CHAPTER II

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

The four essential characteristics of the New Constitution, p. 21.--Supremacy of Parliament maintained, p. 22.--What is meaning of supremacy of Imperial Parliament? p. 23: What it does not mean, ib.: What it does mean, p. 24.--Real effect of reserved supremacy, p. 28.--Peril arising from ambiguity of supremacy of Parliament, p. 30.--Retention of Irish members at Westminster, p. 32.--Change of Gladstonian opinion, p. 33.--Presence of the Irish members involves ruin to Ireland, pp. 33, 34.--Mr. John Morley's opinion, p. 39.--Weakness of England, p, 41. Mr. Morley's opinion, p. 41.--Manner in which England weakened, p. 43: 1. Irish vote determines composition of British Cabinet, ib.: 2. System of Cabinet Government destroyed, p. 45: 3. Irish members changed into an Irish delegation, p. 46: 4. British Parliament not freed from Irish questions, p. 47.--Inducements to accept plan, p. 48.--Maintenance of Imperial supremacy, p. 49.--English management of English affairs, ib.--England does not really obtain management of English affairs, ib.--Minority tempted to unfairness, p. 51.--Minority, without intentional unfairness, may be oppressive, p. 52.--Plan of retaining Irish members for all purposes, p. 53.--Comparison with power hitherto held by or offered to Great Britain, p. 55.--Authority of England before 1782, p. 55.--Authority of England under Grattan's Constitution, p. 56.--Authority of England since the Union, p. 57.--Authority offered to England under Bill of 1886, p. 58.--Why should England accept in 1893 a worse bargain than was offered her in 1886? p. 59: Two alleged reasons, p. 60: First reason, Retention of Irish members concession to Unionists, p. 60: Futility of plea, ib.: Second reason, England will not suffer any greater evil than she does at present, p. 63: Answer. Fallacy of statement, ib.--Explanation of Gladstonian policy, p. 65.--Powers of Irish Government, p. 66: I. Irish Executive, ib.: Importance of Executive, p. 68: Powers of Irish Executive, p. 68: Position of military forces, p. 74: II. The Irish Parliament, p. 73: Its power to appoint the Irish Government, ib.: Its legislative power, p. 76.--Legislation in opposition to English policy, p 78.--Power to pass resolutions, p. 79.--The Restrictions, etc, p. 80: I. Their nature, ib.: 1. No restriction on power of Executive, p. 83: 2. No prohibition of Acts of Indemnity, ib.: 3. No prohibition of _ex post facto_ law, p. 84: 4. No safeguard against violation of contract, p. 85: II. Enforcement of Restrictions, p. 88.--The Veto, p. 88.--The Privy Council, p. 90.--Power to nullify Irish Acts, ib.--Power as final Court of Appeal to treat Irish Acts as void, p. 91.--How arrangement will work, p. 94.--Presumptions on which working of Constitutions depends false, p. 97: 1. Presumption that restrictions do not irritate, p. 98: Its falsehood, ib.--Financial arrangements certain to cause discontent, p. 100.--The Customs, ib.--Charges in favour of England on Ireland, p. 102.--Irish objection to financial proposals, p. 103.--Presumption that Ireland cannot nullify Restrictions. Its falsehood, p. 104.--Summary of criticism, p. 110.