Part 3
The Author's Description of _Boca-Chica_ Castle, _&c._ seems to be tolerably exact, and I cannot omit to remark the justness of his Expression, when he mentions the Bomb Vessels being got near enough to divert the Town; for in Truth they were posted at so great a Distance, that they seem'd to be sent in with no other Intention.
That the City of _Carthagena_ is to the Land-side, fortify'd by double Walls, and double Ditches, flank'd by strong Bastions, is an undoubted Truth; but I must dissent from what the Author alledges, of the Water at the Head of the Harbour, being shoal so far off, that Ships cannot come near enough to do Execution with their Guns. Experienced Pilots, and Masters of trading Vessels, who have been much conversant in that Harbour, do (and will when Occasion requires it) testify the contrary; but nothing can be a stronger Proof of there being sufficient depth of Water for our largest Ships, than that the Station of the _Spanish_ Galleons, is very near the Walls, for the Convenience of taking in their Lading. It is well known, that Monsieur _Ponti_ sent in his Men of War (amongst which was the _Sceptre_ of eighty-four Guns) to batter the City, and with so good an Effect, as in a short Time to oblige them to surrender.
But a still more recent Proof of there being sufficient depth of Water, is the celebrated Admiral _Vernon_'s having ordered in the _Galicia_, a _Spanish_ Man of War of sixty-six Guns: This Vessel was fitted up for battering in a very extraordinary Manner: _Merlons, or Cases, six Feet thick, rammed with Earth, or Sand, were formed between the Port-holes_, which occasioned her drawing more Water, than any of our eighty Gun Ships; notwithstanding, with her sixteen Guns mounted, _only_, she did considerable damage to the City, before she could be demolished.
That the _Spaniards_ have no great Dependance upon this supposed Shoalness of the Water, is very evident from their having lately erected a Battery of forty large Pieces of Cannon, for the defence of the Town on the Side towards the Harbour; a very unnecessary Expence, if the Water is there so shoal as to prevent the near Approach of our large Men of War.
From the Author's own Description, the Fort of St. _Lazar_ appears to be no such trifling Redoubt, as he would insinuate; had he approached near enough to take an exact View of it (which probably he did not) he must have observed that the Hill is near double the Height he mentions, and that the Eminence opposite to it (which, if Cannon could have been convey'd thither, was certainly a very proper Place for the erecting a Battery) is pretty much upon a Level with the Ground upon which the Castle stands.
That the Enemy began their Works upon the Hill, immediately after we were in Possession of _Boca-Chica_ (if not upon the first Appearance of the Fleet,) is a Fact well known, both to the Army and to the Navy; nor was it in the power of the Former to interrupt their Progress till the proper Materials were landed; but how far that might have been done, by sending in two or three of his Majesty's large Ships, the Gentlemen of the Sea are the most proper Judges.
That the Side of the Castle of _St. Lazar_, which is next the Town, could not be defenceless, must be evident to every Reader, from the Circumstance of its being next the Town, and consequently defended by all the Works on that Quarter, particularly by an Half-moon, which is erected about half Musket-Shot from it.
If the Enemy's Numbers (as the Author alledges, page 54.) amounted to 4000 Men, the Troops which were landed, and never exceeded 4350 Rank and File, could but have little Prospect of forcing them amidst their strong Fortifications; nor did the General and Principal Officers ever propose it to themselves, otherwise than by the help of the whole Force on board the Fleet, which was actually promised, as soon as a Passage should be opened for the Ships into the Harbour; how performed, the unhappy Issue but too plainly makes appear.
The Enemy's Engineers, Cannoniers, _&c._ acquitted themselves very well, and ours did the same, nor was there amongst them one single instance of Cowardice or Desertion; would the Author be pleased to put his Name to so base an Aspersion cast upon them, there are of the few surviving, who are well able to convince him of his Mistake.
It is roundly alledged, that excepting two Regiments, the whole body of Troops which came from _England_, were quite raw and undisciplined; how far this is a Fact known to every one, will appear, by minutely entering into their Circumstances.
