand Gulf, a short distance below the mouth of the Big Black River.

CAPTURE OF GRAND GULF.

Although Grand Gulf was strongly fortified its quick capture was a necessity. McClernand had been ordered several times to attack it, but he was so laggard that Grant himself undertook the task. It proved one of extreme difficulty, and he was obliged to make a change of plans, but he handled his troops with admirable skill and with such effect that the Confederate commander's position at Grand Gulf became untenable and he withdrew. Grant rode into town and found the place in the possession of Admiral Farragut.

The success was so brilliant that Pemberton, the Confederate general commanding the forces at Vicksburg, became alarmed and telegraphed to General Jo Johnston for reinforcements, but Johnston was too much occupied with Rosecrans in Tennessee to spare any of his men, and about all he could do was to send encouraging words to his subordinate.

GRANT'S FINE GENERALSHIP.

General Grant never displayed his great genius more strikingly than in the operations before Vicksburg. For days and nights he seemed scarcely to eat or sleep. He was here, there, and everywhere, and was familiar with all the minute details of his momentous enterprise. General Pemberton confessed in his reports that the amazing activity of Grant "embarrassed him."

Grand Gulf was made the base of operations, and, well aware that reinforcements would be hurried to the garrison, Grant hastened his movements. While pressing his attack he learned that Johnston was at Jackson with a strong force, with which to reinforce Pemberton. He immediately dispatched McPherson and Sherman thither, and, after a fierce fight, Jackson was captured. Grant learned from deserters that Johnston, the chief Confederate commander in that section, had sent peremptory orders to Pemberton to leave Vicksburg and attack him in the rear. The latter, with his usual promptness, met this danger, and, by decisively defeating the enemy at Champion Hill, he accomplished the splendid feat of keeping Johnston out of Vicksburg and Pemberton in. It was a great exploit, for Jo Johnston was one of the ablest generals of the war, and the fine campaign which he had planned was brought to naught. Not only was he kept out of Vicksburg, but it was made impossible for him to send any help to Pemberton, around whom the Union commander was drawing the coils more tightly each day.

Still the defenses of Vicksburg were too powerful to be captured by storm, and Grant did the only thing possible--he besieged the city. The siege began about the middle of May. The garrison had provisions for barely two months, from which they had to supply the inhabitants of the town. Jo Johnston saw the peril and set to work with such vigor to raise a force to send to the relief of Pemberton, that Grant was hurried into making an assault on the rebel works. This took place before daylight on the morning of May 19th. Though successful at first, the Federals were repulsed. A grand assault was undertaken three days later and pressed with the utmost bravery, but it resulted in another repulse, in which the loss of the assailants was three times greater than that of the defenders. Porter tried to help with his fleet, but his vessels were so badly injured by the batteries that they were compelled to withdraw from action.

This failure showed that it was useless to try to capture Vicksburg except through a regular siege, which was pressed henceforth without intermission. Shells were thrown into the doomed city night and day; the people lived in caves, on short rations, and underwent miseries and sufferings which it is hard to comprehend in these days. All the time Grant was edging closer and closer. Parallels and approaches were constructed; mines sunk and countermining done. Several attempts were made to relieve Vicksburg, but the bulldog-like grip of Grant could not be loosened, and the condition of the garrison became much like that of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781.

FALL OF VICKSBURG.

The defenders displayed the greatest bravery and endurance, and held out until the time came when it was apparent that it was a choice between surrender and starving to death. That man who prefers to starve rather than submit to a magnanimous foe is a fool. Pemberton had 21,000 troops under his command, but 6,000 were in the hospitals, while Grant had fully 60,000 soldiers waiting and eager to make the assault. On the 3d of July, a flag of truce was displayed in front of Vicksburg, and a message was sent to the Union commander, asking for an armistice with a view of arranging for the capitulation of Vicksburg. Grant's reply was his usual one, that the only terms he could accept were unconditional surrender, and he, therefore, declined to appoint commissioners.

The commanders then met between the lines, and Grant agreed that the garrison should be paroled and allowed to go to their homes, and that the city, stores, arms, and supplies should belong to the conquerors. Although the Union commander's terms "unconditional surrender" sounded harsh, they always proved of a generous nature. There was a good deal of criticism in the South of Pemberton for selecting the 4th of July for making his submission, since the Union people would be sure to make a greater ado over it. Pemberton's explanation was that he believed Grant would be more disposed to give him liberal terms on that date than on any other, and it would not be strange if he was partly right.

IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPTURE.

The capture of Vicksburg was one of the most important Union successes of the war. In his official report, Grant thus summarized the results of his campaign: "The defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of Mississippi; and the capture of Vicksburg, its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and hundreds, perhaps thousands, who can never be collected or reorganized. Arms and munitions of war for an army of 60,000 men have fallen into our hands, beside a large amount of other public property and much that was destroyed to prevent our capturing it."

Thus one of the great objects of the war was accomplished. The Mississippi was opened throughout its entire length and the Confederacy cut in twain. That President Davis felt the gravity of the blow (to which one still more decisive was added about the same time) was proven by his proclamation calling into service all persons in the Confederacy not legally exempt, who were between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. He also appointed the 21st of August as a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer.

Grant's magnificent success greatly increased his popularity in the North. His praises were in every one's mouth; he was declared to be the ablest military leader that had yet appeared, and more than one saw in him the coming saviour of the Union.

Perhaps it is slightly premature to say that the Mississippi was opened from the hour of the surrender of Vicksburg. Port Hudson held out, but its fall was a corollary of that of the more important city. It had stoutly resisted several attacks, but, realizing the hopelessness of his situation, the Confederate commander surrendered on the 9th of July, and the opening of the Mississippi was fully completed.

ROSECRANS' CAMPAIGN.

The reader will recall that the battle of Murfreesboro' took place at the very beginning of the year. Rosecrans, the Union commander, never repeated the brilliant skill he had shown in fighting Bragg on Stone River. He seemed to think that that repulse of the enemy was sufficient to last a good while, for he remained idle throughout the several months that followed. There were a number of brisk skirmishes and fights, but none was of importance. When June arrived without anything of account having been accomplished, the government suggested to Rosecrans that it was time he took steps to drive Bragg into Georgia and thus secure Eastern Tennessee, where the sentiment was strongly Union.

Rosecrans hesitated, but upon receiving a stronger intimation that he ought to be up and doing, he began a series of movements, in the latter part of June, which caused Bragg to withdraw to Chattanooga, where he intrenched himself. Burnside then advanced from Ohio into Eastern Tennessee, but was so delayed that Bragg was heavily reinforced from Virginia. To protect his communications, he fell back, however, upon the approach of the Federal army, which occupied Chattanooga.

Unaware of the increased strength of the enemy, Rosecrans divided his army into three columns, separated by wide spaces of mountains, and marched in loose order against his foe, observing which Bragg determined to overwhelm each of the columns in detail.

The first demonstration was against General George H. Thomas, who commanded the Federal left, and was encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain. That splendid officer eluded the enemy launched against him, and effected a junction with the other two corps.

