Part 2

_September, 1841._--Sir William Macnaghten obtained a force to be sent out to the Zoormut country. A chief, contemptuously designated as a robber, was said to have gone into the town of Zaho beyond Gurdez. The information given to Capt. Hay, commanding one of the Shah's corps, represented the place as contemptible. He went there with some few troops supported by guns, found that the place was much stronger than he had supposed, and that he could not do any thing against it, and that he was fired at from six forts. On this intelligence reaching Cabul, a large force was sent out on the 28th of September, under Col. Oliver of the 5th, consisting of half of Capt. Abbott's battery, two iron nine-pounder guns, a wing of the 44th Queen's, the 5th N. I., Capt. Warburton's guns, Capt. Backhouse's mountain train, Anderson's horse, the Kohistan corps, and two others of the Shah's, with the King's sappers and miners and the Hindostanee sappers and miners under Capt. Sturt, as sole engineer.

The first day's march was through the city, with narrow streets and sharp turnings, very unfavorable for guns, as was also a bad road afterwards, a nullah, and a steep ascent; all which circumstances kept them from getting into camp until late in the evening; after that the road was good, with the exception of the Al-Timor pass, which was very steep. It rises 9600 feet above the level of the sea. The crest was represented as being as much as a man on horseback could surmount, and the artillery would never have been got over it had not the natives given their assistance: 800 of them dragged the guns up. The great difficulty (as far as I could learn) lay, not so much in the acclivity, as in the roughness of the road, which was perfectly filled with huge blocks of stone. Here it was dreadfully cold, and snow fell. Beyond this pass the people of the country fled, abandoning their property, and consequently their suffering must be very great in the approaching winter.

The chiefs declared that they were ready to submit, but the orders were peremptory to destroy the forts that had fired on the Shah's troops. Lieut. John Conolly and Lieut. Burnet (54th) chupao'd[2] Akram Khan, riding sixty miles at night with 300 horsemen. They surprised the chief, his wives, and families; it was however done through the treachery of the chief's son-in-law, who disclosed his retreat. The Shah has ordered Akram Khan's execution. Whilst these events were going on, disturbances had broken out near Cabul, where much had occurred to incite the chiefs to rise. In former times, under the feudal system, when the sovereign of Cabul required troops, each bold chieftain came forward with his retainers; but these vassals had been taken from them, and were embodied in corps commanded by British officers, to whom they owed no affection, and only paid a forced obedience, whilst their hearts were with their national religion; their chief's power was now greatly limited, and the chouk guaranteed to them was withheld on the plea that the Company had commanded retrenchments. But the saving required by Government was a curtailment of those expences which were defrayed by its own rupees, whereas the 40,000 rupees now the subject of dispute were, in fact, no saving at all to us, as that money was never paid by the Company, but was the chouk or money excused to the chiefs out of the revenue or dues owing to the King, on condition of their enforcing the submission of the petty chiefs and the payment of their rents. This sum whether paid to Shah Shoojah or not, would never have replenished the Hon. Company's coffers; and by upholding the Shah in such an act of aggression we compromised our faith, and caused a pretty general insurrection, said to be headed by Meer Musjude.

The Kohistanee chiefs are urged on by the Dooranee Chiefs in Cabul, and all the country about Tézeen and Bhoodkhak is in a state of revolt. It is only wonderful this did not take place sooner.

The Indian government have for some time been constantly writing regarding the enormous expenditure in Affghanistan, every dāk has reiterated retrench; but instead of lessening the political expences and making deductions in that department, they commenced by cutting off these 40,000 rupees from the chiefs.