As a Foundation for forming a Corps of Troops fit for immediate Service, his Majesty was pleased to direct a Draught to be made from the Foot Guards, of the best disciplined Corporals and private Men, to be appointed Marine Serjeants, as likewise 300 private Centinels well instructed in the Use of their Arms, to be placed to every Marine Regiment, who were for that Purpose draughted from all the old Corps in _Britain_; by which Means each of the Marine Regiments was actually supply'd with a Number of well-disciplin'd Men, not much short of the _Irish_ Corps before the Augmentation.
The Colonels of the six Regiments of Marines were old Officers, who had all (excepting one) served abroad in the last War.
Such were the greatest Part of the Lieutenant Colonels and Majors. The Captains were either Gentlemen of Service taken from the Half-Pay, or from the Independent Companies at _Jamaica_; such as had been long inured to the Climate of the _West-Indies_, or Subaltern Officers of long standing in the old Corps, whom his Majesty honour'd with the Command of Marine Companies. The first and second Lieutenants were either Ensigns taken out of the old Corps, Cadets, who had for some time carry'd Arms, or young Gentlemen, whose Quality and Interest very justly entituled them to Preferment. To these the Author has added a third imaginary Class, of _abandoned Wretches of the Town, whose Prostitution had made them useful on some dirty Occasion, and by Way of Reward were provided for in the Army_. I call upon the _Author_ to point out one single Man, who was sent out in those Corps, deserving of that Character; if he does not (as I am well assured he cannot) what Character he himself richly deserves, will easily occur to the Reader.
That few of the Inferior Officers had ever before served against an Enemy, is undoubtedly Fact, nor after thirty Years Peace, could it possibly be otherwise; but their Behaviour during the Incampment in the Isle of _Wight_, evidently made it appear that they were not deficient in Discipline; nor when they came to face the Enemy, could the oldest, and most experienced Officers expose their Persons with greater Gallantry and Chearfulness.
That most of the Officers, who had served long and well, got themselves knock'd on the Head by teaching a young and raw Army, is in Fact false; for both old and young equally shared the Hazard and Fatigue; nor did one single Officer or Soldier loose his Life, excepting in the Performance of his own Duty.
What an Heap of _Billingsgate_ does the Author employ (pag. 56.) to vilify the _American_ Regiment? _The Officers_ (he affirms) _were in particular composed of Blacksmiths, Taylors, and all the Banditti that the Country affords_. Had he been so candid as to have informed himself of those Gentlemens true Characters, he would have known, that the Field Officers were all Men of long Service, named by his Majesty, and sent from _Britain_: That the Companies were chiefly raised by the Interest, and at the Charge of their respective Captains; of whom some were Members of the Assemblies in the Provinces where they resided; others liv'd upon their own Plantations, and had Commands in the Militia; and some few of them had been concerned in Traffick. His Majesty was pleased to send to _North-America_ thirty young Gentlemen, under the Direction of Brigadier _Blakeney_, who were to serve in that Corps as Lieutenants; they had carried Arms either in the old Corps at home, or in the _Scotish_ Regiments in the _Dutch_ Service, and were most of them Cadets of good Families in _North Britain_.
The rest of the Subaltern Officers were recommended by the Governors, and by the Gentlemen of the first Rank in the Provinces where the Companies were raised; and were either younger Sons of the principal Families, bred to no particular Profession, or such of them as had been brought up to the Law, to Merchandize, or who had served at Sea.
It is certain, that the greatest Part of the private Soldiers, who were inlisted in _North-America_, were either _Irish_ (and many of those suspected to be Papists) or _English_, who had been under a Necessity of quitting their Native Country. As the Levy was made in Haste, there was neither Time for strictly examining into their respective Circumstances, nor for their being well-disciplin'd before they joined the Army; whence it became in a great Measure, necessary to employ them chiefly on board the Fleet.
Tho' this infamous Libel appears to be levell'd against that Corps of _Land Forces in general_, yet the Author is pleased more eminently to distinguish the Engineers, _&c._ belonging to the Train; he very roundly affirms, that _worse never bore the Name, nor could be pick'd out of all_ Europe.