At the same time the centre of the three columns was attacked, but the assault was repulsed, and the reunited Union army on the 18th of September stood on the western bank of the Chickamauga, which stream was well named, for the Indian word means "the river of death." The position was twelve miles from Chattanooga, and it was a perilous one, for, as has been stated, Bragg had been heavily reinforced, and Longstreet with a powerful column of veterans from Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was approaching. He, therefore, decided to make an attempt to recover Chattanooga.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

The Confederates crossed the Chickamauga, and, on the morning of the 19th, Rosecrans opened the battle by attacking the enemy's right wing. The entire armies were soon involved, and the fighting lasted until nightfall, with the result in favor of the Confederates. Although forced from several positions, they gained and held the road leading to Chattanooga, and the Union troops were driven almost to the base of Missionary Ridge.

Late that night, Longstreet arrived with his fire-seasoned veterans. He was one of Lee's best lieutenants, and it was arranged that the battle should be renewed the next morning at daybreak, with Longstreet commanding the left wing. From some cause, the Confederate attack was delayed until ten o'clock, the delay giving the Federals time to throw up a number of breastworks. Against these Bragg repeatedly charged with his right wing, but was repulsed each time.

Thomas, in command of the Union left, also repelled a sharp attack, but Longstreet routed Rosecrans, and, discerning a gap caused by the transfer of the Union centre to strengthen the left, Longstreet led his men impetuously into the opening, thus splitting the Union army in two. Striking in both directions, he threw the two divisions into such disorder and confusion that the frightened Rosecrans galloped in hot haste to Chattanooga to secure his supply train and the pontoon-bridges over the Tennessee. At the same time, he telegraphed the terrifying tidings to Washington that the whole Union army had been beaten.

"THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA."

At a crisis in the tremendous battle, General Hood, one of the Confederate leaders, was wounded, and a halt was made until another officer could be brought up to take his place. Short as was the delay, it gave the Unionists time to rally and strengthen their endangered points. Despite this advantage, the telegram of Rosecrans would have been verified and the magnificent army destroyed except for one man. He was George H. Thomas, the heroic commander of the Union left. Longstreet launched his veterans against him again and again, but he beat them back in every instance. Never did men fight more bravely than those Americans, arrayed against each other, and never was finer generalship displayed than by General Thomas, whose wonderful defense that day won for him the name by which he will always be remembered--"The Rock of Chickamauga."

Holding his heroes well in hand, Thomas was ready to renew the battle the next day, but Bragg did not molest him. The Confederates, however, had won a victory, for they drove the Federals from the field and retained possession of it. Thomas fell slowly back toward Chattanooga, presenting a firm front to the enemy.

Chickamauga ranks as one of the great battles of the war. The Union losses were: killed, 1,656; wounded, 9,749; missing, 4,774; total, 16,179. The Confederate losses were: killed, 2,268; wounded, 13,613; captured and missing, 1,090; total, 16,971.

SUPERSEDURE OF ROSECRANS BY THOMAS.

Rosecrans' conduct of this battle caused his supersedure by Thomas, while several division commanders were suspended, pending an inquiry into their course. President Davis removed General Leonidas Polk, who was thought to have shown hesitancy of action at critical points. Bragg, however, was the most blamable, for, with the advantage overwhelmingly in his favor, he refused to permit Longstreet to follow up his success. One of the peculiarities of the Confederate President was his strong likes and dislikes. He was a personal enemy of Jo Johnston, and more than once humiliated him, but he was also a friend of Bragg, and, in the face of indignant protests, retained him in chief command in the southwest.

As soon as the Union army reached Chattanooga intrenchments were thrown up. Bragg appeared before the town on the 23d, and, finding the position too strong to be carried by assault, he laid siege to it. The situation of the army became so dangerous that great uneasiness was felt in Washington, where the wise step was taken of sending General Grant thither, with his appointment to the command of the entire West. Abundant reinforcements were hurried to the imperiled point, the entire Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac forming the principal commands. The Federals became much the stronger, but Bragg did not abandon his siege of Chattanooga.

Recalling the advance of Burnside from the Ohio to the relief of Rosecrans, it should be stated that he did not arrive in time to take part in the battle of Chickamauga, but occupied Knoxville on the 9th of September. Bragg sent Longstreet with a strong force to attack Burnside, the Confederate commander thereby weakening his army, which could ill stand it. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the night of October 20th, and telegraphed Burnside to hold Knoxville at all hazards, while he gave his attention to Bragg.

Sherman came up with his troops November 15th, and a week later Grant had an army of 80,000 men on the ground, while the removal of Longstreet left Bragg with only 50,000. His line, twelve miles long, embraced two elevations commanding a view of Chattanooga Valley. Lookout Mountain was on the south, while Missionary Ridge on the east was not quite so high. The Confederate left wing rested on the former, and the right on Missionary Ridge, with the Chattanooga flowing between. Bragg was justified in considering his position impregnable.

THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS.

Grant, however, held a different opinion. On the night of the 23d the enemy's picket lines were forced back and an improved position secured. The following morning, Hooker, having already crossed the river, was ordered to attack the position on Lookout Mountain. His movements were hidden for a time by a dense fog, and it was his intention to stop as soon as the enemy's rifle-pits at the base were captured; but, when this was accomplished, the men were carried away by their enthusiasm, noting which Hooker ordered them to charge the Confederate position. Up the mountain the cheering, eager fellows swept with irresistible valor. The Stars and Stripes was planted on the crest and 2,000 of the fleeing Confederates were made prisoners. The fog still lay heavy in the valley below, a fact which has led to the battle being called the "Battle above the Clouds."

DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

The following morning was also foggy, but, when it lifted, Sherman's corps was seen advancing against the Confederate right, close to Chickamauga station. In the face of a heavy artillery fire the Federals pressed on, but at the end of an hour they were compelled to retreat. By order of Grant the attack was renewed, but another severe repulse followed. Next a general movement against the left centre was ordered, and this was successful. The enemy was driven in confusion toward Ringgold, to the southeast, while a large number of prisoners and a vast amount of supplies were captured.

General Hooker pursued and drove the Confederates out of Ringgold, but they assumed so strong a position at Taylor's Ridge that Grant ordered him not to attack, but to remain and hold Ringgold, Sherman, in the meantime, marching against Longstreet. Bragg had blundered so much in conducting this disastrous campaign that President Davis was forced to replace him with Hardee.

RAISING OF THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

Meanwhile, Longstreet was besieging Burnside at Knoxville, where the 15,000 Union troops were threatened with starvation. The town was invested November 17th, and the next day some of the outworks were carried. Well aware that Grant, after his defeat of Bragg, would hurry to the relief of Knoxville, Longstreet attacked on the 29th, but suffered a bloody repulse. He stubbornly held his ground until he learned that Sherman was close upon him, when he withdrew and started on his march to Virginia. The campaign soon ended in Tennessee, which was virtually recovered to the Union.