Affairs having assumed this gloomy appearance, the Envoy sent in all haste for the force under Col. Oliver to return as quickly as possible, leaving it to Capt. Macgregor's diplomatic ability to patch up the Zaho business as best he might, and come to the rescue with his advice regarding the Tézeenites, with whose customs, &c. he had much familiarity. Macgregor strongly advised the not stirring up a hornet's nest, and wished to try what he could do by diplomacy. Valour, however, was the order of the day; and various were the suggestions of the politicals. One plan was, that Gen. Sale's brigade, on its way down to the provinces, should make a detour viâ Nigerow. The troops were not to fight but only by their presence to overawe the Nigerowians, whilst some neighbouring tribes, who had a blood feud with them, should make the attack. Plans of the country were sent in, with imaginary roads drawn on them from various points, whilst supervening obstacles to the march of an army, such as hills and passes, were omitted. The scheme was not considered feasible, in consequence of the advanced state of the season, it being now October, and from the apprehension that the cold would destroy the camels requisite to carry the tents and provisions.

_9th October._--The 35th N. I., commanded by Col. Monteath, C. B., with two six-pounder guns under Lieut. Dawes, were suddenly sent at a day's notice to Bhoodkhak, partly as being the first march towards the provinces (they forming a part of Sale's, or the 1st brigade), and partly in consequence of the disturbances.

_11th._--The 13th light infantry, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Dennie, C. B., were also sent at a few hours' notice to Bhoodkhak; but as they were not to proceed on their march until the arrival of Capt. Abbott with his guns, I remained at Cabul with my daughter, Mrs. Sturt, who had been staying with us during her husband's absence with Col. Oliver's force; and Sale took his departure from Cabul, fully expecting me to follow him in three days at the latest.

_12th._--The 13th and 35th, with the two guns under Dawes, moved forward, the whole under Sale, them object being to go through the Khoord Cabul pass, and place the 35th N. I. in an advanced position at Khoord Cabul, after which the 13th were to fall back again on Bhoodkhak. This movement was effected, but with considerable loss. The Khoord Cabul is a narrow defile, enclosed by high and rugged rocks; it is said that the number of the enemy did not exceed 60 men, but they possessed considerable advantage over our troops in their knowledge of the country and in the positions they took up; for until they commenced firing, not a man was known to be there. They were concealed behind rocks and stones, and by a stone breastwork that they had hastily thrown up, behind which, on our troops entering the pass, they laid in wait, and appeared to pick off the officers in particular. The number of the enemy were, however, underrated, as I am assured there were fully 200 of them. The 35th lost, in killed and wounded, about 40 men; and Capt. Younghusband, of the same corps, was badly wounded in the foot. The 13th had 8 men killed and 19 wounded. Gen. Sale was wounded in the left leg; the ball entered near the ankle, shivered the small bone, and was taken out from the skin on the other side where it had lodged. Lieut. Mein of the 13th, while leading his company up to the breastwork, was severely and dangerously wounded in the head; the skull was fractured by the ball, which entered it. Lieut. Oakes, of the same regiment, had also a very narrow escape, being wounded in the head also. It rained very heavily that night, and the 13th had the full benefit of it, for they were out all night, having two alertes; one of the sentries was mortally wounded, being shot on his post. Exertions were made to discover the persons who fired on our sentries: three men were seized who had in their possession the soldier's belt, which was a tolerable evidence of criminality; but the Envoy wrote to say, that the people about the King said that those men were good men and true, and they were to be released without any punishment!

_13th._--Two companies of the 37th N. I. and two guns under Mr. Waller, were sent to reinforce the 13th at Bhoodkhak, leaving only the remainder of the 37th in cantonments, and no guns. Should there be a rising in Cabul, we should be entirely without the means of defence. The Shah's troops have moved from their camp behind, to Siah Sung, for protection, as, from the force which has gone with Col. Oliver, they have not guards enough to protect their camp, or the stores left there: their sentries are fired on constantly. Lieut. Mayne, of the Shah's service was reported to have been shot when going his rounds last night, but it was a mistake; the suwar who accompanied him was the sufferer.