The principal Engineer (Mr. _Moor_) was deservedly esteemed for his Bravery, his Capacity and Skill in his Profession; the Battery, on which he was killed, viewing the Effects of the Shot thro' an Embrasure, was well constructed, and fully answered the End for which it was raised: He had served with Applause in the Defence of _Gibraltar_, one of the principal Fortresses in _Europe_, which was attacked by an Army of 40,000 Men, composed of the best Troops in _Spain_, and batter'd by 100 Pieces of large Cannon; yet this Army was by the gallant Defence of the Garrison obliged to retire, after having been almost totally ruin'd at this _simple_ Siege, as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to stile it.
Mr. _Armstrong_, the Gentleman who succeeded as principal Engineer on the Death of Mr. _Moor_, had all the Experience, which could possibly be acquired in Time of Peace, having been continually employ'd during sixteen Years in the different Works about this Kingdom; nor could any Person whatsoever perform his Duty, with greater Attention, or more chearfully expose his Person, whenever he thought his Presence could in any wise contribute to the publick Service.
It is certain, that no more than two of the Sub-Engineers had ever served in the Face of an Enemy; which surely ought not to be imputed to them as a Fault, when, after so long a Peace, few or none so qualified were remaining: But nothing had been omitted by those Gentlemen to repair their Want of Experience both by their Application to the Study of their Profession at home, and by visiting the Fortifications in Foreign Parts; and when on real Service, it was very evident that they spared no Endeavours to make up that Deficiency by their Diligence and gallant Behaviour: Nor is there the least Room to doubt, but that the few who have returned from that fatal Expedition, will, whenever they shall be called upon, be found qualified to do effectual Service to their Country.
Colonel _Watson_'s Merit and long Services very justly entituled him to the Command of the Train on the late Expedition; nor did his Age (as the Author insinuates) ever prevent his Attendance upon his Duty; in the Performance of which he lost his Life by a Shot which glanced from a Tree, at some Distance from the Battery.
His Successor, a brave blunt Soldier (who can never be pardoned for boldly speaking the Truth) was so far from being rendered unfit for his Duty, that no Man attended it with more Diligence; from the first Opening the Battery before _Boca-Chica_, he scarcely ever left it, even for necessary Refreshment, till the Castle was taken.
Who could be so proper to be inlisted for Cannoniers, Bombardiers, _&c._ as Country Fellows? but those Country Fellows (as the Author is pleased to call them) were disciplin'd Men, capable of doing their Duty; in which they wanted no Aid, till Death and Sickness had reduced them so low, that it was necessary they should be reinforced both from the Army and the Fleet. The extraordinary Conference mentioned by the Author (page 56.) to have been held between the General and them, I can safely affirm, has not the least Foundation.
That many of the Bomb-Shells broke in the Air, from some Defect in their Fusees, or never broke at all, is undoubtedly Fact; which probably was occasioned by Damage they had received at Sea, and which could not be repaired, as we had neither Time nor Convenience for it, before their being wanted for Service. The Grenado-Shells were of the same Sort, of the very same Dimensions with those usually issued out from the Office of Ordnance; nor was there ever before the least mention made of their having been deficient. The Reason given for their not breaking is no great Proof of the Author's Skill, as an Engineer; for it is well known, that one single Ounce of Gunpowder is sufficient (if properly confined) to rend in Pieces a Stone weighting several Tuns.
The eight twenty-four Pounders, put on board for the Use of the Expedition, were all landed at _Boca-Chica_ fit for Service, and were there actually made use of upon the Battery, where two of them were rendered unserviceable.
One hundred Baulks, and three hundred Battery Planks, were by an Order from the Board of Ordnance, bearing date, _May_ 1740, issued out of the Stores, and imbark'd for the Use of the Expedition; but Lord _Cathcart_, having after the Imbarkation of the Troops, been informed that no further Supply could be had in the _West-Indies_, tho' the contrary had been represented to the Board of Ordnance; He applied for an Addition of one hundred Baulks, and 300 Planks, which were put on board before the Fleet sailed; as were likewise 4050 Hand-bills, his Lordship deeming the 1000 already provided not to be sufficient.