The reader will note that we have described the leading events in the West and Southwest from the opening of the year to its close. Once more it is necessary to return to January, 1863, in order to give a history of the most important campaign of all--that against Richmond, which was defended by the formidable Army of Northern Virginia, under the command of General Robert E. Lee.

BURNSIDE SUPERSEDED BY HOOKER.

Burnside's management of the attack on Fredericksburg in December, 1862, was so incompetent and disastrous that it was impossible for him to retain the chief command. Knowing that several of his generals had severely criticised him, Burnside sent a list of names to Washington, giving the government the choice of removing them or accepting his resignation. Prominent on Burnside's "black list" was the name of Hooker. On the 26th of January Burnside's resignation was accepted, and Hooker was made his successor.

The morale of the grand organization had been injured by its wretched leadership, but the material itself could not have been finer. Hooker set resolutely to work, and, by the 1st of May, the army was well trained and disciplined, and numbered 130,000 men, of whom fully 12,000 were cavalry. Lee had about half as many troops.

Knowing it would not do to remain idle when the beautiful spring weather came, Hooker had been carefully planning for another campaign against Richmond. He had won a fine reputation for himself as a fighter and skillful corps commander, and the hopes were high that he would lead his superb army directly into the rebel capital. Everything seemed to be in his favor, and the campaign opened promisingly.

THE NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND.

Hooker's plan was to assail Lee at two points. The Rappahannock and Rapidan were to be crossed a short distance west of Fredericksburg, and the left wing attacked. While this was going on, Hooker's own left wing was to occupy the heights and secure possession of the Richmond Railroad. The powerful Union cavalry were to ride around Lee's position and cut off his retreat to Richmond. This involved the destruction of the railroads and bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers.

This important movement was begun April 27th. The main portion of the corps of Meade, Howard, and Slocum, numbering 36,000 men, marched thirty miles up the Rappahannock and crossed the stream without resistance. A force then moved ten miles down the other side of the river, driving away several Confederate detachments, and opened the way for Couch with 12,000 men to cross and join the other three corps. Taking different routes, the 48,000 advanced toward Chancellorsville, which had been named as the rendezvous. They were soon followed by Sickles with 18,000 men.

It was not until the Union movement had progressed thus far that Lee read its purpose. He hastily called in his divisions, and, on the forenoon of May 1st, the Army of Northern Virginia was drawn up in battle-line in front of that dense-wooded district known as the Wilderness.

Exultingly confident, Hooker ordered an advance that day from near Chancellorsville toward Fredericksburg. Hardly had he started when he learned that Lee was moving against him; he, therefore, paused and threw up defenses. His aim was to flank Lee, and, to prevent it, the Confederate commander took desperate chances. Keeping up a rattling demonstration in front he sent Stonewall Jackson with 30,000 men around the right of the Union army. Had Hooker known of this daring movement, he could easily have crushed each division in detail.

STONEWALL JACKSON'S FLANK MOVEMENT.

Jackson carried out his programme with fearful completeness. Without his purpose being suspected, he traveled fifteen miles, reaching the road leading from Orange to Fredericksburg, on the southern side of the Rapidan. He was thus within two miles of General Howard's Eleventh Corps. The men were preparing supper with no thought of danger, when the air was suddenly split by thousands of "rebel yells," and the graybacks rushed out of the woods and swept everything before them. The whole Eleventh Corps broke into a wild panic, and ran for their lives toward Chancellorsville.

The German division especially, under the command of Carl Schurz, were irrestrainable in their terror.

The majority, however, stood their ground bravely, and their commanders put forth every effort to stop the wild stampede. A partial success was attained, and the artillery poured in a fire which checked the pursuit. Fortunately night was at hand, and the fighting soon ceased. The position of the Union army was critical in the extreme. It was squeezed in between Chancellorsville and the fork of the two rivers. What fate awaited it on the morrow?

At this juncture, the Confederate cause received the severest blow in its history. That remarkable man, Stonewall Jackson, was confident that the destruction of the Union army was at hand, and he was impatient for the morrow that he might complete the fearful work. In the dusk of early evening he rode forward, accompanied by several of his staff, to reconnoitre the Union position. Passing beyond the outer line of skirmishers, the party halted in the gloom and peered toward the Federal lines. Dimly discerned by a South Carolina regiment, they were mistaken for the enemy, and a volley was fired at them. One of the staff was killed and two wounded. Comprehending the blunder, Jackson wheeled and galloped into the woods, but before the shelter could be reached, the South Carolinians fired a second time.

Jackson was struck twice in the left arm and once in the right hand. His frightened horse whirled about and plunged away. A limb knocked off his hat and came near unseating him, but he managed to keep in the saddle and guide his steed into the road, where one of his staff helped him to the ground and supported him to the foot of a tree where he was laid down. He was suffering so keenly that he could not walk, and was carried on a litter to the rear. For a part of the way, all were exposed to such a hot artillery fire that they had to pause several times and lie down.

The wound grew so bad that the arm was amputated, but pneumonia followed, and Jackson died on Sunday, May 10th. His last words, uttered in his delirium, were: "Let us cross over the river and rest under the shadow of the trees."

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

The fighting at Chancellorsville was renewed at daylight, May 3d. General Stuart succeeded to the command of Jackson's corps. The superior numbers of the Union army and its compact formation gave it all the advantage. It needed but one thing to insure overwhelming success: that was competent leadership, and that was the one thing which it did not have.

With the weaker army still separated, it forced the Federals back toward the river, where Hooker was compelled to form a second line. Holding him there, Lee turned toward Sedgwick, who was at Fredericksburg with 25,000 men. He had a good opportunity to assail Lee in the rear, but failed to do so, and gave his efforts to capturing Marye's Heights, which was defended by a weak garrison. It was easily taken, and Sedgwick sent a column in the direction of Chancellorsville. On the road it encountered some breastworks, thrown up by the force which Lee had dispatched to check Sedgwick's advance. He was driven back, and the rebels, having been reinforced, recaptured Marye's Heights. Sedgwick made a hurried retreat, and thenceforward formed no factor in the battle.

Having disposed of him, Lee turned again upon Hooker. Early on the 5th, he placed a number of his guns within range of United States Ford and dropped a few shells among the wagon trains. Nothing, however, was accomplished on this day, except that the dry and parched woods were set on fire, and many of the wounded who were unable to help themselves were burned to death. Every horror that can be conceived as to war was added to the awful scene.

RETREAT OF THE UNION ARMY.

A heavy rainstorm caused the Rapidan and Rappahannock to rise so rapidly that Hooker decided, after consulting his officers, to get back while he had the chance to do so. The bridges were covered with pine boughs, and, with the noise of the wheels deadened by the crashing thunder, the wagons and artillery made the passage without discovery. By the following morning, the entire Army of the Potomac was once more across the Rappahannock and marching back to its old camp at Falmouth, and once more the advance against Richmond had ended in woeful disaster.

