Part 13

The Nawaub Zeman Shall Khan and Osman Khan appear to be honourable men; as also Mahommed Shah Khan Ghilzye: the former, or his son, sits with the hostages day and night to insure their protection. The latter is the person who received the sword-cut on his arm intended for Mackenzie, and thereby saved his life, on the 23d of last month.

A party of fifty Affghan workmen, magnified by the General into 500, have been sent to work on the banks of the canal: they soon said they were cold and tired, and would finish the rest to-morrow.

Two men came in to-day with a Koran to Sergeant Deane (who, from having an Affghan wife, has many acquaintances and friends amongst the people of Cabul): they report that Mahommed Akbar Khan is false; that 10,000 Kohistanees are to attack us at Tézeen, and all the Ghilzyes at Soorkhab.

Offers have been made of provisions; but it is suspected that it is only to try our faith, and see if we will lay in provisions on the sly.

_2d._--Before breakfast Sturt received the following note from Gen. Elphinstone:--

"Dear Sturt,

"Are we to have the Affghan Bhildars again to-day? If so, they had better be employed on the other side of the river. Pottinger proposes our taking on the planks to cross the streams in the Khoord Cabul pass. He says 250 planks would do. He will explain this to you after breakfast. Let me hear what was done yesterday. We shall march on Tuesday, I think: that is the present arrangement. You must settle with Boyd about the bullocks for the bridge, which we must take on to the Loghur.

"Yours, "W. R. E."

There have been so many clever propositions during the siege, that, if I succeed in saving my papers, many of the original letters will require to be appended, to prove that I do not use the traveller's privilege! To-day's is this. We make a bridge to cross the Cabul river; and carry on planks to the Loghur, in case that bridge should have been destroyed. Major Pottinger proposes that we carry 250 planks, to be laid down in the Khoord Cabul, for crossing the streams, which occur on an average every 100 yards. Could we afford transport for these planks, the delay occasioned would render the journey through that pass one of about three days, as the stream is crossed about thirty times. One word regarding the carriage of these said planks. A camel would only carry two; thus, 125 animals would be required; and we are unable to take the requisite quantity of ammunition, for want of carriage. Besides, why is this stream not to be frozen, as it is but a few inches deep any where?

There appears to be much commotion amongst the chiefs regarding the Envoy's death, and Akbar's conduct; who still repeats that he did not kill the Envoy, but that it was done by the Ghazeeas. He threatens to attack us on the road; and Osman Khan says if he does he will fight him all the way down, taking, as his own party, 1000 horse and 500 foot.

Aziz Khan is to be at Soorkhab ready to exterminate us. We hear from the city that Sale has been taking forts, carrying off women and provisions, and greatly annoying the good people about Jellalabad.

_3d._--The march, which was fixed for to-day, is again postponed. The Kohistanees have not received any part of the money given to the chiefs. They have sent an agent to Sturt to say that, if we wish it, they will bring the chiefs of Kardurrah into cantonments, with four others, as hostages; that we need not give them any money now, they know that we have none, and are content with our promise. They wish us to remain quiet. They will give us provisions; and attack and fire Cabul within three days. They will also go down and bring up reinforcements for us from Jellalabad. They assure us that the chiefs are false, and mean to attack us on the road. All this was represented to our chiefs by Sturt. The reply he received was, "It was better to keep the matter quiet; as in the present state of things it might, if known, cause excitement."

Shah Shoojah is said to have a strong party: and all the roads leading to the Bala Hissar are watched, to prevent persons joining him; though Nooreddin has succeeded in doing so, with twenty followers.

The 40,000 rupees given by us to the chiefs, to raise 2000 men, at twenty rupees each, to protect us to Jellalabad, have not succeeded. They have kept the money, of course; but say they cannot get men to go at this season; and even if they could, the chiefs cannot afford to weaken their party by sending their followers away.

The thermometer to-day at sunrise was below zero; in the sitting room, with an enormous blazing fire, at noon, 40°. Yesterday, with the same good fire, at 9 A.M., 11°.

