Part 9

There would be just as much reason in saying that the lawmakers have a right to make the entire marriage contract; to marry any man and woman against their will; dispose of all their personal and property rights; declare them imbeciles, incapable of making a reasonable marriage contract; then presume the consent of both the parties; and finally treat them as criminals, and their children as outcasts, if they presume to make any contract of their own.

This same trick, of holding that the law is a part of the contract, has been made to protect the private property of stockholders from liability for the debts of the corporations, of which they were members; and to protect the private property of special partners, so-called, or limited partners, from liability for partnership debts.

This same trick has been employed to justify insolvent and bankrupt laws, so-called, whereby a first creditor's right to a first mortgage on the property of his debtor, has been taken from him, and he has been compelled to take his chances with as many subsequent creditors as the debtor may succeed in becoming indebted to

All these absurdities and atrocities have been practiced by the lawmakers of the States, and sustained by the courts, under the pretence that they (the courts) did not know what the natural "obligation of contracts" was; or that, if they did know what it was, the constitution of the United States imposed no restraint upon its unlimited violation by the State lawmakers.

SECTION XX.

But, not content with having always sanctioned the unlimited power of the _State_ lawmakers to abolish all men's natural right to make their own contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States has, within the last twenty years, taken pains to assert that congress also has the arbitrary power to abolish the same right.

1. It has asserted the arbitrary power of congress to abolish all men's right to make their own contracts, by asserting its power _to alter the meaning of all contracts, after they are made_, so as to make them widely, or wholly, different from what the parties had made them.

Thus the court has said that, after a man has made a contract to pay a certain number of dollars, at a future time,--_meaning such dollars as were current at the time the contract was made_,--congress has power to coin a dollar of less value than the one agreed on, and authorize the debtor to pay his debt with a dollar of less value than the one he had promised.

To cover up this infamous crime, the court asserts, over and over again,--what no one denies,--that congress has power (constitutionally speaking) to alter, at pleasure, the value of its coins. But it then asserts that congress has this additional, and wholly different, power, to wit, the power to declare that this alteration in the value of the coins _shall work a corresponding change in all existing contracts for the payment of money_.

In reality they say that a contract to pay money is not a contract to pay any particular amount, or value, of such money as was known and understood by the parties at the time the contract was made, but _only such, and so much, as congress shall afterwards choose to call by that name, when the debt shall become due_.

They assert that, by simply retaining the name, while altering the thing,--_or by simply giving an old name to a new thing_,--congress has power to utterly abolish the contract which the parties themselves entered into, and substitute for it any such new and different one, as they (congress) may choose to substitute.

Here are their own words:

_The contract obligation ... was not a duty to pay gold or silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time when the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal intrinsic value in the market.... But the obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made.--Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace 548._

This is saying that the obligation of a contract to pay money is not an obligation to pay what both the law and the parties recognize as money, _at the time when the contract is made_, but only such substitute as congress shall afterwards prescribe, "_when the payment is to be made_."

This opinion was given by a majority of the court in the year 1870.

In another opinion the court says:

Under the power to coin money, and to regulate its value, congress may issue coins of same denomination [that is, bearing the same name] as those already current by law, but of less intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less weight of the precious metals, _and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real value_. A contract to pay a certain sum of money, without any stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be made, may always be satisfied by payment of that sum [that is, that _nominal_ amount] in any currency _which is lawful money at the place and time at which payment is to be made_.--_Juilliard vs. Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_, 449.

This opinion was given by the entire court--save one, Field--at the October term of 1883.

Both these opinions are distinct declarations of the power of congress to alter men's contracts, _after they are made_, by simply retaining the name, while altering the thing, that is agreed to be paid.

In both these cases, the court means distinctly to say that, _after the parties to a contract have agreed upon the number of dollars to be paid_, congress has power to reduce the value of the dollar, and authorize all debtors to pay the less valuable dollar, instead of the one agreed on.

In other words, the court means to say that, after a contract has been made for the payment of a certain number of dollars, _congress has power to alter the meaning of the word dollar_, and thus authorize the debtor to pay in something different from, and less valuable than, the thing he agreed to pay.