The losses of the Unionists at Chancellorsville were: killed, 1,606; wounded, 9,762; missing, 5,919; total, 17,287. The losses of the Confederates were: killed, 1,665; wounded, 9,081; captured and missing, 2,018; total, 12,764.

THE SECOND CONFEDERATE INVASION.

After such a frightful Union defeat, it was no wonder that the Confederates again decided to invade the North. Lee was not favorable to the plan, but he must have felt that the prospect of success was better than ever before. He made his preparations with great care, and strengthened his army to 75,000 men, divided into three corps, commanded respectively by Longstreet, Ewell, and A.P. Hill. He had in addition 15,000 cavalry under General J.E.B. ("Jeb") Stuart.

The northward march was begun the first week in June. Longstreet and Ewell advanced upon Culpeper, while Hill remained near Fredericksburg, aiming to deceive Hooker as to his intentions. Hooker quickly perceived that most of the rebel army had disappeared from his front, but it was a mystery to him where it had gone. A reconnoissance developed the direction taken by the two missing corps. Unsuspicious of the grand project that was in the mind of the Confederate commander, Hooker moved down the Shenandoah Valley, taking the same course as Lee, but with the Blue Ridge Mountains between them.

LEE'S PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

Passing through the defiles in this range, Lee dropped down on Milroy at Winchester before he dreamed of danger. Most of his 7,000 men were captured, but Milroy and a few escaped by a hurried flight at night. All doubt now had vanished as to the intentions of Lee; he was aiming for Pennsylvania, at the head of a powerful, well-organized army; Washington and probably Philadelphia were in peril. The only check that could block its way was the Army of the Potomac, and Hooker lost no time in moving. He reached Fairfax Court-House on the night of the 14th, thus placing himself on the flank of Ewell. The Confederates, however, held the mountain passes securely and nothing effective could be done.

On the 22d the headquarters of Lee were at Beverly, ten miles from Winchester, with which Lee kept up communication through A.P. Hill's corps, which was between Culpeper and Front Royal. Ewell, without hesitation, forded the Potomac into Maryland, while his cavalry pushed on into Pennsylvania.

By this time the government was so alarmed that President Lincoln, on the 15th of June, called by proclamation on the governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia to furnish 100,000 militia for the protection of those States. Pennsylvania, the one in greatest danger, was so laggard that she asked New Jersey to come to her help, and that little State gallantly did so.

GENERAL MEADE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Hooker deserved credit for appreciating his own unfitness for the command of the army that was again to fight Lee. He crossed the Potomac June 26th, making a movement which threatened Lee's communications, and resigned the next day. At Frederick, on the 28th, he published an order to the effect that the army had been placed in charge of Major-General George G. Meade.

This was an excellent appointment. Although Meade was born, in 1815, in Cadiz, Spain, he was an American, because his father was the United States naval agent at the time. Meade was graduated from West Point in 1835, and won distinction in the war with the Seminoles and with Mexico. The appointment was a surprise to him, but it pleased everybody, and he modestly took hold, resolved to do the best he could.

MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL MEADE.

He adhered to the general plan of Hooker. His army numbered about 100,000, and no braver men lived anywhere. Nearly all of Lee's troops were north of the Potomac, partly in Maryland and partly in Pennsylvania. On the 27th of June the whole army was at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; but Lee was greatly hampered by the absence of Stuart and his cavalry. That dashing officer was very fond of making raids, and, giving a wider meaning to the permission of Lee than that general intended, he was off on another of his bold ventures, with no certainty as to when he would return. It was upon him that Lee was obliged to depend for news of the Union army. Receiving none, he was on the point of advancing against Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, when he paused upon receiving the first reliable news of the Army of the Potomac.

Meade had pushed his advance beyond Middleton, where his left was lying when he took command of the army at Frederick. This action of the Union commander looked as if he intended to cross the mountains and attack the Confederate rear. Ewell's corps was at York and Carlisle, but still there was no knowledge whatever of the whereabouts of Stuart.

Lee now attempted to draw Meade away from the Potomac by concentrating his army to the east of the mountains. Hill and Longstreet advanced to Gettysburg, while Ewell was ordered to do the same. Lee himself lagged in the hope that Stuart would join him, and because of that, Meade, who was keenly on the alert, arrived in the neighborhood of Gettysburg first. On the last day of June, he was within a few miles of the town, while Lee was somewhat to the north and making for the same place.

Stuart and his cavalry had harassed the Army of the Potomac in Virginia, but, unable to stay its advance, they crossed the Potomac, and, moving to the east of Meade, entered Carlisle shortly after Ewell had left for Gettysburg. Stuart's delay was owing to the fact that he did not know Lee's whereabouts.

THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

The two mighty armies were now within striking distance of each other. It was yet early in the day when a collision took place between a Confederate division and Reynolds' Corps on the western side of the town. Reynolds was one of the best officers in the Union army. He was engaged in directing the movements of his troops when he was struck in the head by a rifle bullet and instantly killed. General Doubleday succeeded him in command, but was unable to drive back the enemy. Howard arrived with the Eleventh Corps early in the afternoon and took charge of the whole force. These were mainly composed of Germans, who were so overwhelmingly stampeded by Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville. They did not appear to have recovered from that panic, for they fled pell-mell through Gettysburg, with the enemy whooping at their heels. Nearly all who did not run were cut down or they surrendered.

Meade had sent Hancock to take chief command, and, aided by Howard, he rallied the shattered corps on the crest of Culp's Hill, behind the town. The keen eye of Hancock was quick to see that it was here the decisive struggle must take place, and he sent an urgent message to Meade, fifteen miles away, to lose not an hour in hurrying his troops forward. Meade followed the counsel. Some of his men arrived that night, some the next morning, while those from the greatest distance did not come in until the following afternoon.

The line as formed by Hancock extended along Cemetery Hill on the west and south of Gettysburg. It was a formidable position, and Lee, after carefully studying it, decided to await the arrival of Longstreet and Ewell with their corps before making his attack. Events proved that the decision was a disastrous mistake on the part of the Confederate commander.

When the sultry first day of July drew to a close, the Federal right held Culp's Hill, the centre Cemetery Hill, the left was along Cemetery Ridge, and the reserve on the right. This line curved in the form of a horseshoe, with the projecting portion facing Gettysburg. Sedgwick, it will be remembered, had not arrived, but the force was composed of a hundred thousand veterans who had 200 cannon at command.

That night the Confederates were in Gettysburg and a part of the country to the east and west. Ewell formed the left and held the town; Seminary Ridge was occupied by Hill's Corps, and confronted the centre and left of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. When Pickett's division came up on the 3d, it was placed on the right of Hill's position and faced Round Top.

Most of the succeeding day was spent by both armies in preparing for the tremendous death-grapple. At about five o'clock in the afternoon, having become convinced that the left and left centre of the Union line were the weakest points, Lee directed his efforts against them. They were held by Sickles, who made a blunder by advancing a portion of his force beyond the battle-line and seizing a ridge. It was because of this blunder that the first Confederate attack was made at that point.