Another excellent project of Major Pottinger's. Among our various vacillatory measures, there is again a thought, now that the time for action is long past, to force our way into the Bala Hissar: but how are we to get our ammunition in? Erect a battery on the Siah Sung Hill (of course to be the work of fairies during the night), fire our shot from cantonments into the battery, where of course guardian sylphs would protect the lives of our men, who were quickly to pick them up, and send them on, in like manner, into the Bala Hissar! No arrangement made for transporting the powder. The tale was told from where the conversation had taken place--at the General's. The narrator was Capt. Bellew. Both Sturt and I taxed him with joking; but he assured us it was all true, and only another of the many strange events constantly occurring. Then ensued a long parley and military discussion on the point, its feasibility, and its having been tried in some peninsular warfare. But I never could get Bellew to explain how our men's lives in the battery were to be saved.

_4th._--I heard from Sale, dated 19th December. He acknowledged the receipt of my note, giving an account of operations up to the 9th instant. He was doubly anxious relative to our situation, from having heard only the day before that the Kandahar troops were near us, and all the cossids telling those at Jellalabad that we had plenty of provisions; and he still trusts in God that the Kandahar force may arrive in time to save us; and prevent the necessity of terms disgraceful to our reputation in India. He informs me of the arrival of the advanced guard of our cavalry at Peshawer with ammunition; and that the 3d Buffs and 9th Foot had marched; with altogether six regiments of N. I., and some artillery, sappers, and engineer officers. The news from Cabul had not then had any effect on the chiefs about Jellalabad, whose followers are daily diminishing. Our troops were, nevertheless, as hard at work as ever, making the place as strong as possible. At that time Mackeson had not sent them any money; of which they were in great want, not having a rupee to give to the troops, and three months' pay nearly due. Extracts from my letter had been sent to Government and to the Commander-in-Chief. The original has been sent to my son-in-law, Capt. Bund; as Sale writes me that no other person gives them any idea of our real position at Cabul.

The Affghans still tell us we are doomed; and warn us to be particularly cautious of our safety in going out of cantonments. Taj Mahommed says that Mrs. Sturt and I must wear neemchees over our habits--common leather ones--and turbans, and ride mixed in with the suwars; not to go in palkees or keep near the other ladies, as they are very likely to be attacked.

The chiefs are to come in to-morrow to take charge of cantonments before we leave them. Nawaub Zeman Shah Khan is also to come in to see the General.

Orders for the first bugle at 6, the second at 7. Sturt inquired if he was to make the breach, and, when made, who were to guard it, &c.: to which the following is the reply:--

"My dear Sturt,

"If it is as well as before, the General thinks you need not turn out the sappers. The Brigadier says you are the best judge as to whether it is defensible or not.

"Yours truly, "WM. THAIN.

"4th Jan. 7 P.M.

"The General wants to know if the planks which were sent have been removed. The troops are not to turn out at 6 in the morning as ordered, but wait till further orders.

"W. T."

_January 5th._--Sturt employed in making the breach. The chiefs say we shall go to-morrow. Orders out for 7 and 8 o'clock.

Shah Shoojah has sent a message to ask if not even one officer of his force will stand by him. This message was, I know, delivered by Sturt himself to several; but circumstances admitted not of their further adherence. Indeed it is more than doubtful that the King was at the bottom of the insurrection, never dreaming that it would go so far.

[2] See Vocabulary for this and other Oriental terms.

[3] Commonly written Sepoys.

[4] This letter was lost, together with all the rest of the documents of the army. (See p. 2.)

THE RETREAT FROM CABUL.

_Thursday, 6th January, 1842._--We marched from Cabul. The advanced guard consisted of the 44th Queen's, 4th Irregular Horse, and Skinner's Horse, two H. A. six-pounder guns, Sappers and Miners, Mountain Train, and the late Envoy's escort. The main body included the 5th and 37th N. I.; the latter in charge of treasure; Anderson's Horse, the Shah's 6th Regiment, two H. A. six-pounder guns. The rear guard was composed of the 54th N. I., 5th Cavalry, and two six-pounder H. A. guns. The force consisted of about 4500 fighting men, and 12,000 followers.