A poor woman, a Mrs. Smith, the wife of a conductor, was travelling up the Bolan pass to Kandahar, with a few suwars as a guard. She was attacked by the Belooches; the suwars fled, Mrs. Smith got out of her palkee and ran a short distance, but was soon overtaken and killed; the body was not plundered, and her rings were found on her fingers, and her earrings in her ears; not that they committed the act from hatred to the Feringhees and disdain of plunder, but that, according to the superstition of these tribes, it is a most unlucky circumstance to kill a woman; and finding their victim of the gentle sex, they fled, and left her as she fell.

_17th._--Col. Oliver's force returned; Capt. Abbott's guns have had their carriages much damaged; the spokes of sundry wheels are absent, thanks to the acclivities and declivities of the Al-Timor pass, so that he requires a few days to put all to rights before he can go to join Sale with the 37th: when they do so, the brigade will move on Tézeen.

_18th._--The enemy came down (a chupao or night attack), 400 strong, on Khoord Cabul, where an action was fought with great loss on both sides; Lieut. Jenkins of the 30th was mortally wounded, and lingered in great agony, having been shot through the spine. Col. Monteath sent to Sale for reinforcements, who despatched to him the two companies of the 37th that had lately arrived at Bhoodkhak.

_19th._--The remainder of the 37th marched from Cabul to Bhoodkhak; also Capt. Abbott and his guns, and the Shah's sappers and miners under Capt. Broadfoot. Sale and Sturt have agreed that I am to remain with him and my daughter at Cabul, and to come on with the Envoy, who is anxious to go to his government at Bombay, and Gen. Elphinstone, who returns to the provinces in consequence of ill health.

Sale's brigade is to move on to Khoord Cabul to-morrow. Seventy-seven of the wounded men from thence and Bhoodkhak have come in to cantonments, as also Lieut. Mein, of the 13th. It appears that the Hazir Bash, the escort sent by the King with Capt. Trevor to Capt. Macgregor (political agent), were the people who let the Ghilzyes into the 35th's camp; they were partly of the same tribe, and whilst the rest were fighting, these ever-ready gentlemen did a little work of their own, cutting down surwans and hamstringing camels. Whilst they were thus employed Capt. Wyndham came up with a company of the 35th, and fired into the midst, putting them to rout. Col. Monteath turned these people out of his camp as unsafe to be trusted; the Envoy has ordered them to be sent back to Cabul, and to be kindly treated, and will not believe them to be in fault. The Hazir Bash, as their name imports, are "aye ready for the field," but I fear that just now--

"At a word it may be understood, They are ready for evil and not for good,"

like Walter Scott's goblin page.

_20th._--Lieut. Jenkins's body was brought to Capt. Sturt's house; he died just after he was placed in the dhooley, and was thus saved the additional pain of the journey.

_21st._--Lieut. Jenkins's funeral took place. As the 35th lost ninety camels, and fifty more were sent in with the sick and wounded, the force is detained until more camels can reach them from Cabul.

_23d._--Much firing has been heard, and great anxiety prevails. All the forts about Cabul are empty, and the Juwans have gone (it is said) to aid in the fight against us at Tézeen: Sale writes that the report is, that the people at Tézeen say they are unable to cope with us in battle, but that they intend to plunder and annoy the force on its way down.

_24th._--Sturt sent me a note before I was dressed this morning to inform me, that at Tézeen one small fort had been evacuated, and that Lieut. E. King, of the 13th light infantry, was killed. In the course of the morning I heard that the 13th, having expended their ammunition, were obliged to retreat; that poor King, being the last man to do so, was shot dead on the spot. The men could not stop to take up his body then, but they returned shortly after, and obtained it before the enemy had time to do more than take off his jacket. He was a gallant high-spirited young man, universally beloved, and consequently is much lamented. He was interred under a tent at night, lest the Affghans should recognise the grave and disinter the body. We afterwards were informed that the attack was made on the rear guard before they quitted their ground; that the enemy cut in, in rear of the baggage, took ninety camels with all the treasure of the 13th, a large quantity of ammunition, and other stores.