Longstreet and Ewell opened with a sharp cannonade, under cover of which Hood's division impetuously assaulted Sickles' left. He drove his right wing between Sickles left and Little Round Top, and was steadily succeeding in his purpose, when one of those apparently trifling things, for which no one can account, interfered and brought about momentous results.

Little Round Top was the key to the position, and yet it had no real defenders. Had Hood known this, he could have seized it without the slightest difficulty. Perceiving its importance, he began working his way toward it, and only some extraordinary interference could prevent it speedily falling into his possession.

But General Gouverneur Warren, chief engineer, and his officers had climbed Little Round Top and were using it as a signal station. Soon the shots began flying so fast about them that they made hurried preparations to leave. Warren, however, saw the importance of holding the hill, and told his associates to make a pretense of doing so, while he looked around for a force to bring to the spot.

Fortunately, a large body of reinforcements were hurrying past to Sickles, who had sent an urgent call for them. Without hesitation, General Warren detached a brigade for the defense of Little Round Top. They ran up the slope, dragging a battery with them. Hardly had they done so, when Hood made a fierce charge. The fighting was of the most furious nature, and it looked for a time as if the yelling Texans would carry the hill, but they were forced back, and, pressing their way up the ravine at the foot, turned the left Union flank, but were forced again to retire by a bayonet charge.

Sickles called for reinforcements when attacked by Longstreet, but with their aid he could not hold his position. He was rushed back by the terrific fighter, and Longstreet gained and held the key-point of the line against the repeated assaults of the Union troops. Not only that, but he was resistlessly advancing, when more reinforcements arrived and attacked him just as he reached a wheatfield and grove of woods on the western side of Plum Run. The Confederates were beginning to give way, when Hood, having carried Sickles' extreme left, arrived. A vehement charge carried Hood through two divisions that were doubled back on their main line on Cemetery Ridge; Sickles' left having been crushed, his centre and right were assailed, and the latter was driven back. In the fighting Sickles lost a leg as well as his entire advanced position.

The close of the 2d of July brought brilliant, but only partial, success to the Confederates. After reaching Cemetery Ridge, Longstreet's men were repulsed by Hancock. The Confederate commander fell back to the western side of the wheatfield, where he remained until morning. Ewell, impetuously attacking the Union right centre at Cemetery and Culp's Hill, kept back Federal reinforcements from reaching the left, which Longstreet was pounding, drove out the Federal artillery and infantry, and held the works. This was a most important success, and, if Ewell could maintain his position throughout the morrow, General Lee would have a chance of taking Meade's line in reverse. The conclusion of the second day, therefore, left matters in dubious shape for both sides. While the Confederates had made gains, they were not decisive. Still they were such as to cause grave concern on the part of Meade and his brother officers, who held a long, anxious consultation, and discussed the question whether it was not wise to fall back and assume a new and stronger position. The decision was to remain where they were.

THE THIRD DAY.

Naturally Lee strengthened his force near where Ewell had secured a lodgment within the breastworks of Culp's Hill, with the purpose of making his main attack there; but Meade could not fail to see the utmost importance of driving out the enemy from his position. He shelled it at daylight on the 3d, and sent a strong body of infantry against the intruders. The Confederates made a desperate resistance, but in the end were expelled, and the Union line re-established.

It will be seen that this miscalculation of Lee compelled him to change his plans. Sitting on his horse, riding back and forth, often halting and scanning the battlefield through his glasses, and continually consulting his officers, he finally decided to direct his supreme effort against the Union centre. Success there meant the defeat and rout of the Union army, for, if the two wings could be wedged apart, they would be overwhelmed and destroyed by the charging Confederates.

But the impressive fact was as well known to the Federals as to their enemies, and nothing was neglected that could add to the strength of their position. All night long troops kept arriving, and in the moonlight were assigned to their positions for the morrow. It took Lee several hours to complete his preparations for the assault upon the Union centre. At noon he had 145 cannon posted on Seminary Ridge, opposite Meade's centre, while Meade had 80 pieces of artillery lined along the crest of Cemetery Hill.

PICKETT'S CHARGE.

At noon the Confederates opened with all their cannon, their object being to silence the batteries in front, to clear the way for the charge against the Union centre. The eighty Federal pieces replied, and for two hours the earth rocked under the most prodigious cannonade ever heard on this side of the Atlantic. Then the Union fire gradually ceased, and, as the vast volume of smoke slowly lifted, a column of 5,000 gray-coated men were seen to issue from the Confederate lines more than a mile away and advance at a steady stride toward the Union intrenchments. Their bayonets shone in the afternoon sun, and their fluttering battle-flags, the splendid precision of their step, and their superb soldierly appearance made so thrilling a picture that an involuntary murmur of admiration ran along the Union lines, even though these same men were advancing to kill and wound them.

They formed the division of General George E. Pickett, and no more magnificent charge was ever made. They advanced in a double line, their own artillery ceasing firing as they gradually passed within range with beautiful regular step, which seemed to hasten, as if even with their perfect discipline they could not restrain, their eagerness to join in the death-grapple.

The Union artillery remained silent until half the space was crossed, when it burst forth, and the Confederates went down by the score. The gaps could be seen from every point of the immense field, but those who were unhurt immediately closed up and continued their dauntless advance without a tremor. Coming still closer under the murderous artillery fire, they broke into the double-quick, and it looked as if nothing could check them.

Waiting until within a few hundred yards, the artillery and musketry blazed forth again. Through a misconception of orders, the Confederate line had become disjointed, and the supports of Pickett were repelled and a large number killed or taken prisoners, but Pickett's own division came on unfalteringly, let fly with a volley at the breastworks in front of them, and then, with their resounding yells, dashed up the crest of Cemetery Ridge and drove out the defenders at the point of the bayonet.

Immediately the hand-to-hand fighting became like that of so many tigers. Guns were clubbed, men wrestled and fought and struck with their bare fists, while a fire was converged upon the assailants of so murderous a nature that even the daring Pickett saw that every one of his men would be killed, if they remained. He gave the order to fall back, and the survivors broke into a run down the slope for their own lines.

Pickett's charge ranks among the famous in modern history, and was one of the most striking incidents of the war. The double column which marched across that fire-swept field numbered 5,000 of the flower of the Confederate army. Thirty-five hundred were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Of the three brigade commanders, one was killed, the second mortally wounded, and the third badly hurt. One only of the fourteen field officers returned, and out of the twenty-four regimental officers, only two were unhurt. The ferocity of the charge resulted in many deaths among the Unionists, and General Hancock was painfully wounded, but refused to leave the field until the struggle was over.

And all this valor had gone for naught. The Southerners had attempted an impossible thing, and the penalty was fearful. Unspeakably depressed, General Lee saw the return of the staggering, bleeding survivors, and, riding among them, he did all he could to cheer the mute sufferers by his sympathetic words. He insisted that the failure was wholly his own fault, and that not a word of censure should be visited upon anyone else.