The troops left cantonments both by the rear gate and the breach to the right of it, which had been made yesterday by throwing down part of the rampart to form a bridge over the ditch. All was confusion from before daylight. The day was clear and frosty; the snow nearly a foot deep on the ground; the thermometer considerably below freezing point.

By eight o'clock a great part of the baggage was outside the cantonments. It was fully expected that we would have to fight our way out of them, although terms had been entered into with the Sirdar for our safe escort. Bills were granted on India for fourteen and a half lakhs of rupees, by the political authority (Major Pottinger) to the Cabul Shroffs, to be paid to the following Sirdars, who were, on their part, to protect the force as far as Peshawer:--

Mahommed Zeman Shah Khan, three lakhs:

Amenoollah Khan, six lakhs:

Khan Shireen Khan, head of the Kuzzilbashes, two lakhs:

Mahommed Akbar Khan, one lakh:

Osman Khan, two lakhs:

The Ghilzye chiefs, half a lakh.

We started at about half-past nine A.M. The advance party were not molested; there might have been 50 or 100 Affghans collected about the gateway to witness our departure. The ladies, collectively speaking, were placed with the advance, under the charge of the escort; but Mrs. Sturt and I rode up to Capt. Hay, and mixed ourselves with his troopers.

The progress was very slow; for the first mile was not accomplished under two and a half hours. There was only one small bridge over the Nullah, which is eight feet broad, but deep, situated about fifty yards from cantonments.

Great stress had been laid on the necessity of a bridge over the Cabul river, about half a mile from cantonments. In vain had Sturt represented over and over again, that as the river was perfectly fordable, it was a labour of time and inutility: with snow a foot deep, the men must get their feet wet. However, as usual, every sensible proposition was overruled; and Sturt was sent long before daylight to make the bridge with gun carriages. They could not be placed over-night, as the Affghans would have carried them off: he had therefore to work for hours up to his hips in water, with the comfortable assurance that, when his unprofitable task was finished, he could not hope for dry clothes until the end of the march; and immediately on quitting the water they were all frozen stiff. I do not mention this as an individual grievance, but to show the inclemency of the weather, and the general misery sustained.

The bullocks had great difficulty in dragging these gun-carriages through the snow, and when the bridge was made it was proved to be an unnecessary expense of time and labour. The baggage might have forded the river with great ease, a little above the bridge, where it was not deep. Mrs. Sturt and I rode with the horsemen through the river, in preference to attempting the rattling bridge of planks laid across the gun carriages: but the camp followers determined not to go through the water, and jostled for their turns to go over the bridge. This delay was the origin of the day's misfortune, which involved the loss of nearly all the baggage, and the greater part of the commissariat stores.

The troops had been on half rations during the whole of the siege: they consisted of half a seer of wheat per diem, with melted ghee or dhal, for fighting men; and for camp followers, for some time, of a quarter of a seer of wheat or barley. Our cattle, public and private, had long subsisted on the twigs and bark of the trees. From the commencement of negotiations with the chiefs, otta, barley, and bhoosa were brought in in considerable quantities; the former selling at from two to four seers per rupee, and the latter from seven to ten; but neither ourselves nor our servants benefited by this arrangement: it came to the commissariat for the troops. The poorer camp followers had latterly subsisted on such animals (camels, ponies, &c.) as had died from starvation. The men had suffered much from over work and bad feeding, also from want of firing; for when all the wood in store was expended, the chiefs objected to our cutting down any more of the fruit trees; and their wishes were complied with. Wood, both public and private, was stolen: when ours was gone, we broke up boxes, chests of drawers, &c.; and our last dinner and breakfast at Cabul were cooked with the wood of a mahogany dining table.

When the advance had proceeded about a mile, an order was brought for a return to cantonments, as Mahommed Zeman Shah Khan had written to say the chiefs were not ready; but shortly afterwards a counter order arrived to proceed without loss of time.