Upon the whole, nothing could more demonstrate the Goodness of this Army, than the Service they performed, not only amidst the almost insuperable Difficulties, which arose from the Climate, but labouring under the utmost Distresses and Discouragements from a Quarter, whence the Reverse ought justly to have been expected. Were the Instruments imploy'd on the late Expedition such as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to describe, there would be no great Difficulty in accounting for its Miscarriage; the which, Lord _Cathcart_ (had he lived) could probably not have prevented: but as it does, I think, evidently appear, that what the Author has advanced to the Prejudice of the Land Forces, is false and groundless, and that they performed whatever was possible for them to do in their Situation, our Misfortunes are to be ascribed to some other Cause; they were, without Doubt, principally occasioned by the Climate. What further may have contributed, nothing would set in a more clear Light, than an exact and faithful Account of every Transaction, not only during the Time of the Troops lying before _Carthagena_, but to that of their being recalled. Such an Account cannot but be very acceptable to all those who had a Share in that unfortunate Expedition, and had no other End in View but the publick Service. And, I am well assured, to none more than to the Gentleman, on whom the Command devolved by the Death of Lord _Cathcart_, who has all possible Reason to desire, that his whole Conduct may undergo the strictest Scrutiny.
I cannot conclude without remarking, as something extraordinary, the Justice done by the Author in his last Paragraph to the common Soldiers; but which is surely no less due to the Officers, who led them on, and by following whose brave Example, they gave evident Proofs, that they wanted not for Courage and Resolution becoming _Englishmen_.
_FINIS._
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: The principal Council of War, consisted of the two eldest Officers of the Army, of the two eldest Officers of the Navy, and of the Governor of _Jamaica_, whenever he could be present. It was the Province of this Council to determine what Enterprizes should be undertaken.]
[Footnote 2: _Vide_ Note (_a_) in the late Pamphlet, entituled, _An Account of the Expedition to_ Carthagena.]
[Footnote 3: Upon its being first debated, whether an Attempt should be made on _Carthagena_, the General declared, that, as he was a Stranger in those Seas, he had no Knowledge of the then present State of that City; and that he should join with the Admiral in his Opinion; not doubting of his being well inform'd of every Circumstance relating to the Entry into the Harbour, the Strength of the Garrison, _&c._]
[Footnote 4: In relating this Transaction (_vide_ P. 7. note Letter _c_) the very candid Author of the Account of the Siege of _Carthagena_, is pleas'd to affirm, that _the General landed with a Body of 800 Grenadiers, but not thinking them sufficient, reimbark'd, and sent for more_: There was not the least Step taken, which could give Colour for such an Assertion; excepting that Capt. _Dennet_, who commanded General _Harrison_'s Grenadiers, being apprehensive, that the General would give those of his own Regiment the Honour of landing first, push'd forward without Orders, and leaped on Shore with five or six Men: which the General perceiving, and that the rest of the Boats began to move in Confusion towards the Beach; he order'd those who had landed, (who were only _Dennet_, and the few Men abovementioned) to reimbark, and with the rest of the Boats to lay along-side of the _Norfolk_ and _Russel_, there to wait for the Arrival of the Companies, which were still wanting: Nor, had all the Companies of Grenadiers, been compleat to a Man, could they have exceeded 648 Officers included: but that was far from being the Case; for not only _Robinson_'s Grenadiers were then absent, having been separated from the Fleet, but the rest were at that Time so far reduced by Sickness, as not to amount to 400 Men, as it will appear from the Adjutant's Books.]
[Footnote 5: Had the Author of the Account, (_vide_ Note _d_,) been present on Shore, where probably he was not, he might have observed that all possible Diligence was used, to put the Men under Cover; and if he is in any wise capable of judging of military Operations at Land, he must have known that the Camp could not have been so properly formed in any other Place, for carrying on the Attack on the Castle of _Boca-Chica_; nor, if advanced higher into the Woods, could it have been supplied with Water, or the Tents pitch'd on that rocky Soil, which will not admit of the driving down a Tent Pin; but setting aside that Difficulty, how the Tents could have been pitch'd without cutting down the Trees, from whose Shade, as the Author alledges, the Soldiers would have been so much benefited, I really do not comprehend; nor would they have been less exposed to the Enemy's Shot, excepting they had incamped out of the Reach of it, which could not have answered the End proposed by their Landing.]