Gen. Elphinstone told me, that Sale had been very imprudent in using his leg, and had consequently been suffering a great deal of pain, but that the remedies applied had given him relief; he expressed great regret that he had not communicated any information to me, taking it for granted that the Envoy had done so, if I had not a letter from Sale himself; but he was wounded, and with plenty of military occupation, could not always find time to write me many particulars, as he had to send his despatches off as quickly as possible to the General.

A letter from a friend with the force that was sent from Kandahar mentions, that the force had arrived at the extreme point of their tour (Dehwarah) on the 15th of October, and that they were to set out on their return the following day. Capt. Leeson, of the 42d, in temporary command of the Shah's 1st cavalry regiment, was to march twenty-five miles and over a pass (the Kotilla Meercha), to be out of the way of the others, on account of the scarcity of water. The troops had not had any thing to do, nor was there even a chance of their having a foe to contend with, for the people of that part of the country got such a lesson in the fight of Secunderabad, that the chiefs could not have collected 200 men; the forts were mere shells, their walls of no thickness.

The fort against which the eighteen-pounder guns were sent out, has been an utter ruin for years, not only indefensible but uninhabitable. The troops have been terribly distressed bringing the guns over and through the passes, which are more difficult than can be imagined by those that have not seen them; the last, the Dana Thunghee, is described as resembling what the Khyber would be about Ali Musjid, if it had a deep and very rapid river flowing through it, the said river having to be crossed thirteen times.

The Kotilla Taj-i (crown of the mountains), is very steep, and as nearly impracticable as it can be, without being actually so. To avoid these passes, the troops are to go through the Kotilla Murdee (dead men's pass), which Capt. Leeson reports, from what he has seen of it, as practicable but difficult. He writes to me that it will take a great deal of labour to get the guns over it. From thence they steer for Kurtoot (the donkey's mulberry), but it was not known whether the route by that place was practicable; if not, they must face the Kotilla Taj-i, bad as it is. Major Rawlinson, the political agent, had obtained the blessings of the force for leading them such a wild-goose chase; he seems to have received information that Akram Khan had a fort there, but not to have known what that fort was like. It is a pity the army were harassed unnecessarily; but in Major R.'s defence it is but justice to say, that information is difficult to procure, and that it all comes from our enemies.

_25th._--I received a letter from Sale, in which he informs me, that the conduct of the troops employed in the affair at Tézeen was good beyond all praise; but, concluding that I had heard all the particulars, he did not enter into detail. He wrote me that he was to halt that day (the 24th), as Macgregor was in treaty with the chiefs, who he says are willing to refrain from all further opposition, and say they are convinced they have no chance against us. Sturt has seen a letter from Lieut. Cunningham, of the Shah's sappers and miners, by which it appears that no enemy showing themselves, Capt. Paton, Qr.-Mr.-Genl., was on the point of pitching the camp, when some of the advance guard were fired on, upon which two companies were sent from each corps, with the sappers, who all behaved gallantly; they went up the hills, and down again, chased the enemy into their fort, and the sappers, commanded by Capt. Broadfoot, drove them through it, and followed them through the wicket they escaped by. The 13th having expended their ammunition were obliged to retreat, and it was then that Lieut. E. King fell.

Lady Macnaghten called on me, and told me that Capt. Macgregor, Political Agent, wrote that the chiefs received him with great politeness, and were pleased at the confidence reposed in them by his going to meet them attended only by one suwar. They appeared to be unanimous, and many in number, mustering 700 followers, who were daily increasing. They agreed to all the conditions but one; whatever that is, it appears to be the main point to be conceded, and we suppose that it relates to the 40,000 rupees. One day has been allowed to the chiefs to deliberate. The Envoy was some time since warned by three Affghans not to ride so early in the morning or so late in the evening as was his wont; but, whether from policy or natural fearlessness, he has not attended to their advice. The Akhoonzadah has also told him that three men have sworn on the Koran to take his life. The people of Tagow and Lughman are leagued with those of Tézeen. Capt. Macgregor writes that a great quantity of ammunition was left on the road for want of camels to carry it on, which must have proved a great prize to the enemy, who were much in want of it.