When the rear guard left cantonments, they were fired upon from the cantonment then filled with Affghans. The servants, who were not concerned in the plunder, all threw away their loads, and ran off. Private baggage, commissariat, and ammunition were nearly annihilated at one fell swoop. The whole road was covered with men, women, and children, lying down in the snow to die.

The only baggage we saved was Mrs. Sturt's bedding, on which the ayah rode; and keeping her close to us, it was saved.

The Mission Compound was first vacated: and when the force from thence came into cantonments in order to pass through them, it was immediately filled with Affghans; who, in like manner, occupied the cantonments as our troops went out.

It was the General's original intention to halt at Begramee, close to the Loghur river, and about five miles from Cabul (reiterated was the advice of our Affghan friends--alas, how little heeded!--to push on at all risks through the Khoord Cabul the first day): but the whole country being a swamp encrusted with ice, we went on about a mile further, and halted at about 4 P.M. There were no tents, save two or three small palls that arrived. All scraped away the snow as best they might, to make a place to lie down on. The evening and night were intensely cold: no food for man or beast procurable, except a few handfuls of bhoosa, for which we paid from five to ten rupees. Captain Johnson, in our great distress, kindly pitched a small pall over us: but it was dark, and we had few pegs; the wind blew in under the sides, and I felt myself gradually stiffening. I left the bedding, which was occupied by Mrs. Sturt and her husband, and doubled up my legs in a straw chair of Johnson's, covering myself with my poshteen. Mr. Mein and the ayah fully occupied the remainder of the space. We only went in all six miles, and had to abandon two H. A. guns on the road: we were also much delayed by the bullocks that dragged the planks, in case the Loghur bridge should have been destroyed. We had, however, positive information that it was all right; and so it proved.

Previous to leaving cantonments, as we must abandon most of our property, Sturt was anxious to save a few of his most valuable books, and to try the experiment of sending them to a friend in the city. Whilst he selected these, I found, amongst the ones thrown aside, Campbell's Poems, which opened at Hohenlinden; and, strange to say, one verse actually haunted me day and night:--

"Few, few shall part where many meet, The snow shall be their winding sheet; And every turf beneath their feet Shall be a soldier's sepulchre."

I am far from being a believer in presentiments; but this verse is never absent from my thoughts. Heaven forbid that our fears should be realized! but we have commenced our retreat so badly, that we may reasonably have our doubts regarding the finale. Nearly all Hopkins's corps, the Shah's 6th, deserted from this place; as also the Shah's sappers and miners, 250 in number.

We afterwards heard that 400 of Hopkins's men went back to Cabul the next day.

_7th._--Yesterday's rear-guard did not get up to our bivouac till two this morning, as there was no attempt to form any lines. As stragglers came up we heard them shouting out, to know where their corps were; and the general reply,--that no one knew any thing about it.

During last night, or rather towards the morning, there was an alarm. Had it proved the enemy, we were perfectly defenceless; fortunately it was only camp followers, &c.

At daylight we found several men frozen to death, amongst whom was Mr. Conductor Macgregor.

The reason the rear-guard were so late was, that they did not leave cantonments till sunset. Previous to their quitting them the Affghans had entered; and set fire to all the public and private buildings, after plundering them of their contents. The whole of our valuable magazine was _looted_ by the mob; and they burned the gun-carriages to procure the iron. Some fighting took place between the Affghans and our Sipahees. About fifty of the 54th were killed and wounded; and Cornet Hardyman, of the 5th Cavalry, killed. A great deal of baggage and public property was abandoned in cantonments, or lost on the road; amongst which were two Horse Artillery six-pounders, as before mentioned.

The officers of the rear-guard report that the road is strewn with baggage; and that numbers of men, women, and children, are left on the road-side to perish. Captain Boyd's office accounts, to the amount of several lakhs of rupees, have been lost.

Two or three small tents came up to-day.

The men were half-frozen; having bivouacked all night in the snow, without a particle of food or bedding, or wood to light a fire.