The expectation of the Confederates was that the Federals would follow up this repulse with an immediate advance, and preparations were hurriedly made to repel it; but the ammunition was low on Cemetery Ridge, and the furious struggle had exhausted the defenders. Day was closing and the great battle of Gettysburg was ended.

THE FEARFUL LOSSES.

The Union losses were: killed, 3,070; wounded, 14,497; missing, 5,434; total, 23,001. The Confederate losses were: killed, 2,592; wounded, 12,706; captured and missing, 5,150; total, 20,448. To quote from Fox's "Regimental Losses in the American Civil War:" "Gettysburg was the greatest battle of the war; Antietam the bloodiest; the largest army was assembled by the Confederates in the Seven Days' Fight; by the Unionists at the Wilderness."

THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR.

Gettysburg has been styled the Waterloo of the Southern Confederacy. "Highest tide" was reached by its fortunes during those three first days in July, 1863. Lee put forth his supreme effort, and the result was defeat. He and his leading generals clearly saw that their cause had received its death-blow, and, as one of them expressed it, the fighting thenceforward was for terms. They were not yet conquered, and severe work remained to be done, but never again did the Lost Cause come so near success. Its sun, having reached meridian, must now go down until it should set forever in gloom, disaster, and ruin.

General Lee could not fail to perceive that all that remained to him was to leave the country before overtaken by irretrievable disaster. He withdrew Ewell's Corps that night from Gettysburg and posted it on Seminary Ridge, where intrenchments were thrown up. The town was occupied by Meade, and the dismal morrow was spent by the Confederates in burying their dead and removing their wounded. At night the retreat was begun by the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads, which enter the Cumberland Valley through the South Mountain range. Great battles always produce violent storms, and one of these added to the unspeakable wretchedness of the homeward march. Finding Lee was retreating, Meade sent Sedgwick in pursuit. The rear guard was overtaken on the night of the 6th, but its position was too strong to be attacked and the Union army took a route parallel to that of the Confederate. There was considerable skirmishing, but nothing decisive occurred, and the retiring army reached Hagerstown, where it found the fords of the Potomac so swollen as to be impassable. Lee, therefore, intrenched, and stayed where he was until the 13th, by which time the river had fallen sufficiently to be forded, and he once more re-entered Virginia. Meade, fearful that the great prize was about to escape him, made strenuous efforts to intercept him, but failed, and returned to the Rappahannock, while Lee established himself in the neighborhood of Culpeper.

A period of inactivity now followed. Both Meade and Lee sent strong detachments from their armies to the southwest, where, as we have seen, they had the most active kind of service at Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, Knoxville, and other places. When Lee had considerably depleted his forces, Meade thought the prospect of success warranted his making a move against him. Accordingly, he sent his cavalry across the Rappahannock, whereupon Lee withdrew to a position behind the Rapidan, which was so strong that Meade dared not attack, and he, therefore, attempted a flank movement. Before, however, it could be carried out, he was called upon to send two more of his corps to the southwest, because of the defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga. These corps were the Eleventh and Twelfth under the command of Hooker.

This withdrawal compelled Meade to give up his purpose, and he remained on the defensive. By-and-by, when the troops were returned to him, he prepared once more to advance, but Lee anticipated him by an effort to pass around his right flank and interpose between him and Washington. Crossing the Rapidan on the 9th of October, he moved swiftly to Madison Court-House, without detection by Meade, who did not learn of it until the next day, when his outpost was attacked and driven back on the main army at Culpeper. This was proof that the Union right flank had been turned, and Meade immediately started his trains toward the Rappahannock, following a few hours later with his army. On the further side of Bull Run, he fortified himself so strongly that Lee saw it was useless to advance further, and, on the 18th of October, he returned to the line of the Rappahannock.

Meade started for Richmond on the 7th of November. The Confederates were found occupying earthworks on the north of the Rappahannock. An impetuous assault drove them out and across the river. Meade pushed on to Culpeper, and Lee hurriedly retreated across the Rapidan.

Meade's judgment was that no further advance should be made, but the clamor of the North forced him to try another of the many attempts to capture Richmond. He crossed the river on the 26th and 27th of November, his aim being to divide the Confederate army by a rapid march on Orange Court-House. But it seemed as if the flood-gates of heaven were then opened. The rain fell in torrents day and night, and the country became a sea of mud and water. Bridges had to be laid to connect different portions of the army, and all offensive movements were for a while out of the question. The delay gave Lee time to form his troops into a compact mass, so that when the Unionists were ready to attack, it was so evident that another Fredericksburg massacre would follow that the plan was abandoned.

In truth, Lee felt so strong that he was disposed to advance himself, but was dissuaded by the belief that some blunder of the Union commander would give him a better opportunity, but Meade was too wise to do so. On the 1st of December he returned to his old quarters on the Rapidan. The weather had become extremely cold, and both armies went into winter quarters.

The principal military movements of this year have now been described, but it remains to tell of the operations on the seacoast and of the leading military raids.

PRIVATEERING.

The Confederates displayed great activity and ingenuity in the construction of ironclads and in running the blockade. Their vessels continually dodged in and out of a few of the leading ports, the principal one being Wilmington, North Carolina. The profits in a single cargo of a blockade-runner were so enormous that the owners were enriched by several successful voyages, while a single one would reimburse them for the loss of their ship. Under such circumstances it was no wonder that they took desperate chances, and firms were organized who paid liberal salaries to the officers of vessels, who advertised among their friends the regular dates of their departure, and, the worst of it was, they were very regular in keeping them.

The _Alabama_ and other privateers were busy on the ocean, and the Confederates strained every nerve to send others to sea. The _Nashville_ was a fine steamer that was in the Ogeechee River, Georgia, waiting for a chance to slip out and join the commerce destroyers. She had a valuable cargo of cotton, and the Federal cruisers were alert to prevent her escape. They would have gone up the river after her, but there were too many torpedoes waiting for them, and the guns of Fort McAllister were too powerful.

Captain Worden, of the old _Monitor_, was now in command of the _Montauk_, and he was delighted on the night of February 27th to observe the _Nashville_ lying stuck fast in shallow water above Fort McAllister. The opportunity was too tempting to be neglected, and the next morning, despite a hot attack from the fort, he fired into the _Nashville_ until she broke into flames and soon after blew up.

FAILURE OF THE ATTACKS ON CHARLESTON.

Naturally the desire was strong in the North to humble Charleston, where the baleful secession sentiment was born and brought all the woe upon the country. General Beauregard was in command of that department, and he made every preparation for the attack, which he knew would soon come. In a proclamation he urged the removal of all non-combatants, and called upon the citizens to rally to the defense of the city.

A fleet of ironclads was always lying outside of Charleston, watching for an opportunity to give its attention to the forts or city. One tempestuous night in January a couple of rams dashed out of the harbor, and, in a ferociously vicious attack, scattered the ironclads, and compelled a gunboat to surrender. Thereupon the Confederates claimed that the blockade had been raised, but no one paid any attention to the claim.