[Footnote 6: Mr. _Moor_ was of Opinion, that if an Opening should be made through the Wood from the Camp to the _Lagoon_, where the Enemy's Ships of War lay at Anchor, it might be a means of directing their fire: That the Admiral sollicited the General to continue this Coupure, is, I believe, true; but that it would have answer'd the Purposes mention'd in the latter part of the Note (_f_) in the Pamphlet, is not so evident. As the Enemy was in Possession of the _Lagoon_, they would not surely send Succours cross the _Boca-Grande_, (where Ships were posted to observe their Motions) thence with Hazard to pass the _Tierra Bomba_; which Succours could be conveyed by the way of the Harbour, without Danger or Interruption: nor could that Coupure be of the least Use to enable us to observe what passed in the Harbour, of which we daily received Accounts from the abovementioned Ships, or from our small Parties; nor, if there was Danger to be apprehended from the Enemy's Incursions, (which there was not) could this Coupure have prevented them, as it was not much less than 1000 Paces from the Castle of _Boca-Chica_.]
[Footnote 7: The Communication between the Mortar-Battery and the Camp (_vide_ Letter _g_ in the Pamphlet) was covered from the Shot of the Castle by a rising Ground, nor was one Man killed during the whole Time in passing between that and the Camp, nor did one single Shot take Place in it from the Fascine Battery, from which it was in great Measure secured by its natural Situation, which was help'd by a Parapet. Several of the Bombs most certainly broke in the Air, without any Effect; which was possibly occasioned by the splitting of the Fuzees, in driving them into the Shells. Nor (notwithstanding what the Author is pleased to advance) did we suffer much from those thrown by the Enemy; one of which fell near the Mortar-Battery, and killed 6 or 7 Men; a few took Place in the Artillery-Park, (whither they were chiefly directed) damaged some Casks of working Tools, and two or three Carriages; but the greatest Part of them were either extinguished by falling into the Water, or buried themselves so deep in the Sand, as to break without any ill Effect whatsoever.]
[Footnote 8: Fascines and Pickets (_vide_ the beginning of the Note _f_) had not only been cut during the Fleet's watering at _Hispaniola_, but after our landing on _Tierra Bomba_, all possible Diligence was daily used, to compleat the Number required for erecting the Batteries. Nothing can be more absurd than to imagine that so skilful an Engineer, as was Mr. _Moor_, could be so widely mistaken as to the Quantity. As soon as the Ground was cleared, and proper Works thrown up to cover the Workmen, he began with such Materials as were ready, and had from the Fleet no other Assistance than 18 Carpenters for laying the Platforms; the Seamen were employed, (and that was properly their Province) in landing the Stores and Cannon; in getting the latter up to the Battery, and they afterwards assisted in firing of it; (most of the Gunners being at that time either Dead, or disabled by Sickness) besides 150 of them were for one or two Days employed to cut Fascines, but were so ungovernable as to be of little Service.
How far the Author may be qualified to judge of the Knowledge of the Sub-Engineers, Time may discover; was Mr. _Moor_ still living, he could well answer for the Construction of his Battery. He rais'd it not exactly parallel to the Face where the Breach was made, for a very powerful Reason: to prevent its being flank'd from the _Barradera_ Battery, and by that means preserved the Lives of a great many Men, who must otherwise have been lost. It is not improbable, that the Author believ'd the Line of Communication, between the great Gun-Battery and the Camp, to have been expos'd to the Enemy's Shot, and therefore never came near it; or he must have known that it was neither enfiladed from the Castle, nor the Shipping, and that the few Men who were killed there, fell by Shot which glanced from the Trees, and did not exceed 7 or 8 during the whole Time the Troops lay before the Castle. (_vide_ Note _b_)]
[Footnote 9: The Troops were certainly annoyed in their Camp by the Enemy's Cannon, and particularly by the Fascine Battery: an Inconvenience which, in their Circumstances, was absolutely necessary to be supported, as by their removing to so great a Distance, as to be out of the reach of their Shot, the great Gun-Battery must have been expos'd to be insulted, which would at least have for some Time retarded the taking of the Castle, if not oblig'd us to retire.