Well, if congress has power to alter men's contracts, _after they are made_, by altering the meaning of the word dollar, and thus reducing the value of the debt, it has a precisely equal power to _increase_ the value of the dollar, and thus compel the debtor to pay _more_ than he agreed to pay.

Congress has evidently just as much right to _increase_ the value of the dollar, after a contract has been made, as it has to _reduce_ its value. It has, therefore, just as much right to cheat debtors, by compelling them to pay _more_ than they agreed to pay, as it has to cheat creditors, by compelling them to accept _less_ than they agreed to accept.

All this talk of the court is equivalent to asserting that congress has the right to alter men's contracts at pleasure, _after they are made_, and make them over into something, or anything, wholly different from what the parties themselves had made them.

And this is equivalent to denying all men's right to make their own contracts, or to acquire any contract rights, which congress may not _afterward_, at pleasure, alter, or abolish.

It is equivalent to saying that the words of contracts are not to be taken in the sense in which they are used, by the parties themselves, at the time when the contracts are entered into, but only in such different senses as congress may choose to put upon them at any future time.

If this is not asserting the right of congress to abolish altogether men's natural right to make their own contracts, what is it?

Incredible as such audacious villainy may seem to those unsophisticated persons, who imagine that a court of law should be a court of justice, it is nevertheless true, that this court intended to declare the unlimited power of congress to alter, at pleasure, the contracts of parties, _after they have been made_, by altering the kind and amount of money by which the contracts may be fulfilled. That they intended all this, is proved, not only by the extracts already given from their opinions, but also by the whole tenor of their arguments--too long to be repeated here--and more explicitly by these quotations, _viz._:

There is no well-founded distinction to be made between the constitutional validity of an act of congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts contracted after its passage, and that of an act making them a legal tender for the discharge of _all_ debts, _as well those incurred before, as those made after, its enactment_.--_Legal Tender Cases_, 12 _Wallace_ 530 (1870).

Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be, _and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that power_.--12 _Wallace_ 549.

Contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority of congress, _at least so far as relates to the means of payment_.--12 _Wallace_ 549.

The court means here to say that "every contract for the payment of money, simply," is necessarily made, by the parties, _subject to the power of congress to alter it afterward_--by altering the kind and value of the money with which it may be paid--_into anything, into which_ they (congress) _may choose to alter it_.

And this is equivalent to saying that all such contracts are made, by the parties, with _the implied understanding that the contracts, as written and signed by themselves, do not bind either of the parties to anything_; but that they simply suggest, or initiate, some non-descript or other, which congress may afterward convert into a binding contract, _of such a sort, and only such a sort, as_ they (congress) _may see fit to convert it into_.

Every one of these judges knew that no two men, having common honesty and common sense,--unless first deprived of all power to make their own contracts,--would ever enter into a contract to pay money, with any understanding that the government had any such arbitrary power as the court here ascribes to it, to alter their contract after it should be made. Such an absurd contract would, in reality, be no _legal_ contract at all. It would be a mere gambling agreement, having, naturally and really, no _legal_ "obligation" at all.

But further. A _solvent_ contract to pay money is in reality--in law, and in equity--_a bona fide mortgage upon the debtor's property_. And this mortgage right is as veritable a right of property, as is any right of property, that is conveyed by a warranty deed. And congress has no more right to invalidate this mortgage, by a single iota, than it has to invalidate a warranty deed of land. And these judges will sometime find out that such is "the obligation of contracts," if they ever find out what "the obligation of contracts" is.

The justices of that court have had this question--what is "the obligation of contracts"?--before them for seventy years, and more. But they have never agreed among themselves--even by so many as a majority--as to what it is. And this disagreement is very good evidence that _none_ of them have known what it is; for if any one of them had known what it is, he would doubtless have been able, long ago, to enlighten the rest.

Considering the vital importance of men's contracts, it would evidently be more to the credit of these judges, if they would give their attention to this question of "the obligation of contracts," until they shall have solved it, than it is to be telling fifty millions of people that they have no right to make any contracts at all, except such as congress has power to invalidate after they shall have been made. Such assertions as this, coming from a court that cannot even tell us what "the obligation of contracts" is, are not entitled to any serious consideration. On the contrary, they show us what farces and impostures these judicial opinions--or decisions, as they call them--are. They show that these judicial oracles, as men call them, are no better than some of the other so-called oracles, by whom mankind have been duped.