An expedition was carefully organized for the capture of Charleston, and placed in command of Admiral Samuel F. Dupont. The fleet, numbering a hundred vessels, left the mouth of the North Edisto River on the 6th of April, and on the same day crossed the bar and entered the main channel on the coast of Morris Island.

A dense haze delayed operations until the following day, when a line of battle was formed by the ironclads, the wooden vessels remaining outside the bar. A raft was fastened to the front of the _Weehawken_, with which it was intended to explode the torpedoes. The cumbrous contrivance greatly delayed the progress of the fleet, which advanced slowly until the _Weehawken_ had passed the outer batteries and was close to the entrance to the inner harbor. Then Fort Moultrie fired a gun, instantly followed by that of Fort Sumter, and the batteries on Sullivan and on Morris Island. Then a hawser, which the Confederates had stretched across the channel with the purpose of clogging the screws of the propellers, was encountered, the _Weehawken_ was compelled to grope around for a better passage, and everything went wrong. The _New Ironsides_ made an attempt to turn but became unmanageable, two other ironclads ran afoul of her, and matters were in a bad way when Admiral Dupont signaled for each one to do the best it could.

After a time, eight ironclads secured position in front of Fort Sumter, at distances varying from a third to half a mile. This placed them in direct range of 300 heavy guns which concentrated their appalling fire upon them, the shots following one another as rapidly as the ticking of a watch. The _Keokuk_, which ran close to Fort Sumter, was struck ninety times, in the course of half an hour, in the hull and turrets, and nineteen shots pierced her sides close to and below the water-line. Her commander with great difficulty extricated her from her perilous position, and she sank the next day.

The fight was another proof of the fact that, in all such engagements, the preponderating advantage is with the land batteries. The ships of the squadron were severely injured, but they inflicted no perceptible damage upon the forts. Admiral Dupont had gone into the battle against his judgment, and he now signaled for the ships to withdraw. All with the exception of the _New Ironsides_ returned to Port Royal on the 12th of April.

This failure caused great disappointment in the North and to the government. Admiral Dupont was ordered to hold his position inside of Charleston bar, and to prevent the enemy from erecting any new defenses on Morris Island. The admiral replied that he was ready to obey all orders, but, in his judgment, he was directed to take an unwise and dangerous step. Thereupon he was superseded by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, and preparations were begun for a combined land and naval attack upon Charleston.

One of the best engineer officers in the service was General Quincy A. Gillmore, who had captured Fort Pulaski at Savannah the previous year. He was summoned to Washington, and helped the government to arrange the plan of attack upon Charleston. The most feasible course seemed to be for a military force to seize Morris Island and bombard Fort Sumter from that point, the fleet under Dahlgren giving help. There was hope that the monitors and ironclads would be able to force their way past the batteries and approach nigh enough to strike Charleston.

Accordingly, a sufficient detachment was gathered on Folly Island, which lies south of Morris Island, and batteries were erected among the woods. On the 10th of July, General Strong with 2,000 men attacked a force of South Carolina infantry at the southern part of Morris Island, and drove them to Fort Wagner at the opposite end. The Confederates were reinforced, and, in the attack on Fort Wagner, the Federals were repulsed and obliged to retreat, with heavy loss.

On the night of the 18th, in the midst of a violent thunderstorm, a determined assault was made upon Fort Wagner, one of the newly formed negro regiments being in the lead. The fighting was of the most furious character, but the Federals suffered a decisive defeat, in which their losses were five times as great as those of the defenders.

General Gillmore carried parallels against the fort, and the ironclads assisted in the bombardments; but, though it continued for weeks, the city of Charleston seemed to be as far from surrender as ever. A part of the time the weather was so intolerably hot that operations were suspended.

Gillmore, however, was so near Charleston that he was able to reach it with his heaviest guns, and he prepared to do so. His principal piece was a Parrott, which threw a 100-pound ball, and was christened the "Swamp Angel."

The first shot was fired at midnight, August 22d. As the screeching shell curved over and dropped into the sleeping city, with its frightful explosion, it caused consternation. The people sprang from their beds and rushed into the streets, many fleeing to the country. Beauregard sent an indignant remonstrance, telling Gillmore that all civilized nations, before bombarding a city, gave warning that the non-combatants might be removed. Gillmore explained his reason for his course, and agreed to wait until the following night before renewing the bombardment.

At that hour it was resumed, with the promise of grave results, but at the thirty-sixth discharge the Swamp Angel exploded, and thus terminated its own career. General Gillmore continued to push his parallels against Fort Wagner. Although the ironclads could not pass the obstructions to the inner harbor so as to help, Gillmore persevered, and finally rendered Forts Wagner and Gregg untenable. The evacuation occurred on the night of September 6th. As soon as the Federals took possession, they had to make all haste to repair the ramparts to protect themselves against the fire from Fort Moultrie and James Island, whose guns were immediately turned upon them.

By this time, Fort Sumter was in ruins, its artillery could not be served, and its garrison comprised only a detachment of infantry. Upon being summoned to surrender by Dahlgren, the commander invited the admiral to come and take the fort. The effort to do so was made by a military force and the ironclads on the 9th of September, but failed. No more important attempts followed. The result had shown that the defenses of Charleston were practically impregnable, and, though shells were occasionally sent into the forts and city, the latter was not captured until near the end of the war, and then it was brought about, as may be said, by the collapse of the Confederacy itself.

When the war began the Southerners were the superiors of the Northerners as regarded their cavalry. Horseback riding is more common in the South than in the North, but it did not take the Union volunteers long to acquire the art, and, as the war progressed, the cavalry arm was greatly increased and strengthened. One of the natural results of this was numerous raids by both sides, some of which assumed an importance that produced a marked effect on the military campaigns in progress, while in other cases, the daring excursions were simply an outlet to the adventurous spirit which is natural to Americans and which manifests itself upon every opportunity and occasion.

ONE OF GENERAL STUART'S RAIDS.

Mention has been made of the embarrassment caused General Lee during his Gettysburg campaign by the absence of Stuart with his calvary on one of his raids. In the autumn, Stuart started out on a reconnaissance to Catlett's Station, where he observed French's column in the act of withdrawing from the river, whereupon he turned back toward Warrenton. Taking the road leading from that town to Manassas, he found himself unexpectedly confronting the corps of General Warren. Thus he was caught directly between two fires and in imminent danger of defeat and capture, for his force was but a handful compared with either column of the Federals. Fortunately for the raider, he and his men were in a strip of woods, and had not been seen, but discovery seemed certain, for their enemies were on every hand, and the slightest inadvertence, even such as the neighing of a horse, was likely to betray them.

Stuart called his officers around him to discuss what they could do to extricate themselves from their dangerous situation. No one proposed to surrender, and it looked as if they would be obliged to abandon their nine pieces of horse artillery and wait until night, when they might cut their way out.