_26th._--There being a report that all was peaceably settled at Tézeen, I became very anxious for intelligence. Two letters were brought to me, but alas! neither of them were to my address, one being from Capt. Havelock to Gen. Elphinstone, the other from Capt. Paton to Major Thain. After giving them a reasonable time to ruminate over their news, I wrote to Major Thain, requesting him to give me any information in his power; and informing him that I had no letter, I got the provoking reply that the Sahib was gone out. Sometime afterwards Major Thain called: he owned he was puzzled as to what was going on, but hoped that affairs would remain quiet until we got out of the country. He said it was the present intention, that the sick should move out on Saturday next, and the Envoy and the General should leave Cabul on Monday the 1st. Shortly after he left me, he sent me the two letters to read; he had expressed his surprise that they had not arrived sooner, both being dated the 24th; and my letter of the same date from Sale had arrived the day before! Capt. Havelock mentions that all is settled and hostages given, but remarks that, since the pacification, the camels have been fired on, as also our outposts, but says, the one may be attributable to the arrival of a chief who was in ignorance of the treaty, and the other, to their people not being well in hand, a pretty sounding phrase; but are we to understand that our men are so well in hand as not to resent it? Capt. Paton writes mysteriously, that he has much to communicate, "better spoken than written," and says the enemy have consented regarding the obnoxious chief, (some person who they did not wish should participate in the benefits of the treaty). He adds that a force to be of any use in that country must not be hampered with camels, tents or baggage, and that the ammunition should be carried only on mules or yaboos. If all remained quiet, Paton and Havelock were to return, and the force to go on to Kutta Lung. Paton hints that something had gone wrong which would not have done so, had Gen. Sale not been confined to his dhooley. Thain tells me that there is no mention in Sale's despatch of the gallant conduct of the sappers and miners as related by Cunningham; he being wounded probably did not observe all that passed, and did not have the circumstances brought to his notice in time to write them; but had he done so, it would have been very immaterial, for, excepting from private letters, no intelligence transpires.

Last year, when Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded, and during the disturbances in the Kohistan, every despatch from Sale, who commanded the troops there, was promulgated in orders, and the present system of keeping information close is disgusting; there can be no secrets regarding what passes in action in the field. The general impression is that the Envoy is trying to deceive himself into an assurance that the country is in a quiescent state. He has a difficult part to play, without sufficient moral courage to stem the current singly. About two months since Sir William wrote to Lord Auckland, explaining to him the present state of Affghanistan, and requesting that five additional regiments should be sent to this country, two of them to be European. To these statements a written war succeeded between the Envoy and the Supreme Government of Bengal. Letter after letter came calling for retrenchment. Sir William had been appointed from home Governor of Bombay, and was particularly chosen for the office from his being a moderator and a man unlikely to push any violent measures; he hoped affairs might take a turn for the better, and was evidently anxious to leave Cabul and assume his new appointment. In an evil hour he acceded to the entreaties of Sir Alexander Burnes (who appears to have been blinded on the subject) and wrote to Lord Auckland to nullify his former request for additional troops, and to say that part of those now in the country might be withdrawn. The 1st brigade under Sale was accordingly ordered to be in readiness to move down; and it was generally understood, that all would be withdrawn as soon as the Shah had raised five more regiments of his own. The letter of recall, as we may term Sir William's, was sent off only two days before the breaking out of the Zoormut affair.

Great stress has been laid upon the chiefs having given us hostages, but this is no certain proof of their sincerity; we have been long enough amongst them for them to know the British character; they also know that the Dost's family were safely and honourably treated under our protection, whilst he and his son were in arms against us, and they naturally consider their safety as a proof of that of any hostages they leave with us.