But these judges certainly never will find out what "the obligation of contracts" is, until they find out that men have the natural right to make their own contracts, and unalterably fix their "obligation"; and that governments can have no power whatever to make, unmake, alter, or invalidate that "obligation."

Still further. Congress has the same power over weights and measures that it has over coins. And the court has no more right or reason to say that congress has power to alter existing contracts, by altering the value of the coins, than it has to say that, after any or all men have, for value received, entered into contracts to deliver so many bushels of wheat or other grain, so many pounds of beef, pork, butter, cheese, cotton, wool, or iron, so many yards of cloth, or so many feet of lumber, congress has power, by altering these weights and measures, to alter all these existing contracts, so as to convert them into contracts to deliver only half as many, or to deliver twice as many, bushels, pounds, yards, or feet, as the parties agreed upon.

To add to the farce, as well as to the iniquity, of these judicial opinions, it must be kept in mind, that the court says that, after A has sold valuable property to B, and has taken in payment an honest and sufficient mortgage on B's property, congress has the power to compel him (A) to give up this mortgage, and to accept, in place of it, not anything of any real value whatever, but only the promissory note of a so-called government; and that government one which--if taxation without consent is robbery--never had an honest dollar in its treasury, with which to pay any of its debts, and is never likely to have one; but relies wholly on its future robberies for its means to pay them; and can give no guaranty, but its own interest at the time, that it will even make the payment out of its future robberies.

If a company of bandits were to seize a man's property for their own uses, and give him their note, promising to pay him out of their future robberies, the transaction would not be considered a very legitimate one. But it would be intrinsically just as legitimate as is the one which the Supreme Court sanctions on the part of congress.

Banditti have not usually kept supreme courts of their own, to legalize either their robberies, or their promises to pay for past robberies, out of the proceeds of their future ones. Perhaps they may now take a lesson from our Supreme Court, and establish courts of their own, that will hereafter legalize all their contracts of this kind.

SECTION XXI.

To justify its declaration, that congress has power to alter men's contracts after they are made, the court dwells upon the fact that, at the times when the legal-tender acts were passed, the government was in peril of its life; and asserts that it had therefore a right to do almost anything for its self-preservation, without much regard to its honesty, or dishonesty, towards private persons. Thus it says:

A civil war was then raging, which seriously threatened the overthrow of the government, and the destruction of the constitution itself. It demanded the equipment and support of large armies and navies, and the employment of money to an extent beyond the capacity of all ordinary sources of supply. Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit of the government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had become nearly exhausted. Moneyed institutions had advanced largely of their means, and more could not be expected of them. They had been compelled to suspend specie payments. Taxation was inadequate to pay even the interest on the debt already incurred, and it was impossible to await the income of additional taxes. The necessity was immediate and pressing. The army was unpaid. There was then due to the soldiers in the field nearly a score of millions of dollars. The requisitions from the War and Navy departments for supplies, exceeded fifty millions, and the current expenditure was over one million per day.... Foreign credit we had none. We say nothing of the overhanging paralysis of trade, and business generally, which threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government to maintain its continued existence, and therewith the complete destruction of all remaining national credit.

It was at such a time, and in such circumstances, that congress was called upon to devise means to maintaining the army and navy, for securing the large supplies of money needed, and indeed for the preservation of the government created by the constitution. It was at such a time, and in such and emergency, that the legal-tender acts were passed.--12 _Wallace_ 540-1.

In the same case Bradley said:

Can the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn be thus taken by the government, when the public exigency requires it, and cannot the rich man's bonds and notes be in like manner taken to reach the same end?--_p._ 561.

He also said:

It is absolutely essential to independent national existence that government should have a firm hold on the two great instrumentalities of the _sword_ and the _purse, and the right to wield them without restriction, on occasions of national peril_. In certain emergencies government must have at its command, _not only the personal services--the bodies and lives--of its citizens_, but the lesser, though not less essential, power of absolute control over the resources of the country. Its armies must be filled, and its navies manned, by the citizens in person.--_p._ 563.