At half-past seven the advance-guard moved off--no order was given--no bugle sounded. It had much difficulty in forcing its way ahead of the baggage and camp followers; all of whom had proceeded in advance as soon as it was light. Amongst them there were many Sipahees; and discipline was clearly at an end. If asked why they were not with their corps, one had a lame foot, another could not find his regiment, another had lost his musket: any excuse to run off.

The whole of what little baggage was left, was not off the ground ere the enemy appeared, and plundered all they could lay their hands on.

As the mountain train, consisting of three three-pounders dragged by yaboos and mules, was passing a small fort close to our back-ground, a party of Affghans sallied out, and captured the whole. Scarcely any resistance was offered on the part of our troops, and the saces immediately absconded. Brig. Anquetil and Lieut. Green rallied the men, and retook the guns; but were obliged to abandon them, as the 44th, whose duty it was to guard them, very precipitately _made themselves scarce_: but this was not done until Anquetil and Green had spiked them with their own hands, amid the gleaming sabres of the enemy.

As the troops advanced on their road, the enemy increased considerably on both flanks; and greatly annoyed the centre and rear.

It was the General's intention to proceed through the Khoord Cabul pass to Khoord Cabul; and as it was not above one P.M. when the advance arrived at Bhoodkhak, having only come five miles, it was with dismay we heard the order to halt.

We left Cabul with five and a half days' rations to take us to Jellalabad, and no forage for cattle, nor hope of procuring any on the road. By these unnecessary halts we diminished our provisions; and having no cover for officers or men, they are perfectly paralysed with the cold. The snow was more than a foot deep. Here, again, did evil counsel beset the General: his principal officers and staff objecting to a further advance; and Capt. Grant, in whom he had much confidence, assured him that if he proceeded he risked the safety of the army!

On our arrival at Bhoodkhak, the enemy had very greatly increased around our position; and we heard that Mahommed Akbar Khan was with them. Scarcely any baggage of either officers or men now remained. In a very small pall of Johnson's we slept nine, all touching each other.

We were also indebted to Johnson and Troup for food. They had a few Cabul cakes and some tea, which they kindly shared with us.

During this short march we were obliged to spike and abandon two other six-pounders, the horses not having strength sufficient to drag them on. We have only two horse artillery guns left, with scarcely any ammunition.

Again no ground was marked out for the troops. Three fourths of the Sipahees are mixed up with the camp followers, and know not where to find the headquarters of their corps.

Snow still lies a foot deep on the ground. No food for man or beast; and even water from the river close at hand difficult to obtain, as our people were fired on in fetching it.

Numbers of unfortunates have dropped, benumbed with cold, to be massacred by the enemy: yet, so bigoted are our rulers, that we are still told that the Sirdars are faithful, that Mahommed Akbar Khan is our friend!!! &c. &c. &c.; and the reason they wish us to delay is, that they may send their troops to clear the passes for us! That they will send them there can be no doubt; for every thing is occurring just as was foretold to us before we set out.

Between Begramee and Bhoodkhak, a body of the enemy's horse charged down into the column (immediately after the 5th and 37th had passed); and succeeded in carrying off an immense quantity of baggage and a number of camels, without experiencing the least resistance.

_8th._--At sunrise no order had been issued for the march, and the confusion was fearful. The force was perfectly disorganised, nearly every man paralysed with cold, so as to be scarcely able to hold his musket or move. Many frozen corpses lay on the ground. The Sipahees burnt their caps, accoutrements, and clothes to keep themselves warm. Some of the enemy appearing in rear of our position, the whole of the camp followers rushed to the front; every man, woman, and child, seizing all the cattle that fell in their way, whether public or private. The ground was strewn with boxes of ammunition, plate, and property of various kinds. A cask of spirits on the ground was broached by the artillerymen, and, no doubt, by other Europeans. Had the whole been distributed fairly to the men, it would have done them good: as it was, they became too much excited.

The enemy soon assembled in great numbers. Had they made a dash at us, we could have offered no resistance, and all would have been massacred.