Stuart did not like the idea of losing his guns. At any rate, he would not consent, until another plan which had occurred to him was tried. Several of his men were dismounted, and each was furnished with a musket and infantry knapsack. The uniform was not likely to attract notice in the darkness, in case they met any Federals. These messengers were ordered to pick their way through the Union lines to Warrenton, where they would find General Lee, who was to be told of the danger in which Stuart was placed. The Confederate commander could be counted upon to send prompt help. Fortunately for Stuart, two of his men succeeded in getting through the Union lines and reaching Lee.

At the best, however, the night must pass before help could arrive, and it need not be said that the hours were long and anxious ones to the troopers hiding in the woods, with the Federal camp-fires burning on every side, and the men moving about and likely to come among them at any moment. They were so close, indeed, that their laughter and conversation were plainly heard.

The alert horsemen suddenly observed two Union officers coming toward them. Their careless manner showed they had no thought of danger, and they were strolling along, when several dark figures sprang up from the ground, shoved their pistols in their faces, and warned them if they made the least outcry they would be instantly shot. The prisoners saw the shadowy forms all around them, and were sensible enough to submit and give no trouble. The night gradually wore away, and just as it was growing light, and while the Union division on the heights of Cedar Run, where they were posted to protect the rear of General Warren, were preparing breakfast, they were alarmed by the firing of musketry from the advance of a Confederate column coming up the Warrenton road.

"That means that Uncle Bob has sent us help!" was the gratified exclamation of Stuart to his delighted friends; "we must take a hand in this business."

The cavalry opened fire on the Union lines, which were thrown into some confusion, during which Stuart limbered up his guns and quickly rejoined Ewell.

STONEMAN'S RAID.

As has been stated, General Hooker at the opening of the battle of Chancellorsville was confident that he was going to defeat Lee. In order to cut off his retreat, he sent General Stoneman, with 2,300 cavalry, on April 28th, to the rear of the Confederate army. Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, where his force was divided. One-half, led by General Averill, headed for the Orange Railroad, a little way above Culpeper, then occupied by Fitzhugh Lee, with a force of 500 men. He was attacked with such vigor that he hurriedly retreated across the Rapidan, burning the bridges behind him. Averill, instead of pursuing, turned about and made his way back to Hooker, in time to accompany him in his retreat to the northern bank of the Rappahannock.

Meanwhile, Stoneman crossed the Rapidan on the 1st of May, and galloped to Louisa Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, a dozen miles to the east of Gordonsville. There he paused and sent out several detachments, which wrought a great deal of mischief. One of them advanced to Ashland, only fifteen miles from Richmond, while another went still closer to the Confederate capital. These bodies of troopers caused much alarm, and a general converging of the enemy's cavalry caused Stoneman to start on his return, May 6th. For a time he was in great danger, but his men were excellently mounted, and, by hard riding, they effected a safe escape along the north bank of the Pamunkey and York Rivers, and rejoined their friends at Gloucester.

GRIERSON'S RAID.

During the siege of Vicksburg a daring raid was made in the rear of the city by Colonel B.H. Grierson. In this instance his work was of great help to General Grant, for he destroyed the Confederate lines of communication, and checked the gathering of reinforcements for Pemberton. Grierson, who conceived the plan of the raid, left La Grange on the 17th of April with three regiments of cavalry. After crossing the Tallahatchie, he rode south to the Macon and Corinth Railroad, where the rails were torn up, telegraph lines cut, and bridges and other property destroyed. To do the work thoroughly detachments were sent in different directions, and they spared nothing.

Grierson now changed his course to the southwest, seized the bridge over Pearl River, burned a large number of locomotives, and forced his way through a wild country to Baton Rouge, which he found in the possession of Unionists. He had been engaged for a fortnight on his raid, during which he destroyed an immense amount of property, captured several towns, fought several sharp skirmishes, and carried off many prisoners.

John S. Mosby was the most daring Confederate raider in the East. Some of his exploits and escapes were remarkable, and an account of them would fill a volume with thrilling incidents. General Lee did not look with favor on such irregular work, but accepted it as one of the accompaniments of war, and it cannot be denied that Mosby gave him valuable help in more than one instance.

MORGAN'S RAID.

John H. Morgan was famous in the southwest as a raider and guerrilla. At the beginning of July, 1863, he seized Columbia, near Jamestown, Kentucky, and advanced against Colonel Moore at Greenbrier Bridge. His reception was so hot that he was obliged to retreat, whereupon he attacked Lebanon, where there was considerable vicious fighting in the streets. One of Morgan's regiments was commanded by his brother, who was killed. The incensed leader set fire to the houses, and, although the defenders surrendered, the place was sacked. Then the invaders retreated before the Union cavalry who were advancing against them. Their course was through Northern Kentucky, where they plundered right and left, and spread dismay on every hand.

Reckless and encouraged by their successes, they now swam their horses over the Ohio River, and, entering Indiana, gave that State its first experience in war. The local militia were called out, but the experienced cavalry easily brushed them aside. They knew, however, it would be different when they met the regular Union cavalry who were riding hard after them. To escape them, Morgan started for western Virginia. When he entered Ohio, the State was terrified, and even Cincinnati trembled, but the raiders had no thought of stopping until they readied western Virginia, where they would be safe.

The telegraph had carried the news of Morgan's movements everywhere, and the determination was general that he should not be allowed to escape from the entanglements in which he and his men had involved themselves. The militia guarded all the fords of the Ohio; gunboats steamed back and forth; the roads were blocked by felled trees, and everything possible was done to obstruct the band, who were so laden with plunder that their exhausted animals had to proceed slowly.

It is stated by credible witnesses, who saw the formidable company riding along the highway when hard pressed, that nearly every man in the saddle was sound asleep. They dared not make any extended halt through fear of their pursuers, and when they did pause it was because of their drooping animals.

Reaching the Ohio at last, Morgan planted his field guns near Buffington Island, with the view of protecting his men while they swam the river. Before he could bring them into use, a gunboat knocked the pieces right and left like so many tenpins. Abandoning the place, Morgan made the attempt to cross at Belleville, but was again frustrated. It was now evident that the time had come when each must lookout for himself. Accordingly, the band broke up and scattered. Their pursuers picked them up one by one, and Morgan himself and a few of his men were surrounded near New Lisbon, Ohio, and compelled to surrender. He and his principal officers were sentenced to the Ohio penitentiary, where they were kept in close confinement until November 27th, when through the assistance of friends (some of whom were probably within the prison), he and six officers effected their escape, and succeeded in reaching the Confederate lines, where they were soon at their characteristic work again.

Morgan was a raider by nature, but, as is often the case, the "pitcher went to the fountain once too often." While engaged upon one of his raids the following year he was cornered by the Federal cavalry, and in the fight that followed was shot dead.

Far below these men in moral character were such guerrillas as Quantrell, who were simply plunderers, assassins, and murderers, who carried on their execrable work through innate depravity, rather than from any wish to help the side with which they identified themselves. Most of them soon ran their brief course, and died, as they had lived, by violence.