Also he said:

_The conscription may deprive me of liberty, and destroy my life.... All these are fundamental political conditions on which life, property, and money are respectively held and enjoyed under our system of government, nay, under any system of government._ There are times when the exigencies of the State rightly absorb all subordinate considerations of private interest, convenience, and feeling.--_p._ 565.

Such an attempt as this, to justify one crime, by taking for granted the justice of other and greater crimes, is a rather desperate mode of reasoning, for a court of law; to say nothing of a court of justice. The answer to it is, that no government, however good in other respects--any more than any other good institution--has any right to live otherwise than on purely voluntary support. It can have no right to take either "the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn," or "the rich man's bonds and notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without their consent. And when a government resorts to such measures to save its life, we need no further proof that its time to die has come. A good government, no more than a bad one, has any right to live by robbery, murder, or any other crime.

But so think not the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. On the contrary, they hold that, in comparison with the preservation of the government, all the rights of the people to property, liberty, and life are worthless things, not to be regarded. So they hold that in such an exigency as they describe, congress had the right to commit any crime against private persons, by which the government could be saved. And among these lawful crimes, the court holds that congress had the right to issue money that should serve as a license to all holders of it, to cheat--or rather openly rob--their creditors.

The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve the life of the government, congress had the right to issue such money as would authorize all creditors to demand twice the amount of their honest dues from all debtors.

The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve the life of the government, congress had the right to sell indulgences for all manner of crimes; for theft, robbery, rape, murder, and all other crimes, for which indulgences would bring a price in the market.

Can any one imagine it possible that, if the government had always done nothing but that "equal and exact justice to all men"--which you say it is pledged to do,--but which you must know it has never done,--it could ever have been brought into any such peril of its life, as these judges describe? Could it ever have been necessitated to take either "the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn," or "the rich man's bonds and notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without their consent? Could it ever have been necessitated to "conscript" the poor man--too poor to pay a ransom of three hundred dollars--made thus poor by the tyranny of the government itself--"deprive him of his liberty, and destroy his life"? Could it ever have been necessitated to sell indulgences for crime to either debtors, or creditors, or anybody else? To preserve "the constitution"--a constitution, I repeat, that authorized nothing but "equal and exact justice to all men"--could it ever have been necessitated to send into the field millions of ignorant young men, to cut the throats of other young men as ignorant as themselves--few of whom, on either side, had ever read the constitution, or had any real knowledge of its legal meaning; and not one of whom had ever signed it, or promised to support it, or was under the least obligation to support it?

It is, I think, perfectly safe to say, that not one in a thousand, probably not one in ten thousand, of these young men, who were sent out to butcher others, and be butchered themselves, had any real knowledge of the constitution they were professedly sent out to support; or any reasonable knowledge of the real character and motives of the congresses and courts that profess to administer the constitution. If they had possessed this knowledge, how many of them would have ever gone to the field?

But further. Is it really true that the right of the government to commit all these atrocities:

_Are the fundamental political conditions on which life, property, and money are respectively held and enjoyed under our system of government?_

If such is the real character of the constitution, can any further proof be required of the necessity that it be buried out of sight at once and forever? The truth was that the government was in peril, _solely because it was not fit to exist_. It, and the State governments--all but parts of one and the same system--were rotten with tyranny and crime. And being bound together by no honest tie, and existing for no honest purpose, destruction was the only honest doom to which any of them were entitled. And if we had spent the same money and blood to destroy them, that we did to preserve them, it would have been ten thousand times more creditable to our intelligence and character as a people.

Clearly the court has not strengthened its case at all by this picture of the peril in which the government was placed. It has only shown to what desperate straits a government, founded on usurpation and fraud, and devoted to robbery and oppression, may be brought, by the quarrels that are liable to arise between the different factions--that is, the different bands of robbers--of which it is composed. When such quarrels arise, it is not to be expected that either faction--having never had any regard to human rights, when acting in concert with the other--will hesitate at any new crimes that may be necessary to prolong its existence.